H. Gravelot inv. Scul.

The PASSAGE of HANNIBAL over the ALPS.

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THE

ROMAN HISTORY

FROM THE

FOUNDATION of ROME

TO THE

BATTLE of ACTIUM:

THAT IS,

To the End of the COMMONWEALTH.

By Mr ROLLIN, *late Principal of the Univerſity of Paris, Profeſſor of Eloquence in the Royal College, and Fellow of the Royal Academy of Inſcriptions and Belles Lettres.*

Tranſlated from the FRENCH.

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TO THE

READER.

IN the part of hiſtory at the end of the preceding volume and the beginning of this I had not Livy for my guide: this, I have reaſon to fear, is but too evident. We have loſt the ſecond decade of that hiſtorian, which contained the war with the Tarentines and Pyrrhus, the end of that with the Samnites, the firſt Punic war, and the events which happened in the interval between That and the ſecond. We have indeed the Supplement of Freinſhemius, who has collected, with infinite pains and wonderful diſcernment, a vaſt variety of paſſages diſperſed here and there in authors, to fill up the chaſms of Livy, and make his remains a continued hiſtory. So uſeful, or rather neceſſary a work, compoſed with ſo much accuracy, and even elegance, cannot be too much eſteemed: but it is not Livy. Nothing is above that illuſtrious hiſtorian's merit. The beauty and elevation of his ſtile is equal to the greatneſs and glory of the People whoſe hiſtory he writes. He is every where luminous, intelligible, agreeable: but, when he enters into important things, he riſes in ſome meaſure above himſelf, to treat them with peculiar attention and a kind of ſelf-delight and complacency. He renders the action he deſcribes preſent; he ſets it before

the eyes; he does not relate it, he ſhews it. He paints the genius and character of the perſonages he brings upon the ſtage after nature, and puts words in their mouths that are always conformable to their ſentiments and different ſituations. In a word, he has the wonderful art of keeping his readers in ſo pleaſing a ſuſpence by the variety of events, and to engage their curioſity ſo ſtrongly, that they cannot quit his relation of a fact, till it is entirely at an end.

It was a misfortune that we had not a good tranſlation of ſo excellent an hiſtorian in the French language; and it has long been wiſhed that ſome able hand would apply himſelf to it. Mr. Guerin, ſometimes profeſſor of rhetoric in the college of Beauvais, has complied with the deſires of the public, by undertaking to give us, not only all that remains of Livy, but alſo all the ſupplements of Freinſhemius: and ſeveral volumes of it have already been publiſhed. It is a great work, and forms a compleat body of the Roman Hiſtory: I mean that of the Commonwealth. It were improper for me to ſay much in its praiſe here, which might be ſuſpected, becauſe it comes from the hand of one of my pupils. I ſhall content myſelf with ſaying, what in my opinion conſtitutes the higheſt applauſe that can be given a tranſlation; that This has not the air of one. Some negligences may perhaps be found in it, which a ſecond edition will eaſily amend: and it is no wonder that ſome ſhould creep into a work of ſo great length:

—*Opere in longo fas eſt obrepere ſomnum.*

I have

I have great reaſon to wiſh the ſame indulgence in my own reſpect:

—*Hanc veniam petimuſque damuſque viciſſim.*

And I own, with ſincere gratitude, that the public treat me with more favour, than I think I deſerve. For the reſt, I ought to congratulate myſelf on having formed diſciples, who are become my maſters; or at leaſt, not to offend their modeſty, who are great helps to me in compoſing my work; the one by his new edition of Livy with notes, that inſtruct and guide me; and the other, by the tranſlation of the ſame author, on which he is ſtill actually at work. This enables me not to make the public wait long for my volumes of the Roman Hiſtory. I hope the fifth will appear before the end of the current year.

Mr. *Crevier.*

SECOND

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER.

WHEN this fourth volume of the Roman Hiſtory was printed off, and in the hands of the binders, I was informed that there was a book printed in Holland with this title, *Critical Eſſays: I. Upon the writings of Mr. Rollin: II. Upon the tranſlations of Herodotus: III. Upon the geographical and critical dictionary of Mr. Bruzen la Martiniere.* The author is anonymous: but not unknown. This book was left in my hands but twenty-four hours. I read only the preface and the three firſt letters concerning me, intituled, *Letter upon a paſſage in Livy, wherein the interpretation of two modern writers is refuted.*

Thoſe two modern writers are Mr. Crevier, profeſſor of rhetoric in the college of Beauvais, and I. The paſſage in queſtion relates to the puniſhment of the ſons of Brutus; a fact known to every body. *Conſules in ſedem proceſſere ſuam, miſſique lictores ad ſumendum ſupplicium, nudatos virgis cædunt, ſecurique feriunt: cum inter omnes tempus pater, vultuſque & os ejus ſpectaculo eſſet;* EMINENTE ANIMO PATRIO *inter publicæ pœnæ miniſterium.*

Liv. ii. 5.

The

The difficulty conſiſts in the ſecond part. I have related this fact in the firſt volume of the Roman Hiſtory as follows. *The Conſuls repaired then to their tribunal; and whilſt the two criminals were executing, the eyes of the whole multitude were fixed upon the father, examining his every motion, his carriage and countenance; whilſt he, notwithſtanding his conſtancy, could not help letting the ſentiments of nature eſcape him, which, though he ſacrificed to the neceſſity of his office, he could not totally ſuppreſs.*

In my treatiſe upon ſtudying the Belles-Let- Vol. I.
tres, I have obſerved, " that two quite con-
" trary ſenſes are given to the words *animo pa-*
" *trio*, upon which the whole difficulty turns.
" Some ſay they ſignify, that on this occaſion
" the quality of Conſul prevailed over that of
" father, and that the love of his country ſtifled
" in Brutus all ſenſe of tenderneſs for his ſons.
" Others, on the contrary, maintain, theſe
" words intend, that in the midſt of this func-
" tion, which the quality of Conſul impoſed
" upon Brutus, whatever efforts he made to
" ſuppreſs his grief, the tenderneſs of the fa-
" ther diſcovered itſelf in his countenance."
And in the ſame place I add, " that the latter
" ſenſe ſeems to me the moſt rational, and beſt
" founded in nature." And I ſtill think in the ſame manner, without condemning thoſe who think otherwiſe. In matters of this kind eſpecially, every one is allowed *to abound in his own ſenſe.* But the author of the Critic ought not, in order to inforce his own, and throw a kind of ridicule upon ours, to ſuppoſe, as he does in more than one place, *that we pretend, Mr. Crevier and I, that Livy ſays Brutus ſhed*

tears; and, as he explains himſelf in another place, that we make him *weep like a ſoft weak man*. Neither Mr. Crevier, nor I, have mentioned *tears*, nor ſuppoſe that Livy *made Brutus weep*.

The next letter has for its title, which is all that I know of it, *Second letter upon ſome miſtakes of Mr. Rollin in his Antient Hiſtory*. Theſe miſtakes turn upon ſeveral paſſages in Greek authors, the ſenſe of which I am charged with rendering wrong; and the author hints clearly enough in his preface that he ſuſpects me of being groſsly ignorant in the Greek tongue. I freely confeſs, that after a continual ſtudy of that language from my earlieſt youth till now, of which I could name abundance of witneſſes, I did not expect ſuch a reproach. And I add, not ſo much for my own, as the reputation of the Academies, of which I have the honour to be a member, that ſuch a ſuſpicion will ſcarce find credit with thoſe who are particularly acquainted with me; and that my Critic himſelf might have known how ill-founded that ſuſpicion is, from a great number of faults in the tranſlations of Greek authors, both Latin and French, which I have corrected, without taking notice of them, in many parts of my work.

I do not deny, however, but that a great many miſtakes of the ſenſe of the Greek authors I have uſed, may have eſcaped me. I have neither had time to examine, nor even to read, the obſervations of my Cenſurer, and find it not difficult to perſuade myſelf that they may be ſolid. I could only deſire that they were not attended with ſo much warmth and ill-temper; which ſeem to argue a formed deſign to diſcredit

credit the writer criticized. Amongſt authors, who together form a kind of common ſociety and republic, it ſhould be conſiſtent mutually to aid and ſupport each other; and eſpecially that thoſe, who believe themſelves more knowing and able than the reſt, ſhould have more indulgence for them. In this manner of acting, there would be a moderation and generoſity, that would argue ſuperior merit, and certainly acquire men of letters, and Letters themſelves, a general eſteem.

Though I have not been treated with this tenderneſs and reſerve, I do not think I have a right to complain, as I may have fallen into the faults of inattention and negligence, that have drawn ſuch cenſure upon me. I do not bluſh to own it, and pretend to no other revenge, but that of correcting myſelf.

I have not diſſembled my making great uſe of the works of others, and conceive it for my honour. I never believed myſelf learned, and do not deſire to ſeem ſo. I have ſometimes even declared, that I am not ambitious of the title of an author. My ambition is to make myſelf uſeful to the public, if I can. For this purpoſe I call in aids from all ſides, and borrow elſewhere whatſoever may contribute to the perfection of my work. This liberty which I have taken, and at which, generally ſpeaking, few ſeem to take offence, enables me to make a much greater progreſs in my work than I could without it. What ſignifies it to the reader whether what I preſent him be my own, or another's, provided he likes, and is ſatisfied with it? But I owe him this reſpect and gratitude; not to impoſe facts upon him, through want of attention, as true, that are not ſo.

For

For the reſt, I do not believe, that amongſt the faults mentioned in the ſecond letter, there are many of the laſt kind; and conceive there are ſtill leſs in the third, of which the ſubject is, *Some new expreſſions in Mr. Rollin's Antient Hiſtory.* When the book is publiſhed I ſhall examine them carefully, and make the uſe I ought of it, by correcting in the new editions the places, which ſhall appear to want alteration: And this is all the author has a right to require of me. But on my ſide, I ought to thank him for the pains he has taken to point out my faults, by which he has enabled me to make my work leſs defective. I am ſtill more obliged to him for the conſiderable ſervice he does me by a criticiſm, ſo capable of mortifying ſelf-love, and of ſerving at the ſame time as a balance to praiſes and commendations, much more to be apprehended by me, and much more dangerous, than the ſevereſt criticiſms could be.

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ROMAN HISTORY Continued.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS introductory diſcourſe will conſiſt of two ſections. In the firſt, I ſhall endeavour to give an idea of the government, character, and manners of the Carthaginians, who, in the part of the Roman hiſtory I am going to begin, will long occupy the ſcene, and have a moſt important ſhare. In the ſecond, I ſhall relate the different treaties, concluded between the Carthaginians and Romans before the Punic wars.

SECT. I.

Origin, increaſe, power, character, manners, and defects of the Carthaginians.

BEFORE I enter into the wars of the Romans againſt Carthage, I think it neceſſary to give a brief account of the origin of that city, the extent of its power, with the character and manners of the Carthaginians. I have given a ſufficient circumſtantial plan of them in the firſt volume of the Antient Hiſto-

ſtory, in ſpeaking of the Carthaginians, which I ſhall only abridge in this place.

Origin and foundation of Carthage by Dido.

Carthage in Africa was a colony of Tyre, the moſt famous city in the world for commerce (*a*). Tyre, long before its foundation, had ſent another colony into the ſame country, which built the city of Utica, famous for the death of the ſecond Cato, commonly called Cato of Utica.

Authors differ very much concerning the time when Carthage was founded. It may be called the year of the world 3121, when Athaliah was King of Judah, 13 years before Rome was built, and 883 before the birth of JESUS CHRIST. The epochas I have ſet down in the Antient Hiſtory, are different from this, which I ſhall now follow.

Juſtin. xviii. 4—6. Appian. de Bell. Pun. p. 1.

The foundation of Carthage is aſcribed to Eliſa, a Tyrian Princeſs, more known under the name of Dido. Her brother Pigmalion reigned at Tyre, who having put Sicharbas, otherwiſe called Sichæus, Dido's huſband to death, with deſign to ſeize his great riches, ſhe illuded her brother's cruel avarice by retiring ſecretly with all the treaſures of Sichæus. After changing her courſe ſeveral times, ſhe landed at length on the coaſts of the gulf, where Utica was built, in the country called Africa Propria, ſix leagues from Tunis, a city well known at preſent from its corſairs, and ſettled there with her few followers, having purchaſed a piece of land of the inhabitants of the country.

(*a*) Utica & Carthago ambæ inclytæ, ambæ à Phœnicibus conditæ: illa fato Catonis inſignis, hæc ſuo. *Pompon. Mel.* c. 67.

Many

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Many that inhabited in the parts adjacent, invited by the hopes of gain, repaired thither in crowds to ſell the new-comers the neceſſaries of life, and ſoon after ſettled there themſelves. The multitude of theſe inhabitants, drawn together from different parts, became very great. The people of Utica, who conſidered them as their countrymen, ſent deputies to them with great preſents, and deſired them to build a city in the place where they had firſt ſettled. The natives of the country, through an eſteem and conſideration common enough for ſtrangers, did the ſame on their ſide. Thus every thing concurring with the views of Dido, ſhe built her city, which was to pay an annual tribute to the Africans for the land bought of them. It was called *Carthada* * Carthage, which in the Phœnician and Hebrew languages, that are very like each other, ſignifies *the new city.*

Extent of the dominions of Carthage.

Carthage at firſt augmented its territories in the country about it: but its ſway did not continue long confined to Africa. That ambitious city carried her arms abroad, conquered Sardinia, ſeized a great part of Sicily, and ſubjected almoſt all Spain; and having ſent out powerful colonies on all ſides, ſhe remained miſtreſs of the ſea during upwards of ſix hundred years, and made herſelf a ſtate, that for opulence, commerce, great armies, formidable fleets, but eſpecially the valour and merit of her Captains, might diſpute with the greateſt Empires of the world. She was at the higheſt point of her greatneſs, when the Romans declared war againſt her.

* *Karthahadath*, or *hadtha.*

Government of Carthage. Arist. de Rep. ii. 11.

The government of Carthage was eſtabliſhed upon principles of profound wiſdom; and it is not without reaſon, that Ariſtotle places this Republic in the number of thoſe, which were the moſt eſteemed by the antients, and which might ſerve as a model for others. He ſupports his opinion in the beginning with a reflection much for the honour of Carthage, by obſerving, that down to his time, that is to ſay, for more than five hundred years, no conſiderable ſedition had diſturbed her tranquillity, nor any tyrant ſubverted her liberty. And indeed, mixed governments, like that of Carthage, where power is divided between the Nobility and the People, have the double inconvenience, either of degenerating into popular licenſe, through ſeditions on the ſide of the People, as was uſual in Athens and all the Greek Republics; or into tyranny, on the ſide of the Great, by violating the public liberty, as happened at Athens, Syracuſe, Corinth, Thebes, and Rome itſelf in the time of Sylla and Cæſar.

The government of Carthage, like thoſe of Sparta and Rome, conſiſted of three different authorities, which balanced, and mutually ſupported, each others: that of the two ſupreme magiſtrates called * *Suffetes*; that of the Senate, and that of the People. The Tribunal of the Hundred was afterwards added, which had great weight in the Commonwealth.

The Suffetes. Liv. xxxiii. 46, 47.

The Suffetes continued but one year in power. The were almoſt the ſame at Carthage as the Conſuls were at Rome. It

* *This name is derived from a word, which in the Hebrew and Phœnician ſignifies* Judges.

was

was a moſt conſiderable office, as, beſides the right of preſiding in the adminiſtration of juſtice, it gave them that of propoſing and paſſing new laws, and of making thoſe who received the public money bring in their accounts.

The Senate. The ſenate formed the council of ſtate, and, like that of Rome, was in a manner the ſoul of all public deliberation. When opinions were uniform, and all the ſuffrages united, the Senate decided ſovereignly and finally. When it was divided, and did not agree, affairs were referred to the people, in which caſe the power of deciding devolved to them. It is eaſy to comprehend the wiſdom of this regulation, and how proper it was for putting a ſtop to cabals, for conciliating opinions, for ſupporting good counſels, and for making them take place; a body, like this, being extremely jealous of its authority, and not eaſily conſenting, that affairs within its juriſdiction ſhould be ttanſferred to another authority. Polybius obſerves, that as long as the Senate had the direction of affairs, the ſtate was governed with abundance of wiſdom, and all its undertakings very ſucceſsful.

Ariſtot. loco citat. Polyb. xv. 706.

The People. It appears, from Ariſtotle, that the people voluntarily left the care of the public affairs, and the principal adminiſtration of them, to the Senate: and it was thereby that the Republic became ſo powerful. This was not the ſame in the ſequel. The People, become inſolent through their riches and conqueſts, and not reflecting, that they were indebted for them to the prudent conduct of the Senate, reſolved to ſhare alſo in the government, and aſſumed almoſt all power to themſelves. Every thing

then was carried by faction and cabal; which was one of the principal cauſes of the ruin of the State.

The Tribunal of the Hundred. Ariſtot.

The Tribunal of the Hundred conſiſted of an hundred and four perſons. They were at Carthage what the Ephori were at Sparta; from whence it appears, that it was inſtituted to balance the power of the Great; but with this difference, that the Ephori were only five in number, and continued but a year in office, whereas the others were perpetual, and exceeded the number of an hundred. (*a*) They were intended to check the authority of the Generals, which, whilſt they commanded the troops, was almoſt unlimited and ſovereign; and this was conceived a means to ſubject it to the laws, in laying them under the neceſſity of giving an account of their adminiſtration to theſe judges on their return from the field. The wiſeſt and beſt concerted inſtitutions degenerate by degrees, and give place at length to diſorder and licence, which break through all barriers. Theſe judges, who ought to have been the terror of guilt and the ſupport of juſtice, abuſing their power, which was almoſt unlimited, became ſo many petty tyrants. * Hannibal being in office, after his return into Africa, from perpetual, as the authority of theſe judges was, made it annual, about two hundred years after the inſtitution of the tribunal of the Hundred.

Liv. xxiii.

(*a*) Ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent; ut domi judicia legeſque reſpicerent. *Juſtin.* xix. 2.

* *It appears that the name of Prætor, which Livy gives Hannibal, is uſed inſtead of* Suffetes.

Ariſtotle,

Ariſtotle, amongſt ſome other obſervations which he makes upon the government of Carthage, remarks two great defects in it, very repugnant, in his opinion, to the views of a wiſe legiſlator, and the rules of good policy.

Two defects in the government of Carthage. Ariſt. loco citato.

The firſt of theſe defects conſiſts, in conferring ſeveral offices at the ſame time on the ſame perſon, which in Carthage was conſidered as the proof of extraordinary merit. Ariſtotle conſiders this cuſtom as highly prejudicial to the good of the public. And indeed, ſays he, when a man has only one employment, he is much more capable of acquitting himſelf well in it; affairs being then more carefully examined, and diſpatched with greater expedition. We do not find, adds he, that this is practiſed either in armies or fleets. The ſame officer does not command two different bodies; nor does the ſame pilot ſteer two veſſels. Beſides which, the good of the ſtate requires, that offices and favours ſhould be divided, in order to excite emulation between perſons of merit: whereas, when they are accumulated upon the ſame man, they often make him giddy in effect of ſo peculiar a diſtinction, and excite envy, diſcontent, and murmurs in others.

1. *Conferring ſeveral offices upon the ſame perſon.*

The ſecond defect, which Ariſtotle finds in the government of Carthage, is, that in order to attain to the great offices, beſides merit and birth, it was neceſſary to have a certain eſtate; and that in conſequence poverty could exclude the moſt deſerving perſons; which he conſiders as a great evil in a ſtate. For in that caſe, ſays he, virtue and merit being reckoned as nothing, and money as every thing, the ad-

2. *Giving offices only to the rich.*

miration and avidity of riches ſeize and corrupt a whole city: beſides that the magiſtrates and judges, who do not become ſo but at great expences, ſeem to have a right to indemnify themſelves afterwards with their own hands.

Selling of offices unknown to the antients.

We do not find, I think, any trace in antiquity, which argues, that the dignities, either of the State, or Judicature, were ſold; and what Ariſtotle ſays here of the expences for attaining them at Carthage, falls no doubt on the preſents, by which the ſuffrages of thoſe, who conferred offices, were bought; which, as Polybius alſo obſerves, was very common amongſt the Carthaginians, with whom no kind of gain was infamous. It is therefore no wonder, that Ariſtotle condemns a practice, of which it is eaſy to perceive the pernicious, the fatal, conſequences.

Polyb. vi. 497.

But, if he means that the rich and poor were equally to have the firſt dignities, as he ſeems to inſinuate, his opinion might be anſwered by the general practice of the wiſeſt Republics; which without depreſſing or degrading poverty, have thought it neceſſary to give riches the preference; becauſe there is reaſon to preſume, that thoſe who have fortunes, have had a better education, think more nobly, are leſs liable to ſuffer themſelves to be corrupted, and to do mean things, and that the very ſituation of their affairs renders them better affected to the State, more diſpoſed to preſerve peace and good order in it, and more intereſted to obviate all ſedition and revolt.

Trade, one of the ſources of the riches and power of Carthage.

Trade was, properly ſpeaking, the occupation of Carthage, the peculiar object of its induſtry, and its determinate and prevailing taſte,

taſte. It was its great force, and principal ſupport. Situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, and ſtretching out one hand to the eaſt and the other to the weſt, by the extent of her commerce, ſhe took in all the known regions of the earth. The Carthaginians, in making themſelves the factors and dealers of all nations, were become the ſovereigns of the ſea, the tie that united the eaſt, weſt and ſouth, and the neceſſary channel by which they communicated.

The moſt conſiderable perſons of the city did not diſdain to trade. They applied themſelves to it with the ſame induſtry as the meaneſt citizens: and their great riches never gave them a diſguſt for aſſiduity, patience, and the labour neceſſary for augmenting them. This acquired them the empire of the ſea, made their Commonwealth flouriſh, enabled them to diſpute preheminence with Rome herſelf, and raiſed them to ſo high a degree of power, that it coſt the Romans, at two ſeveral times, a cruel and doubtful war of more than forty years, to ſubdue this haughty rival. For Carthage may be conſidered as conquered after the ſecond war. In the third ſhe only expired nobly. For the reſt, it is no wonder, that Carthage, which had her origin in the principal ſchool of the world for commerce, I mean Tyre, had ſo ſudden and ſo continual ſucceſs in it.

Mines of Spain, another ſource of the riches and power of Carthage.

Diodôrus obſerves with reaſon, that the ſilver and gold mines, which the Carthaginians found in Spain, were an inexhauſtible ſource of riches, that enabled them to ſupport ſuch long wars with the Romans. The natives of the country had long been ignorant of the treaſures Diod. iv. 312.

treaſures contained in the bowels of the earth, or at leaſt knew little of their uſe and value. The Phœnicians were the firſt that diſcovered them, and in exchange of merchandize of ſmall value for thoſe precious metals, amaſſed immenſe riches. The Carthaginians knew well how to improve from their example, when they had made themſelves maſters of the country; as the Romans did afterwards, when they had taken it from them. Polybius, cited by Strabo, ſays, that in his time forty thouſand men were employed in the mines near Carthagena, and that they ſupplied the Roman people every day with twenty-five thouſand drachmas, that is, about ſix hundred and fifty pounds ſterling.

Strab. iii. 147.

Advantages and inconveniences of the government of Carthage in reſpect to war.

Carthage muſt be conſidered at the ſame time as a trading and as a warlike Commonwealth. It was a trading ſtate by inclination and condition; and became warlike, firſt thro' the neceſſity of defending itſelf againſt the neighbouring people, and afterwards through the deſire of extending its commerce, and aggrandizing its empire. This double idea is the true plan and character of the Carthaginian State.

The military power of Carthage conſiſted in alliances with Kings; tributary countries, from which ſhe had ſoldiers and money; ſome troops compoſed of her own citizens; and mercenary ſoldiers, which ſhe hired in the neighbouring ſtates, without being obliged either to raiſe or diſcipline them; becauſe they were entirely formed and diſciplined before: chuſing in each country the troops, which had moſt merit and reputation. From Numidia, ſhe had a light, bold, impetuous, indefatigable

ble cavalry, in which the principal ſtrength of her armies conſiſted; from the iſlands Baleares, ſhe had the moſt excellent ſlingers in the univerſe; from Spain and Africa a firm and invincible infantry; from the coaſts of the Gauls, troops of experienced valour; and even from Greece itſelf, ſoldiers equally good for all the operations of war, whether in the fields or towns, in beſieging or defending places.

Thus ſhe could immediately ſet a powerful army on foot, compoſed of all the choſen troops of different ſtates, without depopulating her countries or cities by new levies; without ſuſpending her manufactures, or diſturbing the works of artiſans; without interrupting her commerce, or weakening her navigation. She acquired by the blood ſhe bought, the poſſeſſion of provinces and kingdoms, and made other nations the inſtruments of her greatneſs and glory, without contributing any thing to it of her own, except money, which foreign ſtates ſupplied her by her trade.

If ſhe received any blows in the courſe of a war, thoſe loſſes were like accidents foreign to herſelf, which only grazed upon the outſide of the State, without making any deep wounds either in the bowels or heart of the Republic. Theſe loſſes were ſoon repaired by the ſums, which a flouriſhing commerce, like a perpetual fund of war, and an ever-new reſtorative of the State, ſupplied to purchaſe troops, that were always ready to ſell themſelves; and by the vaſt extent of the coaſts in their poſſeſſion, it was eaſy for them to raiſe in a little time as many ſeamen and rowers, as were neceſſary to work and man their fleets, and to find ſkilful

pilots

pilots and experienced captains to command them.

But all these parts fortuitously combined, had no natural, cordial, necessary tie. As they were united by no common interest, to form them into a solid and unalterable body, none of them were sincerely affected for the success of affairs, and the prosperity of the State. They were not actuated by the same zeal, and did not expose themselves to dangers with the same courage, for a Republic, (which they considered as foreign, and therefore as indifferent;) as people would have done for their own country; the happiness of which constitutes that of all the citizens, who compose it.

On considerable losses, the allied * Kings were easily disunited from Carthage, either through the jealousy, which the greatness of a more powerful neighbour naturally causes; the hope of more advantages from a new ally; or the fear of being involved in the misfortunes of an old one.

The tributary provinces disgusted by the weight and infamy of the yoke, which they bore with impatience, generally flattered themselves with the hopes of one more gentle, in changing their master: or, if servitude were inevitable, they were very indifferent as to their choice, as we shall see from many examples, which the sequel of this history will supply.

The mercenary troops, accustomed to measure their fidelity by the greatness and duration of their pay, were always ready, on the least discontent, or the slightest promise of

* *As Sipbax and Masiniſſa.*

greater

greater hire, to go over to the enemy, againſt whom they came to fight, and to turn their arms againſt thoſe, who had called them in to their aid.

Thus the greatneſs of Carthage, which ſuſtained itſelf only by external aids, was ſhaken to its foundation, aſſoon as they were removed. And if, beſides this, her commerce, which was her only reſource, happened to be interrupted by the loſs of a battle at ſea, ſhe believed herſelf upon the brink of ruin, and abandoned herſelf to diſcouragement and deſpair, as appears clearly at the end of the firſt Punic war.

Ariſtotle, in the book wherein he treats of the advantages and inconveniences of the government of Carthage, does not condemn it for employing none but foreign troops; and one may infer from his ſilence on that head, that it did not fall into that error, till ſome time after. The revolts of the mercenaries, which immediately followed the peace of the iſlands Ægates, and of which the effects were ſo terrible, that Carthage, before her final ruin, never ſaw herſelf ſo near deſtruction, ought to have taught her, that there is nothing more unfortunate than a State ſupported only by foreign troops, in whom there is neither zeal, ſafety, nor obedience.

This was not the caſe in the Roman Commonwealth. As ſhe had neither trade nor money, ſhe could not pay for aids capable of enabling her to puſh her conqueſts with ſo much rapidity as Carthage. But at the ſame time, as ſhe derived every thing from herſelf, and all the parts of the State within itſelf were united with each other, ſhe had more aſſured reſources

resources in her great misfortunes, than Carthage had in hers. And hence it was, that she had no thoughts of asking peace after the battle of Cannæ, as the latter had asked it after the naval battle gained by Lutatius, at a time when the danger was much less urgent.

Besides the forces of which we have spoken, Carthage had a body of troops composed only of her own citizens; but it was not numerous.

This was the school, wherein the principal Nobility, and such as had elevation, talents, and ambition, for aspiring at the great offices, made their first appearance in the profession of arms. It was out of these, that all the general officers, who commanded the different bodies of troops, and had the principal authority in the armies, were chosen. This State was too suspicious to confide the command of them to foreign Captains. But she did not carry her diffidence for her own citizens, to whom she gave great power, nor her precautions against the abuse they might make of it to oppress their country, so far as Rome and Athens. The command of her armies was neither annual, nor fixed to a limited time, as in the two other Republics. Many of her Generals retained it during a long course of years, and to the end of the wars, or of their lives; though they were always accountable for their actions to the Commonwealth, and liable to be recalled, when either a real fault, a misfortune, or the credit of an opposite faction, gave occasion for it.

Character and manners of the Carthaginians. Cic. de Arusp. n. 19.

It remains for us to speak of the character and manners of the Carthaginians. In the enumeration of the different qualities, which Cicero

Cicero aſcribes to different nations, and by which he defines them, he gives the Carthaginians art, ability, addreſs, induſtry and cunning, *calliditas*; which no doubt were uſed in war, but appeared ſtill more in all the reſt of their conduct, and were attended with another quality that borders cloſe upon them, and was ſtill leſs for their honour. Art and cunning naturally lead on to lying, double dealing, and breach of faith; and by inſenſibly accuſtoming the mind to become leſs delicate in the choice of the means for attaining its ends, they prepare it for knavery and perfidy. (*a*) Theſe were alſo in the number of the characteriſtics of the Carthaginians; and were ſo evident and ſo well known, that they became proverbial. To expreſs a treacherous diſpoſition, it was uſual to ſay, *Carthaginian faith*, *fides Punica*; and to deſcribe a knaviſh turn of mind, no expreſſion was either more proper, or had more energy, than *Punicum ingenium*, *a Carthaginian genius*.

The extreme deſire of amaſſing riches, and the inordinate paſſion for gain, (a failing wherein the great danger of commerce conſiſts) was amongſt them the uſual ſource of injuſtice and vile practices. A ſingle inſtance will prove this. (*b*) During a truce, which Scipio had granted them at their earneſt requeſt, ſome Roman ſhips driven by a ſtorm,

(*a*) Carthaginenſes fraudulenti & mendaces—multis & variis mercatorum advenarumque ſermonibus ad ſtudium fallendi quæſtus cupiditate vocabantur. *Cic. Orat.* 2. *in Rull.* n. 94.

(*b*) Magiſtratus Senatum vocare, populus in Curiæ veſtibulo fremere, ne tanta ex oculis manibuſque amitteretur præda. Conſenſum eſt, &c. *Liv.* xxx. 24.

arriving

arriving in ſight of Carthage, were ſtopt, and ſeized by order of the Senate and People, who could not ſuffer ſo fine a prey to eſcape them. They were always for gaining in any manner, and whatſoever it coſt them. The * inhabitants of Carthage, many ages after, owned, as St. Auguſtin tells us, on an occaſion particular enough, that they had not degenerated from their forefathers in this point.

Theſe were not the only vices of the Carthaginians. They had always ſomething cruel and ſavage in their humour and genius, an haughty and imperious air, a kind of ferocity, which in the firſt emotions of anger hearkening to neither reaſon nor remonſtrance, brutally hurried them on to the laſt exceſſes and violences. The People, timorous and crouching in their fears, were fierce and cruel in their rage, and at the ſame time that they abjectly trembled in the ſight of their magiſtrates, in their turn made all in ſubjection to themſelves tremble.

We here ſee the difference education makes between nation and nation. The people of Athens, a city always conſidered as the centre of politeneſs and erudition, were naturally very jealous of their authority, and difficult

* *A mountebank promiſed the inhabitants of Carthage to tell them their moſt ſecret thoughts, if they would come to him on a certain day. When they were all aſſembled, he told them,* That they all thought to buy as cheap, and ſell as dear, as they could. *They unanimouſly agreed laughing, that it was true; and conſequently owned, ſays St. Auguſtin, that they were all unjuſt.* Vili vultis emere, & carè vendere. In quo dicto leviſſimi Scenici omnes tamen conſcientias invenerunt ſuas, eique vera & tamen improviſa dicenti admirabili favore plauſerunt. *S. Auguſtin. De Trinit.* xiii. 3.

to

to manage: but they had however a fund of goodneſs and humanity, which made them compaſſionate to the misfortunes of others, and ſuffer the faults of their leaders with patience and lenity. Cleon one day demanded, that the aſſembly ſhould be diſmiſſed, becauſe he had a ſacrifice to offer, and ſome friends to entertain. The people only laughed, and withdrew. At Carthage, ſays Plutarch, ſuch a liberty had coſt him his life.

Livy makes a like reflection on the occaſion of Terentius Varro's return to Rome after the battle of Cannæ, which had been loſt by his ill conduct; he was received by all the orders of the ſtate, who went out to meet him, and thanked him for not deſpairing of the Commonwealth; him, ſays the hiſtorian, who would have had nothing to expect but immediate execution, had he been General at Carthage. Liv. xxii. 61.

And indeed, at Carthage there was a tribunal expreſsly eſtabliſhed for calling the Generals to an account for their conduct, and they were made to anſwer for the events of war. Bad ſucceſs was puniſhed there as a crime againſt the ſtate; and a commander who had loſt a battle, was almoſt ſure to loſe his life at a gibbet on his return; ſo hard-hearted was the diſpoſition of that People, ſo violent, cruel, barbarous, and always ready to ſhed the blood of citizens, as well as that of ſtrangers. The unheard-of torments which they made Regulus ſuffer are a proof of this; and their hiſtory abounds with examples of the ſame kind, that give horror.

They carried this ferocity of character into the worſhip of the Gods, which, one would think, ſhould ſoften the manners of the moſt ſavage, and inſpire ſentiments of humanity

Q. Curt. iv. 3. and mercy. In great calamities, as in the time of the plague, they ſacrificed human victims to appeaſe the anger of their gods; an action, which deſerved the name of ſacrilege, much more than that of ſacrifice: *Sacrilegium verius, quam Sacrum.* (*a*) They ſacrificed a great number of children to them, without pity for an age which excites compaſſion in the moſt cruel enemies; ſeeking a remedy for their misfortunes in the greateſt iniquity, and uſing barbarity to appeaſe their gods.

Juſtin. xviii. 6.

Diodorus relates an example of this cruelty, which cannot be read without horror. When Agathocles was upon the point of beſieging Carthage, the inhabitants of that city, ſeeing themſelves reduced to the laſt extremity, imputed their misfortune to the juſt wrath of Saturn againſt them; becauſe inſtead of children of the firſt quality, which they uſed to ſacrifice to him, they had fraudulently ſubſtituted the children of ſlaves and ſtrangers in their ſtead. To make amends for this pretended crime, they ſacrificed two hundred children of the beſt families of Carthage to that god; beſides which, more than three hundred citizens offered themſelves voluntarily as victims.

Plut. de ger. Reip. p. 169—171.

Is this, ſays Plutarch, adoring the gods? Is it having an idea of them, that does them much honour, to ſuppoſe them deſirous of ſlaughter, appeaſed with human blood, and capable of exacting and approving ſuch ſacrifices?

(*a*) Cum peſte laborarent, cruenta ſacrorum religione & ſcelere pro remedia uſi ſunt. Quippe homines ut victimas immolabant, & impuberes (quæ ætas etiam hoſtium miſericordiam provocat) aris admovebant, pacem deorum ſanguine eorum expoſcentes, pro quorum vita Dii maximè rogari ſolent. *Juſtin.* 16.

Could

Could one believe mankind ſuſceptible of ſuch an exceſs of madneſs and phrenzy? Men have not commonly ſo total a contradiction to all that is moſt ſacred in nature in their compoſition. To ſacrifice, to ſlaughter their children with their own hands; to throw them into flaming furnaces in cool blood; (*a*) to ſtifle their cries and ſhrieks, leſt a victim offered with a bad grace ſhould offend Saturn; what horrors are theſe! Sentiments ſo unnatural, ſo barbarous, and however adopted by whole nations, and by nations remarkable for the wiſdom of their conſtitutions of government; the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Gauls, Scythians, and even the Greeks and Romans, and ſanctified by the conſtant practice of many ages, could only be inſpired by him, who was *a murtherer from the beginning*, and who delights only in the degradation, miſery, and deſtruction of mankind.

SECT. II.

Treaties concluded between the Romans and Carthaginians before the firſt Punic war.

THE treaties which I repeat in this place will be of ſome uſe for ſhewing the condition of the two States, eſpecially in reſpect to commerce, at the time they were made. We are principally indebted to Polybius for preſerving them.

Firſt Treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians.

This firſt treaty was made in the time of the firſt Conſuls that were created after the ex- A. R. 244. Ant. C. 508.

(*a*) Blanditiis & oſculis [matres] comprimebant vagitum, ne flebilis hoſtia immolaretur. *Minuc. Fel.*

Polyb. iii. 176—178

pulſion of the Kings. It is as follows, ſays Polybius, as near as it was poſſible for me to interpret it: for the Latin of thoſe times was ſo different from that now ſpoke, that the moſt expert find it difficult to underſtand certain things.

" Between the Romans and their allies on one
" ſide, and the Carthaginians and their allies
" on the other, there ſhall be an alliance upon
" theſe conditions. Neither the Romans nor
" their allies ſhall navigate beyond the * *Fine*
" *Promontory*, except driven by ſtorms, or
" conſtrained by enemies. That in caſe they
" are forcibly driven thither, they ſhall not be
" allowed either to buy or take any thing ex-
" cept what is ſtrictly neceſſary for refitting
" their ſhips, or the worſhip of the gods, that
" is to ſay, for ſacrifices; and that they ſhall
" depart in five days. That the merchants
" ſhall pay no duty, except thoſe to the crier
" and the regiſter: that whatever is ſold in the
" preſence of thoſe two witneſſes, the public
" ſhall be obliged to make good to the ſeller.
" That if any Roman ſhall land in the part of
" Sicily, ſubject to the Carthaginians, ſtrict
" juſtice ſhall be done him in all things. That
" the Carthaginians ſhall ceaſe to commit any
" ravages in the countries of the Antiates, Ar-
" deates, Laurentini, Circeii, Tarracini, and
" of all the people of Latium ſubject to the
" Romans. That they ſhall do no hurt even to
" ſuch cities there, as are not in the dependance
" of the Romans. That in caſe they take any
" of them, they ſhall reſtore them entire to
" the Romans. That they ſhall build no fort
" in the country of the Latines: and that if

* *Where this Promontory was, is not exactly known; and the ſituation of the two cities mentioned in the following treaty is as uncertain.*

" they

" they enter it in arms, they ſhall not paſs the
" night in it."

Second Treaty.

This ſecond treaty was made an hundred and ſixty years after the firſt, in the Conſulſhip of Valerius Corvus, and Popillius Lænas. It differs in ſome things from the former. " The " inhabitants of Tyre and Utica with their allies are included in this treaty. Two cities " little known, Maſtia and Tarſejum, are added to the fine Promontory, beyond which " the Romans were not to navigate. It ſays, " that if the Carthaginians take any city in the " country of the Latines not ſubject to the Romans, they ſhall keep the money and priſoners, but ſhall not ſettle in it, and ſhall " reſtore it to the Romans—That the Romans " ſhall not traffick nor build any city either in " Sardinia or Africa.—That at Carthage and " in the part of Sicily, poſſeſſed by the Carthaginians, the Romans ſhall have the ſame " rights and privileges in reſpect to trade, as " the citizens." Livy, who has not mentioned the firſt treaty, gives us no particulars of this, and contents himſelf with ſaying, " That Ambaſſadors from Carthage being arrived at " Rome to make a treaty of alliance and amity " with the Romans, it was accordingly concluded with them."

A. R. 407. Ant. C. 345. Liv. vii. 27.

Third Treaty.

Only Livy mentions this treaty, and ſays but few words of it. " The treaty with the Carthaginians was renewed this year for the third " time, and preſents were made with politeneſs " and amity to the Ambaſſadors, who came to " Rome on that occaſion."

A. R. 447. Ant. C. 305. Liv. ix. 43.

Fourth Treaty.

A. R. 474. Ant. C. 278. Liv. Epit. xiii. Polyb. iii. 180.

About the time that Pyrrhus made a deſcent into Italy, the Romans made a treaty with the Carthaginians, wherein the ſame articles, as in the former, are agreed on, with the following additions. "That if the one or the other "ſhould make an alliance with Pyrrhus, this "clauſe ſhould be inſerted in it; *that in caſe* "*either of them ſhould be attacked, the other* "*ſhould be at liberty to give them aid.* That "which ever of the two ſtates ſhould be at-"tacked, the Carthaginians ſhould always fur-"niſh ſhips, as well for the tranſportation of "ſoldiers and proviſions, as for battle: but "that each ſhould pay their own troops. "That the Carthaginians ſhould aid the Ro-"mans even by ſea, if neceſſary. That no "ſhip's crew ſhould be forced to quit it againſt "their will."

Liv. Epit. xviii. 2. Val. Max. iii. 7. Pyrrhus.

It was probably in conſequence of this treaty, that Mago, the General of the Carthaginians, who was then at ſea, came, by order of his maſters, to acquaint the Senate of the pain they were in, to ſee Italy attacked by a powerful King, and to offer the Romans an hundred and twenty ſhips, in order to enable them to defend themſelves with a foreign aid againſt a foreign power. The Senate received him very graciouſly, and expreſſed abundance of gratitude for the good will of the Carthaginians; but did not accept their offer; adding, that the Roman people entered into no wars, but ſuch as they were capable of ſuſtaining and terminating with their own arms.

Theſe treaties, eſpecially the firſt, give us occaſion to make ſome obſervations upon the condition of the two ſtates. By the firſt treaty,

it

it appears, that at the time it was concluded, the Carthaginians were much more powerful than the Romans. Beſides the great extent of their territories in Africa, they had conquered all Sardinia with part of Sicily, and were abſolute maſters of the ſea, which enabled them to give other nations the law, and to preſcribe them the bounds, beyond which they were not to carry their navigation. But Rome, which at that time had not long thrown off the yoke of regal power, was ſtill ſtruggling with her neighbours, and ſaw her dominion confined within very narrow bounds. This infant ſtate, weak as it was, ſeemed however to have began to give Carthage umbrage, and matter of diſquiet. Accordingly, at the ſame time that ſhe kept as fair as poſſible on the one ſide with the Romans, in courting their alliance, and giving them and their allies all the ſecurity they could deſire, on the other, by liniting their navigation, ſhe took wiſe meaſures to prevent them from having too much knowledge of the condition and affairs of Africa. However that were, the alliance with Rome was of great advantage to the maritime cities of their allies, as it ſecured them againſt the invaſions of a people ſo powerful by ſea as that of Carthage.

This ſame treaty informs us alſo, that from the time of the kings there were citizens of Rome that applied themſelves to traffick. And this was abſolutely neceſſary in a ſtate, which was obliged to have recourſe to others for the neceſſaries of life, and eſpecially for corn and other proviſions. This is ſeldom mentioned by hiſtorians. Livy ſpeaks of the election of a magiſtrate, who was to be charged with the care of proviſions, and to eſtabliſh a ſociety of factors. In proceſs of time commerce was one of A. R. 259. Liv. ii. 27.

the principal ſources of the riches, which the Romans acquired; in effect either of following it themſelves, or putting out their money to intereſt in trading ſhips, as Cato the Cenſor did. In his life mention is made of fifty dealers, who ſent fifty ſhips to ſea. That famous (*a*) Roman eſteemed, and uſed this method of acquiring riches. Cicero explains himſelf more clearly upon this head, as I have already obſerved elſewhere. (*b*) As to trade, ſays he, when it is great, and extenſive, and by bringing in from all parts a great abundance of things uſeful to life, gives every one the means of ſupplying themſelves with what they want; it is not to be blamed, eſpecially when carried on without fraud and impoſition. It is even meritorious and laudable, if thoſe, who apply themſelves to it, are not inſatiable, and content themſelves with reaſonable gains.

Plut. in Cat. p 349.

It is therefore certain, that the Romans uſed navigation at the beginning of the Republic, at leaſt for trade. They afterwards applied themſelves to it even for war, as Mr. Huet obſerves in his Hiſtory of Commerce. In the 417th year of Rome, the Romans having overcome the Antiates, prohibited them all trade by ſea, took (*c*) from them all their ſhips, burnt a part of them, and carried the reſt up the Tiber to Rome, where they were laid up in the place appropriated to the keeping and building of ſhips.

(*a*) Eſt interdum præſtare populo, mercaturis rem quærere, ni tam periculoſum fiet. *Cat. Init. lib. de re ruſtica.*

(*b*) Mercatura, ſi tenuis eſt, ſordida putanda eſt. Sin magna & copioſa, multa undique apportans, multiſque ſine vanitate impertiens, non eſt admodum vituperanda. Atque etiam, ſi ſatiata quæſtu, vel contenta potius — videtur jure optimo poſſe laudari. *Offic.* i. 151.

(*c*) Naves Antiatium, partim in navalia Romæ ſubducta, partim incenſæ. *Liv.* viii. 14.

This

This is a proof that the Romans in thoſe times applied themſelves to naval affairs. In the 443d year of Rome the place of Duumviri is mentioned, whoſe (*a*) office was to fit out, repair, and keep up the fleet. In the year 470, the Romans had a fleet of ten ſhips at ſea commanded by the Duumvir Valerius. It was inſulted by the Tarentines, which gave occaſion for the war with that people, Freinſh. xii. 7, & 8.

It appears from the laſt treaty concluded in the time of Pyrrhus, and the ſilence of hiſtorians in reſpect to the navy of the Romans before the Punic wars, that till then the Romans had thought little of maritime affairs, though they had not totally neglected them; ſo that if it were neceſſary to have a conſiderable fleet for a war, they were not in a condition to fit one out: and it was for that reaſon they ſtipulated, that the Carthaginians ſhould ſupply them with ſhips.

Treaties and alliances were made from time to time, as we ſee here, between the Romans and Carthaginians, but no real amity ever ſubſiſted between them. They feared, and perhaps mutually hated, each other. Their refuſal of the aid in the laſt place, which Carthage offered the Romans againſt Pyrrhus, argues a people averſe to having any obligations to the Carthaginians, and who then perhaps foreſaw a rupture. Accordingly the laſt treaty between the two ſtates was ſoon followed by the firſt Punic war.

(*a*) Duo imperia eo anno dari cœpta per populum, utraque pertinentia ad rem militarem —— alterum, ut Duumviros navales claſſis ornandæ reficiendæque cauſâ idem populus juberet. *Liv.* ix. 30.

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

THE ROMAN HISTORY Continued.

THIS book contains the history of the first Punic war, which continued twenty-four years, from the 488th to the 509th year of Rome.

SECT. I.

Aid granted by the Romans to the Mamertines against the Carthaginians occasions the first Punic war. The Consul Appius goes to Sicily. He defeats Hiero, and enters Messina. He beats the Carthaginians, and leaving a strong garrison at Messina, returns to Rome, and has the honour of a triumph. Census compleated. Institution of gladiatorial combats. Vestals punished. Two new Consuls go to Sicily. Treaty concluded between Hiero and the Romans. Punishment of soldiers who had surrendered themselves to the enemy in a cowardly manner. The Consuls return to Rome. Triumph of Valerius: first sundial at Rome. Nail driven on account of the plague. New colonies. The Romans, in conjunction with the troops of Syracuse, besiege Agrigentum. A battle is fought, in which the

Carthaginians

Carthaginians are entirely defeated. The city is taken after a ſiege of ſeven months. Perfidy of Hanno in regard to his mercenary ſoldiers. He is recalled, and Amilcar ſent to ſucceed him. The Romans build and man a fleet, in order to diſpute the ſovereignty of the ſea with the Carthaginians. The Conſul Cornelius and ſeventeen ſhips are taken, and carried to Carthage. The reſt of the fleet beats the Carthaginian General. Famous naval victory gained by Duilius near the coaſt of Myle. His triumph. Expedition againſt Corſica and Sardinia. Conſpiracy at Rome ſuppreſſed in its birth.

HISTORY is now going to open a new ſeries of things, and events to become far greater, and more important, than they have hitherto been. During the five hundred years from the building of Rome, the Romans have been employed in ſubjecting the ſtates of Italy, (ſome by the force of arms, others by treaties and alliances,) and laying the foundations of an empire, which is to comprehend almoſt the whole univerſe. They are now going to reap the fruit of their domeſtic conqueſts, by the addition of foreign ones to them, which will begin by Sicily and the neighbouring iſlands; then like a conflagration that perpetually gains ground, they will go on in the Spains, Africa, Aſia, Greece, and the Gauls: conqueſts, which, notwithſtanding their vaſt extent, will coſt them leſs time than that of Italy alone.

Aid granted the Mamertines by the Romans againſt the Carthaginians; occaſion of the

A body of Campanian adventurers, who were in the pay of Agathocles the tyrant of Sicily, having entered the city of Meſſana, which with a little variation is now Meſſina, ſoon after put ſome of the inhabitants to the ſword, drove out the reſt, married their wives, ſeized all their

firſt Punic war. Polyb. l. i. p. 6, 11.

their effects, and remained ſole maſters of the place, which was very important. They aſſumed the name of Mamertines.

After a Roman legion by their example and aid, as we have related in the preceding volume, had treated the city of Rhegium in the ſame manner, the Mamertines, ſupported by thoſe allies, became very powerful, and gave the Syracuſans and Carthaginians, between whom the dominions of Sicily were then divided, much diſquiet. That power was of ſhort duration. The Romans, as ſoon as they had put an end to the war with Pyrrhus, having taken vengeance of the perfidious legion, that had ſeized Rhegium, and reſtored the place to its antient inhabitants, the Mamertines continuing alone and without ſupport, were no longer in a condition to oppoſe the forces of the Syracuſans. The ſenſe of their weakneſs, and the view of the approaching danger, wherein they were, of falling into the hands of their enemies, obliged them to have recourſe to the Romans, and to implore their aid. But Hiero did not give them time to take breath. He attacked them vigorouſly, and gained a conſiderable victory over them, by which he ſaw himſelf in a condition to reduce them to ſurrender at diſcretion. But an unforeſeen aid extricated them out of this extremity.

* Hannibal, General of the Carthaginians, who was accidentally at that time at the iſlands of Lipara near Sicily, having received advice of Hiero's victory, apprehended, that if he ſhould entirely ruin Meſſana, the power of the Syracuſans would become formidable to his

* *The names Hannibal, Aſdrubal, Adherbal, Hanno, and the like were very common at Carthage. It were needleſs to tell the reader, that this is not the great Hannibal.*

country,

country. For this reaſon, he immediately paid Hiero a viſit; and under pretext of congratulating him upon his victory, he delayed him ſome days, and prevented him from ſetting out directly for Meſſana, as he intended. In the mean time he entered the city firſt himſelf; and finding that the Mamertines were inclined to ſurrender to the conqueror, he diſſuaded them from it, by promiſing them powerful aids, and even making part of his troops immediately enter their city.

Hiero, perceiving that he had ſuffered himſelf to be over-reached, and that he was not in a condition to beſiege Meſſana after the reinforcement which had juſt entered it, thought fit to return to Syracuſe, where he was received with the univerſal joy of the inhabitants, and declared King, as I have related elſewhere with greater extent. *Ant. Hiſt. Vol. IX.*

After Hiero's retreat the Mamertines reſumed courage, and began to deliberate upon the choice they had to make. But they could not agree amongſt themſelves. " Some affirmed " that it was neceſſary to put themſelves under " the protection of the Carthaginians without " the leaſt heſitation: that it was for their ad- " vantage to do ſo on many accounts, beſides " its being become neceſſary, as they had re- " ceived their troops into the city. Others " maintained, on the contrary, that the Ma- " mertines had no leſs to fear from the Cartha- " ginians, than from Hiero. That it was to " run headlong into voluntary ſlavery, to con- " fide in a Republic, that had a powerful " fleet upon the coaſts of Sicily, was actually " in poſſeſſion of a great part of the iſland, " and had long ſought to make herſelf miſtreſs " of the reſt. That conſequently, the only

" choice

" choice they could make with ſafety, was to
" implore the aid of the Romans, a people as
" invincible in war, as faithful in their engage-
" ments, who had not a foot of land in Sicily,
" had no fleet, nor any experience in naval af-
" fairs, and had an equal intereſt to prevent
" as well the Syracuſans as Carthaginians from
" becoming too powerful in Sicily. That laſtly,
" as they had already ſent Ambaſſadors to
" Rome, in order to put themſelves under the
" protection of the Roman People, it would
" be a kind of inſult to change their reſolution
" on a ſudden, and to have recourſe to others."

Whilſt things were in this condition at Meſſana, the affair was deliberated upon at Rome, which had for Conſuls at that time

A. R. 488. Ant. C. 264.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS CAUDEX.
M. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

The Roman People determine to aid the Mamertines.

Polyb. l. 10, 11. Zonar. viii. 381.

The Roman Senate conſidering this affair in its different lights, found ſome difficulty in it. On the one ſide it appeared ſhameful and unworthy of the Roman virtue, openly to take upon them the defence of traitors and villains, who were directly in the ſame predicament with thoſe of Rhegium, whom they had juſt puniſhed ſo ſeverely. On the other ſide, it was of the laſt importance to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the Carthaginians, who, not content with their conqueſts in Africa and Spain, had made themſelves maſters of all the iſlands in the ſeas of Sardinia and Etruria, and would ſoon undoubtedly poſſeſs themſelves of all Sicily, if Meſſana were abandoned to them. Now the diſtance from thence into Italy was not great, and to leave the entrance open, was in ſome meaſure to invite ſo powerful an enemy thither.

The

The Senate was beſides offended that the Carthaginians had aided the Tarentines.

Theſe reaſons, how ſtrong ſoever they appeared, could not determine them to declare for the Mamertines: the motives of honour and juſtice prevailed on this occaſion over thoſe of intereſt and policy. But the People were not ſo delicate. In the aſſembly, which was held upon this occaſion, it was reſolved to aid the Mamertines. The Conſul Appius Claudius, who had diſpatched before him one of the Tribunes of his army, named Claudius alſo, to conciliate the favour of the inhabitants of Meſſana, ſet out with his army. In the mean time the Mamertines, partly by menaces and partly by ſurprize, drove the governor, who commanded for the Carthaginians, out of the citadel. His imprudence and cowardice coſt him his life; for he was hanged at his return to Carthage. The Carthaginians, in order to retake Meſſana, made a fleet advance near Pelorus, and placed their infantry on the other ſide. At the ſame time Hiero, to take advantage of the occaſion, for driving the Mamertines entirely out of Sicily, made an alliance with the Carthaginians, and immediately ſet out from Syracuſe to join them.

The Conſul Appius goes to Sicily.

During that time, Appius had advanced with the utmoſt diligence to aid the Mamertines. He had the ſtreight Meſſana to paſs. The enterprize was dangerous, or more properly ſpeaking, raſh, and even, according to all the rules of probability, impoſſible. The Romans had no fleet, and only boats of a groſs ſtructure, which might be compared almoſt to the canoes of the Indians. For this ſeems to be implied by the term *caudicariæ naves*, which the antients uſe in ſpeaking of the fact I am

Frontin. i. 4—11.

now

A. R. 488. Ant. C. 264.

now relating: and from thence came the Conſuls ſurname *Caudex*. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, had a fleet well manned and very numerous. Appius in this difficulty, which would have diſconcerted any other, had recourſe to ſtratagem. Not being able to paſs the ſtreight where the Carthaginians had poſted themſelves, he made a feint of abandoning the enterprize, and of marching back towards Rome, with all the troops he had to embark. Upon that news the enemy, who blockaded Meſſana on the ſide next the ſea, having retired as if there was nothing farther to apprehend, the Conſul, taking advantage of their abſence and the darkneſs of the night, paſſed the ſtreight, and arrived in Sicily.

We ſee here the terrible effects, with which a fault that ſeems ſlight at firſt, may be attended. Had the Carthaginians prevented his paſſing, as they might very eaſily have done, and made themſelves maſters of Meſſana, which was an inevitable conſequence of it, the Romans perhaps might never have been capable of landing in Sicily, nor in conſequence of making all the conqueſts, that acquired them the empire of the univerſe. But Providence, that had allotted it to them, opened them the way to it on this occaſion. It is remarkable, that this bold ſtep of Appius, is the firſt made by the Romans out of Italy.

Appius gains a victory over Hiero, and enters Meſſana. Zonar. viii. 524.

The place where he landed was not far from the camp of the Syracuſans. He exhorted his troops to charge it at unawares, aſſuring them of victory in the ſurprize wherein they would find the enemy. It happened as the Conſul had promiſed. Hiero, who expected nothing ſo little, had ſcarce time to draw up his troops in battle. His cavalry had ſome advantage at firſt;

firſt; but the Roman infantry having charged the groſs of his army, ſoon broke and put it entirely to the rout. Appius, after having cauſed the dead bodies of the enemy to be ſtript of their ſpoils, entered Meſſana, where he was received as a preſerver, come from heaven; and made the joy of the Mamertines the greater and the more ſenſible, as they had ſcarce any hopes of ſuch an event. Hiero ſeeing himſelf defeated, almoſt before he ſaw the enemy, as he afterwards ſaid himſelf, and ſuſpecting, that the Carthaginians had given up the paſſage of the ſtraight to the Romans, and diſguſted long before by the perfidy of that people, made his troops decamp the next night with as little noiſe as poſſible, and returned to Syracuſe with great diligence. A. R. 488. Ant. C. 264.

He beats the Carthaginians

Appius freed from all apprehenſions on that ſide, thought proper to take the advantage of the terror, which the noiſe of this firſt victory had ſpread even amongſt the Carthaginians. Accordingly he marched to attack them in their camp, which ſeemed inacceſſible, as well by its natural ſituation, as the intrenchments, with which it was fortified. And he was actually repulſed and obliged to retire with ſome loſs. The Carthaginians, who conſidered this haſty retreat, as an effect of their bravery, and the enemy's fear, purſued them. This was what the Conſul expected. He faced about; on which the fortune of the battle changed with the ſituation of the place. Their own courage was now all that either ſide had to truſt to. The Carthaginians did not long maintain their ground before the Romans. A great number of them were killed. Some eſcaped into their camp, others into the neighbouring cities, and they did not

A. R. 485. Ant. C. 264. dare to quit their intrenchments, as long as Appius continued in Meſſana.

Seeing himſelf in conſequence maſter of the field, he ravaged the whole flat country without oppoſition, and burnt the villages of the allies of the Syracuſans. So general a conſternation inſpired him with the bold deſign of approaching Syracuſe itſelf. Several battles enſued with very various ſucceſs, in one of which the Conſul was in great danger. He had recourſe upon this occaſion to ſtratagem. He diſpatched an officer to Hiero, as if to treat of peace. The King willingly hearkened to that propoſal. They had ſeveral interviews, and during thoſe conferences, Appius inſenſibly retrieved the bad ſtep he had made. Other propoſals paſſed between ſome private perſons of the two armies. The Syracuſans ſeemed to deſire peace: but the King would not hear of it then; probably becauſe the Conſul, when out of danger, became more difficult.

Zonar. viii. 384.

Appius returns to Rome.

Theſe different motions took up great part of the year. The Conſul returned to Meſſana, in which he left a ſtrong garriſon, capable of ſecuring the city, and then went over to Rhegium, in order to return to Rome. He was received there with great applauſes and univerſal joy. His triumph over Hiero and the Carthaginians was celebrated with the greater ſolemnity and concourſe of people, as it was the firſt that had been obtained over nations beyond the ſeas.

Luſtrum, *or cloſing of the Cenſus.*

At the cloſing of the *Cenſus* this year by the Cenſors Cn. Cornelius and C. Marcius, the number of the citizens was found to be two hundred ninety two thouſand, two hundred twenty-four, an exceeding great number, and which ſeems incredible,

Freinſh. xvi. 40—42.

incredible, when we reflect upon the uninterrupted ſeries of wars from the foundation of Rome, and the frequent plagues no leſs deſtructive than battles. One can never ſufficiently admire the wiſe policy of the Romans for repairing all theſe loſſes, which was by incorporating great numbers of the people of the conquered ſtates into the body of the Commonwealth: a policy eſtabliſhed from the reign of Romulus, and afterwards practiſed with unalterable perſeverance, which was the principal ſource of the greatneſs of Rome, and contributed very much to render her invincible, by making her ſuperior to ſo many defeats, of which ſome ſeemed to make her eternal ruin inevitable. A. R. 488. Ant. C. 264.

Inſtitution of the combats of the gladiators.

This ſame year gave birth to a cruel and ſavage cuſtom, which however became very common in proceſs of time, wherein the ſhedding of human blood, in the combats of the gladiators, was conſidered as the moſt agreeable ſight that could be exhibited to the Roman People. It was introduced by the two brothers M. and D. Junius Brutus, to do honour to the funeral of their father. I ſhall ſay ſomething on this head at the end of this volume.

Veſtal puniſhed.

The veſtal Capparonia, convicted of breaking her vow of chaſtity, prevented the puniſhment by hanging herſelf. The corrupter and accomplices were puniſhed according to the laws.

M'. VALERIUS MAXIMUS.
M'. OTACILIUS CRASSUS.

A. R. 489. Ant. C. 263.

The two Conſuls go to Sicily.

The preceding year Rome had been obliged to ſend one of the two Conſuls againſt the revolted ſlaves of Volſinii in Tuſcany. This year, not being diverted by other wars, ſhe Polyb. i. 16, 17.

A. R. 489. Ant. C. 263. Freinſh. xvi. 43—48. Zonar. viii. 385.

made the two new Conſuls go to Sicily. They acted there in great concert, ſometimes uniting, and ſometimes dividing their troops; beat the Carthaginians and Syracuſans on ſeveral occaſions; and ſpread the terror of the Roman arms in ſuch a manner almoſt throughout the whole iſland, that the cities ſent from all ſides to make their ſubmiſſion to the Conſuls: their number amounted in all to ſixty ſeven, amongſt which were * Tauromenium and Catina, two ſtrong places.

Treaty concluded between Hiero and the Romans.

Such ſpeedy ſucceſs induced them to advance towards Syracuſe in order to beſiege it. Hiero, who doubted his own forces, and thoſe of the Carthaginians, and relied ſtill leſs upon the faith of the latter, and who had a ſecret inclination for the Romans, in effect of the eſteem univerſally conceived for their probity and juſtice, ſent deputies to the Conſuls to treat of peace. The accommodation was ſoon concluded. It was too much deſired on both ſides to be long in negotiating. The conditions of the treaty were: "That Hiero ſhould reſtore to the "Romans the places he had taken from them "or their allies; that he ſhould diſmiſs the "priſoners without ranſom; that he ſhould pay *An hundred thouſand crowns.* "an hundred talents of ſilver for the expences "of the war; that he ſhould remain in quiet "poſſeſſion of Syracuſe and the cities in its "dependance." The principal of theſe were Acræ, Leontium, Megara, Netinæ, and Tauromenium. The treaty was ſoon after ratified at Rome. It was made only for fifteen years; but mutual eſteem, and good offices on both ſides, rendered it perpetual. The Romans had no ally more faithful, nor friend more conſtant

* *Now* Taormina, *or the eaſtern coaſt of Sicily.* Catane, ibid.

than

than this Prince. Bringing him over from the ſide of the Carthaginians was doing every thing. He was of infinite advantage to them, eſpecially in reſpect to proviſions, the tranſportation of which was very difficult before, becauſe the Carthaginians were maſters of the ſea, which had put the Romans to abundance of inconveniences the preceding year. A. R. 489. Ant. C. 263.

The Carthaginian General, who had ſailed with a fleet to the aid of Syracuſe, which he expected to find beſieged, having received advice of the treaty concluded between Hiero and the Romans, returned faſter than he came. The forces of the two new allies being united, they took a great number of cities from the Carthaginians.

Puniſhment of ſoldiers, who had ſurrendered themſelves in a cowardly manner to the enemy. Frontin. iv. 1.

The Conſul Otacilius gave at that time an uſeful example of ſeverity, in reſpect to military diſcipline, and very conformable to the Roman genius. Some Roman ſoldiers, on an occaſion of danger, had ſubmitted to paſs under the yoke, to preſerve their lives. When they rejoined the army, the Conſul condemned them to incamp ſeparately without the intrenchments, where they were in much leſs ſecurity than the reſt of the army, being more expoſed to the incurſions of the enemy; beſides which it was a permanent diſgrace, that continually reproached them with their cowardice, and animadverted to them to wipe out the ſtain by ſome action of valour.

Triumph of Valerius: ſun-dial.

The winter approaching, the Conſuls, after having left ſufficient garriſons in the towns, returned to Rome with the reſt of the troops. M'. Valerius, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf this campaign in a peculiar manner, received the honour of a triumph, in which a ſun-dial was carried, a new object to the Romans, who

A. R. 489. Ant. C. 263. till then had diſtinguiſhed the hours, as the people do in the country, by the different height of the ſun. The ſun-dial was horizontal, and came from Catina. Valerius afterwards placed it upon a pedeſtal near the tribunal of harangues. He alſo cauſed a picture to be ſet up in the hall *Hoſtilia*, wherein his battle with Hiero and the Carthaginians was painted; which had not been done before, but afterwards became very common. (*a*) He was ſurnamed *Meſſala*, for having delivered the city of Meſſana from danger; which probably, after the departure of Appius Claudius, had been attacked again by Hiero and the Carthaginians. He was called at firſt *Meſſana:* which name was changed inſenſibly into that of *Meſſala*. Seneca, no doubt through inadvertence, ſays, that this ſurname was given him for taking the city of Meſſana.

I ſaid before, that clocks were not known at Rome before the Conſulſhip of Valerius. An ancient author, according to Pliny, gives the uſe of them a prior date, as early as the eleventh year before the war with Pyrrhus; but Pliny himſelf invalidates this teſtimony. The (*b*) ſun-dial, which Valerius brought to Rome, having been made for the climate of Catina, did not agree with that of Rome, nor tell the hours right. About an hundred years after the Cenſor Marcius Philippus ſet up a more regular one near that of Valerius. In that interval they

Plin. vii. 60.

(*a*) Primus ex familia Valeriorum urbis Meſſanæ captæ in ſe tranſlato nomine Meſſana appellatus eſt, paulatimque vulgo permutante literas, Meſſala dictus eſt. *Senec. de brevit. vit.* c. 13.

(*b*) Quod cùm ad clima Siciliæ deſcriptum, ad horas Romæ non conveniret, Marcius Philippus Cenſor aliud juxtà conſtituit. *Cenſorin. de die natali*, cap. 22.

became

became common enough at Rome, as appears from a fragment of Plautus, that Aulus Gellius has preſerved. It is an hungry paraſite that ſpeaks. A. R. 489. Ant. C. 263.

Ut illum Dii perdant, qui primus horas *repperit,*
Quique adeo primus hîc ſtatuit ſolarium,
Qui mihi comminuit miſero articulatim diem!
Nam me puero uterus hic erat ſolarium,
Multò omnium iſtorum optumum & veriſſimum,
Ubi iſte monebat eſſe, niſi cum nihil erat.
Nunc etiam quod eſt, non eſt, niſi ſoli lubet.
Itaque adeo jam oppletum eſt oppidum ſolariis,
Major pars populi aridi reptant fame.

This kind of dial was of no uſe but when the ſun ſhined. Five years after the Cenſorſhip of Marcius, another Cenſor (Scipio Naſica) ſet up one, which ſerved both for day and night. It was called a *Clepſydra*. It ſhewed all the hours by the means of water, and ſome wheels that it turned. There is a deſcription of it in Vitruvius, who, as well as Athenæus and Pliny, aſcribes the invention of it to Cteſibius, a native of Alexandria, that lived under the two firſt Ptolemies. This Clepſydra differed from that firſt uſed by the Greeks, and afterwards by the Romans, to limit the time allowed the oraters to plead; that was alſo uſed in the (*a*) armies to regulate the four watches of the night, of which each was three hours, when the ſentinels were relieved. A. R. 595. Vitruv. ix. 9.

(*a*) Quia impoſſibile videbatur in ſpeculis per totum noctem vigilantes ſingulos permanere, ideo in quatuor partes AD CLEPSYDRAM ſunt diviſæ vigiliæ, ut non ampliùs quàm tribus horis nocturnis neceſſe ſit vigilare. *Veget. de re mil.* iii. 8.

A. R. 480. Ant. C. 263. What a difference there is between the antient clocks, either public or private, and ours! I do not know, whether we have a due ſenſe of ſo conſiderable a good, that includes ſo many conveniences: which certainly is not the effect of chance, but of God's beneficent attention to our wants.

2 Chron. xx. 11. All the world knows, that the moſt antient ſun-dial mentioned in hiſtory, is that of Ahaz King of Juda, on which the prophet Iſaiah made the ſhadow of the ſun go back ten degrees.

Nail driven on account of the plague. I return to our hiſtory. The plague continuing to ſhew itſelf in the city, a Dictator was nominated for driving the nail, and putting a ſtop by that religious ceremony to the wrath of the gods.

Some colonies were alſo ſettled: at Eſernia, Firmum, and Caſtrum, cities of Naples.

L. POSTUMIUS GEMELLUS.
A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262. Q. MAMILIUS VITULUS.

The Romans in conjunction with the troops of Syracuſe, form the ſiege of Agrigentum. A battle is fought, in which the Carthaginians are entirely defeated. Polyb. i. 16—19.

Theſe two Conſuls had Sicily for their province, but with only two legions, which appeared ſufficient ſince the alliance with Hiero; and that diminution eaſed Rome conſiderably on the ſide of proviſions.

Having united their troops with thoſe of the allies, they undertook the ſiege of Agrigentum, one of the ſtrongeſt places of Sicily. Its natural ſituation and fortifications rendered it almoſt impregnable. The Carthaginians, who had foreſeen that the Romans, emboldened by the conſiderable aids which they ſhould have from Hiero, would undoubtedly form ſome important enterprize, and that they would probably attack Agrigentum, had made choice of it for their

their place of arms, and with that view had ſtrengthened it abundantly with every thing neceſſary for a good defence. They at firſt had ſent part of their troops into Sardinia, with deſign either to prevent or retard the paſſage of the Romans into Sicily. Finding that precaution ineffectual, they had made them return, and united them with a great body of auxiliary troops from Liguria, the Gauls, and eſpecially from Spain. A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262.

The Conſuls encamped within a mile from Agrigentum, and reduced the enemy to ſhut themſelves up within the walls. The corn was now ripe, and actually upon the ground. As it was manifeſt, that the ſiege would be of long continuance, the Roman ſoldiers, ſolely attentive to cutting and bringing off the grain, diſperſed themſelves farther, and with leſs precaution, than was conſiſtent with the proximity of a powerful enemy. This negligence was very near proving fatal to them, in the entire ruin of their army. The Carthaginians falling ſuddenly upon them, the foragers could not ſuſtain ſo warm an attack, and were put to the rout. The enemy then advanced to the camp of the Romans, and having divided their troops into two bodies, the one began to pull up the paliſades, whilſt the other attacked the guards poſted there for the defence of the camp. Though the latter were much inferior in number to the Carthaginians, as they knew that to quit their poſt was capital with the Romans, they ſuſtained the charge with inconceivable reſolution. Abundance of them were killed, and ſtill more on the ſide of the enemy. This vigorous defence gave time for aid to arrive, when the Carthaginians, who were engaged, were broke, and put to the rout. Thoſe who had already pulled

A. R. 493. Ant. C. 262. pulled up part of the paliſades, were ſurrounded on all ſides, and almoſt all cut to pieces; the reſt were purſued quite into the city. This action, in which the invincible valour of the Roman troops retrieved their negligence, rendered the enemy leſs diſpoſed to make ſallies, and the Romans more upon their guard in forraging.

Sallies accordingly were leſs frequent from thenceforth; and this determined the Conſuls to divide their armies into two great bodies, and to poſt them in the front of two parts of the city; the one facing the temple of Eſculapius, aad the other upon the great road to Heraclea. They fortified the two camps with good lines of contravallation and circumvallation: the firſt, to prevent ſallies; and the other to cut off the entrance of ſuccours or proviſions into the place. The ſpace between the two camps was occupied by guards, poſted at ſmall diſtances from each other.

The Romans in all theſe operations had great aids from the ſtates of Sicily, that had lately joined them. Their troops, in conjunction with thoſe of the Romans, formed an army of an hundred thouſand men. Convoys of proviſions were carried for them as far as Erbeſſa, from whence the Romans brought them into their camp, which was not very remote. In effect of theſe ſupplies they abounded with every thing neceſſary.

The ſiege continued in this condition during almoſt five months, without any conſiderable action on either ſide, nothing paſſing but ſome ſlight ſkirmiſhes. But in the mean time, the Carthaginians ſuffered exceedingly, becauſe being at leaſt fifty thouſand ſhut up in the place, they had conſumed almoſt all their proviſions,

and

and had no hopes, that any ſupplies could be brought in; ſo good a guard did the Romans keep to ſhut up all the avenues. In conſequence the evils they had already ſuffered, and thoſe which they apprehended were to come, diſcouraged them entirely. A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262.

Hannibal, the ſon of Giſgo, who commanded in the place, had ſent courier after courier to demand aids and proviſions. At length Hanno arrived in Italy with fifty thouſand foot, ſix thouſand horſe, and ſixty elephants. He landed at Lilybæum with his troops, from whence he marched to Heraclea. The inhabitants of Erbeſſa went thither to him, and promiſed to put their city into his hands, through which paſſed all the convoys for the Romans. Accordingly, by their help he made himſelf maſter of it; from whenceforth the beſiegers were no leſs diſtreſſed by the want of proviſions than the beſieged. They were at length reduced to ſuch extremities, that they deliberated more than once upon raiſing the ſiege; and they would have been reduced to do it, if Hiero, by attempting every kind of means, had not at laſt found one, for conveying ſome ſupplies to them, which gave them time to breathe.

Hanno informed that the Romans were greatly diſtreſſed both by famine, and diſeaſes, which are generally the effect of it; and on the contrary ſeeing his own troops in good condition, reſolved to approach nearer the enemy, in order to bring them, if poſſible, to a battle. Accordingly he marched from Heraclea with his whole army and fifty elephants, and made the Numidian cavalry advance before him, after having given them the neceſſary inſtructions for drawing the Romans into an ambuſcade. The Numidians acquitted themſelves exactly of their com-

A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262. commiſſion, and advanced to the camp of the Conſuls, with an air of contempt, and a kind of inſult. The Romans did not fail to come out, and charge them immediately. The Numidians made ſome ſtand: and afterwards being broke, fled precipitately the ſame way that they knew Hanno was advancing. The Romans purſued them at the heels, till they came up to the main body of their army. The farther they were from the camp, the more difficult it was to retreat. Abundance of them, who could not get off, fell on the ſpot.

This ſucceſs giving Hanno hopes of a compleat victory, he ſeized an eminence, not above fifteen hundred paces from the Roman camp. However, though the two armies were ſo near each other, they did not come to a battle till long after; both ſides equally apprehending an action, that could not but be deciſive. The Romans in particular, being diſcouraged by the check their cavalry had received, kept cloſe within their camp: But when they ſaw that their fear diſcouraged their allies, and on the contrary augmented the boldneſs of the enemy, they determined to march out. Hanno began then to fear on his ſide, and was in no haſte to fight. Two months paſſed in this manner without any conſiderable action.

At length, at the warm inſtances of Hannibal, who informed him that the beſieged could not hold out againſt the famine, and that many of them went over to the enemy, he reſolved to give battle without farther delay, and agreed with Hannibal, that he ſhould make a ſally at the ſame time. The Conſuls, who were apprized of this deſign, affected to remain quiet in their camps. This induced Hanno to offer them battle with more haughtineſs. He advanced

vanced quite up to their intrenchments, and reproached them with their abject timidity. The Romans contented themſelves with defending their camp, and only ſkirmiſhed: which continually augmented the ſecurity of the Carthaginians, and their contempt of the enemy. At laſt one day, when Hanno came as uſual to attack the intrenchments, Poſtumius, according to cuſtom, made ſome troops march out only to repulſe him, who fatigued and haraſſed him from ſix in the morning till noon. Then, as Hanno was retiring, the Conſul advanced at the head of all the legions to charge him. Though he was ſurprized, not expecting a battle, he fought with all poſſible valour; ſo that the victory continued doubtful almoſt to the cloſe of the day. But, as his troops had been very much fatigued before the battle, without having taken any refreſhment, and the Romans, who had prepared themſelves in all reſpects, came on with quite freſh force and courage, the match was not equal. The defeat began by the mercenary troops of the firſt line, who could ſuſtain the fatigue no longer. They not only abandoned their poſt, but throwing themſelves with precipitation into the midſt of the elephants, and upon the ſecond line, diſordered all the ranks, and drew all the reſt after them. The other Conſul had no leſs ſucceſs on his ſide, and repulſed Hannibal, who had made a ſally, with vigour into the city, and killed him abundance of men. The camp of the Carthaginians was taken. Three elephants were wounded, thirty killed, and eleven fell into the hands of the Romans. The men were either cut to pieces, or diſperſed in flight. Of ſo numerous an army, ſome few eſcaped with their General to Heraclea.

A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262.

Hannibal

A. R. 490. Ant. C. 262. *The city of Agrigentum is taken after a ſiege of ſeven months.*

Hannibal ſeeing that the Romans, after the fatigues of ſo rude an action, abandoned themſelves to the joy of their victory, and were more remiſs than uſual in keeping guard, took advantage of that interval of inactivity and neglect, and quitted the city in the night at the head of his mercenary troops. The Romans, who were informed of his departure the next morning, immediately purſued him. But as he had got a great way before them, they could only come up with his rear-guard, part of which they handled ſeverely enough. The inhabitants of Agrigentum, ſeeing themſelves abandoned by the Carthaginians, put many of thoſe that remained in the city to the ſword, either to avenge themſelves upon the authors of their miſeries, or to make their court to the victors. They had not the better quarter on that account. Twenty-five thouſand men of them were made ſlaves. Agrigentum was taken in this manner, after a ſiege of ſeven months. A great number of other places ſurrendered themſelves in conſequence to the victors. This victory was very uſeful and glorious to the Romans, but it coſt them dear. During this ſiege, more than thirty thouſand men of the Conſul's army, and that of the States of Sicily, periſhed by different cauſes. As the approach of the winter would admit no farther enterprizes in Sicily, they returned to Meſſana in order to repair to Rome.

L. VALERIUS FLACCUS.

A. R. 491. Ant. C. 261. T. OTACILIUS CRASSUS.

Both the new conſuls had Sicily for their province, which then engroſſed the attention of the

the Romans, and they repaired thither, aſſoon as the ſeaſon would permit. A. R. 491. Ant. C. 261.

The grief which Hanno felt for his defeat, was augmented by the extreme perplexity he was in, on account of the revolt of the mercenary troops, and eſpecially the Gauls, who complained with ſeditious cries, of not having had their pay for ſome months. He endeavoured to mollify them by magnificent promiſes of the great and ſpeedy advantages which he deſigned them, and added, that there was a neighbouring city of which he was ſure of making himſelf maſter by intelligence, and of which he intended them the plunder, that would make them ample amends for all that was due to them. They liked that propoſal well; and imagining themſelves very rich already, expreſſed their gratitude to him for his intentions in their favour, and congratulated each other upon the booty they were going to take. Hanno however had ordered his treaſurer to go to the Conſul Otacilius as a deſerter, under pretext of being unwilling to deliver in his accounts to his General; and to give him advice, that four thouſand Gauls had orders to repair the next night to the city of * Entella, which was to be ſurrendered to them by treachery; and that it would be eaſy to cut them all off, by laying an ambuſcade. Though the Conſul did not rely much upon the information of a deſerter, he however did not think it proper to deſpiſe this piece of advice entirely, and poſted an ambuſcade at the place. The Gauls did not fail coming thither at the time. The ambuſcade roſe, attacked them at unawares, and put them all to the ſword, but not without ſelling their lives dearly.

Perfidy of Hanno in reſpect to his mercenary troops. Frontin. Strat. iii. 16. Zonar. viii. 386.

* *On the ſouth ſide of the iſland, a little to the weſtward.*

A. R. 491. Ant. C. 261.

dearly. Hanno in conſequence had the double joy of diſcharging his debts without coſt, and of deſtroying a conſiderable number of his enemies. How horrid was ſuch a conduct! Hanno, on this occaſion, well makes good the proverb applied to the Carthaginians: *Punica Fides*, *Punic Faith*. Could he flatter himſelf, that ſo black and deteſtable a treachery would remain unknown to men, and unpuniſhed by the Divinity. Accordingly, at the end of this war we ſhall ſee Carthage brought to the very brink of deſtruction, from having broke her word with other mercenary ſoldiers, and refuſed to give them their arrears.

Amilcar is ſent to ſucceed Hanno.

The Carthaginians, diſſatisfied with Hanno, recalled him, and laid a great fine upon him. Amilcar, whom we muſt not confound with the father of Hannibal, was ſent to command in his place. That new general, having no hopes of ſucceeding againſt the Romans in battle by land, conceived the deſign of transferring all the operations of the war to the ſide, on which the Carthaginians had indiſputably the ſuperiority, that is the ſea. He therefore applied himſelf to cruizing with his fleet not only upon the coaſts of Sicily, of which all the cities ſurrendered themſelves to him, but on thoſe of Italy, ravaging the country wherever he came. There was no new action this year in Sicily. A kind of partition was now made between the inland and maritime cities. The firſt ſided with the Romans, and the latter with the Carthaginians.

CN. COR-

CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO ASINA. A. R. 492.
C. DUILIUS. Ant. C. 260.

The fifth year of the firſt Punic war begins here. The Romans had no reaſon to repent their having undertaken it. Hitherto they had ſucceeded both in battles and ſieges. However, as advantageous as their victory over Hanno might be, they rightly perceived, that as long as the Carthaginians continued maſters of the ſea, the maritime cities of the iſland would declare for them, and that they ſhould never be able to drive them out of thoſe places. Beſides which, they were not ſatisfied, that Africa ſhould remain in peace and tranquility, whilſt Italy was infeſted by the frequent incurſions of the enemy. For Carthage was no leſs formidable by her fleets and naval armies, than Rome by her legions and land-forces. The Romans therefore now firſt conceived thoughts of building a fleet, and diſputing the ſovereignty of the ſea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold: but it ſhews the valour and greatneſs of mind of that People. When they went to Sicily, they had not a ſingle ſhip, though ever ſo ſmall, equipped for war, and had nothing to carry them over but the canoes, of which we have ſpoke, and ſome veſſels borrowed of their neighbours. They had no experience of naval affairs, nor ſo much as a ſingle workman of capacity in the building of ſhips. They even did not know the form of a quinqueremis, that is, a galley with five rows of oars, in which the principal ſtrength of fleets conſiſted at that time. But luckily at the beginning of the war, they had taken one that had run aſhore, which ſerved them for a model.

The Romans, in order to diſpute the ſovereignty of the ſea with the Carthaginians, build and fit out a fleet. Polyb. i. 20, 21.

A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260. This induſtrious and ingenious People, whom no labour diſcouraged, and who turned every thing to their advantage, learnt from their enemies themſelves the art and means for ſubduing them. The Conſuls preſided in this new work. The Romans animated by their warm exhortations, and ſtill more by their example, applied themſelves with incredible ardor and induſtry in building ſhips of all kinds. Whilſt they were thus employed on one ſide, rowers were raiſed on the other, who were taught a manner of working entirely unknown to them before. They were made to ſit upon benches on the ſide of the ſea, in the ſame order as in ſhips, and to practiſe, as if actually at the oar, the different motions of falling back with a ſpring in pulling with their arms, and then of extending them forwards in order to renew the ſame motion, and that all together, in concert, and at the inſtant the ſignal was given. In the ſpace of two months, an hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three, were fitted out: ſo that, ſays an author (*a*), one might almoſt have believed, that they were not ſhips built by art, but trees metamorphoſed into galleys by the gods. After the rowers had been exerciſed for ſome time in the ſhips themſelves, the fleet put to ſea. The command of the land-army in Sicily fell by lot to Duilius, and of that by ſea to Cornelius.

Polybius gives us this account of the building of this fleet, and of the preparations of this firſt naval army of the Romans. We muſt not conclude from thence, that they had never uſed the ſea. The contrary is proved by certain monu-

(*a*) Ut non arte factæ, ſed quodam munere deorum converſæ in naves, atque mutatæ arbores viderentur. *Flor.* ii. 2.

ments,

ments, for the knowledge of which we are indebted to the ſame hiſtorian. But they never had a fleet, which deſerved that name, nor probably ſhips of ſeveral benches of oars. A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260.

The Conſul Cornelius had advanced before with ſeventeen ſhips. The reſt of the fleet was to follow him at no great diſtance. Having confided too haſtily in the people of Lipara, who had promiſed to ſurrender that iſland and city to him by treachery, he approached them, and was immediately ſurrounded by Carthaginian ſhips. He prepared to engage, and to make a good defence: but the General of the enemy having ſent to parley with him concerning an accommodation, upon his promiſe he went on board his galley with his principal officers to treat about the conditions. He had no ſooner entered it, than the perfidious Carthaginian ſeized his perſon, and all that accompanied him; and after having made himſelf maſter of all his ſhips, carried his priſoners to Carthage. *The Conſul Cornelius, with ſeventeen ſhips is taken and carried to Carthage.* Polyb. i. 22.

He was ſoon puniſhed for his mean treachery. He had advanced with fifty ſhips to take a near view of the Roman fleet, to examine of how many ſhips it conſiſted, and in what manner their crews worked. Full of contempt for enemies, who were quite new to the ſea, he had not uſed the precaution to draw up in battle, but went on without order. On doubling a cape, he met the Roman fleet, at the moment he leaſt expected it. It rowed and made all poſſible ſail, and fell upon that of the Carthaginians roughly. This was not a battle, but a chace. He loſt the beſt part of his ſhips, and with great difficulty eſcaped with the reſt. *The reſt of the fleet beats the Carthaginian Admiral.*

A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260. *Famous naval victory gained by Duilius near the coaſts of Myle.* Polyb. i. 22—24. Zonar. viii. 377.

The victorious fleet having been informed of what happened to Cornelius, ſent advice of it to his Collegue Duilius in Sicily, where he was at the head of the land-forces, and alſo that it was arrived there, after having gained an advantage over the enemy. Duilius having left the command of his army to the Tribunes, repaired immediately to the fleet. As it was within ſight of the Carthaginians at * Myle, they prepared for a battle.

As the galleys of the Romans, built groſsly and in haſte, were not very ſwift, nor eaſy to work, they had ſupplied that inconvenience by a machine invented on the occaſion, and which was afterwards called † *Corvus*, by the means of which they grappled with the enemy's veſſels, boarded them againſt their will, and came immediately to blows.

The ſignal of battle was given. The Carthaginian fleet conſiſted of an hundred and thirty ſail, commanded by Hannibal, of whom we have ſpoke before. He was on board a galley of ſeven benches of oars, which had belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, whom the blow they had juſt received, had not taught the wiſdom of not deſpiſing their enemies, advanced proudly, leſs to fight than to take the ſpoils of the enemy, of which they conceived themſelves already maſters. They were however a little amazed at the machines, which they ſaw raiſed upon the prow of each ſhip, and which were

* *Melazzo now, upon the north coaſt of Sicily.*

† *Polybius gives us a very circumſtantial but very obſcure deſcription of this machine. There are ſeveral kinds of* Corvi. *Mr. Follard's diſſertation upon this ſubject may be ſeen in his* Polybius, Book I. p. 83. *&c. and in the Arts and Sciences of the Antients there are plates and deſcriptions of them. See* Sect. of Art Military.

new

new to them. But they were much more ſo, when the ſame machines directed againſt their ſhips, and let fall on a ſudden, grappled them whether they would or no, and changing the form of the fight, obliged them to come to blows as if they had been by land. The ſtrength of the Romans conſiſted in cloſe fight: for which reaſon, when they came board and board, by the means of their Corvi, they had a great ſuperiority over the enemy, who excelled them only in agility, and addreſs in working their ſhips, but were inferior to them in every thing elſe. Accordingly, they could not ſuſtain the charge of the Romans. The ſlaughter was horrible. The Carthaginians loſt thirty ſhips, amongſt which was that of the General, who eſcaped in a boat not without difficulty. A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260.

He well knew what this defeat was to coſt him, and immediately diſpatched a friend to Carthage before the ſad news of it could arrive there. On entering the Senate he ſaid: *Hannibal has ſent me to ask you, whether he is to give the Conſul battle, who has a numerous fleet under his command?* He was anſwered unanimouſly, that there was no occaſion to heſitate upon that head. *He has done ſo, Gentlemen*, added he, *and has been defeated.* This was putting it out of the power of his judges to condemn him; becauſe they could not do it after what had paſſed, without condemning themſelves. In conſequence at his return, he was only diveſted of the command.

After the General's flight, the ſhips that remained were at a great loſs. They were aſhamed to retire from the battle, without having ſhared in the danger, ſuffered any thing, or being puſhed by the enemy: but they did not dare to attack him, ſo much did they dread thoſe new

A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260.

and terrible machines, from which they could not eſcape. Accordingly, when they did make an effort, they were borne down by their means. In this ſecond battle, and the former, fourteen ſhips were ſunk and thirty one taken; with ſeven thouſand priſoners, and three thouſand killed. Such was the ſucceſs of the naval battle fought near the iſlands of Lipara.

The firſt good effect of the victory was the deliverance of * Segeſta, which was very much preſſed by the Carthaginians, and reduced to the laſt extremity. Duilius, after having cauſed the ſiege to be raiſed, attacked and took Macella †, Amilcar not daring to come againſt him. The campaign being almoſt over, the Conſul returned to Rome. His abſence reinſtated the affairs of the Carthaginians conſiderably, and many cities, either voluntarily returned to their obedience to them, or were reduced to do ſo.

Naval triumph of Duilius.

It is eaſy to conceive with what tokens of joy Duilius was received at Rome. Extraordinary honours were paid the author of a kind of glory entirely new. He was the firſt of all the Romans to whom a naval triumph was granted. A monument of this victory was erected in the Forum, which was a *columna Roſtrata* of white marble, with an inſcription that mentioned the number of ſhips, which were either taken or ſunk, and the ſums of gold and ſilver brought into the treaſury. This column ſubſiſts to this day, and its inſcription is one of the moſt antient monuments of the Latin tongue, which was ſtill very groſs and imperfect in thoſe times. Duilius in ſome meaſure perpetuated his triumph

* *On the weſt of Sicily, near the ſea.*
† *A more inland place than Segeſta.*

during

during his whole life. (*a*) For that purpoſe, when he returned at night from ſupping in the city, he always walked with a torch and a muſician before him: an unexampled diſtinction of a private perſon, and which he aſſumed himſelf; ſo much confidence did the glory he had acquired, give him, and ſo much did it raiſe him above rules. A. R. 492. Ant. C. 260. Florus ii. 2.

L. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.
C. AQUILIUS FLÓRUS. A. R. 493. Ant. C. 259.

The provinces of theſe Conſuls, as before, were Sicily and the fleet. The Senate left him, to whom the fleet ſhould fall, at liberty to land in Sardinia or Corſica, if he thought fit. The lots gave this province to Cornelius, who immediately ſet out. This was the firſt expedition of the Romans againſt Sardinia and Corſica. *Expedition againſt Sardinia and Corſica.* Freinſh. viii. 12—22.

Theſe two iſlands are ſo near each other, that they might be taken almoſt for one and the ſame: but they differ very much in the nature of their ſoil and climate, as well as in the genius and character of their inhabitants. Sardinia was otherwiſe called *Ichnuſa*. It does not give place in extent to the greateſt iſlands in the Mediterranean, nor for goodneſs to the moſt fertile. (*b*) Valerius Maximus, ſpeaking of Sicily and Sardinia, calls them the abundant feeders and nouriſhers of Rome. It was rich in cattle, bore excellent corn in great plenty,

(*a*) C. Duilium—redeuntem à cœna ſenem ſæpe videbam puer. (*It is Cato who ſpeaks*) Delectabatur cereo funali, & tibicine; quæ ſibi nullo exemplo privatus ſumpſerat: tantum licentiæ dabat gloria. *Cic. de Senect.* n. 44.

(*b*) Siciliam & Sardiniam, benigniſſimas urbis noſtræ nutrices. *Val. Max.* viii. 6.

A. R. 495. Ant. C. 259. and had many mines both of gold and ſilver. The air has been counted bad in all ſeaſons, but eſpecially in ſummer. The principal city was *Caralis*, now called *Cagliari*, oppoſite to Africa, and has a good port.

Corſica, called by the Greeks *Cyrnus*, is not to be compared to Sardinia, either for extent or power. It is mountainous, rough, inacceſſible, and uncultivated in many places. The inhabitants partake of the nature of the ſoil, and are of a groſs and brutal diſpoſition. They bear ſubjection with great reluctance, and are averſe to all maſters. They had ſeveral cities, but not much frequented: the principal were Aleria, a colony of the Phoceans, and Nicea, a colony of the Hetrurians. It is now divided into two parts, the one on this ſide of the mountains, in which there are five and forty ſmall diſtricts, that they call *Pieves*, wherein are Baſtia the capital of the iſland, Balagnia, Calvi, Corte, Aleria, and the cape of Corſica; the other part beyond the mountains, in which there are one and twenty diſtricts or Pieves; the principal cities are Ajazzo, Boniface, Porto-Vecchio, and Sarna.

The Carthaginians had long made war with the inhabitants of theſe two iſlands, and had at length poſſeſſed themſelves of the whole country, except ſuch places as were inacceſſible and impracticable, to which no army could approach, and where it was impoſſible to force them. As it was more eaſy to overcome the bodies, than the minds of theſe people, the Carthaginians had recourſe to a ſtrange method in reſpect to them, which was to root up all their corn and other productions of the earth, in order to hold them in entire dependance, by obliging them to fetch every thing neceſſary to life from Africa, and

and by prohibiting them, upon pain of death, either to ſow grain or to plant fruit trees. Ariſtotle, who relates this fact, does not mention at what time it was. How capable was ſo cruel and inhuman a treatment to irritate a people naturally fierce, and enemies to every kind of ſubjection! To reduce them, it was neceſſary not to root up the corn from their lands, but the love of liberty natural to all men from their hearts; or to ſpeak more properly, pains ſhould have been taken to ſoften and poliſh their manners, by treating them with gentleneſs and humanity. The Carthaginians in conſequence could never make themſelves entirely maſters of this people, (*a*) ſufficiently ſubjected to obey but not to be treated like ſlaves, as Tacitus ſays of the people of Great-Britain.

A. R. 493. Ant. C. 259. De mirab. Auſcult. p. 1159.

The Conſul Cornelius advances towards theſe iſlands, and firſt took Aleria in Corſica; after which all the other places ſurrendered themſelves. From thence he went to Sardinia. He fell in, on his way, with the enemy's fleet, which he put to flight. He intended to attack Olbia; but finding himſelf too weak, and that city in too good a condition to defend itſelf, he renounced the ſiege, and returned to Rome in order to raiſe more numerous forces. At his return he was more fortunate. Having defeated and killed Hanno in a battle, he took the city. The Conſul ordered the funeral of the Carthaginian General to be ſolemnized in an honourable manner; convinced that ſuch an act of humanity, in reſpect to an enemy, would very much exalt the luſtre of the victory he had gained. That action ſuits the probity and virtue of Cornelius, as atteſted by an antient inſcription,

(*a*) Jam domiti ut paveant, nondum ut ſerviant. *Tacit. in vit. Agric.* c. 13.

which

A. R. 493. Ant. C. 259. which I ſhall repeat here, becauſe it is ſhort; but it includes the moſt perfect praiſe, in ſaying, that Cornelius held the firſt rank amongſt the perſons of worth and honour. *Honc oinom ploerumei coſentiont duonorum optimom fuiſſe virom:* which, according to the manner of later ages, would be wrote, *Hunc unum plurimi conſentiunt bonorum optimum fuiſſe virum.*

Conſpiracy at Rome ſtifled in its birth.

Oroſ. iv. 7. Zonar. viii. 386.

Liv. xxxvi. 2. xxxvii. 2. xl. 16. xlii 27.

Liv. xxiv. 11.

Rome ſaw herſelf expoſed at that time within her own walls to an exceeding danger, from which ſhe was preſerved by extreme good fortune. The fact is as follows. The rowers, in the Roman fleets, were compoſed partly of freedmen, who from ſlaves had been made Roman citizens, and partly of ſoldiers furniſhed by the allies. Both the one and the other were called *ſocii navales*, as we find in ſeveral parts of Livy. They were liſted, and took an oath, as ſoldiers. In the ſecond Punic war, as the public treaſury was exhauſted, the citizens were obliged to furniſh, and maintain at their own expence, a certain number of their ſlaves for rowers, according to the amount of their eſtates. At the time of which we are ſpeaking, there were four thouſand men at Rome, moſt of them Samnites, ſent by the allies to make up the number of rowers. As they had a declared averſion for the ſea-ſervice, they were continually talking with each other upon the misfortune to which they were going to be expoſed. This inflamed them to ſuch a degree, that they formed the deſign of burning and plundering the city. Three thouſand ſlaves entered into this conſpiracy. Happily one of the officers of the Samnites diſcovered the plot, and informed himſelf in all the circumſtances of it, which he immediately imparted to the Senate, who ſtifled it in its birth, and before it could break out.

The

The Conſul Florus did no great exploits in Sicily. Cornelius, having driven the Carthaginian arms both out of Corſica and Sardinia, triumphed with great glory. A. R. 493. Ant. C. 259.

SECT. II.

The Conſul Atilius is preſerved in great danger by the courage of Calpurnius Flamma, a Legionary Tribune. He beats the Carthaginian fleet. Regulus is elected Conſul. Famous battle of Ecnoma gained by the Romans at ſea. The two Conſuls go to Africa, take Clypea, and ravage the whole country. Regulus continues to command in Africa in quality of Proconſul: his Collegue returns to Rome. Regulus demands a ſucceſſor. Battle with the ſerpent of Bagrada. Battle gained by Regulus. He takes Tunis. Hard propoſals of peace offered by Regulus to the Carthaginians: they refuſe them. The arrival of Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian revives the courage and confidence of the Carthaginians. Regulus is defeated in a battle by Xanthippus, and taken priſoner. Xanthippus retires. Reflections of Polybius upon that great event. A new fleet built at Rome. The Carthaginians raiſe the ſiege of Clypea. The Conſuls go to Africa with a numerous fleet. After gaining two battles, they put to ſea again to return into Italy. The Roman fleet is diſperſed by a dreadful ſtorm upon the coaſts of Sicily. The Carthaginians beſiege, and take Agrigentum. The taking of Panormus by the Romans is followed by the ſurrender of many places. The Romans, diſcouraged by ſeveral ſhipwrecks, renounce the ſea. Lipara taken. Diſobedience of an officer ſeverely puniſhed. Remarkable ſeverity of the Cenſors. The Senate turn their whole efforts again to the war

war by ſea. Famous battle by land near Panormus gained by the Proconſul Metellus over the Carthaginians. The elephants that were taken are ſent to Rome. Manner in which they are made to paſs the ſtrait. The Carthaginians ſend Ambaſſadors to Rome to treat of peace, or of the exchange of priſoners. Regulus accompanies them. He declares againſt the exchange. He returns to Carthage, where he is put to death in the moſt cruel torments. Reflections upon the conſtancy and patience of Regulus.

A. R. 494. Ant. C. 258.

A. ATILIUS CALATINUS.
C. SULPICIUS PATERCULUS.

Siege and taking of Mytiſtrata. Zonar. viii. 388. Liv. Epit. xvii. A. Gell. iii. 7.

ATILIUS, to whom the command of the land-army in Sicity had fallen by lot, confined himſelf to the ſiege of Mytiſtrata *, a very ſtrong place, which his predeceſſors had attacked at different times, but always without ſucceſs. After a long reſiſtance the Carthaginian garriſon tired with the cries and lamentations of the women and children, who eagerly demanded that an end ſhould be put to the cruel evils the city had long ſuffered, quitted the place in the night, and left the inhabitants at liberty to diſpoſe of their fate as they thought fit. The next morning they opened their gates to the Romans. Their ſubmiſſion, which was entirely voluntary, deſerved the kindeſt and moſt indulgent treatment. But the ſoldiers, who had ſuffered the length of the ſiege with impatience, tranſported with fury, and hearkening only to revenge, put all to the ſword without regard to age or ſex, till the Conſul, to put an end to the ſlaughter, cauſed declaration to be made, that the ſoldiers ſhould have the money for which the

* *Situated weſtward, near the river Alæſus.*

priſoners

priſoners were ſold. Avarice prevailed over cruelty, and diſarmed thoſe frantic wretches. The citizens that eſcaped their fury were ſold; and the place was plundered and afterwards deſtroyed. A. R. 494. Ant. C. 258.

The Conſul Atilius is preſerved in great danger by the valour of Calpurnius Flamma a legionary Tribune.

The ſame Conſul having entered a valley, commanded by an eminence, upon which the Carthaginian General was poſted, could not have diſengaged himſelf, and muſt have periſhed there with all his troops, but for the valour and boldneſs of one of his officers. He was ealled, according to the moſt common opinion, (for authors differ concerning the name of that brave man) Calpurnius Flamma, and was Tribune of a legion. After the example of the Decii, he expoſed himſelf, with three hundred men intrepid like himſelf, to certain death to preſerve the army. *Let us die*, ſaid he to them, *and by our deaths deliver the Conſul and the legions.* He ſet out, and found means to ſeize a neighbouring eminence. The enemy did not fail to go thither to diſlodge him. Though their number was ſmall, as they were determined to periſh, they ſold their lives dear, made an horrible ſlaughter, and defended themſelves long enough to give the Conſul opportunity to ſave the army, whilſt the enemy was ſolely intent upon driving them from that eminence. The Carthaginians, ſeeing their deſign fruſtrated, retired. Florus ii. 2. Aul. Gell. iii. 7.

The ſequel of ſo heroic an action is quite wonderful, and exalts the luſtre of it. Calpurnius was found in the midſt of an heap of dead bodies both of his own men and the enemy, and was the only one that reſpired among them. He was covered all over with wounds; but happily not one of them was mortal, and was carried off and dreſſed: infinite care was taken of him; and being perfectly cured, he did his

country

A. R. 494. Ant. C. 258. country good ſervice long after. To be taken in this manner out of an heap of the dead, is almoſt to come out of the grave, and to ſurvive one's ſelf. Cato, from whom Aulus Gellius extracted the account of this couragious action, compares it to that of (*a*) Leonidas amongſt the Greeks at Thermopylæ, with this difference, that the valour of the Spartan King was celebrated by the praiſes and applauſes of all Greece, and the remembrance of it preſerved in all hiſtories, and tranſmitted down to poſterity by paintings, ſtatues, inſcriptions, and every kind of public monuments that perpetuate the name and glory of great men: whereas a moderate and tranſient praiſe, a crown of turf (*corona graminea*) was all the reward of the Roman tribune. How many heroic actions of our armies are at this day ſtill leſs known and leſs celebrated than that of Calpurnius Flamma! He was very well ſatisfied with his fate, and thought himſelf ſufficiently honoured. And indeed, (*b*) of all the crowns with which the exploits of the Roman citizens were rewarded, that of turf was far the moſt glorious, and took place even of thoſe of gold ſet with diamonds. In theſe happy times the Romans were not at all ſenſible to intereſt, and would have thought it

(*a*) Leonidas Lacedæmonius laudatur, qui ſimile apud Thermopylas fecit. Propter ejus virtutes omnes Græcia gloriam atque gratiam præcipuam claritudinis inclutiſſimæ decoravere monimentis, ſignis, ſtatuis, elogiis, hiſtoriis, aliiſque rebus gratiſſimum id ejus factum habuere. At Tribuno militum parva laus pro factis relicta, qui idem fecerat, atque rem ſervaverat. *Cato, apud Aul. Gell.*

(*b*) Corona quidem nulla fuit gramineâ nobilior, in majeſtate populi terrarum principis, præmiiſque gloriæ. Gemmatæ & aureæ—poſt hanc fuere, ſuntque cunctæ magno intervallo, magnaque differentia. *Plin.* xxii. 3.

diſhonou-

diſhonouring themſelves to act from ſuch mean and abject motives. Glory, and the pleaſure of ſerving their country, were deemed the only rewards worthy of virtue. A. R. 494. Ant. C. 258.

The conſul made an advantageous amends for his fault by reducing ſeveral cities of Sicily.

His collegue had at the ſame time ſuch good ſucceſs in Sardinia, that he ventured to go from thence with his fleet to Africa. The alarm was great there. Hannibal, who was at Carthage after his flight from Sicily, received orders to go againſt the Conſul. The two armies were ſeparated by a furious tempeſt, and both driven into the ports of Sardinia. A battle enſued near that iſland. Hannibal was defeated by his own fault, and had moſt of his ſhips taken. The troops, who aſcribed their defeat to his temerity, avenged themſelves upon him by crucifying him, which was the uſual puniſhment amongſt the Carthaginians. Polyb. i. 25.

C. Duilius was Cenſor this year with L. Cornelius Scipio. Faſt. Capit.

C. ATILIUS REGULUS.
CN. CORNELIUS BLASIO.

A. R. 495. Ant. C. 257.

Regulus was actually employed in * ſowing his land, when the officers ſent by the Senate, came to inform him, that he (*a*) was elected Conſul. Happy times, when poverty was ſo much in honour, and Conſuls were taken from

* *For this reaſon he was ſurnamed* Serranus.

(*a*) Illis temporibus ab aratro arceſſebantur, qui Conſules fierent—Atilium ſua manu ſpargentem ſemen, qui miſſi erant, convenerunt. *Cic. pro Roſc. Amer.* n. 50.

Sed illæ ruſtico opere attritæ manus ſalutem publicam ſtabilierunt, ingentes hoſtium copias peſſum dederunt. *Val. Max.* iv. 4.

the

A. R. 495. Ant. C. 257. the plow. Thoſe hands enured to country labours, ſuſtained the State, and cut to pieces the numerous armies of its enemies.

Some prodigies happened about this time upon the Alban mountain, in ſeveral other places, and in the city itſelf. The Senate ordered, that ſacrifices ſhould be offered, and the games, called *Feriæ Latinæ*, celebrated again. For this purpoſe a Dictator was nominated.

Polyb. i. 25. The Conſul Regulus, (this is not the great Regulus) who commanded the Roman fleet, having landed at Tyndarida a city of Sicily, oppoſite to Lipara, and having deſcryed the Carthaginian fleet under Amilcar in motion there without order, he ſet out firſt with ten ſhips, and commanded the reſt to follow him. The Carthaginians ſeeing the enemy divided, and not in a good diſpoſition, ſome only going on board, whilſt others were weighing anchor, and the advanced guard very diſtant from thoſe that followed, they ſtood towards that guard, ſurrounded and ſunk all the galleys, except that of the Conſul, which was in great danger: but as it was well ſupplied with rowers, and lighter than the reſt, it happily extricated itſelf, and got clear. It was a great fault in the Admiral to advance raſhly with ſo ſmall a number of ſhips, without being apprized of the enemy's force. He had the good fortune to repair it ſoon. The reſt of the Roman ſhips arrived preſently after, drew up in a line, charged the Carthaginians, took ten of their ſhips, and ſunk eight. The reſt retired into the iſlands of Lipara.

L. MAN-

L. MANLIUS VULSO.
Q. CÆDICIUS.

A. R. 496.
Ant. C. 256.

The laſt of theſe Conſuls dying in office, to him was ſubſtituted

M. ATILIUS REGULUS II.

Famous battle of Ecnoma gained by the Romans. Polyb. i. 26—30.

The Romans had ſtrengthened themſelves exceedingly at ſea the preceding years, and gained many battles; they however conſidered all the advantages they had gained hitherto, as trials and preparations for a great enterprize which they meditated: this was to attack the Carthaginians in their own country. The latter feared nothing ſo much, and to avert ſo dangerous a blow, reſolved to come to a battle whatever it coſt them.

Dreadful preparations were made on both ſides. The Roman fleet conſiſted of three hundred and thirty ſhips, and carried an hundred and forty thouſand men; each ſhip having three hundred rowers, and an hundred and twenty combatants. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar and Hanno, had ten ſhips more, and men in proportion. I deſire the reader to take particular notice of the greatneſs of this armament, which muſt give him a quite different idea, from what we uſually have of the navies of the ancients.

The Romans anchored firſt at Meſſana: from thence they left Sicily on their right, and doubling the cape of Pachynus, they bore away towards * Ecnoma; becauſe their army was in that neighbourhood. As to the Carthaginians,

* Ecnoma, *a city and mountain called* Dilicata, *near the mouth of Himera, or* Salſi, *upon the ſouth ſide of Sicily.*

A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256. they advanced towards Lilybæum, and from thence to Heraclea of Minos. The two fleets ſoon came in ſight. One could not behold two ſuch great fleets and armies, nor be witneſs of the extraordinary movements they made in preparing for battle, without being ſtruck with ſome dread at the ſight of the danger, which two of the moſt powerful people of the earth were upon the point of experiencing.

The Romans kept themſelves in a readineſs to fight if the enemy offered them battle, and to make a deſcent in their country, if they did not prevent it. They choſe the beſt of their land troops, and divided their whole army into four parts, of which each had two names. The firſt was called the firſt legion and the firſt ſquadron, and ſo of the reſt, except the fourth, which was called the *Triarii*, a name given by the Romans to the laſt line of the land army.

Reflecting, that they were going to fight in the open ſea, and that the enemy's ſtrength conſiſted in the lightneſs of their ſhips, they thought it neceſſary to fix upon a ſecure order of battle, and one which could not eaſily be broke. In order to this the two veſſels of ſix benches of oars, on board of which were the two Conſuls Regulus and Manlius, were placed in the front ſide by ſide. Each of them was followed by a line or file of ſhips, of which the one formed the firſt, and the other the ſecond, ſquadron. The veſſels of each line kept off, and enlarged the ſpace in the middle, in proportion as they drew up, and kept their heads turned outwards. The two firſt ſquadrons drawn up in this order, formed the two ſides of an acute-angled triangle. The ſpace in the middle was void. The third ſquadron formed the baſe of the triangle, extending in breadth from the end of the firſt

ſquadron

Rollin's. Rom. Hist. Tol. IV. p. 67



W. H. Toms Sculp.

1. Carthaginian Fleet.
2. Roman Fleet.
3. First Squadron.
4. Second Squadron.

PLAN of the NAVAL BATTLE of ECNOMA

5. Third Squadron.
6. Transports towed by the 3d Squadron.
7. Fourth Squadron.

ſquadron to that of the ſecond. Thus the order of battle had the figure of a triangle. This third ſquadron towed the tranſports diſpoſed in a long line behind it. And laſt of all was the fourth ſquadron, or the Triarii, which was ſo drawn up, as to extend at both ends beyond the line that preceeded it. A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256.

This order of battle adapted in the whole either to motion or action, and at the ſame time very difficult to break, was entirely extraordinary, and perhaps unexampled, but without doubt founded upon good reaſons, for which perſons ſkillful in naval affairs can account, though above my comprehenſion. I content myſelf, in order to aſſiſt the reader to conceive it the more eaſily, to exhibit the image of it to his eyes in this place.

Whilſt all things were preparing in this manner, the Carthaginian Generals exhorted their ſoldiers, by telling them very ſuccinctly, "that "by gaining the battle, they would have no "war to ſuſtain, except in Sicily; whereas if "they loſt it, they would be obliged to defend "their own country, and all that was deareſt "to them in the world." They then gave orders for the troops to go on board their ſhips and prepare for battle, which the ſoldiers executed with joy and diſpatch, extremely animated by the powerful motives, which had juſt been laid before them in few words, and ſhewing a courage and confidence capable of intimidating the enemy.

The Carthaginian Generals, regulating the diſpoſition of their fleet by that of the Romans, divided it into three ſquadrons, drawn up in one line. They extended the right wing towards the main ſea, by removing it a little from the centre, as if to ſurround the enemy, and turned

A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256. their heads towards them. To the left wing they joined a fourth ſquadron, drawn up in a curve line, inclining towards the ſhore. Hanno the General, who had been worſted at the ſiege of Agrigentum, commanded the right wing, and had with him the ſhips and galleys that were fitteſt by their lightneſs to ſurround the enemy. Amilcar, who had already commanded at Tyndarida, reſerved the centre and the left to himſelf. During the battle, he made uſe of a ſtratagem, which might have occaſioned the ruin of the Romans, if his fleet had made the uſe of it that they ought. As the Carthaginians were drawn up in a ſingle line, which therefore ſeemed eaſy to be broke, the Romans began by attacking the centre. Upon which, in order to ſeparate their army, orders were ſent to the centre of the Carthaginians to retreat. Accordingly it fled; and the Romans ſuffering themſelves to be carried away by their ardor, purſued thoſe that gave way with a raſh impetuoſity. The firſt and ſecond ſquadrons, in effect of this movement, ſeparated from the third, which had the tranſports in tow; and from the fourth, in which were the Triarii intended to ſupport them. When they were at a certain diſtance a ſignal was hoiſted in Amilcar's ſhip, upon which thoſe that fled, faced about vigorouſly againſt their purſuers. The battle now grew warm on both ſides; the Carthaginians had the advantage of the Romans by the lightneſs of their ſhips, and their addreſs and faculty in advancing and retiring: but the vigour of the Romans in the charge, their *Corvi* for grappling with the enemy's ſhips, the preſence of their Generals who fought at the head of them, and in whoſe ſight they ardently deſired to ſignalize themſelves, inſpired them with no leſs confidence, than the

Cartha-

Carthaginians had on their ſide. Such was the attack in this part of the fleets. A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256.

At the ſame time Hanno, who commanded the right wing, and in the beginning of the battle had kept at ſome diſtance from the reſt of the navy, advancing into the open ſea, veered about to charge the ſhips of the Triarii in the rear, and put them into confuſion. On the other ſide, the Carthaginians of the left wing, who were near the land in a curve line, changed their ſituation, drew up in front, keeping their heads oppoſite to the enemy, and charged the third ſquadron, that had the tranſports in tow. That ſquadron immediately let go the veſſels made faſt to them, and came to blows. Thus the whole battle was divided into three parts, each engaging at a very great diſtance from the other. The victory was a long time doubtful, and wavered between both parties. But at length the ſquadron commanded by Amilcar, not being able to reſiſt longer, was put to flight, and Manlius made faſt the ſhips he had taken to his own. Regulus went to aid the Triarii and tranſports with the galleys of the ſecond ſquadron, which had not ſuffered at all. Whilſt he was engaged with Hanno's fleet, the Triarii, who were almoſt reduced to ſurrender, reſumed courage, and returned to the charge with vigour. The Carthaginians, attacked in front and rear, and ſurrounded by this new aid, in their confuſion gave way and made off.

Things were in this ſtate, when Manlius returned, and perceived the third ſquadron driven towards the ſhore by the left wing of the Carthaginians. The tranſports and Triarii being ſafe, Regulus and he joined, in order to extricate that ſquadron out of the danger, in which it was. For it was in a manner beſieged, and

A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256. would infallibly have been defeated, if the Carthaginians had not contented themſelves with hemming it in towards the ſhore, for fear of boarding and cloſe fight. The Conſuls arrived, ſurrounded the Carthaginians, and took fifty of their ſhips with all their crews. Some having ſtood in for the land found their ſafety in flight. Such were the events of the different attacks, in all which the Romans had the advantage, and gained a compleat victory. For twenty-four of their ſhips that were ſunk, the Carthaginians loſt thirty: no ſhip of the Romans fell into the hands of the enemy, and the latter had ſixty-four taken.

Polyb. i. 56. Zonar. viii. 390. The fruit of this victory was, as the Romans had projected, their ſailing to Africa, after having refitted their ſhips, and ſupplied them with all things neceſſary for a long war in a ſtrange country. The Carthaginian Generals ſeeing that they could not prevent their paſſage, would at leaſt have retarded it for ſome weeks, in order either to give Carthage time to put itſelf into a condition of defence, or to ſend them the aids they expected. The queſtion was to make propoſals of peace to the Conſuls. Amilcar did not dare to go to them in perſon, leſt the Romans ſhould ſeize him, by way of reprizal, for the Conſul Cornelius Aſina, treacherouſly taken five years before and ſent in chains to Carthage. Hanno was bolder. He went to the Conſuls, and declared, that he was come to treat of peace with them, and to make, if poſſible, a good alliance between the two States. He heard however ſome Romans about the Conſuls murmur about Cornelius Aſina, and actually ſay, that they ought to follow that example on this occaſion. *If you do that*, ſays Hanno, *you will be as bad as the Africans.* The Conſuls ſilenced their

their attendants, and addreſſing themſelves to Hanno, ſaid: (a) *You need be under no apprehenſions on that head: the faith of Rome ſecures you from that fear.* They did not enter into a conference with him concerning an accommodation. They well perceived with what view he came: beſides which, the great ſucceſſes they promiſed themſelves, made them prefer war to peace. A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256.

Some days after the Conſuls ſet out with the fleet, but not without extreme repugnance on the ſide of ſome ſoldiers, and even officers, whom the name only of the ſea, a long voyage, and the coaſt of an enemy greatly diſpirited. Mannius, one of the legionary Tribunes, diſtinguiſhed himſelf more than the reſt, and from complaints and murmuring went ſo far as to refuſe to obey. Regulus, who was a man of great ſteadineſs and authority, pointing to the rods and axes carried by the Lictor, told him in a menacing tone, that *he knew how to make himſelf be obeyed.* (b) One fear got the better of the other, and the menace of preſent death made him a reſolute navigator. Flor. ii. 2.

The two Conſuls ſail to Africa, make themſelves maſters of Clypea, and ravage the whole country. Polyb. i. 30, 31.

They had a good voyage, without being croſſed by any ſtorm or other bad accident. The firſt ſhips came to an anchor on the coaſt near the promontory of * Hermæum, which lying in the gulf of Carthage, projects into the ſea on the ſide towards Sicily. They waited there for the reſt of the fleet, and when it came up, ſteered along the coaſt as far as Aſpis, otherwiſe

(a) Iſto te metu, Hanno, fides civitatis noſtræ liberat. *Val. Max.* vi. 6.

(b) Securi diſtricta Imperator metu mortis navigandi fecit audaciam. *Flor.*

* *It is believed to be the ſame as the promontory of Mercury or Hermæum, now called* Good Cape.

A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256. called * Clypea. They landed there, and having drawn their ſhips aſhore, they covered them with an intrenchment; and on the refuſal of the inhabitants to open their gates, they beſieged the place.

It is eaſy to conceive the trouble and emotion, which the arrival of the Romans occaſioned amongſt the Carthaginians. From the moment they received advice of the loſs of the battle of Ecnoma, the alarm became general throughout the whole country. Convinced that the Conſuls, encouraged by their great, and ſeemingly unexpected, ſucceſs, would not fail to advance with their victorious troops to Carthage, if it were only to inſult it; they were in continual apprehenſions, and expected every moment to ſee the army of the enemy before their gates.

The Conſuls, on their ſide, as ſoon as they became maſters of Clypea, after having fortified it well, made it their place of arms: they then diſpatched couriers to Rome, to give the Senate advice of their ſucceſsful landing, and to receive its orders concerning the farther operations of the war. In the mean time, they diſperſed themſelves about the flat country, deſtroyed it in a terrible manner, carried off a vaſt number of cattle, with twenty thouſand priſoners. They found the land rich and fertile, which had not felt the ſword of an enemy ſince the irruption of Agathocles, that is to ſay, during fifty years.

The courier being returned from Rome, brought back the Senate's orders, who had thought proper to continue Regulus in the command of the army in Africa as Proconſul, and

* *Now* Quipia, *below the promontory of Mercury.*

to

to recal his collegue, with a great part of the fleet and army, leaving Regulus only forty ſhips, fifteen thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe. Part of the fleet might have been neceſſary for preſerving the conqueſts in Sicily; but to reduce the forces of the Conſul to ſo ſmall a number of ſhips and men, was evidently renouncing the advantages to be expected from the deſcent in Africa. A. R. 496. Ant. C. 256.

Manlius, before winter came on, ſet out with the reſt of the fleet and army. Zonaras tells us, that the Conſul brought away many Roman citizens, who had been taken in the preceding years by the Carthaginians, and were delivered by him out of ſlavery. Perhaps Cornelius Aſina, whom we ſhall ſee Conſul again in a ſhort time, was of that number. Manlius, at his return to Rome with great ſpoils, was extremely well received, and had the honour of a naval triumph granted him.

SERV. FULVIUS PÆTINUS NOBILIOR.
M. ÆMILIUS PAULUS. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

Regulus demands a ſucceſſor.

I have juſt ſaid, that the Senate did not think it proper to recal Regulus from Africa, and to interrupt the courſe of his victories, but had continued him in the command of the army. No one was ſo ſorry for this decree as him, for whom it ſeemed ſo glorious. He wrote to the Senate to complain of it, and to demand that ſomebody ſhould be ſent to ſucceed him. One of his reaſons was, *That a day-labourer taking the advantage of the death of the huſbandman, who cultivated a ſmall eſtate of ſeven acres, had ran away with all his working tools uſed in manuring: That his preſence was therefore abſolutely neceſſary, leſt, if his field ſhould happen to lie unculti-*

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255. *uncultivated, he ſhould not have ſubſiſtence for his wife and children.* The Senate decreed, *That his field ſhould be cultivated at the expence of the public; that working tools ſhould be bought to ſupply the place of thoſe, which had been ſtolen; and that the Commonwealth ſhould provide for the wife and children of Regulus.* (a) Thus the Roman People made themſelves, in ſome meaſure, the huſbandman of Regulus. (b) And this was all that ſo rare an example of virtue, which will do honour to Rome during all ages, coſt the public treaſury.

How amazing was the ſimplicity of this conqueror of the Carthaginians! Some will perhaps call it, his ruſticity. But let ſuch term it as they will, the diſcerning will always perceive his exalted worth, and greatneſs of ſoul. For my part, I can't tell whether to admire him moſt at the head of armies, conquering the enemies of his country, or with the companions of his labours, cultivating his little field. We here ſee, how much true merit is above riches. The glory of Regulus ſtill ſubſiſts: for who can refuſe him their eſteem? The wealth of the opulent periſhes with them, and often before them, *either in making no uſe, or a bad one of it.*

Polyb. i. 31. The Carthaginians in the mean time had eſtabliſhed two leaders to command in the city, Aſdrubal the ſon of Hanno, and Boſtar, and had made Amilcar return from Sicily, who had brought with him five thouſand foot and five hundred horſe. Theſe three Generals, after having deliberated together concerning the preſent

(a) Fuit næ tanti ſervum non habere, ut colonis ejus Populus Romanus eſſet. *Senec. de Conſol. ad Helv.* cap. 12.

(b) Tanti ærario noſtro virtutis Atilianæ exemplum, quo omnis ætas Romana gloriabitur, ſtetit. *Val. Max.* iv. 4.

ſtate

ſtate of affairs, concluded unanimouſly, that it was not proper to keep the troops ſhut up within the walls, as had been done hitherto, nor to leave the Romans at liberty to ruin the whole country with impunity. The army in conſequence took the field. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

As for Regulus he did not let his own lie ſtill, but continually advancing, deſtroyed all the country in his way. Being come to a place through which the river * Bagrada runs, he found there, if hiſtorians may be believed, an enemy of a kind entirely new, which he did not expect, and from which his army had much to ſuffer: this was a ſerpent of enormous magnitude. When the ſoldiers went to the river to fetch water, he darted out upon them, and either cruſhed them to death with the weight of his body, ſmothered them with the folds of his tail, or killed them with his envenomed breath. The hard ſcales of his ſkin made him invulnerable to darts, and every other kind of weapons. It was neceſſary to plant catapultas and baliſtas againſt him, and to attack him in form like a citdel. At length, after many ineffectual diſcharges, a ſtone of a vaſt ſize flung with exceeding force, broke his back bone, and laid him upon the earth. The ſoldiers were ſo much afraid of ſo terrible an enemy, though in a manner dead, that he was not entirely killed without difficulty. Regulus ſent his ſpoils, that is to ſay his ſkin, ſix and twenty feet long, to Rome. It was hung up in a temple, where Pliny the Naturaliſt ſays, it was to be ſeen in the time of the war of Numantia. *Battle with the ſerpent of Bagrada.* Val. Max. i. 8. Plin. viii.

* *A river between Utica and Carthage. It is now called* Megrada.

From

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 253. *Battle gained by Regulus.* Polyb. i. 31.

From Bagrada Regulus advanced to * Adis, one of the ſtrongeſt towns of the country, and beſieged it. The Carthaginians marched immediately to the relief of that place, and poſted themſelves upon an hill which commanded the camp of the Romans, and from which they could annoy them very much; but its ſituation rendered a great part of their army uſeleſs. For the principal ſtrength of the Carthaginian forces conſiſted in cavalry and elephants, which were of no uſe except on plains. Regulus did not give them time to come down from thence; and to take advantage of the eſſential fault committed by the Carthaginian Generals, he attacked them in that poſt, and after a weak reſiſtance, in which their own elephants did them more hurt than the enemy themſelves, he put them to the rout. The plain ſecured the horſe and the elephants. The victors, after having purſued the infantry for ſome time, returned to plunder the camp. In this action the Carthaginians had ſeventeen thouſand men killed, and five thouſand taken priſoners, with twelve elephants. The news of this victory, which ſoon ſpread univerſally, acquired the Romans not only the neighbouring, but very remote, countries, and in a few days almoſt fourſcore cities and towns ſurrendered to them. Regulus, ſoon after, made himſelf maſter of Tunis, a place of importance, which brought him very near Carthage; it being only about twelve or fifteen miles from thence.

Taking of Tunis.

Hard conditions of peace offered the Carthaginians by Regulus. Polyb. i. 31.

The enemy were extremely alarmed. Every thing had gone againſt them hitherto. They had been defeated by ſea and land. More than two hundred places had ſurrendered to the victor.

* *It does not ſubſiſt now, and where it was, is not known.*

The

The Numidians committed greater ravages in the Country than the Romans. They expected every moment to ſee themſelves beſieged in their capital. The peaſants flying thither from all ſides with their wives and children for refuge, augmented the confuſion and trouble, and made them apprehend famine in caſe of a ſiege. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

The Carthaginians ſeeing themſelves without hope or reſource, deputed the principal perſons of their Senate to demand peace of the Roman General. Regulus, who apprehended the coming of a ſucceſſor to deprive him of the glory of his exploits; and beſides, ſeeing himſelf not in a condition, with the few troops that had been left him, to undertake the ſiege of Carthage, which was the ſole means to terminate the war entirely in Africa, did not refuſe to treat. He made ſome propoſals of peace to the conquered; but they appeared ſo hard, that they could not hearken to them. Theſe conditions were, "That "they ſhould give up all Sicily and Sardinia to "the Romans; that they ſhould reſtore them "their priſoners without ranſom; that they "ſhould ranſom their own at ſuch a price as "ſhould be agreed upon; that they ſhould bear "all the expences of the war, and pay an an-"nual tribute." To theſe he added ſome other conditions no leſs mortifying: "That they "ſhould conſider all thoſe as friends and ene-"mies, who were ſo to the Romans; that "they ſhould uſe no long ſhips; that they "ſhould have but one ſhip of war at ſea; and "that they ſhould furniſh the Romans, when-"ever required, with fifty galleys of three "benches of oars entirely equipped." As he was aſſured the Carthaginians were reduced to extremities, he would abate nothing of theſe conditions, whatever inſtances the deputies made

Zonar. viii. 391.

Polyb.

to

A. R. 497. Am. C. 255.

to him on that head; and through a preſumption, with which great and unexpected ſucceſſes are almoſt always attended, he treated them with haughtineſs, affirming, that they ought to conſider all he left them as great favour, adding with a kind of inſult; *That they ought either to know how to conquer, or how to ſubmit to the victor.* So hard and haughty a treatment enraged the Carthaginians, and they reſolved rather to periſh with their ſwords in their hands, than to ſubmit to any thing ſo unworthy of the greatneſs of Carthage.

The arrival of Xanthippus revives the courage and confidence of the Carthaginians. Polyb. i. 33—37.

In this dreadful extremity a reinforcement of auxiliary troops from Greece arrived very opportunely, amongſt whom was Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian, educated in the Spartan diſcipline, and who had learnt the art military in that excellent ſchool. When he had informed himſelf in all the circumſtances of the laſt battle, had clearly perceived how it came to be loſt, and ſeen with his own eyes, wherein the principal ſtrength of the Carthaginians conſiſted; he declared publickly, and often repeated it in converſation with the other officers, that if the Carthaginians had been defeated, it was entirely owing to the incapacity of their Generals, who had not known how to employ the ſtrength and advantages they had in their own hands. This diſcourſe was related to the public Council, on whom it made great impreſſion. He was deſired to repair thither. He ſupported his opinion with ſuch ſtrong and convincing reaſons, that he made the faults, which the Generals had committed evident to every body; and he ſhewed as clearly, that in obſerving a different conduct, the country might not only be ſecured, but the enemy driven out of it.

Such

Such a diſcourſe revived the courage and hopes of the aſſembly. They deſired, and in ſome meaſure forced him, for he made a difficulty of it a great while, to take upon himſelf the command of the army. When they ſaw, in the exerciſes which he made the troops perform without the walls, his manner of drawing them up, of making them advance, retreat, or file off with order and promptitude; in a word, all the evolutions and movements neceſſary in the art military, they were quite aſtoniſhed, and confeſſed that the moſt able Generals Carthage had ever produced till then, were ignorant novices compared with this. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 253.

Both officers and ſoldiers were ſtruck with admiration; and what is very extraordinary, envy itſelf was mute and at reſt, the fear of preſent danger and the love of their country ſuppreſſing all other thoughts in the minds of the Carthaginians. To the mournful conſternation which had ſpread amongſt the troops, joy and gaiety ſucceeded on a ſudden. They demanded with great cries and much ardour to be led on directly againſt the enemy; aſſured, ſaid they, of conquering under their new General, and of obliterating the ſhame of their paſt defeats. Xanthippus did not ſuffer this ardour to cool. The ſight of the enemy only augmented it. When he was no more than twelve hundred paces from them, he thought proper to hold a council of war, in order to do honour to the Carthaginian officers by conſulting them. They all with unanimous conſent came entirely into his opinion, and promiſed to ſecond him to the utmoſt. It was therefore reſolved to give battle the next day.

The

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255. *Regalus is defeated in a battle, and taken priſoner by Xanthippus.*

The army of the Carthaginians conſiſted of about twelve thouſand foot, four thouſand horſe; and about an hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near as can be conjectured from what has been ſaid; (for Polybius ſays nothing of their number in this place) was fifteen thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe.

To ſee two armies engage, like theſe, not numerous, but compoſed of brave ſoldiers, and commanded by able Generals, is very fine. In the tumultuous actions between two or three hundred thouſand combatants, there muſt be abundance of confuſion, and it is hard, through a multiplicity of events, in which Chance ſeems to have a greater ſhare than Counſel, to diſtinguiſh the real merit of the commanders, and the true cauſes of victory. But here nothing eſcapes the reader's curioſity, who ſees diſtinctly the diſpoſition of the two armies; who ſeems almoſt to hear the orders given by the Generals; who follows all the motions made by the troops; who has in a manner before his eyes the moſt minute fault committed by either ſide, and in conſequence is capable of judging with certainty to what the gaining or loſing of the battle is to be aſcribed. The event of this, though it may appear inconſiderable from the ſmall number of combatants, is to decide the fate of Carthage.

The diſpoſition of the two armies was as follows. Xanthippus placed his elephants in the front in one line. At ſome diſtance behind them, he drew up in the manner of a phalanx in only one body, the infantry conſiſting wholly of Carthaginians. The cavalry was poſted on the wings. As for the foreign troops in their pay, the heavy-armed were placed upon the right between the phalanx and the cavalry, and the reſt, compoſed of light-armed troops, were diſpoſed by

by platoons on both wings amongſt the cavalry. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

On the ſide of the Romans, as they dreaded the elephants moſt, Regulus, to remedy that inconvenience, diſtributed the light-armed troops in the front upon a line. Next them he placed the cohorts behind each other, and poſted his horſe upon the two wings. In giving his main body leſs front and more depth, he took indeed wiſe meaſures againſt the elephants, ſays Polybius, but he did not provide againſt the inequality of horſe, in which the enemy was much ſuperior to him.

There requires no great knowledge in military affairs to perceive, the Carthaginians having four thouſand horſe, and the Romans but three hundred in all, that the Roman General ought to have avoided plains, and choſen poſts where the enemy's cavalry could not act, and would have been of no ſervice; which had been in ſome meaſure to deprive the Carthaginians of that part of their army, upon which they relied moſt. Regulus himſelf knew, it was by a like fault, though of an oppoſite kind, that the Carthaginians had loſt the preceding battle; that is, by having choſen a poſt, where they could make no uſe either of their horſe or their elephants. It muſt be owned, that the luſtre of ſo glorious a victory had dazzled him, and made him believe himſelf invincible, wherever he gave battle.

The two armies drawn up, as I have ſaid, waited only for the ſignal. Xanthippus gave orders to his light-armed troops, after they had diſcharged their darts, to retire into the ſpaces between the troops in their rear, and whilſt the enemy were engaged with the Carthaginian pha-

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255. lanx, to come out on the ſide and attack them in flank.

The battle began by the elephants, which Xanthippus made advance, in order to break the enemy's ranks. The Romans, to frighten thoſe animals, raiſed great cries, and made an hideous noiſe with their arms. The Carthaginian cavalry charged that of the Romans at the ſame time, which made no great ſtand, being infinitely inferior to the other. The Roman infantry on the left, either to avoid the ſhock of the elephants, or becauſe they were in hopes of dealing better with the foreign ſoldiers, that compoſed the right of the enemy's foot, attacked, defeated, and purſued them as far as their camp. Of thoſe who oppoſed the elephants, the firſt were trod down, and cruſhed to death, defending themſelves valiantly: the reſt of the main body kept their ground for ſome time in effect of their depth. But when the rear-ranks, ſurrounded by the horſe and light-armed troops, were obliged to face about in order to make head againſt them, and thoſe who had forced their paſſage through the elephants, came to the Carthaginian phalanx, which had not charged, and was in good order, the Romans were broke on all ſides, and entirely defeated. Moſt of them were cruſhed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants: the reſt without quitting their ranks, were expoſed on all ſides to the darts of the light-armed troops, and born down by the horſe. Only a very ſmall number fled: but as it was in a flat country, the elephants and the Numidian cavalry killed moſt of them. Five hundred were made priſoners with Regulus.

The

The Carthaginians, after having taken the ſpoils of the dead, re-entered Carthage in triumph, with the General of the Romans and five hundred priſoners walking before them. Their joy was the greater, as ſome days before they ſaw themſelves upon the brink of deſtruction. They could ſcarce believe their own eyes. Men and women, old and young, crouded to the temples to return the gods their fervent thanks, and nothing was ſeen for ſeveral days but feaſts and rejoicing. Regulus was ſhut up in a dungeon, where he continued five or ſix years, and ſuffered much from the cruelty of the Carthaginians. We ſee the Roman General defeated and taken priſoner: but his priſon will render him more illuſtrious than his victories. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 251.

Xanthippus, who had ſo great a ſhare in this happy change, wiſely choſe to retire ſoon after, and to diſappear; leſt his glory, hitherto unblemiſhed and entire, after this firſt dazzling brightneſs, ſhould deaden by degrees, and make him the mark of envy and calumny, which are always dangerous, but moſt ſo in a ſtrange country, where a perſon is alone, without friends, and entirely deſtitute of aid. *Xanthippus retires.*

Polybius ſays, that the departure of Xantippus is differently related, and promiſes an account of it elſewhere: but that paſſage is not come down to us. We find in Appian, that the Carthaginians, actuated by a baſe and deteſtable envy of the glory of Xanthippus, and not being able to bear the idea of being indebted for their preſervation to a ſtranger, under pretext of conducting him back to his own country honourably with a numerous convoy of ſhips, gave ſecret orders to thoſe, who had the command of them, to deſtroy the Lacedæmonian De Bel. Pun. p. 3.

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

General, and all that accompanied him by the way: as if it were poſſible to bury with him in the ſea both the remembrance of the ſervices he had done them, and the horror of the crime which they committed in that reſpect. So black a guilt does not ſeem credible to me even in Carthaginians.

Reflections of Polybius upon this great event.

This battle, ſays Polybius, though not ſo conſiderable as many others, may give us ſome ſalutary inſtructions, which, adds he, is the ſolid fruit of hiſtory. That great maſter I endeavour to follow here.

Firſt, Can one rely much upon good fortune, after what has happened in this place to Regulus? Haughty from his victory, and inexorable in regard to the conquered, he ſcarce vouchſafes to hear them; and ſoon after falls into their hands. Hannibal makes the ſame reflection to Scipio, when he would perſuade him not to ſuffer himſelf to be dazzled by the ſucceſs of his arms. (*a*) *Regulus*, ſaid he, *would have been one of the moſt extraordinary models of valour and ſucceſs that ever was, if after the victory, which he gained in the very country where we now are, he had thought fit to grant our anceſtors the peace they demanded. But from not having known how to check his ambition, and keep within the bounds of reaſon, the greatneſs of his elevation only ſerved to make his fall the more ſhameful.*

In the ſecond place we ſee here the truth of

(*a*) Inter pauca felicitatis virtutiſque exempla M. Atilius quondam in hac eadem terra fuiſſet, ſi victor pacem petentibus dediſſet patribus noſtris. Sed non ſtatuendo tandem felicitati modum, nec cohibendo efferentem ſe fortunam, quanto altiùs elatus erat, eo fœdius corruit. *Liv.* xxx. 30.

what

what Euriphides ſays, (a) *That one wiſe head is better than a multitude of hands.* One man, on this occaſion, changes the whole face of affairs. On the one ſide, he puts troops to flight that appeared invincible: on the other, he revives the courage of a city and army that he found in conſternation and deſpair. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

And this, ſays Polybius, is the uſe to be made of reading. For there being two ways of learning and improving, the one by one's own experience, and the other by that of others, it is much the wiſer and more advantagious, to be taught by the faults of others than by one's own.

A new fleet built at Rome.

The news of the defeat and taking of Regulus occaſioned a great alarm amongſt the Romans, and made them apprehend, that the Carthaginians, emboldened by their ſucceſs, and irritated by the evils they had ſuffered, would conceive thoughts of coming to avenge themſelves on Rome itſelf, and undertake to make Italy feel the ſame calamities, which Africa had ſo lately experienced. For this reaſon the Senate ordered the Conſuls to provide firſt for the ſafety of the country, by leaving the number of troops in it neceſſary to its defence; to apply themſelves to the building of a conſiderable fleet; to ſet out aſſoon as poſſible for Sicily, and even to go to Africa, if they judged it proper, in order to keep the enemy employed in their own country.

The Carthaginians raiſe the ſiege of Clypea.

The Carthaginians at firſt thought only of re-eſtabliſhing their affairs in Africa, of reducing the people that had revolted either by lenity or force, and of recovering the cities of which the Romans had made themſelves maſters. Clypea was the moſt conſiderable. The garriſon which the Romans had left there made a vigorous de- Polyb. i. 37.

(a) Ὡς ἓν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χεῖρας νικᾷ.

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

fence, and kept the army of the Carthaginians long employed; ſo that, when they received advice of the extraordinary preparations making in Italy for putting a fleet to ſea, they raiſed the ſiege, in order to apply themſelves ſolely to fitting out one on their ſide, capable of diſputing the landing of the Romans in Africa.

The Conſuls ſail to Africa with a numerous fleet. After gaining two battles, they put to ſea again to return to Italy.

The Conſuls had been ſo active, that in the beginning of the ſummer they had three hundred galleys compleatly fitted out, and ready to put to ſea. They ſet ſail without loſs of time, and landed firſt in Sicily, where they left good garriſons in the cities that wanted them; and from thence they ſteered immediately for Africa. A great ſtorm drove them to the iſland of Coſſura, ſituated between Africa and Sicily, over againſt the promontory of Lilybæum. They made a deſcent there, ruined all the flat country, and took the capital city, called by the ſame name as the iſland. From thence they gained the promontory of Hermæum, near which the city of Clypea is ſituated, where the Carthaginian fleet came to meet them. A rude battle was fought there, in which ſucceſs was a long time doubtful. The aid which came very opportunely from Clypea, made the balance incline to the ſide of the Romans, and obtained them a compleat victory. The Carthaginians had above an hundred ſhips ſunk, and thirty taken, with the loſs of fifteen thouſand men. The Romans loſt only eleven hundred men and nine ſhips. The fleet proceeded directly to Clypea, where the troops landed, and incamped near the city. The Carthaginians came thither ſoon after to attack them. A battle was fought by land. The Carthaginians were defeated again, and loſt almoſt nine thouſand men. Amongſt the priſoners were ſeveral of the principal

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pal citizens of Carthage, who were carefully kept, in order to be exchanged for Regulus, and the other Romans of the greateſt diſtinction. A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255.

The Conſuls afterwards deliberated upon the meaſures it was neceſſary to take. The great advantages they had juſt obtained, made them at firſt believe it practicable to ſupport themſelves in Africa. But as all the neighbouring countries had been deſtroyed, they apprehended famine. It was therefore judged proper to withdraw the garriſon of Clypea, and to ſail for Sicily. They carried away great ſpoils, which were the fruits of Regulus's victories, that had been laid up by him in that city.

The Roman fleet meets with a dreadful ſtorm on the coaſts of Sicily. Polyb. i. 38.

They might have had a good voyage to Sicily, and arrived ſafe in Italy, if the Conſuls had known how to take good counſel. The pilots informed them that navigation would be dangerous, if delayed till between the riſing of Orion and the Dog-ſtar, at which time great ſtorms uſually happen: (that time is fixed to the months of June and July.) They took little notice of this advice, and amuſed themſelves with beſieging ſome maritime cities, which they were deſirous of taking on their way. They ſoon found to their great misfortune the truth of the counſel they had neglected. On their departure one of the greateſt ſtorms aroſe they had ever known. Of more than three hundred and ſixteen ſhips, ſcarce fourſcore eſcaped, and even thoſe were obliged to throw their equipage into the ſea, without mentioning a great number of barks and ſmall veſſels which periſhed. The ſea was covered with the dead bodies of men and other animals, and with the planks and wrecks of galleys from the coaſt of * Camarina, where

* *Now called* Torre di Camarana, *upon the ſouthern coaſt of Sicily.*

A. R. 497. Ant. C. 255. this tempeſt had ſurprized the fleet, as far as the cape of Pachynus. The goodneſs and generoſity of King Hiero was a great conſolation, and a very neceſſary relief to them in this ſad diſaſter. He ſupplied them with cloaths, proviſions, and ſuch arms as the ſhips had occaſion for, and convoyed them as far as Meſſina.

The Carthaginians beſiege and take Agrigentum.

The Carthaginians knew well how to take advantage of the misfortune of their enemies. After having retaken the city and iſland of Coſſura * in their way, they landed in Sicily, formed the ſiege of Agrigentum, under their General Carthalon, took that city in a few days, which received no aid, and deſtroyed it entirely. It was to be feared, that all the other places of the Romans would have the ſame fate, and be obliged to ſurrender; but the news of a powerful armament preparing at Rome, gave the allies courage, and induced them to make head againſt the enemy. Accordingly in three months two hundred and twenty galleys were in a condition to put to ſea.

A. R. 498. Ant. C. 254.

CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO ASINA II.
A. ATILIUS CALATINUS II.

This is the ſame Cornelius, who when Conſul ſeven years before, had been taken by the Carthaginians in an ambuſcade near the iſlands of Lipara, and carried to Carthage, where he was ſhut up in a priſon, and treated with indignities. "(*a*) Who would believe, cries an au-

* *Now* Pantalerea, *an iſland between the kingdom of Tunis and Sicily.*

(*a*) Quis crederet illum à duodecim ſecuribus ad Carthagenienſium proventurum catenas? Quis rurſus exiſtimaret à Punicis vinculis ad ſumma Imperia perventurum faſtigia? Sed tamen ex Conſule captivus, ex captivo Conſul factus eſt. *Val. Max.* vi. 9.

" thor,

" thor, that this Cornelius ſhould be led from the Conſular purple to a dungeon, and from a dungeon be reſtored to the Conſular purple? He experienced this double change in the ſpace of ſome years, and became a captive from a Conſul, and a Conſul from a captive." Viciſſitudes of this kind are rare; but it ſuffices that they are not without example, to inſtruct the wiſe man not to ſuffer himſelf to be too much depreſſed by bad, nor too much exalted by good, fortune. A. R. 498. Ant. C. 254.

The taking of Panormus by the Romans followed by the ſurrender of many places. Polyb. i. 39.

The two Conſuls, having taken with them ſome ſhips which they found on their way at Meſſina, almoſt the only ones that had eſcaped the laſt wreck, landed in Sicily with a fleet of two hundred and fifty ſail at the mouth of the river * Himera, and made themſelves maſters of the city of Cephaledia, which is but eighteen miles from it. They failed of taking Depranum, of which they were obliged to raiſe the ſiege. They immediately formed another of much greater importance: it was that of † Panormus, the principal city in ſubjection to the Carthaginians. They firſt ſeized the port. The inhabitants refuſing to ſurrender, they applied themſelves to ſurrounding the city with intrenchments. As the place ſupplied them with wood in abundance, the works advanced conſiderably in a ſhort time. The attack was carried on with vigour. Having beaten down a tower on the ſide next the ſea with their machines, the ſoldiers entered the breach, and after having made a great ſlaughter, ſeized the exterior city called

* *There are two rivers of this name, one of which runs towards the north, and the other towards the ſouth. It is the firſt, of which we ſpeak here, now called* Fiume grande.

† Palermo, *the capital of Sicily, upon the northern coaſt of the iſland.*

the

A. R. 498. Ant. C. 254. the new city. The old one did not hold out long. As it began to want proviſions, the beſieged offered to ſurrender, upon condition only of having their lives and liberty granted them. Their offer was not accepted. They were obliged to pay a certain ranſom, which was two *minæ*, or about five pounds an head. Fourteen thouſand perſons were ranſomed at that price, which amounted to about ſeventy thouſand pounds ſterling. The reſt of the populace, who amounted to thirteen thouſand, were ſold with the plunder.

The taking of this city was followed by the voluntary ſurrender of many other places, the inhabitants * of which drove out the Carthaginian garriſons, and eſpouſed the part of the Romans. The Conſuls, after theſe glorious expeditions, returned to Rome.

A. R. 499. Ant. C. 253. CN. SERVILIUS CÆPIO.
C. SEMPRONIUS BLÆSUS.

Polyb. i. 40. Theſe Conſuls went to Africa with a fleet of two hundred and ſixty ſhips. They made deſcents there, took ſome places, and carried off abundance of plunder. No important expedition paſſed there, becauſe the Carthaginians always prevented them from taking any commodious poſt. They had re-eſtabliſhed their affairs well throughout the whole country, having retaken all the places of which Regulus had made himſelf maſter, and reduced all thoſe that had revolted to return to their duty. Amilcar went all over Numidia and Mauritania, quieted thoſe countries every where, and laid a fine upon the people, by way of ſatisfaction, of a

* *The Jetini, Saluntini, Petrinienſes, Tyndaritani*, &c.

thouſand

thouſand talents, (about fifty thouſand pounds) and twenty thouſand oxen. As to the principal perſons of the cities, who were accuſed of favouring the Romans, he hanged to the number of three thouſand of them. We ſee here a ſenſible inſtance of the Carthaginian character. A. R. 499. Ant. C. 253.

The Conſuls having been driven by the winds to the iſland of the * Lotophagi, called Meninx, in the neighbourhood of the leſſer Syrtes, experienced a danger that ſhews how † little they were acquainted with the ſea, of which the ebbing and flowing were a matter of novelty to them. The water being fallen, they were ſurprized to ſee themſelves almoſt on dry land, and believing themſelves loſt, they threw abundance of things overboard in order to lighten the ſhips. The return of the tide ſurprized them no leſs, but in an agreeable manner: for it delivered them from an imaginary danger, which they thought without remedy. The reſt of the voyage was favourable enough to them, as far as the cape of ‖ Palinurus. which projects into the ſea from the mountains of Lucania. When they had doubled it, a violent ſtorm aroſe on a ſudden, and ſunk them above an hundred and fifty large ſhips, without including a great number of barks and other ſmall veſſels.

So many loſſes of ſhips upon the neck of each other, which could not be repaired but at immenſe expences, afflicted the Romans extremely, and made them believe, it was not the will of the gods that they ſhould have the ſovereignty of the ſea.

The Romans diſcourged by many ſhipwrecks renounce the ſovereignty of the ſea.

* *In the kingdom of Tunis.*

† *As the ſea does not ebb and flow, except in certain particular parts of the Mediterranean, it is the leſs ſurprizing that the Romans were ignorant of its doing ſo at the Syrtes.*

‖ Capo-Palinuro: *A cape of the kingdom of Naples.*

vereignty

A. R. 499. Ant. C. 253. vereignty of the ſea. The ſenate in conſequence decreed, that no more than ſixty ſhips ſhould be fitted out to guard the coaſts of Italy, and to tranſport proviſions, and other neceſſary munitions to the armies that made war in Sicily.

One of the Cenſors being dead, the other abdicated, according to the cuſtom long eſtabliſhed; which occaſioned the *Cenſus* to be put off till the enſuing year.

A. R. 500. Ant. C. 252.

C. AURELIUS COTTA.
P. SERVILIUS GEMINUS.

They retook a city in Sicily called Himera, or * *Thermæ Himerenſes.*

Lipara taken. An officer's diſobedience ſeverely puniſhed. Val. Max. ii. 4.

C. Aurelius forms the ſiege of Lipara, a city in the iſland of the ſame name. Being obliged to return to Rome, to take the auſpices again, he confides the care of the ſiege to Q. Caſſius a legionary Tribune, with orders only to keep a good guard for the preſervation of the works, and expreſs command not to attack the place in his abſence. The young officer, hurried on by an immoderate deſire of glory, attacked the place at the head of his troops. His raſhneſs was well puniſhed. The beſieged made a furious ſalley in which he loſt a great number of men, repulſed himſelf to his camp, which he defended with great difficulty, and afterwards burnt all the works. The Conſul's return ſoon reinſtated every thing. The town was taken, and a great ſlaughter made in it. He then thought proper to puniſh the officer; who was degraded, publickly ſcourged with rods, and

* Termine, *at the north-weſt of Sicily, and the mouth of the river of the ſame name.*

obliged

obliged to ſerve in the loweſt rank of the foot as a private ſoldier. A. R. 500. Ant. C. 252.

When Lipara was taken, the deſcendants of Timaſitheus were exempted from all tributes and taxes, in gratitude for the ſignal ſervice which he had rendered the Commonwealth an hundred and forty years before. He was at that time ſupreme magiſtrate at Lipara. He cauſed a gold cup which the Romans had ſent to Delphi, and which had been taken by the pirates of Lipara, to be reſtored; gave the Ambaſſadors a good convoy to Delphi; and afterwards reconducted them in ſafety to Rome. The action was noble: but the gratitude of the Roman People, as warm after ſo many years as if the ſervice had been quite recent, is highly remarkable, and well worthy of praiſe. *Antient good office of Timaſitheus rewarded in his poſterity.* Liv. v. 28.

Since the misfortune of Regulus, the elephants, which had greatly contributed to it, had ſpread ſo great a panic amongſt the Roman troops, that they were almoſt afraid to look the enemy in the face, and to hazard a battle with them. This change, which the Carthaginians perfectly diſcerned, joined with the reſolution, which they knew the Senate had taken to fit out no new fleets, gave them hopes, that, if they made ever ſo little effort, it would be eaſy for them to recover all Sicily.

They were in want of money, the public treaſury being exhauſted by the enormous expences, with which a war, that had continued twelve years, had coſt them. They ſent an embaſſy to Ptolomy King of Egypt, (this was Ptolemy Philadelphus) to deſire him to lend them two thouſand * talents of ſilver. Ptolemy, who had entered into a treaty of amity *Embaſſy of the Carthaginians to Ptolemy.* App. apud Fulv. Urſ.

* *About three hundred thouſand pounds.*

with

A. R. 500. Ant. C. 252. with the Romans, having endeavoured ineffectually to reconcile the two States as mediator, declared to the Ambaſſadors, that though he much deſired to oblige the Carthaginians, he could not do it in the preſent conjuncture, becauſe it would be a violation of the faith of treaties to aid one ally with money or troops againſt another.

Liv. Epit. xviii. The Plebeians were admitted to ſhare in the dignity of Pontifex Maximus this year for the firſt time. Ti. Coruncanius had this office conferred upon him.

Remarkable ſeverity of the Cenſors. The new Cenſors compleated the Cenſus at this time: this was the thirty-ſeventh *Luſtrum.* The citizens capable of bearing arms were found to be two hundred and ninety-ſeven thouſand

Val. Max. ii. 9. ſeven hundred and ninety-ſeven. This Cenſorſhip was ſevere and rigorous. Thirteen Senatros were degraded. Their horſes were taken from four hundred of the Roman youth, and they were reduced into the loweſt claſs of the People. The cauſe of ſo diſgraceful a puniſhment was the complaint which the Conſul Aurelius had made againſt them at the Tribunal of the Cenſors; that on a preſſing occaſion in Sicily, they had refuſed to obey when commanded to aſſiſt at the works. The Conſul induced the Senate to add another puniſhment to this inflicted by the Cenſors. It was reſolved, that they ſhould not be allowed their paſt years of ſervice, and ſhould be obliged to begin them again. It was by ſuch examples of ſeverity, that military diſcipline was ſtrictly preſerved amongſt the Romans, upon which the whole ſucceſs of armies depends, and which contributed more than any thing to raiſe the Roman greatneſs to the height it attained.

Ærarii facti.

L. CÆCI-

A. R. 501.
Ant. C. 251.

L. CÆCILIUS METELLUS.
C. FURIUS PACILUS.

Nothing conſiderable paſſed this year. The Conſuls, who went to Sicily, did not attack the enemy, and were not attacked by them. Aſdrubal, however, a new General of the Carthaginians, was lately arrived with two hundred galleys, an hundred and thirty elephants, and twenty thouſand horſe and foot. This inactivity, which in protracting the war exhauſted the treaſures of the State, gave the Senate reaſon to examine again into the reſolution which had been taken to build no more fleets, on account of the great expences which they coſt the Commonwealth. "The Senate ſaw, that they "were falling into the ſame inconveniences by "the prolongation of the war. Since the de"feat of Regulus, the Roman troops had not "ſhewn the ſame ardor as before. Whilſt "every thing generally ſucceeded in the bat"tles by land, they could neither terminate "any thing, nor drive the Carthaginians out "of Sicily, whilſt they continued maſters of "the ſea. Beſides which, there was ſomething "ſhameful and unworthy of the Roman cha"racter, in ſuffering themſelves to be diſcou"raged by loſſes not occaſioned by their fault, "but by misfortunes not to be avoided by hu"man prudence." Theſe conſiderations determined the Senate to reſume their former plan, and to employ the principal efforts of the Commonwealth again at ſea.

The Senate applies again with vigour to reinſtate their power at ſea. Polyb. i. 41.

C. ATI-

A. R. 502.
Ant. C. 250.

C. ATILIUS REGULUS II.
L. MANLIUS VULSO II.

Theſe Conſuls were appointed to provide a fleet, and to fit it out with every thing neceſſary. L. Metellus was continued in the command of the army in Sicily as Proconſul, where he remained, whilſt his collegue returned to Rome for the election of Conſuls.

Famous battle by land near Panormus, in which the Carthaginians are defeated.

In the mean time Aſdrubal, ſeeing there was but one Roman General, with half the forces, in Italy, and reflecting, that the Roman army, when together, though almoſt every day drawn up in battle in the ſight of the enemy, was afraid to engage; he believed, that the time was come for hazarding an action; and the rather becauſe his troops demanded it with ardor, and ſuffered all delays with impatience. He ſet out from Lilybæum, and having croſſed the country of Selinuntum by a very difficult route, he arrived in the territory of Panormus, and incamped there.

Polyb. i. 41—43.

The Proconſul Metellus was then in that city with his army. It was at the time of harveſt, and he had come thither in order to give the inhabitants an opportunity of cutting and bringing in their corn with ſecurity. Having been informed by ſome ſpies Aſdrubal had in the city, that he was come with deſign to give battle; in order to confirm him in that reſolution, and render him leſs upon his guard, he made a feint of being afraid, and kept himſelf cloſe within the walls. This conduct emboldened the Carthaginian General extremely. He ravaged the flat country without oppoſition, put all to fire and ſword, and advanced haughtily to the very

very gates of Panormus. Metellus continued quiet, and to give Aſdrubal a ſtill worſe idea both of the courage and number of his troops, he ſuffered only few of his ſoldiers to appear upon the walls. Aſdrubal heſitated no longer. He made all his troops, as well horſe as foot, and all his elephants, advance to the walls of the city, near which he fixed his camp with ſo much ſecurity and contempt for an enemy, who did not dare to ſhew himſelf, that he did not ſo much as ſurround it with intrenchments. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

The ſuttlers and ſervants, that followed the army, had brought abundance of wine into the camp. The mercenary ſoldiers did not ſpare it, and full of liquor excited a tumult, and raiſed ſuch confuſed and violent cries, as drunkenneſs is apt to occaſion. The Proconſul thought this the time for acting. He began by making his light-armed troops march out in order to bring the enemy to a battle; which did not fail to take effect. Advancing inſenſibly after each other, the whole army at laſt quitted the camp. Metellus poſted part of the light-armed troops along ſome of the foſsés of the city, with orders, if the elephants approached, to pour their arrows upon them in abundance; and, when they found themſelves preſſed, to go down into the foſsé, in order to come up again ſoon after, and harraſs the elephants. And that they might not want darts, he cauſed a great quantity of them to be carried to the walls, and made ſome of the common people throw them down from time to time into the works. He alſo placed his archers along the walls. As for himſelf, he ſtayed with his heavy-armed troops at the gate of the city, which fronted the left

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

wing of the enemy, in readineſs to come out when proper.

In the mean time the light-armed troops, who had began the action, ſometimes puſhed by the multitude of the enemy, retired towards the city in good order, and ſometimes reinforced by new troops ſent them by the Conſul, maintained the fight. On the ſide of the Carthaginians, the commanders of the elephants, deſiring to have the principal honour of the victory, and to deprive Aſdrubal of it, without waiting for orders, made their heavy animals move on, and purſued thoſe who retired towards the city quite to the foſsés. Here they were expected. The archers upon the walls, and the light-armed troops upon the ſide of the foſsés, poured a continual ſhower of darts and arrows upon them. The elephants, wounded in many places, would obey no longer their guides, and growing furious, turned upon the Carthaginians, broke and beat down their ranks, and cruſhed to death all that came in their way. This was the uſual inconvenience of elephants. Metellus ſallied in the midſt of this diſorder and confuſion, which ſerved him as a ſignal. Finding the enemy in the condition he had foreſeen, he had no difficulty to bear them down and put them to the rout. The ſlaughter was very dreadful both in the battle and the purſuit: to compleat their misfortune, the Carthaginian fleet arrived in this ſad conjuncture, and ſo far from being in a condition to give them any aid, became the occaſion of a new and greater evil. As ſoon as it appeared, blind with their fears, they ran precipitately towards it, as to their ſole refuge; and tumbling over each other, were either trampled on by their own troops, cruſhed

to

to death by the elephants, killed by the enemy who purſued them, or drowned in the ſea, endeavouring to ſwim to the ſhips. Aſdrubal eſcaped to Lilybæum. He was condemned during his abſence at Carthage; whither when he returned without knowing what had paſſed againſt him, he was put to death. He was one of the greateſt Generals Carthage had ever produced. A ſingle misfortune made that barbarous State forget all the ſervices he had rendered it. Rome did not act in that manner. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

The Romans had ſcarce ever gained a greater victory than this. It revived the valour of their troops, and entirely diſpirited the Carthaginians; ſo that during the whole duration of this war, they never dared to hazard a battle by land. Twenty thouſand Carthaginians periſhed in this action. Twenty-ſix elephants were taken in it, and all the reſt the next and the following days. The Proconſul perceiving, that thoſe who did not know how to manage thoſe animals, would find it difficult to take and bring them off in the furious condition they then were, ſtraggling about the country, cauſed proclamation to be made by an herald, that life and liberty ſhould be granted to ſuch, as ſhould aſſiſt in taking ſome of them. The Carthaginians embraced with joy ſo favourable an occaſion of ſoftening their fate. They at firſt took thoſe that were the leaſt furious, and which they knew beſt, and by their means allured all the reſt without difficulty. Metellus ſent them all to Rome to the number of an hundred and forty-two. *The elephants that were taken are ſent to Rome.*

The Conſul's manner of tranſporting them, which was not eaſy, becauſe he had no ſhips proper for that uſe, was as follows. Firſt, a great *Manner in which the elephants are carried over the ſtrait.*

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250. Frontin. i. 7. Plin. viii. 6.

great number of empty caſks were provided, which were faſtened together two and two by the means of a piece of timber placed between them, to prevent them from beating againſt each other, and from ſeparating. On theſe were laid a kind of floor made of planks, and covered with earth and other materials, and on the ſides a kind of breaſt-work, or little wall, was raiſed to prevent the elephants from falling into the water. They entered them from the ſhore without difficulty, advanced upon the ſea without perceiving it, and by the help of theſe floats, arrived on the oppoſite ſhoar, as if they had never been off the land. Metellus cauſed all his elephants to be tranſported in this manner to Rhegium; and from thence they were carried to Rome, where they were expoſed in the Circus: a ſight, which gave the people as much pleaſure as they had hitherto given terror to the troops.

The Carthaginians ſend Ambaſſadors to Rome, to treat of peace or the exchange of priſoners.

The conſiderable loſſes, which the Carthaginians had ſuſtained as well by land as ſea for ſome years, determined them to ſend Ambaſſadors to Rome, to treat of peace: and in caſe they could not obtain a favourable one, to propoſe the exchange of priſoners; and eſpecially of ſome, who were of the principal families of Carthage. They believed that Regulus might be of great ſervice to them, eſpecially in reſpect to the ſecond article. He had a wife and children at Rome, beſides a great number of relations and friends in the Senate, and his couſin-german actually Conſul. There was reaſon to preſume, that the deſire of quitting the ſad condition wherein he had languiſhed ſo many years, of returning to his family which he loved tenderly, and of being reinſtated in a country, where

Regulus accompanies them. Freinſh. xviii. 57—66.

where he was univerſally eſteemed and reſpected, would infallibly induce him to ſecond the demand of the Carthaginians. He was therefore urged to join the Ambaſſadors in the voyage to Rome for which they were preparing. He did not think proper to refuſe this demand: the ſequel will ſhew what his motives were. Before he ſet out, he was made to take an oath, that in caſe he did not ſucceed in his demands, he would return to Carthage, and he was even given to underſtand, that his life depended on the ſucceſs of his negotiation. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

When they wete near Rome, Regulus refuſed to enter it; giving for his reaſon, that it was not the cuſtom of their anceſtors to give the Ambaſſadors of an enemy audience within the city. The Senate being aſſembled without the walls, the Ambaſſadors, after having declared the purpoſe of their coming, retired. Regulus would follow them, though the Senators deſired him to ſtay; and he did not comply with their requeſt, till the Carthaginians, whoſe ſlave he conſidered himſelf to be, had given him their permiſſion.

Regulus declares againſt the exchange of priſoners.

It does not appear that mention was made of any thing relating to peace; or at leaſt, nothing farther: the deliberation turned upon the exchange of priſoners. Regulus, being deſired by the Senate to give his opinion, replied, that he could not do it as a Senator, having loſt that quality, as well as that of a Roman citizen, from the time he fell into the hands of the enemy: but he did not refuſe to ſay what he thought as a private perſon. The conjuncture was delicate. Every body was touched with the misfortune of ſo great a man. He had only one word to ſay, ſays Cicero, to recover with his liberty his for-

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250. tune, dignities, wife, children, and country: But that word ſeemed to him contrary to honour and the good of the State. He regarded only the ſentiments with which fortitude and greatneſs of mind inſpired him. (*a*) Thoſe are the virtues, ſays Cicero, ſpeaking of Regulus, which teach men to fear nothing; to deſpiſe all human things; to prepare for the worſt that can happen; and, I will add with (*b*) Seneca, to go wherever duty calls them through the greateſt dangers without regard to any other intereſt whatſoever. He therefore (*c*) frankly declared, "That they ought not to think of exchanging "priſoners: that ſuch an example would have "conſequences fatal to the Commonwealth: "that citizens who had been abject enough to "give up their arms to the enemy, were un-"worthy of compaſſion, and incapable of ſer-"ving their country. That as for himſelf, at

(*a*) Magnitudo animi & fortitudo —— Harum enim eſt virtutum proprium, nihil extimeſcere, omnia humana deſpicere, nihil quod homini accidere poſſit, intolerandum putare. *Offic.* iii. 100.

(*b*) Calcatis utilitatibus ad eam (virtutem) eundum eſt, quocumque vocavit, quocumque miſit, ſine reſpectu rei familiaris. *Senec. de Benef.* vi. 1.

(*c*) Hoc caverat mens provida Reguli,
Diſſentientis conditionibus
Fœdis, & exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum;
Si non periret immiſerabilis
Captiva pubes ——
Auro repenſus ſcilicet acrior
Miles redibit! Flagitio additis
Damnum ——
Erit ille fortis.
Qui perfidis ſeſe credidit hoſtibus;
Et marte Pœnos proteret altero.
Qui lora reſtrictis lacertis
Senſit iners, timuitque mortem!
Hor. Od. v. *l.* 3.

"his

" his years, the loſs of him ought to be conſi- A. R. 502.
" dered as nothing; whereas they had ſeveral Ant. C. 250.
" Carthaginian Generals in their hands in the
" vigour of life, and capable of doing their
" country great ſervice for many years."

It was not without difficulty that the Senate gave in to an opinion which was to coſt ſo dear, and was unexampled, unheard of, in the caſe wherein Regulus was. Cicero in the third book of his Offices, examines whether Regulus, after having given his opinion in the Senate, was obliged to return to Carthage, and to expoſe himſelf to the moſt cruel torments, rather than break an oath extorted from him by force, and made to an enemy who knew not what it was to be faithful to his engagements, and from whom he had nothing to fear, any more than from the wrath of the gods, who are * incapable of anger.

Cicero refutes this frivolous manner of reaſoning with a kind of indignation. What ought to be conſidered in an oath, and make it be obſerved, ſays he, is not the fear of being puniſhed for breaking it, but the force and ſacred nature of it. For (*a*) *an oath is a religious affirmation.* Now what is affirmed in this manner, and which God is called upon to witneſs, muſt be obſerved through reſpect for faith engaged, that faith of which Ennius happily ſays: (*b*) *O ſacred and divine faith, by whom Jove himſelf ſwears, how worthy art thou of a place in*

* *It was the opinion of ſome philoſophers, that the Divinity was never angry, and that men had nothing to fear from his vengeance.*

(*a*) Eſt enim jusjurandum affirmatio religioſa. Quod autem affirmatè, quaſi deo teſte, promiſeris, id tenendum eſt. *Offic.* iii. 104.

(*b*) O fides alma, apta pinnis, jusjurandum Jovis.

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

the bigheſt part of temples. Whoever violates his oath therefore, violates this faith ſo ſacred and venerable. War itſelf has its rights, which ought to be obſerved inviolably with reſpect to all enemies whatſoever; and to pretend, that faith engaged to one that has no faith himſelf, is void, is endeavouring to cover the guilt of infidelity and perjury by a pretext that cannot be maintained.

From what has been ſaid it muſt be concluded, that all which fear and meanneſs of ſpirit induce men to act, might have been imputed to Regulus, if in giving his opinion upon the exchange of priſoners, he had regarded rather his own, than the intereſts of the Commonwealth; or, if inſtead of returning, he had remained at Rome; and that ſuch actions ought to be conſidered as criminal, ſhameful, and infamous. It is Cicero that ſays all this: And we may ſee from it, how high human wiſdom is capable of attaining, which is always far ſhort, when the queſtion is to go back to the firſt principles of things; and that, building up its morality without relation to God, without the fear of being puniſhed by him, without the hope of pleaſing him, it deprives virtue of its only ſolid motive and real ſupport.

Regulus returns to Carthage, where he expires in the moſt cruel torments.

Regulus did not heſitate concerning the choice he ought to make. That illuſtrious (*a*) exile ſet out

(*a*) Fertur pudicæ conjugis oſculum,
Parvoſque natos, ut capitis minor,
A ſe removiſſe, & virilem
Torvus humi poſuiſſe vultum.
Donec labantes conſilio Patres
Firmaret auctor nunquam aliàs dato,
Interque mœrentes amicos
Egregius properaret exul.

Atqui

out from Rome to return to Carthage, without being moved either by the great grief of his friends, or the tears of his wife and children, and with the tranquility of a magiſtrate going to his country-houſe in a vacation from buſineſs. However, he was not ignorant of the torments prepared for him. Accordingly, when the enemy ſaw him return, without having obtained the exchange, and knew that he had even oppoſed it, there were no kind of torments which their cruelty did not inflict upon him. They kept him a great while in a dark dungeon, from whence, after having cut off his eyelids, they brought him out on a ſudden to expoſe him to the ſun, when its heat was greateſt. They afterwards ſhut him up in a kind of cheſt ſtuck full of ſpikes. which never ſuffered him to reſt night or day. At length after having long tortured him with exceſſive pains, and by keeping him continually awake, they nailed him to a croſs, the moſt uſual kind of puniſhment amongſt the Carthaginians, upon which he expired. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

Such was the end of this great man. (*a*) Something had been wanting to his glory, if his con-

Atqui ſciebat quæ ſibi barbarus
Tortor pararet. Non aliter tamen
Dimovit obſtantes propinquos,
Et populum reditus morantem,
Quàm ſi clientum longa negotia
Dijudicatâ lite relinqueret,
Tendens Venafranos in agros,
Aut Lacedæmonium Tarentum.

Hor. Od. V. *l.* iii.

(*a*) Adverſi aliquid incurrat oportet, quod animum probet. *Senec. ad Marc.* c. 6.

Marcet ſine adverſario virtus. Tunc apparet quanta ſit, quantum valeat, quantumque polleat, cum, quid poſſit, patientia oſtendit. *Id de Provid.* c. 2.

ſtancy

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

ſtancy and patience had not been put to ſo rude a trial. It is not proſperity, but misfortunes, which ſhew virtue in its luſtre, place it in all its light, and make known how far its force extends. It is a Pagan that talks in this manner; but he did not know the uſe of the great truths he taught. (*a*) When you ſee the good, ſays Seneca again, oppreſſed by the wicked, afflicted and tormented, think not that God forgets them. He treats them as a good father does his children, whom he loves, but at the ſame time forms with ſeverity for wiſdom and virtue. God has not a weak tenderneſs for the virtuous, that induces him to treat them with gentleneſs and favour: he tries, he enures, and takes pains to make them worthy of him. (*b*) A tyrant may exerciſe his power upon their bodies; but it extends no farther. He can do nothing on the ſoul, which is a ſacred aſylum inacceſſible to his ſtripes. (*c*) In the midſt of torments they remain tranquil, and inviolably attached to their duty. They feel, but they ſurmount, them. And this is the picture of Regulus, the hero of

(*a*) Quem (virum bonum) parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, ſicut ſeveri patres, duriùs educat. Itaque cùm videris bonos viros, acceptoſque diis, laborare, ſudare, per arduum aſcendere; malos autem laſcivire, & voluptatibus fluere; cogita filiorum nos modeſtia delectari, vernularum licentia; illos diſciplina triſtiori contineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat. Bonum virum in deliciis non habet: experitur, indurat, ſibi illum præparat. *Ibid.*

(*b*) Corpuſculum hoc — huc atque illuc jactatur. In hoc ſupplicia, in hoc latrocinia, in hoc morbi exercentur: animus quidem ipſe ſacer & æternus eſt, & cui non poſſunt injici manus. *De conſolat. ad Helv.* cap. xi.

(*c*) Eſt omnibus externis potentior, nec hoc dico, non ſentit illa, ſed vincit; & alioquin quietus placiduſque contra incurrentia attollitur. *De Provid.* cap. 2.

paganiſm

paganiſm in point of courage and patience; but, unfortunately for him, the martyr of vanity, of the love of glory, and of a vain phantom of virtue. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

It is remarkable, that Polybius does not ſay a word of all this prodigious conſtancy.

Carthaginians delivered up to the reſentment of Marcia, the wife of Regulus.

The Senate having been informed of the tragical death of Regulus, and the unheard-of cruelty of the Carthaginians, delivered up the moſt diſtinguiſhed of their priſoners to Marcia his wife, and to his children. They put them into a cheſt ſtuck with iron ſpikes, in order to repay them with intereſt the pains, in which Regulus had ended his life; and left them five whole days without nouriſhment, at the end of which Boſtar died of hunger and miſery. But Amilcar, whoſe conſtitution was more robuſt, lived five days longer by the ſide of Boſtar's corpſe, with whom he had been ſhut up, in effect of nouriſhment, which was only given him to prolong his torments. At length the magiſtrates, being informed of what paſſed in Marcia's houſe, put a ſtop to theſe inhumanities, ſent the aſhes of Boſtar to Carthage, and ordered the reſt of the priſoners to be treated with more lenity. In my opinion, however the Carthaginians might have deſerved that barbarity, the Senate ought not to have delivered them up to the reſentment of a woman, and that a contraſt of humanity had been a more noble revenge, and more worthy of the Roman name.

Zonar. viii. 394. Aul. Gell. vi. 4. Diod. apud val. lxxiv.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Triumph of Metellus. Siege of Lilybæum by the Romans. Treaſon diſcovered in that city: A conſiderable relief enters it. Bloody action round the machines. They are ſet on fire. Vain diſpoſition of the Conſul Clodius. Battle of Drepanum: loſs of the Roman fleet. The Conſul Junius goes to Sicily. New diſgrace of the Romans at Lilybæum. They happily avoid two battles. The Roman ſhips entirely deſtroyed by a great ſtorm. A Dictator is nominated. Junius takes Eryx. Amilcar Barcas is appointed to command in Sicily. Several perſons fit out privateers, and plunder Hippona. Birth of Hannibal. Exchange of priſoners. Two new colonies. Cenſus. A Roman lady cited before the People, and fined. Amilcar takes the city of Eryx. New Roman fleet built, and fitted out by private perſons. Poſtumius the Conſul kept at Rome on account of his being a prieſt. The Senate forbids Lutatius to conſult the divinations of Præneſte. Battle at the iſlands Ægates gained by the Romans. Treaty of peace between Rome and Carthage. End of the firſt punic war. Sicily becomes a province of the Roman People.

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250. *Triumph of Metellus.* Freinſh. xix. Liv. Epit. xix.

TO the grief occaſioned by the deplorable end of Regulus, ſucceeded the joy, which the grateful ſight of the triumph of L. Metellus gave the whole city, before whoſe chariot walked thirteen great officers of the Carthaginian army, and an hundred and twenty elephants. I have already ſaid, that thoſe animals were again ſhewn to the people in the Circus, after which

which they were all killed, becauſe it was not judged proper to uſe them in the Roman armies. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

It is obſerved that proviſions were very cheap this year: a buſhel of corn, a *congius* (about a gallon) of wine, thirty pounds of dry figs, ten pounds of oil of olives, twelve pounds of meat, were all of the ſame price, and coſt only one *as*; and the *as*, the tenth part of the Roman *Denarius*, which according to many learned writers was only ten-pence, was in value only one * penny. Polybius tells us, that in his time the buſhel of wheat in Italy was actually worth fourteen *oboli*, that is to ſay, ſix-pence half-penny, and the buſhel of barley half as much. A buſhel of wheat was a ſoldier's ſubſiſtence for eight days. At the time of which we are now ſpeaking, the extraordinary expences they had been obliged to be at in fitting out fleets, had exhauſted the publick treaſury, and made money very ſcarce; which had occaſioned the price of proviſions to be ſo low. Liv. xviii. 3. Polyb. ii. 103.

Siege of Lilybæum by the Romans. Polyb. i. 43—47.

The cruelty of the Carthaginians in regard to Regulus, had inflamed the Romans with a ſtrong deſire of revenge. The two Conſuls ſet out for Sicily with four legions, and a fleet of two hundred ſhips, to which they added forty, which they found at Panormus, without including a great number of ſmall barks. After having held a council of war, and maturely conſidered the meaſures it was neceſſary to take, they formed the bold deſign of attacking Lilybæum. It was the ſtrongeſt place the Carthaginians had in Sicily, of which the loſs would neceſſarily be attended with that of all the places

* *Or leſs: for according to others, the* Denarius *was only* 7 d ¼.

they

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250. they retained in the iſland, and leave the Romans a free paſſage into Africa. This ſiege, which was of great length, and could not be terminated but with the war, may be conſidered as the maſter-piece of the Roman art and capacity.

Polyb. i. 43. The figure of Sicily is that of a triangle, of which each point is a promontory. That at the ſouth, which projects into the ſea, is called * Pachynus. That called † Pelorus, ſituated at the north, bounds the ſtreight on the weſt, and is about twelve furlongs (or *ſtadia*) ſomething more than half a league from Italy. The third and laſt is called ‖ Lilybæum. It is oppoſite to Africa, at the diſtance of about a thouſand ſtadia, (or fifty leagues) and lies to the ſouth-weſt. Upon this laſt cape ſtands the city of the ſame name. It was well fortified with walls, and ſurrounded with a deep ditch, and moraſſes formed by the ſea-water. The entrance into the port is by theſe marſhes, and the way dangerous to thoſe, who are not perfectly well acquainted with it.

It is eaſy to conceive the ardor on both ſides in attacking and defending the place. Imilco commanded in it. He had ten thouſand troops, without including the inhabitants; and we ſhall ſoon ſee, that he was conſiderably reinforced. The Romans having eſtabliſhed their quarters before the city, on both ſides of it, and having fortified the ſpace between the two camps with a foſſé, an intrenchment and a wall, they began the attack by the tower neareſt the ſea towards Africa. Continually adding new works to the former, and advancing on, at length they threw

* *Now the cape of Paſſaro.* † *The fare of Meſſina.*
‖ *Capo Boeo.*

down

down ſix towers on the ſame ſide as that we have juſt mentioned, and undertook to beat down others with their battering rams. Imilco ſpared no pains to prevent the progreſs of the beſiegers. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and watched every occaſion for ſetting the machines on fire; and in order to effect that, engaged night and day; and ſometimes with greater loſs on both ſides, than is uſual in field-battles. A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

Whilſt he was making ſo generous a defence, the foreign ſoldiers, Gauls and others, formed a conſpiracy amongſt themſelves to give up the place to the Romans. Happily for the beſieged, the treaſon was diſcovered, and rendered abortive immediately. *Treaſon in the city diſcovered. A conſiderable aid thrown into it.*

The Carthaginians were not aſleep in reſpect to the danger, to which Lilybæum was expoſed. They fitted out fifty ſhips, and gave the command of them to Hannibal, the ſon of Amilcar, with orders to ſail directly, and like a man of courage to ſeize the firſt favourable occaſion for throwing himſelf into the place. Hannibal put to ſea with ten thouſand ſoldiers well armed, came to an anchor at the iſlands * Ægufæ, between Lilybæum and Carthage, and with the firſt briſk gale that blew, made all the ſail he could, advanced with intrepid courage through the enemy's fleet, boldly entered the port, and landed his ſoldiers; the Romans, who were ſurprized and afraid of being driven into the port by the violence of the wind, not daring to diſpute the paſſage with him.

* Favognane, *upon the weſtern coaſt of Sicily.*

Imilco,

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250. *Bloody action at the machines.*

Imilco, with a view to his deſign of burning the machines of the beſiegers, and deſiring to make uſe of the good diſpoſition, in which the troops of the place, and thoſe lately landed, ſeemed to be; the former becauſe they ſaw themſelves relieved, and the latter, becauſe they had ſuffered nothing hitherto, called an aſſembly of them both, and by a ſpeech, wherein he promiſed thoſe who ſignalized themſelves, and all in general, preſents and rewards from the Commonwealth of the Carthaginians, enflamed their zeal and courage to ſuch a degree, that they all cried out, he had only to diſpoſe of them immediately as he thought proper. The General, after having expreſſed his ſatisfaction in their good-will, diſmiſſed the aſſembly, and bad them take ſome repoſe at preſent, and for the reſt to expect orders from their officers.

Soon after he aſſembled the principal perſons amongſt them; aſſigned them their ſeveral poſts; told them the ſignal, and time for the attack; and ordered their leaders to be ready at the hour fixed. This was executed, and the works attacked in ſeveral places early in the morning. The Romans, who had foreſeen this ſally, and kept upon their guard, flew on all ſides where aid was neceſſary, and made a vigorous defence. The battle ſoon became general, and bloody. For twenty thouſand men ſallied from the city, and the beſiegers were ſtill more numerous. The action was the warmer, as the ſoldiers fought pell mell without keeping their ranks, and followed only their own impetuoſity. This attack, in which the troops engaged hand to hand, and rank to rank, formed ſeveral diſtinct engagements, rather than a ſingle action.

But

A. R. 502. Ant. C. 250.

But the cries, and hotteſt ſervice, were about the machines: for the intent of the ſalley was againſt them. They fought with ſuch emulation and ardor, on one ſide only to deſtroy, and on the other only to defend them. On both ſides they fell in their poſts rather than abandon them to the enemy. The beſieged with torches, tow, and fire in their hands, poured on all ſides upon the machines with ſuch fury, that the Romans were ſeveral times reduced to the laſt extremity, and upon the point of giving way. In the mean time, as a great ſlaughter was made of the Carthaginians, without their being able to effect their deſign, their General, who perceived it, cauſed a retreat to be ſounded; and the Romans, who were very near loſing all their preparations, at laſt remained in poſſeſſion of their works, and preſerved them without the loſs of any.

When the action was over, Hannibal put to ſea in the night; undoubtedly believing, that the Romans fatigued with ſo rude a conflict, would be leſs ſtrict in keeping guard. He carried away with him the horſe of Lilybæum, which could only be an incumbrance in a beſieged place, and might be of ſervice elſewhere. He got off undiſcovered, and took the route of Drepanum, where Adherbal, the Carthaginian General, was. Drepanum was a place advantagiouſly ſituated, with a fine port, an hundred and twenty ſtadia (ſix leagues) from Lilybæum, and the Carthaginians had always had the keeping of it much at heart.

Diod. in Eclog. p. 849.

Burning of the works.

The Romans, animated by the advantage they had juſt gained, renewed their attacks of the place with ſtill greater ardor than before; the beſieged not daring to make a ſecond at-

Polyb. i. 49.

A.R. 502. Ant.C. 250. tempt to burn the machines; ſo much were they diſcouraged by the loſs ſuſtained in the firſt. But a very high wind riſing on a ſudden, ſome of the mercenary ſoldiers took notice of it to the General; adding, that the occaſion was entirely favourable for ſetting the machines of the beſiegers on fire, and the more as the wind ſate directly againſt them; and they offered themſelves for that ſervice. Their offer was accepted. They were ſupplied with every thing neceſſary for that enterprize. All the machines took fire in a moment, without its being poſſible for the Romans to prevent it; becauſe in this conflagration, which became almoſt univerſal in a very ſhort time, the wind drove the ſmoke and ſparks in their eyes, and prevented them from diſcerning where to apply their aid, whereas the others ſaw clearly where to direct their diſcharges, and throw their fire. This accident made the Romans deſpair of carrying
Diod. ibid. the place by open force. Beſides which, proviſions were ſo ſcarce, that they were reduced to ſubſiſt wholly upon horſefleſh; and the diſeaſes, which ſucceeded, killed almoſt ten thouſand men in a ſhort time. They were therefore abſolutely reſolved to abandon the ſiege. But Hiero, King of Syracuſe, having ſent them corn in abundance, revived their courage, and exhorted them in the ſtrongeſt terms not to renounce their enterprize. They therefore contented themſelves with changing the ſiege into a blockade, and ſurrounding the city with a line of contravallation; they poſted their army all around it, reſolved to expect that from time, which they were not in a condition to effect, by a ſhorter method.

P. CLO-

P. CLODIUS PULCHER.
L. JUNIUS PULLUS.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C. 249.

When Rome was informed of what paſſed at the ſiege of Lilybæum, and that part of the troops had periſhed there, that bad news, far from dejecting the citizens ſeemed to renew their ardor. Every one was in haſte to give in his name for the ſervice. Ten thouſand men were preſently raiſed, who paſſed the ſtreight, and marched by land to join the beſiegers.

Vain diſpoſition of the Conſul Clodius. Diod. apud Valeſ. l. iv. p. 270.

The province of Sicily had fallen by lot to the Conſul Clodius, and he was gone thither. He was a man of a cruel, proud, violent diſpoſition; full of his Nobility, ſtill more conceited of his own merit, and deſpiſing all others; incapable of taking counſel, and however, always forming hardy enterprizes that had great occaſion for it. As ſoon as he arrived in Sicily, he began by condemning the conduct of the Conſuls his predeceſſors before the troops, accuſing them of negligence and cowardice, and reproaching them with having paſſed their time in feaſting and pleaſure, inſtead of carrying on the ſiege with vigour.

Polyb. l. 49.

To deprive the beſieged of the means of receiving either advices or aids, he undertook to ſhut up the entrance of the port by filling it up: a great and bold deſign, but raſh, and found to be abſolutely impracticable! And what rendered Clodius more blame-worthy, was, that his predeceſſors had already attempted to fill up the entrance of the port ineffectually. The ſea was too deep in that place, and nothing thrown into it remained where it was neceſſary. The waves, and the rapidity of the current, carried away,

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. and diſperſed, the materials, before they came to the bottom.

Battle of Drepanum: loſs of the Roman fleet. Polyb. i. 51—53.

As he was determined, at any price whatſoever, to ſignalize himſelf, he conceived thoughts of another enterprize, which was to attack Adherbal at Drepanum. He aſſured himſelf of victory, and was firmly perſuaded, that he ſhould ſurprize the enemy, becauſe, after the loſs which the Romans had lately ſuſtained at Lilybæum, the Carthaginians, who did not know they had received a conſiderable reinforcement, could not imagine that they ſhould think of putting to ſea. With this hope, he made choice of two hundred ſhips, on board of which he put his beſt ſeamen, and the flower of the legions. The troops embarked with joy, becauſe the paſſage was not long, and beſides, according to what the Conſul had told them, they could not fail of great ſpoils. The better to cover his deſign, he made the fleet ſet out in the night, without being perceived by the beſieged. At day-break the advanced guard being in ſight of Drepanum, Adherbal, who expected nothing leſs, was ſurprized, but not diſconcerted. He immediately drew up his ſhips upon the coaſt, gave orders for them to put to ſea, and to follow the ſhip he was on board of, keeping an eye always upon it. He would not fight in the port; where, not having room to extend his lines, to veer and tack, and to run between the ſhips of the enemy, he would have loſt all the advantages of the lightneſs of his own veſſels; and could not avoid being boarded by the Romans, which he feared moſt of all.

He

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249.

He accordingly ſet forwards firſt, gained the open ſea, and made his fleet file off under the rocks on the ſide of the port oppoſite to that through which the enemy was to enter. The Conſul, who had began to make his right wing enter the port, ſurprized at the movement of the Carthaginians, ſent orders to the ſhips of his right, which were already in the port, to tack about, and join the groſs of the fleet. This motion occaſioned infinite confuſion. For the ſhips, which were in the port, running foul of thoſe that were entering it, put them into exceeding diſorder, and even broke their oars. The trouble and confuſion with which this bad manner of working the ſhips was attended, had began to alarm and diſcourage the army; when an action of the Conſul's entirely diſcouraged the troops, and made them loſe all hope and reſolution. The Romans, at leaſt the common people, had great faith in the auſpices and augury. At the moment the battle was going to begin, ſomebody came to tell Clodius, that the chickens would neither come out of their coop, nor eat. He ordered them to be thrown into the ſea; adding with a tone of raillery, (*a*) *If they wont eat, let them drink.* This jeſt, ſays Cicero (*b*), coſt him many tears, and the Roman People a great diſaſter. All theſe obſervances of auſpices and auguries were, at bottom, mere grimace: but they conſtituted part of the religion of thoſe unhappy times; and to ſeem to deſpiſe them, was making one's ſelf to be

Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 7. Flor. ii. 2.

(*a*) Abjici eos in mare juſſit, dicens: *Quia eſſe nolant, bibant. Val. Max.* i. 4.

(*b*) Qui riſus, claſſe devicta, multus ipſi lacrymas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 7.

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. conſidered as an impious wretch, and an enemy to the gods. In the mean time, as faſt as any ſhip diſengaged itſelf, the officers immediately made it draw up along the coaſt, with its head facing the enemy. At the ſame time Adherbal, advancing into the main ſea, drew up his galleys in one line, oppoſite to thoſe of the Romans, which, poſted near the ſhore, waited for the ſhips that were coming out of the port: an order of battle that was very pernicious to them. The two fleets approaching near each other, and the ſignal being given on both ſides, the charge began. All was equal enough at firſt, becauſe the troops that engaged were the flower of both the land-armies: but the Carthaginians by degrees had the better. And indeed they had many advantages over the Romans during the whole battle. Their ſhips were built ſo as to move every way with great agility; their rowers were very expert; and they had taken the wiſe precaution to draw up in the open ſea. If any of their ſhips were preſſed by the enemy, they retired without running any riſque; and light as they were, it was eaſy for to ſtand off. If the enemy advanced to purſue them, they turned, kept in motion round him, took him in flank, and beat againſt him perpetually; whereas the Roman ſhips could not tack without difficulty, on account of their heavineſs, and the little experience of their rowers; which occaſioned a great number of them to be ſunk. As they fought near the land and had left themſelves no room to move in behind them, they could neither extricate themſelves out of danger when preſſed, nor carry aid where it was neceſſary. Thus a great part of their ſhips remained immoveable upon the banks of

of ſand, and the reſt were daſhed to pieces againſt the land. Only thirty eſcaped, which being near the Conſul, fled with him; diſengaging themſelves as well as they could along the ſhore. As it was neceſſary, in order to arrive at the army before Lilybæum, to paſs thro' the Carthaginians, he adorned his galleys with all the marks of victory, and by that ſtratagem amuſed the enemy, who conſidering him as victorious, believed that his whole fleet followed him. All the reſt, to the number of ninety-three, with their crews, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. The Romans loſt eight thouſand men in this action, who were either killed or drowned; and twenty thouſand ſoldiers, mariners, and rowers, were taken and carried to Carthage.

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. Frontin. Stratag. ii. 13. Oroſ. iv. 8.

So conſiderable a victory did Adherbal's prudence and valour as much honour amongſt the Carthaginians, as it covered the Roman Conſul with ſhame and ignominy.

The Conſul Junius goes to Sicily. Polyb. i. 53—56.

This was not the laſt diſgrace the Romans experienced this year. They had appointed L. Junius, one of the Conſuls, to carry proviſions, and other munitions of war, to the army before Lilybæum, and ſixty ſhips were given him for a convoy. Junius having arrived at Meſſana, and augmented his fleet there with all the ſhips that came to him from Lilybæum and the reſt of Sicily, ſet out with the utmoſt diligence for Syracuſe, where he arrived without incurring any danger. His fleet conſiſted of an hundred and twenty long ſhips, and about eight hundred tranſports. He gave half of the latter, with ſome of the others, to the Quæſtors, with orders to carry proviſions to the camp directly. As for himſelf, he ſtayed at Syracuſe for the

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. ſhips, which could not follow him from Meſſana, and to receive the corn with which the allies of the inland country were to ſupply him.

New diſgrace of the Romans at Lilybæum.

About this time Aſdrubal, after having ſent all the men and ſhips he had taken in the laſt victory to Carthage, formed a ſquadron of an hundred ſail, thirty of his own, and ſeventy which Carthalon, who had the joint command with him, had brought, put that officer at their head, and ordered him to ſail for Lilybæum, to fall unexpectedly on the enemy's ſhips at anchor there, to take as many as he could, and burn the reſt. Carthalon took this commiſſion upon him with pleaſure. He ſet out at day-break, burnt part of the enemy's fleet, and diſperſed the reſt. The terror ſpread into the Roman camp. They ran with great cries to their ſhips. But, whilſt they were carrying them aid, Imilco, who had perceived early what paſſed, ſallied from the city, and fell on them on another quarter with his foreign troops. It is eaſy to conceive the conſternation of the Romans, when they ſaw themſelves attacked on both ſides at the ſame time.

They happily avoid two battles.

Carthalon having taken ſome ſhips, and burnt others, removed a little from Lilybæum, and poſted himſelf in the way from * Heraclea, in order to obſerve the new fleet of the Romans, and prevent it from arriving at the camp. Informed afterwards by thoſe he had ſent out as ſcouts, that a conſiderable great fleet approached, conſiſting of all kinds of ſhips, (it was that which the Conſul had ſent before him under the Quæſtors) he advanced to meet the Romans, and offer them battle; believing after

* *A city on the ſouthern coaſt of Sicily.*

his

his firſt exploit, that he had only to ſhew himſelf in order to conquer. The ſquadron, which came from Syracuſe, were apprized, that the enemy was not far off. The Quæſtors, not believing themſelves in a condition to hazard a battle, ſtood in to a ſmall allied city called Phintias *, where there was not a port indeed, but where the rocks riſing above the land, formed a kind of road commodious enough. They landed there, and having planted as many catapultas and baliſtas, as the city would ſupply them with, they expected the Carthaginians. The latter no ſooner arrived, but they reſolved to attack. They imagined, that in the terror the Romans were, they would not fail to retire into this little inconſiderable place, and abandon their ſhips to them. But the affair not taking the turn they had expected, and the Romans defending themſelves with vigour, they retired from that place, where they were very much expoſed; and carrying off with them ſome tranſports which they had taken, they ſailed to the river Halycus, where they continued to obſerve what route the Romans would take. A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. Diod. in Eclog. p. 880. Diod. ibid.

Junius having made an end of all he had to do at Syracuſe, doubled the cape of Pachynus, and made ſail for Lilybæum, without knowing any thing of what had happened to thoſe he had ſent before him. This news coming to Carthalon, he made all ſail with deſign to give the Conſul battle, whilſt ſeparated from the oeher ſhips. Junius ſaw the numerous fleet of the Carthaginians at a great diſtance. But being too weak to ſuſtain a battle, and too near the enemy to fly, he choſe to come to an

* *Near the mouth of the Himera, mount Ecnomus, and Gela.*

anchor

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. anchor near Camarina, on a coaſt amongſt abſolutely inacceſſible cliffs; chuſing rather to expoſe himſelf to the danger of periſhing on the rocks, than to fall with his fleet into the hands of the enemy. Carthalon was far from giving the Romans battle in ſuch difficult places. He ſeized a promontory, came to an anchor, and having placed himſelf between the two Roman fleets, watched what paſſed in them both.

The Roman fleet entirely loſt in a great ſtorm.

A dreadful ſtorm beginning to threaten, the Carthaginian pilots, very expert in ſuch caſes, foreſaw what was going to happen. They gave Carthalon notice of it, and adviſed him to double the cape of Pachynus as ſoon as poſſible, and ſhelter himſelf from the ſtorm. That General prudently gave in to this advice. It required abundance of labour and pains to paſs the cape: but at length they effected it, and placed the fleet out of danger. The ſtorm broke out ſoon after. The two Roman fleets being in places expoſed and uncovered, were ſo roughly treated, that not a ſingle plank of them fit for uſe eſcaped, except two ſhips, which the Conſul em-

Diod. ibid. ployed in taking in ſuch as had the good fortune to ſurvive the wreck, either by throwing themſelves on ſhore, or being driven thither by the ſtorm: and the number of theſe was very conſiderable. This accident, which highly favoured the Carthaginians, and ſtrengthened their hopes, entirely dejected the Romans, already much weakened by their former loſſes. They renounced the ſea, determined never to fit out any more naval armaments, and to keep only ſome tranſports for the convoys, which they ſent from time to time to Sicily, giving up in that manner a ſuperiority to the Carthaginians, which they

they could no longer diſpute, and even not well aſſured of having the advantage entirely over them by land. A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249.

Theſe ſad news gave both Rome and the army before Lilybæum the moſt ſenſible affliction, but did not make them raiſe the ſiege: they even took juſt meaſures to ſend proviſions thither. Rome thought only of placing authority in better hands than thoſe in which it then was: for ſhe was equally diſſatisfied with both Conſuls, whoſe bad ſucceſs was attributed to the contempt, which both had expreſſed for religion. Clodius had already been recalled to Rome to give an account of his conduct. Accordingly it was reſolved, that a Dictator ſhould be declared to command the armies in Sicily. Hitherto none who had been inveſted with that important charge, had exerciſed it out of Italy.

A Dictator nominated. Suet. in Tib. p. 2.

Clodius had orders to nominate this Dictator. One cannot tell what name to give his extravagance of conduct upon this occaſion, of which there is no example. As if he had made it his buſineſs, by degrading and rendering the principal office of the State contemptible, to inſult the majeſty of the Senate and People, and to exaſperate them more and more againſt himſelf, he pitched upon one Glicias of the dregs of the people, who had ſerved him as a ſerjeant or regiſter, Dictator. The indignation of the public then broke out againſt that unworthy Conſul: he was obliged to abdicate, and immediately cited before the People. It is ſaid, that a ſudden ſtorm diſſolved the aſſembly, and ſaved him. Atilius Calatinus was nominated Dictator in the room of Glicias. He appointed Cecilius Metellus maſter of the horſe. They both

Val. Max. viii. 1. Liv. Epit. xviii.

A. R. 503. Ant. C. 249. both ſet out for Sicily; but acted nothing memorable there.

Junius makes himſelf maſter of Eryx. Polyb. i. 56.

Junius, who had remained in Sicily, endeavouring to cover his faults and misfortune by ſome conſiderable exploit, found means to hold ſecret intelligence in Eryx, and had the city delivered up to him. Upon the top of the mountain called by the ſame name, was the temple of Venus Erycina, undoubtedly the fineſt and richeſt of all the temples of Sicily. The city was ſituated a little below this ſummit, and the only way up to it was a long and very ſteep one. Junius poſted part of his troops on the top of the mountain, and the reſt at the bottom, near a little town called Egithalla, which he fortified, and where he left eight hundred men in garriſon. After having taken theſe precautions, he conceived he had nothing to fear. But Carthalon having landed his troops there in the night, took the little town. Part of the garriſon was killed, and the reſt took refuge in the city of Eryx.

Diod in Eclog. p. 841.

Hiſtory tells us nothing certain from this time concerning Junius. Some authors believe he periſhed taken by Carthalon in the expedition we have juſt related: others, that foreſeeing what would happen if he returned to Rome, he prevented his condemnation by a voluntary death.

Zonar. Val. Max.

Cenſorin. de die Natali. c. 17.

Writers differ alſo concerning the celebration of the ſecular games. Some place it in the year of which we are ſpeaking, others fourteen years after, in the Conſulſhip of P. Cornelius Lentulus, and C. Licinius Varus.

C. AURE-

C. AURELIUS COTTA II.
P. SERVILIUS GEMINUS II.

A. R. 504.
Ant.C. 248.

No great events happened in the following years, till the deciſive battle, which terminated the war. Amilcar, ſurnamed Barcas, father of the great Hannibal, ſucceeded Carthalon in Sicily, from whence he ſet out with his fleet for Italy, and ravaged the countries of the Locri and Brutii.

Amilcar is charged with the command in Sicily.

Rome, under endleſs obligation to Hiero, in order to expreſs her gratitude, remitted the annual tribute he had engaged to pay her, and entered into a ſtricter amity with him than ever.

L. CÆCILIUS METELLUS II.
NUM. FABIUS BUTEO.

A. R. 505.
Ant.C. 247.

Private perſons fit out ſhips, and plunder Hippo.

The Senate had reſolved to act no longer by ſea: but private perſons induced them to ſupply them with ſhips to cruize againſt the enemy, upon condition of reſtoring them at their return, and of keeping the prizes they ſhould take for their own uſe. A conſiderable number of galleys were lent them, which they fitted out at their own expence. They ravaged the coaſts of Africa, and having entered the port of the city of * Hippo, they ſet the ſhips they found in it on fire, burnt many houſes of the place, and carried off a conſiderable booty. Whilſt they were employed in plundering, the inhabitants ſhut up the mouth of the port with chains. The Romans were in great perplexity; but their in-

Zonar. viii. 397.

* *It is believed to be Hippo Diarrhyſus, ſituated near Utica, twenty-five or thirty leagues from Carthage.*

duſtry

A. R. 505. Ant. C. 247. duſtry extricated them. When a galley came near the chains, all the men on board went to the poop, that immediately raiſed its head above the chain, at which inſtant they returned to the head, and the poop riſing in its turn, the veſſelf cleared herſelf, and went over. By this means all the ſhips eſcaped the danger, and arrived at Panormus, where they were attacked by the Carthaginian fleet, which they put to flight.

Polyb. i. 58. The Conſuls were at that time employed, the one as the ſiege of Lilybæum, and the other at that of Drepanum. Amilcar haraſſed them perpetually from the poſt which he had occupied, in which way things continued ſeveral years. No pains were ſpared on either ſide. New ſtratagems, feints, ſurprizes, approaches, and attacks, paſſed every day: however, though nothing was omitted, nothing deciſive paſſed.

Birth of Hannibal Polyb. xv. 706. Liv. xxx. 37. What ought to make this year moſt remarkable, is the birth of the great Hannibal. What he ſays himſelf, after the battle which he loſt in Africa againſt Scipio, in the 550th year of Rome, at which time he was five and forty years old, authorizes the dating of his birth in the preſent year, which is the 505th year of Rome.

Exchange of priſoners. Liv. xxii. 23. A conſiderable great number of priſoners had been taken on both ſides many years, and an exchange was agreed on. The cartel was ſettled at the rate of about ſix pounds an head. Moſt priſoners had been taken from the Carthaginians, who paid the balance in money according to the rate ſtipulated.

Two new colonies. Vel. Pat. i. 14. Two new colonies were ſettled; the one at Æſulum in Hetruria, and the other at Alſium in Umbria.

The

The *Cenſus*, taken by Atilius Calatinus and Manlius Torquatus, concluded at this time with the uſual ceremony of the *Luſtrum*: this was the thirty-eighth. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and fifty-two thouſand two hundred and twenty-two; which was almoſt fifty thouſand leſs than at the laſt Cenſus: a conſiderable decreaſe occaſioned by the wars, and frequent ſhipwrecks.

A. R. 505. Ant. C. 247. *Cenſus.* Faſt. Cap. Liv. Epit. xix.

M. OTACILIUS CRASSUS II.
M. FABIUS LICINUS.

A. R. 506. Ant. C. 246.

This year a Roman lady was cited before the People as guilty of treaſon; a thing of which there was no example. She was the ſiſter of Clodius Pulcher, whoſe ill conduct had occaſioned the loſs of the Roman fleet. One day returning from the games, the throng of the people in the ſtreets obliged her chariot to drive ſlow, on which the following words eſcaped her in a loud voice: *Oh that my brother could but revive, to command the fleet again!* The multitude incommoding her, ſhe deſired the diminution of it. Notwithſtanding all the endeavours of her relations and the friends of her family, who were the principal perſons of Rome, and remonſtrated, that the laws did not puniſh indiſcreet words, but only criminal actions, ſhe was ſentenced to pay a fine, which was applied in building a little chapel to Liberty.

Roman lady tried by the People, and fined. Liv. Epit. xix. Val. Max. viii 1. A. Gell. x. 6. Suet. in Tib. c. 2.

M. FA-

A. R. 507. Ant. C. 245. M. FABIUS BUTEO.
C. ATILIUS BULBUS.

Vell. Pat. i. 14. A colony was ſent to Fregeliæ, a city of Hetruria, only three leagues from Alſium, where one had been ſettled two years before.

Flor. ii. 2. A battle was fought near the iſland of Ægimurus, which was fatal to both ſides; to the Carthaginians by their defeat, and to the Romans by the ſhipwreck, which followed ſoon after.

Frontin. iii. 10. Amilcar found means to make troops and proviſions enter Lilybæum.

A. R. 508. Ant. C. 244. A. MANLIUS TORQUATUS II.
C. SEMPRONIUS BLÆSUS.

Amilcar takes the city of Eryx.

Polyb. i. 59. Diod. Eclog. xxiv. p. 581. We have ſaid before, that the Romans had made themſelves maſters of Eryx. Having poſted a good body of troops on the top of the mountain, and another at the bottom, they believed, that they had nothing to fear for a city ſituate between both, and the rather, becauſe its ſituation alone ſeemed to ſecure it entirely from danger. But they had to do with an enemy, whoſe vigilance and activity ought to have kept them always upon their guard. Amilcar made his troops advance in the night, and marching at their head a league and a half with profound ſilence round the mountain, he made himſelf maſter of the city, after having killed part of the garriſon, and cauſed the reſt to be carried priſoners to Drepanum. One cannot conceive how the Carthaginians could ſuſtain themſelves in this poſt, attacked as they were both from above and below, and not being able to receive convoys, except from one place on the coaſt

coaſt in their poſſeſſion. By ſuch ſtrokes, as much and perhaps more than by the gaining of a battle, the ability and wiſe boldneſs of a commander may be known. A. R. 508. Ant. C. 244.

The war, in this ſmall ſpace upon the mountain of Eryx, was more warm and vigorous than it is poſſible to imagine. Amilcar, poſted between two bodies of troops, the one above and the other below, was beſieged by the latter as well as the other by him. The attacks and defence were ſuſtained on both ſides with equal ardor. Neither reſted night or day. They had learnt not to ſuffer themſelves to be ſurprized. They knew that a ſingle moment might be deciſive. Sometimes victorious, and ſometimes defeated, yet they did not loſe courage. Neither the ſcarcity of proviſions, fatigues, nor the dangers which they ſuffered for two years, could induce either ſide to yield. This double ſiege, for it may well be called ſo, terminated only with the war.

Under the Conſuls of this year a colony was ſent to Brunduſium in the territory of the Sallentini, twenty years after that country had been ſubjected by the Romans. Vell. Pat. i. 14.

L. Cæcilius Metellus ſucceeded Ti. Coruncanius as Pontifex Maximus, who was the firſt Plebeian that had this dignity.

C. FUNDANIUS FUNDULUS.
C. SULPICIUS GALLUS. A. R. 509. Ant. C. 243.

Five years were paſſed without any conſiderable event on either ſide. The Romans had believed that they ſhould be able to take Lilybæum with their land-forces: but finding it ſpun out to a great length, they returned to their *New Roman fleet built and fitted out by the zeal of particulars.*

A. R. 509. Ant. C. 243. firſt plan, and made extraordinary efforts for arming a new fleet. The public treaſury was exhauſted; but that defect was ſupplied by particulars; ſo much did the love of their country ſway with the People. Every body according to their ability contributed to the common expence, and on the credit of the public, which engaged to repay in time the ſums lent for this armament, no heſitation was made in advancing the money for an expedition, on which the glory and ſafety of the Commonwealth depended. One fitted out a ſhip at his own expence; others joined two or three together to do the ſame. In a very ſhort time two hundred galleys of five ranks of oars were ready to put to ſea. They were built upon the model of one taken from the enemy of extraordinary ſwiftneſs. In the courſe of the Punic wars, we ſhall ſee more than one example of this generous love of the Romans for their country, which conſtituted one of the principal parts of their character. But the Commonwealth was alſo true to her engagements. Thus the publick faith, which we cannot repeat too often, is an aſſured reſource to a State on great occaſions. To commit the leaſt breach of it, is tranſgreſſing the moſt eſſential rule of good policy, and leaving a diffidence in the minds of a people, for which there is often no remedy. This ſudden reſource, which Rome ſeems to have little reaſon to expect after her recent loſſes by ſea, enabled the Commonwealth to compleat the conqueſt of Sicily, and afterwards to proceed to the other conqueſts, which the Divine Providence had allotted her.

C. Lu-

A. R. 510.
Ant. C. 242.

C. LUTATIUS CATULUS.
A. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS.

Poſtumius prepared to go with his collegue for Sicily, where they promiſed themſelves ſome great event this year. But as he was *Flamen Martialis*, prieſt of Mars, (and the prieſts could not remove from Rome) Metellus the grand Pontiff would not let him ſet out for his province. In proceſs of time this ſtrict regularity was diſpenced with.

The Conſul Poſtumius kept at Rome as a prieſt. Liv. Epit. xix. Tacit. An. iii. 71. Val. Max. i. 1.

The Senate ſhewed a like delicacy alſo in reſpect to religion, by forbidding Lutatius to conſult the divinations of Prænesſte, which were given by lot, *Prænesſtinas Sortes*, being againſt a Roman Conſul's having recourſe to foreign ceremonies. All kinds of predictions amongſt the ancients were called *Sortes*. There were different ſpecies of them. The *Sortes* of Prænesſte were very ancient and famous throughout Italy. They were ſmall pieces of wood, inſcribed with enigmatical characters, contained in a coffer, which the prieſts kept with great care in the temple of Fortune. When a perſon went to conſult this oracle, the prieſts brought out this box, and made a child ſtir the little pieces of wood ſeveral times; after which he drew at a venture. The prieſts pretended to find the anſwer to the demands of the queriſts, in the characters inſcribed upon them. Cicero (*a*) with reaſon derides the ſtupid credulity of people, who ſuffered themſelves to be impoſed upon by a groſs cheat, founded only on one ſide in the avarice of the prieſts, and on the other in the

The Senate forbids Lutatius to conſult the divinations of Prænesſte. Val. Max. i. 3.

(*a*) Tota res eſt inventa fallaciis, aut ad quæſtum, aut ad ſuperſtitionem, aut ad errorem. *De Divinat.* ii. 85.

A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242. ſuperſtition of thoſe, who came to conſult the oracle.

Creation of a ſecond Prætor. Liv. Epit. xix.

As the two Conſuls could not ſet out for Sicily, and one did not ſuffice for ſupporting the weight of ſo important a war, two Prætors were created this year for the firſt time, (for hitherto there was but one, whoſe ſole function was to adminiſter juſtice) and Q. Valerius Falto one of them, had orders to accompany Lutatius, and to ſhare with him in the cares of the war as his Lieutenant. As ſoon as the winter was over, they ſet out for Sicily with a fleet of three hundred galleys, and ſeven hundred tranſports. Two Prætors were always created for the future, though there was no occaſion for them in the army. They both remained at Rome to adminiſter juſtice, the one between citizens and citizens, who was called *Prætor urbanus*; and the other between citizens and ſtrangers, called *Prætor peregrinus*.

Battle near the iſlands Ægates. Polyb. i. 60—62.

Lutatius landed in Sicily, when he was leaſt expected there. The fleet of the enemy was retired into Africa, becauſe they did not believe, that the Romans had any thoughts of putting to ſea again. He made himſelf maſter of the port of Drepanum, and of all the advantageous poſts in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum, which the retreat of the Carthaginians left without defence. He made his approaches round Drepanum, and diſpoſed every thing for the ſiege. The machines had ſoon made a breach, and the ſoldiers were preparing for the aſſault with the Conſul at their head, when he was dangerouſly wounded in the thigh. The ſoldiers, by whom he was very much beloved, abandoned the attack to ſerve him, and followed him in a body to the camp, whither he was carried. Whilſt his

Oroſ. iv. 10.

his wound was curing, he did not loſe time. Foreſeeing, that the enemy's fleet would not be long before it arrived, and having always before his eyes what had been judged at firſt, that the war could be terminated only by a naval battle, without loſing a moment's time, he exerciſed his crews ſo as to form them for the deſign he had of attacking the enemy, and by his aſſiduity in this practice, of mere ſailors he made them excellent ſoldiers in a very ſhort time. A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242.

The Carthaginians, much ſurprized that the Romans ſhould dare to appear again at ſea, and deſiring that the camp at Eryx might not want the neceſſary munitions, fitted out ſhips immediately, and having ſupplied them with grain and other proviſions, they made this fleet depart, and gave Hanno the command of it. He ſailed firſt to the iſland of Hiera, with deſign to land at Eryx, without being perceived by the enemy, to unlade his ſhips there, to add all the beſt troops at Eryx to his naval army, and to go with Amilcar to offer the enemy battle.

The Conſul was not well recovered of his wound, when he was apprized, that the fleet of the enemy approached. Conjecturing what the views of the Carthaginian Admiral might be, he choſe the braveſt and moſt experienced troops in his land-army, and ſailed for * Æguſa, an iſland ſituate oppoſite to Lilybæum. There, after having exhorted his people to behave well, he gave the pilots notice to prepare for a battle the next morning.

At the break of day, ſeeing the wind which favoured the Carthaginians was much againſt him, and that the ſea was extremely rough, he

* *One of the Ægates.*

A. R. 513. Ant. C. 242.

pauſed at firſt concerning the meaſures he ſhould take. But he afterwards reflected, that if he engaged during that foul weather, he ſhould only have the naval army, and ſhips laden and heavy to deal with: that on the contrary, if he waited till it was calm, and ſuffered Hanno to join the camp at Eryx, he would have ſhips lightened by unlading their freight upon his hands, as alſo the flower of the land-army, and, which was ſtill more formidable than all the reſt, the ability and intrepidity of Amilcar. All theſe reaſons determined him to ſeize the preſent occaſion. Theſe motives for the conduct of a General, explained in this manner by one more able as a captain than as a writer, for ſuch Polybius was, add infinite value to the narration of facts, and are in a manner their ſoul.

The Conſul had choſen troops, good mariners who had been well exerciſed, and excellent ſhips built, as we have ſaid, upon the model of a galley taken ſome time before, which was the moſt compleat the Romans had ever ſeen of the kind. On the ſide of the Carthaginians every thing was the reverſe. As they had been ſole maſters of the ſea for ſome years, and the Romans did not dare to face them, they conſidered them as nothing, and themſelves as invincible. On the firſt report of the motion the latter were making, Carthage ſent out a fleet equipped in haſte, in which every thing argued precipitation: the ſoldiers and mariners were all mercenaries, newly raiſed, and as void of experience, courage and zeal, as intereſt in the common cauſe. This appeared entirely in the battle. They could not ſuſtain the firſt attack. Fifty of their ſhips were ſunk, and ſeventy taken with all on board. The reſt, with the help

help of a wind that ſprung up very opportunely for them, retired to the little iſland, from whence they ſate out. The number of the priſoners exceeded ten thouſand. A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242.

Hanno retired to Carthage with what ſhips he could ſave. He there loſt his life, the uſual treatment of unſucceſsful Generals. Rome did not act in that manner; and her policy in this reſpect, beſides being more conformable to the humanity which the Romans always profeſſed, was more advantagious to the State and the ſervice in the field, by leaving the Generals, who had failed of ſucceſs, time to retrieve either their fault or their misfortune.

Lutatius, after the action, advanced to Lilybæum, and joined the beſiegers. After having given his troops ſome reſt, he marched them to Eryx, where he gained an advantage over Amilcar, undoubtedly in a battle by land, and killed him two thouſand men. Oroſ. iv. 10.

Treaty of peace between Rome and Carthage. Polyb. i. 63, 64.

When this bad news was brought to Carthage, it occaſioned the more ſurprize and conſternation, as it had been little expected. The Senate did not loſe courage. The deſire of continuing the war was not wanting; but the ſtate of their affairs oppoſed it. As the Romans were maſters of the ſea, it was no longer poſſible to ſend their proviſions or troops to the armies in Sicily. They therefore ſent diſpatches immediately to Amilcar Barcas, who commanded there, and left it to his prudence to act as he ſhould think moſt expedient. That great man, as long as he had the leaſt reaſon to hope, had done every thing that could be expected from the moſt intrepid valour, and the moſt conſummate wiſdom. But as he had now no reſource, he ſent deputies to the Conſul to treat

A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242. of a peace and alliance: prudence conſiſting, ſays Polybius, in knowing how both to reſiſt, and to yield when neceſſary.

Lutatius, beſides his particular intereſt in not leaving the glory of terminating ſo important a war to a ſucceſſor, knew how weary the Roman People were of one ſo ruinous, which had exhauſted their forces and revenues; and he had not forgot the unfortunate conſequences of Regulus's inexorable and imprudent haughtineſs. He therefore made no difficulties about treating, and dictated the following terms. THERE SHALL BE, IF THE ROMAN PEOPLE APPROVE IT, AMITY BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. THE CARTHAGINIANS SHALL EVACUATE ALL SICILY. THEY SHALL NOT MAKE WAR AGAINST HIERO, NOR CARRY ARMS AGAINST THE SYRACUSANS OR THEIR ALLIES. THEY SHALL RESTORE ALL THE PRISONERS TAKEN FROM THE ROMANS WITHOUT RANSOM. THEY SHALL PAY THEM IN THE SPACE OF TWENTY YEARS, * TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EUBOIC TALENTS OF SILVER. The ſimplicity, exactneſs and perſpicuity of this treaty, which ſays ſo many things in few words, and regulates all the intereſts of two potent States and their allies by ſea and land, are worth obſerving in this place.

Cor. Nep. in Amil. The Conſul had demanded, that the troops in Eryx ſhould deliver up their arms. Barcas abſolutely refuſed to come into that article, and declared that he would hazard the laſt extremities, and even periſh, rather than conſent to ſuch an infamy. He only agreed to pay eigh-

Liv. xxi. 41.

* *The ſum is about three hundred and nine thouſand pounds ſterling.*

teen

teen Roman *Denarii* (about nine ſhillings) for each ſoldier of that garriſon. A. R. 510. Ant.C. 242.

When theſe conditions were brought to Rome, the People not approving them in the whole, ſent ten deputies to regulate the affair finally upon the ſpot. They made no alteration in the main of the treaty. "They only ſhortened "the terms for the payments of the money, "and added to the ſum impoſed by the Conſul "a thouſand talents, to be paid immediately "for the charges of the war, and that the Car-"thaginians ſhould quit all the iſlands between "Italy and Sicily." It is neceſſary to obſerve, that Sardinia is not included in this treaty. Lutatius was continued in the command in Sicily, to regulate the affairs and government of the new conqueſt.

End of the firſt Punic war. A. R. 510. Ant.C. 242.

Thus terminated one of the longeſt wars mentioned in hiſtory, as it ſubſiſted four and twenty years without interruption. The ardor for diſputing empire was equally obſtinate on both ſides. Abundance of reſolution, abundance of greatneſs of ſoul, appear both in the enterprizes and execution of both parties. The Carthaginians take place in their knowledge of naval affairs; their ſkill in building ſhips, their addreſs and facility in working them; the experience of their pilots; their knowledge of the coaſts, creeks, roads, and winds; and laſtly, their abundant riches for ſupporting the expences of a rude and long war. The Romans had none of theſe advantages: but valour, zeal for the public good, love of their Country, a noble emulation for glory, and a warm deſire to extend their dominion, ſerved inſtead of all they wanted in other reſpects. It is ſurprizing to ſee them, entirely new to, and unexperienced in, naval

A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242.

naval affairs, not only make head againſt the moſt expert and moſt powerful nation of the world at ſea, but gain many naval battles againſt them. No difficulties, no misfortunes, were capable of diſcouraging them. They loſt in the courſe of this firſt Punic war, either in battles or by ſtorms, ſeven hundred galleys. The conſtancy of the Roman People may be judged from hence. They undoubtedly would not have made peace in the ſame circumſtances, wherein we have juſt ſeen the Carthaginians demand it. A ſingle unfortunate campaign diſcourages them; many do not ſhake the reſolution of the Romans.

As to the ſoldiers, there is no compariſon between thoſe of Rome and thoſe of Carthage; the firſt being infinitely ſuperior to the latter in point of courage. As to the Generals, Amilcar, ſurnamed Barcas, was undeniably the moſt diſtinguiſhed both by his conduct and valour. During all this war, no General has appeared on the ſide of the Romans, whoſe extraordinary talents can be conſidered as the cauſe of victory: ſo that it was ſolely by the conſtitution of the State, and, if I may venture to ſay ſo, her national virtues, that Rome triumphed over Carthage.

When we conſider at one view the whole ſeries of the firſt Punic war, we ſeem to ſee ſomething like what paſſed in the combats of the antients, between two equally ſtrong and robuſt Athletæ, who full of courage and ardor, animated by the warm deſire of conquering, and by the cries of the ſpectators, engage in fight, beat with their fiſts, wreſtle, lift one another off the ground, ſhake each other violently, throw one another down, riſe that moment with new vigour,

vigour, employ ſtrength, art, and all imagina- A. R. 510. Ant. C. 242.
ble agility and addreſs; till at laſt both being down again, after having ſtruggled a great while upon the ſand, turned each other over and over, and twiſted in a thouſand different manners, one of the two getting the upperhand, reduces his adverſary to aſk quarter, and to confeſs himſelf conquered. Such was very near the caſe between the Romans and Carthaginians in the war of which we have been ſpeaking.

Q. LUTATIUS CERCO. A. R. 511.
A. MANLIUS ATTICUS. Ant. C. 241.

Lutatius and Valerius remained in Sicily, the firſt in quality of Proconſul, the other as Prætor. They in concert made all the neceſſary regulations for eſtabliſhing good order there, and fixed the taxes and duties, that each city was to pay the Commonwealth. They applied themſelves particularly to remove all cauſe and occaſion of troubles and revolt. In order to this they diſarmed all the Sicilians, who had declared for Amilcar, and ordered the Gauls, who had deſerted from the ſame Amilcar to the Romans, whilſt they were in garriſon upon mount Eryx, to quit the iſland, and to go and ſettle elſewhere, ſupplying them with the ſhips neceſſary for that purpoſe. They made their pretext for an order, which muſt ſeem very hard to thoſe troops, the crime they had committed in plundering the temple of Venus upon mount Eryx; which had rendered them odious to the whole iſland. From thenceforth the part of the iſland, which had been under the Carthaginians, became a province of the Roman People. The reſt of it formed the kingdom of Hiero. After

Sicily become a province of the Roman People.

the

A. R. 511. Ant. C. 241. the whole had been regulated, Lutatius and Valerius returned to Rome. A triumph was decreed Lutatius; on which Valerius having repreſented that he had equally contributed to the ſucceſs of the Roman arms, added, it was but juſt, as he had ſhared with Lutatius in the cares and dangers of the battle, that he ſhould alſo ſhare with him in the honour and reward of it. What made moſt in favour of the Prætor's cauſe, was, that the Conſul, who was not perfectly cured of his wound, had not been able to act; ſo that Valerius had performed the functions of General in this battle. Lutatius oppoſed his demand as contrary to cuſtom, and unjuſt; pretending that it was unuſual, and contrary to the laws, to equal two officers in the diſtribution of honours, of which the one was inferior and ſubordinate to the other. The diſpute growing warm on both ſides, they agreed to refer it to the arbitration of Atilius Calatinus, who, in regard to the ſuperiority of Lutatius's power, which his opponent could not conteſt with him, decided the difference in his favour. Notwithſtanding this ſentence, as Valerius had diſtinguiſhed his merit in an extraordinary manner in this war, the honour of a triumph was alſo granted him.

I have ſaid, that part of Sicily was become a province of the Roman People. The Romans called the countries, which they conquered out of Italy, *Provinces*. Theſe countries were governed as conquered countries: and though the people of them were called allies of the State, and not *Subjecti*, they however had not the entire enjoyment of their own laws, and did not chuſe their own magiſtrates. Rome ſent them every year a Prætor and a Quæſtor; the firſt

to

to adminiſter juſtice, and command the troops when neceſſary; and the other to receive the duties, which the countries newly conquered paid the victors. A. R. 511. Ant. C. 241.

Sicily was the firſt that received law from the Romans. Cicero, in one of his orations againſt Verres, gives it a fine praiſe: "(a) She was "the firſt, ſays he, of all foreign nations, that "ſought our amity; that adorned our empire "by becoming its province; and taught our "anceſtors how glorious it was to command "States abroad." After having extolled the conſtant fidelity of that iſland to the Commonwealth; its particular conſideration for the *Publicani*, that is, thoſe who collected the taxes, whoſe name was odious every where elſe; its extraordinary fertility in excellent corn, which made Cato the Elder call it the granary of Rome, and the nurſing mother of the Roman People; he adds, addreſſing himſelf to the People: "(b) The provinces and tributary coun-"tries are to you what their farms and eſtates "are to individuals, of which the neareſt to "Rome are the moſt eſteemed, and thoſe which "give the moſt pleaſure. Thus Sicily, which "is almoſt at the gates of Rome, is dearer and "more agreeable to you than all the other pro-"vinces of the empire. In Verr. 3. n. 2—7.

(a) Omnium nationum exterarum princeps Sicilia ſe ad amicitiam fidemque populi Romani applicuit: prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii eſt, provincia eſt appellata: prima docuit majores noſtros, quàm præclarum eſſet exteris gentibus imperare.

(b) Et quoniam quaſi quædam prædia populi Romani ſunt, vectigalia noſtra atque provinciæ: quemadmodum propinquis vos veſtris prædiis maximè delectamini, ſic populo Romano jucunda ſuburbanitas eſt hujuſce provinciæ.

Of

Of the Combats of the GLADIATORS.

THEY called thoſe gladiators, who killed one another in the amphitheatres to divert the people.

The ancient cuſtom of ſacrificing captives, or priſoners of war, to the manes of great men who died in battle, made way for theſe combats. Thus Achilles in Homer ſacrifices twelve young Trojans to the manes of Patroclus; and, in Virgil, Æneas ſends captives in like manner to Evander, in order to their being ſacrificed at the funeral of his ſon Pallas.

Iliad xxiii.

Æneid. xi.

As it ſeemed barbarous to maſſacre theſe captives like beaſts, it was decreed, that they ſhould fight with each other, and uſe all their addreſs to ſave their own lives, and to kill their adverſaries. This ſeemed the leaſt inhuman, becauſe they might eſcape death in the end; and their lives were in their own hands, and depended on their dexterity in defending themſelves.

It was in the 488th year of Rome that this kind of ſhews was firſt exhibited to the Roman people, when the two brothers M. and D. Brutus cauſed their father's funeral to be celebrated with pomp. The Romans were not the authors of this cuſtom. It ſubſiſted before amongſt other people of Italy; and Livy ſpeaks of it in the 444th year of Rome, as practiſed amongſt the Campanians, who even entertained themſelves with this barbarous diverſion at their feaſts. The Romans at firſt exhibited theſe combats of gladiators only at the funerals of illuſtrious men: but it became an entirely common cuſtom in proceſs

Val. Max. c. 4. Liv. Epit. xvi.

Liv. ix. 40.

proceſs of time; and private perſons ſet down in their wills how many couples of gladiators ſhould fight in that manner after their deaths. Theſe gladiators were called *Buſtuarii*, becauſe they fought round the funeral pile, *buſtum*. Senec. de brevit. vit. c. xx.

At firſt the number of gladiators, who were made to fight, were not very great: but it increaſed continually as is uſual. In the 536th year of Rome, the ſons of M. Æmilius Lepidus brought out twenty-two pairs of gladiators at the funeral of their father. This ſhew continued three days, and was celebrated in the Forum of Rome. In the 552d year, the ſons of M. Valerius Levinus exhibited twenty-five pairs of gladiators in the ſame ceremony. In 569, ſeventy, and in 578, ſeventy-four, fought on the like occaſion. Liv. xxiii. 30. Liv. xxxi. 50. Liv. xxxix. 46. & xli. 28.

In order to ſupply men for theſe kind of combats, it was neceſſary to prepare the combatants long beforehand. The profeſſion of gladiator became an art. There were maſters to teach them the uſe of arms; who were called *Laniſtæ* by the Latins. People learnt to fight, and exerciſed themſelves that way.

Two ſorts of perſons ſhared in theſe combats: the one forced, that is to ſay, ſlaves and condemned criminals; the other voluntarily and of their own accord. The latter were freemen, who hired themſelves for this infamous uſe, and ſet a price upon their blood. The maſter of the gladiatots made theſe laſt ſwear, that they would fight till they died. They (*a*) engaged Liv. xxviii. 21.

(*a*) In verba Eumolpi ſacramentum juravimus, uri, vinciri, verberari, ferróque necari; &, quicquid aliud juſſiſſet, tanquam legitimi gladiatores domino corpora animoſque addicimus. *Petron.* c. 17.

them-

themſelves accordingly by oath religiouſly to diſcharge all the duties of a good and faithful gladiator: they devoted themſelves body and ſoul without reſerve to their maſters; and agreed, in caſe they refuſed to ſerve, to ſuffer death either by fire, ſword, or under the ſtrokes of the laſh.

This kind of ſhews began in grief and mourning, having been employed at the celebration of funerals: but in proceſs of time pleaſure and joy adopted them, and they became the moſt grateful and affecting diverſion of the Roman People, who crowded to them with incredible paſſion. (*a*) Cicero ſays, that no other aſſembly, either for the public affairs, or the election of magiſtrates, was ſo numerous as this, and that an infinite multitude of citizens of all ranks and conditions were preſent at them.

The gladiators had different names from the different arms they uſed. To avoid prolixity, I ſhall repeat only three or four kinds of them in this place.

RETIARII. They were armed with a trident or three-grained ſpear, and carried a net, which they threw over the heads of their antagoniſts, in order to entangle him in ſuch a manner, as to make them incapable of defending themſelves.

THRACES. They were ſo called from being armed like the Thracians with a kind of

(*a*) Id ſpectaculi genus erat, quod omni frequentia atque omni genere hominum celebratur: quo multitudo maximè delectatur——Equidem exiſtimo nullum tempus eſſe frequentioris populi, quàm illud gladiatorium; neque concionis ullius, neque verò ullorum comitiorùm. *Pro Sext.* 124 & 125.

dagger,

dagger, poinard, and round buckler. Horace mentions them:

Thrax eſt Gallina Syro par? Serm. ii. 6.

(*a*) MYRMILLONES. It is believed from a paſſage in Feſtus, that this name was given them on account of their being armed, like the Gauls, with a long ſword and buckler, and an helmet, the creſt of which was uſually a fiſh.

SAMNITES. They were undoubtedly ſo called from their being armed like the Samnites, whatever that armour was. They are often mentioned by authors. Livy ſays: *Campani ab ſuperbia, & odio Samnitium, gladiatores, quod ſpectaculum inter epulas erat, eo ornatu armarunt, Samnitiumque nomine appellarunt.* And Horace: Liv. ix. Ep. 2. l. 2.

Cædimur, & totidem plagis conſumimus hoſtem,
Lento Samnites ad lumina prima duello.

Cicero has: *Neque eſt dubium, quin exordium dicendi vehemens & pugnax non ſæpe eſſe debeat. Sed, ſi in ipſo illo gladiatorio vitæ certamine, quo ferro decernitur, tamen ante congreſſum multa fiunt, quæ non ad vulnus, ſed ad ſpeciem valere videantur: quanto hoc magis in oratione expectandum, in qua non vis potiùs quàm delectatio poſtulatur? Atque ejuſmodi illa proluſio debet eſſe, non ut Samnitum, qui vibrant haſtas ante pugnam, quibus in pugnando nihil utuntur: ſed ut ipſis ſententiis, quibus proluſerunt, vel pugnare poſſint.* I ſhall cite another De Orat. ii. 317. & 325.

(*a*) Retiario pugnanti adverſus Myrmillonem cantatur; *Non te peto, piſcem peto: quid me fugis Galle?* quia myrmillonicum genus armaturæ Gallicum eſt, ipſique Myrmillones antè Galli appellabantur, in quorum galeis piſcis effigies inerat. *Feſtus.*

very fine and very remarkable paſſage of Cicero's upon the ſame ſubject in the ſequel.

Theſe gladiators, as I have already ſaid, were inſtructed and formed for combats by a fencing-maſter, who took great care to give them good and ſolid nouriſhment, in order to their being ſtrong and robuſt, which conſtituted their principal merit, and very much augmented their price. It was neceſſary alſo that they ſhould be large and well ſhaped, to give the ſpectators the greater pleaſure. (*a*) Seneca tells us in more than one place, that they fought naked; which I can ſcarce believe. The fencing-maſters ſold them very dear, either to the magiſtrates, who were obliged by their offices to give this kind of ſhews; or to private perſons, who to conciliate the favour of the People, and obtain their ſuffrages, entertained them with theſe games, which were infinitely agreeable to them. Cicero, during his Conſulſhip, prohibited this method of canvaſſing offices by a law. Thoſe who exhibited theſe ſhews, were called *Editores*. The madneſs for the gladiatorial combats roſe ſo high as to make them follow the example of the Campanians, and entertain themſelves with this brutal pleaſure in the midſt of feaſts.

Orat. pro Sext. n. 133.

By way of prelude to theſe combats, as we have ſeen in the paſſage of Cicero, they made abundance of motions, diſcharged theirs darts in the air, and attacked each other gently, and only for the ſake of ſhew. But they ſoon came to cloſe fight and wounds, from which the

(*a*) Mutuos ictus nudis & obviis pectoribus excipiunt —— Nihil habent quo tegantur, ad ictum totis corporibus expoſiti. *Senec. Epiſt.* vii.

blood

blood that flowed was preſently a part of the entertainment.

Theſe unhappy victims of the cruel pleaſure of the Romans were not permitted to ſhew the leaſt ſign of regret or fear in combat. It was a crime for a gladiator to vent the leaſt complaint when wounded, or to aſk quarter when overcome. In thoſe caſes the people expreſſed their indignation againſt him: *Kill* (*a*), *burn*, *whip him to death*, cried they. *What*, *does he go on timorouſly*, *does he meet the ſtroke like a coward! He falls with no ſpirit! He hath not the courage to die with a good grace!* Did ever Barbarians talk in ſuch a manner!

But indeed this fear and want of ſpirit were very rare: from whence we may obſerve with amazement, what impreſſions habit and example are capable of making upon the mind of man, and even upon the mean and mercenary. A (*b*) gladiator believed himſelf diſgraced, when matched with one inferior to himſelf in ſtrength and dexterity; convinced, that there is no glory in conquering, when there is no danger in fighting. This principle of honour, almoſt generally implanted in the minds of thoſe who appeared upon the *Arena*, and which made them ſuperior to all human fears, is propoſed by Cicero in more than one place, as an admirable model of courage and conſtancy; by which he intended to animate himſelf and others to ſuffer every thing for the

(*a*) Occide, ure, verbera. Quare tam timidè incurrit in ferrum? quare parum audacter occidit? quare parum libenter moritur? *Senec. Epiſt.* vii.

(*b*) Ignominiam judicat gladiator, cum inferiore componi: & ſcit eum ſine gloria vinci, qui ſine periculo vincitur. *Senec. de Provid.* cap. 3.

preſervation of liberty, and the defence of the Commonwealth.

Tuſc. ii. 41. " What ills, ſays he, do not the gladiators, " that is, wretched Barbarians, ſuffer? Which " of them, that has been well trained up, does " not chuſe rather to receive the mortal ſtroke, " than to avoid it in a ſhameful manner? " How often do we ſee that all they propoſe is " to pleaſe their maſter (that is him who has " bought them for the ſhews) or the people? " When covered with wounds, they ſend to " their maſters, to aſk whether they are ſatiſ- " fied; and declare, if they are, that they die " contented. (*a*) Do we ever hear a gladiator " of the leaſt merit vent a ſingle groan? Does " he ever change colour and turn pale at the " ſight of danger? Which of them not only " in combat, but when not able to fight any " longer, he falls down to receive the mortal " ſtroke, ſuffers the leaſt ſign of fear to eſcape " him? Such force has example, habit, and re- " flection! *What! ſhall a Samnite, a ſlave, a* " *man of nothing, a wretch without a name*, be " capable of ſuch a conſtancy of ſoul, and ſhall " a man born for glory, when the queſtion is to " ſuffer pain or confront danger, not be able, " whatever inward weakneſs he may be con- " ſcious of, to encourage and ſtrengthen him- " ſelf by the motives of reaſon and ſenſe of " honour?

(*a*) Quis mediocris gladiator ingemuit? quis vultum mutavit unquam? quis non modò ſtetit, verumetiam decubuit turpiter? quis cùm decubuiſſet, ferrum recipere juſſus, collum contraxit? tantum exercitatio, meditatio, conſuetudo valet! Ergo hoc poterit

Sammis, ſpurcus homo, vita illa dignu' locoque: —

vir natus ad gloriam, ullam partem animi tam mollem habebit, quam non meditatione & ratione corroboret?

" honour? Some perſons think the gladiatorial
" ſhews cruel and inhuman, and perhaps not
" without reaſon, as exhibited at preſent. But
" were only criminals condemned to die ex-
" poſed to theſe combats, they would be, in
" my opinion, a good leſſon, not to the ears
" but eyes, to teach men to deſpiſe pain and
" death bravely."

Cicero, in another paſſage, exhorts himſelf and all good citizens to courage and conſtancy by the example of the gladiators: it is in ſpeaking againſt Antony, the enemy of the public peace and tranquility, who menaced the ſubverſion of the State. " (*a*) If in theſe unhappy
" times the laſt hour of the Commonwealth be
" arrived, (which may the gods forbid) let us
" imitate thoſe generous gladiators, who do not
" fear to die, provided it be with honour: Let
" us, who are the lords and ſovereigns of the
" nations of the earth, chuſe rather to fall with
" glory, than to live enſlaved with infamy."

Philip. ii. 35.

It was theſe ſentiments of valour and conſtancy, that conſtituted the moſt ſenſible pleaſure of the ſpectators. (*b*) They only deſpiſed ſuch of the gladiators as expreſſed timidity, became ſuppliants, and implored quarter: on the contrary, thoſe who behaved with fortitude and greatneſs of ſoul, and generouſly offered them-

(*a*) Quod ſi jam (quod dii omen avertant!) fatum extremum reip. venit: quod gladiatores nobiles fáciunt, ut honeſtè decumbunt, faciamus nos, principes orbis terrarum gentiumque omnium, ut cum dignitate potiùs cadamus, quàm cum ignominia ſerviamus.

(*b*) In gladiatoriis pugnis timidos, & ſupplices, & ut vivere liceat obſecrantes, etiam odiſſe ſolemus: fortes, & animoſos, & ſe acriter ipſos morti offerentes, ſervari cupimus. *Cic. pro Milone*, n. 92.

ſelves to the mortal ſtroke, they were truly ſollicitous to preſerve. The people decided the fate of the combatants: for thoſe who gave the ſhews uſually referred that to them. The fiſt doubled with the thumb erect was the ſignal of death to the victors.

Munera nunc edunt, & verſo pollice vulgi
Quemlibet occidunt populariter. Juvenal.

The (*a*) people believed themſelves treated with contempt, when the gladiators did not willingly preſent themſelves to receive the mortal ſtroke. They were enraged, as if ſome injury had been done them, and from mere ſpectators became their declared adverſaries.

It is amazing, that ſo great a number of perſons could be found to enter into a profeſſion, which, properly ſpeaking, was devoting themſelves to death. That number, which was at firſt very moderate, became exceeding great in the latter times of the Commonwealth, and under the Emperors. Julius Cæſar, in his Ædileſhip, exhibited three and twenty pair of gladiators. Gordian, before he was Emperor, gave theſe ſhews twelve times in a year, that is to ſay, once a month. In ſome of theſe there were five hundred pairs of gladiators, and never leſs than fifty. But what may ſeem almoſt incredible, long before him, Trajan, the model of good Emperors, had given theſe ſhews to the people an hundred and twenty-three days together, du-

Plut. in Cæſ. p. 705.

Capit. in Gord.

Dio. in Trajan.

(*a*) Gladiatoribus populus irascitur, & tam iniquè, ut injuriam putet quòd non libenter pereunt. Contemni ſe judicat, ut vultu, geſtu, ardore de ſpectatore in adverſarium vertitur. *Senec. de Ira* i.

ring

ring which time ten thouſand gladiators appeared on the *arena.*

They were formed at Rome into different companies; and the people took the part of one againſt another, with a violence and fury that often terminated in bloody ſeditions. The example of the capital was ſoon followed by the other cities, and the whole empire was infected with a ſanguinary diverſion, the horror of which Seneca expreſſes in few words. "Man, ſays he, the ſacred creature man, is eſteemed of "ſo little value, that we make it a ſport, a di- "verſion, to mangle and butcher him." *Homo, ſacra res homo, jam per luſum & jocum occiditur.* Ep. 96.

And even before Rome was become the capital of the known world, Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria, in imitation of the Romans, had introduced the combats of gladiators in his dominions. (*a*) Livy obſerves, that theſe ſhews at firſt gave the ſpectators more horror than pleaſure, whilſt they were new to them; and it was only ſlowly, and by degrees, that they accuſtomed themſelves to them. At their beginning, the firſt wound put an end to the combat: but growing familiar with blood from frequently ſeeing it ſhed, and theſe ſhews at length, all horrible as they were in themſelves, uſually ending with the death of one of the combatants, they became their moſt common and moſt grateful diverſion. Liv. xli. 20.

(*a*) Gladiatorum munus Romanæ conſuetudinis, primò majore cum terrore hominum inſuetorum ad tale ſpectaculum, quàm voluptate, dedit: deinde, ſæpius dando, & modò vulneribus tenus, modò ſine miſſione etiam, familiare oculis gratumque id ſpectaculum fecit.

Lucian in vit. Dæmonact. p. 1014.

It is remarkable that the Athenians, who were naturally beneficent and humane, never admitted bloody ſhews into their city. And when it was propoſed to eſtabliſh combats of gladiators there, in order not to give place in that reſpect to the Corinthians: *Firſt throw down*, cried out an * Athenian from the midſt of the aſſembly, *the altar which our forefathers above a thouſand years ago erected to Mercy.* And indeed, one muſt have renounced all ſenſe of humanity and compaſſion, and become barbarous and ſavage, to ſee the blood of one's fellow-creatures ſhed not only without pain, but with joy and delight.

M. Aurel. vit. Dio. apud Val. p. 718.

Some Pagan Emperors, moved with the ſad effects of this murtherous cuſtom, endeavoured to moderate it. It was in this view, that Marcus Aurelius retrenched the enormous expences employed in theſe combats, and would not ſuffer the gladiators to fight with each other except with very blunt ſwords, like files; ſo that they could ſhew their addreſs without any danger of being killed. But this was one of thoſe exceſſive evils, which require as exceſſive remedies. None of the Emperors had dared to uſe any ſuch. This honour was reſerved for Chriſtianity, and it coſt many efforts and much time to effect it; ſuch profound root had the evil taken, and ſo much had it eſtabliſhed itſelf by the long preſcription of many ages, and the opinion of the world, that theſe combats were acceptable to the gods, to whom, for that reaſon, they offered the blood of gladiators lately

This was Dæmonax, a famous philoſopher, whoſe diſciple Lucian had been; he flouriſhed in the reign of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

ſpilt

ſpilt by way of ſacrifice, as ſeveral of the fathers obſerve.

Conſtantine the Great was the firſt Emperor, who made laws to prohibit the cruel ſhews of the gladiators. Lactantius had repreſented to him in his Inſtitutions, an admirable work which he inſcribed to him, how much ſhews in general, but eſpecially thoſe of the gladiators, were dangerous and deſtructive.

All the authority of Conſtantine did not ſuffice for aboliſhing them, and Honorius was obliged to renew that prohibition. Prudentius, the Chriſtian poet, in his poem againſt Symmachus, had exhorted him to deliver Chriſtianity from this reproach: but the Emperor was induced to it by a particular occaſion, which the reader, I believe, will not be offended at my inferting here. An holy hermit of the eaſt, named Telemachus, came to Rome, where the phrenzy for the ſhews ſtill prevailed, and went to the amphitheatre like the reſt, but with a very different intention. When the combat began he went down into the arena, and uſed his utmoſt endeavours to prevent the gladiators from killing each other. This was an unexpected ſight which much offended all the ſpectators. In conſequence full of the ſpirit of him *who was an homicide from the beginning*, that is to ſay of the devil, who alone could inſpire men with this barbarous thirſt of human blood, they fell upon the new combatant, the enemy to their diverſion, and ſtoned him to death. Honorius, being informed of what had paſſed, abſolutely prohibited ſuch pernicious ſhews. The blood of the martyr obtained that from God, which the laws of Conſtantine could not effect; and from thenceforth the combats of gladiators were

Theodoret. V. 26.

heard

heard of no more at Rome. " Thus, ſays Mr. " Tillemont, from whom I have extracted this " account, God crowned even before men an " action, which the wiſe men of the world, " and perhaps part of thoſe of the church, " would probably have condemned as an in- " diſcretion and a folly; but folly from God " is wiſer than all the wiſdom of men.".

All the holy biſhops, all true believers had the ſame horror for theſe combats of the gladiators as this generous hermit. " (*a*) How! " cries out St. Cyprian, is one man deprived " of life for the pleaſure and diverſion of ano- " ther? Is knowing how to kill, an art, a " ſcience, a profeſſion? Murther is not only " committed, but taught by rule. Can any " thing be more inhuman? can any thing be " more horrid? To learn to kill, is diſcipline, " and to put it in practice, glory."

Lactantius in the work, which I have cited above, ſhews how criminal thoſe are, who aſſiſt at theſe ſights. " (*b*) If the perſon, ſays he, " who is preſent at a murther [without pre- " venting it if he can] makes himſelf an ac- " complice of the crime, and if in that caſe, " the witneſs is as crimial as the aſſaſſin, it

(*a*) Homo in hominis voluptatem perimitur: & ut quis poſſit occidere, peritia eſt, uſus eſt, ars eſt? Scelus non tantum geritur, ſed docetur! Quid poteſt inhumanius, quid acerbius dici? Diſciplina eſt, ut perimere quis poſſit: & gloria eſt, quod peremit. *S. Cyprian.*

(*b*) Quod ſi intereſſe homicidio, ſceleris conſcientia eſt; & eodem facinore ſpectator obſtrictus eſt, quo & admiſſor; ergo & his gladiatorum ſceleribus non minùs cruore perfunditur qui ſpectat, quàm ille qui facit; nec poteſt eſſe immunis à ſanguine, qui voluit effundi, aut videri non interfeciſſe, qui interfectori & favet, & præmium poſtulavit. Quid ſcena? num ſanctior? *Lact. in Inſtituit.*

" follows,

" follows, that the ſpectator of theſe combats
" is as much a murtherer, as the gladiators
" themſelves; that conſenting to the effuſion
" of blood, he is reſponſible for it as well as
" he that ſheds it; and applauding him that
" kills, is himſelf deemed to have killed, tho'
" by the hand of another. The ſhews of the
" theatre are no leſs to be condemned."

I ſhall conclude this brief diſcourſe upon the combats of the gladiators, with repeating a fact from St. Auſtin upon this ſubject, to which I deſire the ſerious attention of my young readers. Alipes, a young man of one of the beſt families of Tagaſta in Africa, where St. Auguſtin was alſo born, went to Rome to ſtudy the civil law. One day, ſome young perſons his friends, who alſo ſtudied the law, meeting him by chance, aſked him to go with them to ſee the combats of the gladiators. He rejected this propoſal with horror, having always had an exceeding averſion for ſo horrid a ſight, as the ſhedding of human blood for diverſion. His reſiſtance only made them the more earneſt; and uſing that kind of violence, which is ſometimes committed between friends, they carried him with them whether he would or no. *What are you doing*, ſaid he? *You may drag my body thither, and place me amongſt you at the amphitheatre: but can you diſpoſe of my mind and eyes, and make them attentive to the ſhew? I ſhall be there, as if I were not there, and ſhall triumph both over it and you.* They arrived at the amphitheatre, and found it in the height of the ardor and tranſport of theſe barbarous pleaſures. Alipes at firſt ſhut his eyes, and prevented his ſoul from ſharing in ſo horrible a phrenzy; and it had been happy for him, if he could have

ſhut

ſhut his ears alſo! They were ſtruck with violence by a cry raiſed by the whole people on the occaſion of a mortal wound given a gladiator. Overcome by curioſity, and believing himſelf ſuperior to all things, he opened his eyes, and received that moment a greater wound in his ſoul, than the gladiator had juſt received in his body. (*a*) As ſoon as he ſaw the blood run, far from taking off his eyes, as he had flattered himſelf he ſhould, he fixed them with exceeding eagerneſs upon it, and intoxicating himſelf, without knowing it, with that barbarous pleaſure, he ſeemed to drink deep of cruelty, inhumanity, and phrenzy; ſo much was he tranſported out of himſelf. In a word, he left the place quite changed from what he was before, and with ſuch a paſſion for the ſhews, that he breathed nothing elſe, and from thenceforth, it was he that dragged his companions to them.

He could not, and did not deſerve to quit that abyſs, like many others that periſh in it. But God, who thought fit to make him a great ſaint and biſhop, and to teach youth by his example to diffide in themſelves, and their own good reſolutions, and to avoid dangerous aſſemblies, after having ſuffered him to ſee all his weakneſs, cured him entirely by a reflection of St. Auſtin's upon the combats of the gladiators, which ſeems to have eſcaped that ſaint by chance in a rhetorical lecture, at which Alipes was preſent, but which was the effect of God's views of mercy in reſpect to him from all eternity.

(*a*) Ut vidit illum ſanguinem, immanitatem ſimul ebibit; & non ſe avertit, ſed fixit aſpectum, & hauriebat furias & neſciebat, & delectabatur ſcelere certaminis, & cruenta voluptate inebriabatur.

BOOK

Rollins Rom. Hist. vol. 4. p. 157

Plate IV.

MAP
FOR THE EXPEDITION OF HANNIBAL,
wherein his Passage into
ITALY,
and his principal Marches are marked:
For the understanding of Mr. ROLLIN's
Antient History,
By Mr. D'ANVILLE, Geographer in Ordinary to the French King.
April, 1739.

SCALE.
Roman Miles of 754 Toises. 50 100 150
Greek Stadia, of which 8 are a Mile. 400 800 1200
French Lieques, of 3000 Geometrical Paces. 5 10 20 30 40 50
Hannibal's Marches.

GALLIA CISALPINA
GALLIA TRANSALPINA
ITALIA
HISPANIA
MARE GALLICUM or Gulf of Lyons
MARE LIGUSTICUM or Gulf of Genoa
MARE SUPERUM
MARE INFERUM
I. CYRNUS
I. SARDO
INS. BALEARES
SICILIA
Alps
Pyrenean M.
Apennin M.
Rhodanus Fl.
Padus Fl.
Tiber Fl.
Arnus Fl.
Volturnus Fl.
Liris Fl.
Aufidus Fl.
Sicilian Sea
Ionian Sea
Adriatic Sea
Tyrrhenian Sea
Taphros or Strait of Fossa I.
Heraules I.
Sacrum Pr.
Pontia I.
Palinurium Pr.
Lacinium Pr.
Zephyrium Pr.
Drepanum
Panormus
Messana
Lipara
Ins. Liparæ
Ustica
Ilva
Corsica
Sardinia
Majorca
Minor
Ebusus
Pityusæ Ins.
Fortus Magonis
Calaris
Olbia
Bosa
Aleria
Argentarius M.
Circæum Pr.
Cajeta
Capua
Cumæ
Neapolis
Nuceria
Pestum
Velia
Buxentum
Metapontum
Heraclea
Tarentum
Sybaris
Crotona
Locri
Scylacium
Cocintum Pr.
Hipponium
Rhegium
Ancona
Ariminum
Ravenna
Bononia
Mutina
Parma
Placentia
Cremona
Mediolanum
Bergomum
Brixia
Verona
Mantua
Benacus L.
Venetia
Venice
Aquileia
Tergeste
Tridentum
Genua
Luca
Pisa
Florentia
Volaterræ
Arretium
Perusia
Clusium
Spoletium
Interamna
Reate
Falerii
Veii
Tibur
Roma
Ostia
Antium
Anagnia
Alba
Fidenæ
Corfinium
Sulmo
Aufidena
Teate
Pinna
Hadria
Asculum
Beneventum
Luceria
Arpi
Sipontum
Barium
Brundusium
Tarracina
Capua
Vulturnum
Sena
Rimini
Ariminum
Pisaurum
Metaurus Fl.
Sena Gallica
Auximum
Firmum
Truentus Fl.
Matrinus Fl.
Sagrus Fl.
Frento Fl.
Diomedeæ I.
Garganus M.
Tifernum
Larinum
Saguntum
Calubrona
Dertosa
Indibilis
Mouths of Iberus
Iberus Fl.
Tarraco
Barcino
Blanda
Emporiæ
Gerunda
Ruscino
Illiberis
Narbo
Agatha
Massilia
Antipolis
Nicæa
Monaci Portus
Arelate
Mouths of the Rhone
Tolosa
Garumna Fl.
Tectosages
Arecomici
Volcæ
Cavares
Tricastini
Helvii
Vocontii
Caturiges
Segusii
Taurini
Segusia
Vienna
Lugdunum
Allobroges
Centrones
Salassi
Geneva
Lacus Lemanus
Octodurus
Summus Penninus
Taurinum
Augusta Taurinorum
Eporedia
Vercellæ
Ticinum
Placentia
Astu
Dertona
Genua
Ingaunum
Albium
Cebenna M.
Druentia Fl.
Isara Fl.
Durias Fl.
Sesites Fl.
Tanarus Fl.
Tarus Fl.
Trebia Fl.
Macra Fl.
Rubicon Fl.
Metaurus Fl.
Æsis Fl.
Æsernia
Samnium
Marsi
Latium
Volsci
Campania
Lucania
Bruttii
Apulia
Peucetia
Messapia
Salentini
Sallentini
Picentini
Sabini
Umbria
Etruria
Ligures
Insubres
Cenomani
Veneti
Carni
Istria
Japygia
Japygium Pr.
Iapygii
Ausones
Opici
Osci
Sicani
Elymi
Siculi
Mamertini
Hiera
Thapsus
Utica
Hippo Regius
Numidia
Mauritania
Tingitana
Libyssonis
Ilva
Russellæ
Vulsinii
Tarquinii
Falerii
Veii
Cære
Reate
Interamna
Nar Fl.
Tiber Fl.
Arnus Fl.
Ombrone Fl.
Volturnus Fl.
Liris Fl.
Aufidus Fl.
Silarus Fl.
Crathis Fl.
Sybaris Fl.
Neæthus Fl.
Lacinium Pr.
Zephyrium Pr.
Cocintum Pr.
Scylacium
Hipponium
Rhegium
Messana
Panormus
Himera
Drepanum
Lipara
Ustica
Ins. Liparæ

R.W. Seale sculp.

BOOK THE TWELFTH.

THE

ROMAN HISTORY Continued.

THIS twelfth book contains the hiſtory of twenty-three years, from the end of the firſt Punic war, to the beginning of the ſecond.

SECT. I.

Joy for the peace with Carthage interrupted by the overflowing of the Tiber, and a great fire. Cenſus. Two new Tribes. Livius Andronicus. Games called Floralia. *Wars with the Ligurians and Gauls. Revolt of the Mercenaries againſt the Carthaginians. Sardinia taken from the Carthaginians by the Romans. Ambaſſadors ſent to the King of Egypt. Arrival of Hiero at Rome. Secular games. Expeditions againſt the Boii and Corſicans. Death of one of the Cenſors. Rome confirms the peace granted to the Carthaginians. Sardinia ſubjected. Reflexions upon the continual wars of the Romans. Veſtal condemned. Cenſus. The poet Nævius. Differences between the Romans and Carthaginians. Troubles occaſioned by a law propoſed by Flaminius.*

Flaminius. Expeditions againſt Sardinia and Corſica. Firſt triumph upon the Alban mountain. Cenſus. Teuta ſucceeds her huſband Agron King of the Illyrians. Complaints to the Senate concerning their piracies. Cenſus. Teuta cauſes a Roman Ambaſſador to be killed. Expedition of the Romans into Illyrium. Treaty of peace between the Romans and Illyrians.

A. R. 511. Ant. C. 241. Q. LUTATIUS CERCO. A. MANLIUS.

Joy of the peace with Carthage interrupted by the overflowing of the Tiber and a great fire. Oroſ. iv. 11.

THE joy occaſioned at Rome by the glorious peace, which had lately terminated the war with the Carthaginians, was interrupted by ſad and unhappy events, which occaſioned infinite damage there. The Tiber, ſwollen by the ſudden overflowing of ſeveral other rivers that run into it, overflowed alſo on a ſudden, and overſpread great part of the city with ſo violent a rapidity, that it threw down many edifices. As this inundation was of long continuance, the waters, which remained a great while in the low parts of Rome, undermined by degrees the foundations of the houſes, and occaſioned many of them to fall down.

Liv. Epit. xix. Oroſ. iv. 11. Plin. vii. 43. The overflowing of the Tiber was ſoon followed by a terrible fire, which began in the night, but how was not known, and having ſoon made its way into ſeveral quarters of the city, deſtroyed a great number of the citizens and houſes. This conflagration conſumed almoſt all the ſtructures round the Forum, and amongſt the reſt the temple of Veſta. Here the eternal fire, kept by the Veſtal virgins, gave place to a tranſitory one. Thoſe prieſteſſes, having no thoughts but of eſcaping from the flames by flight,

flight, left to the goddeſs the care of preſerving herſelf, and all that belonged to her. The Pontifex Maximus, L. Cæcilius Metellus, more couragious and religious than the veſtals, threw himſelf into the midſt of the flames, and brought off the Palladium (the certain pledge, in their ſenſe, of the eternity of their empire) and the other ſacred things. He loſt his ſight, and had half one of his arms burnt off on this occaſion. The People, to reward ſo generous and laudable a zeal, granted him the ſingular, and till then unheard-of, privilege, of being carried to the Senate in a chariot. (*a*) A great and exalted diſtinction, but merited by a moſt memorable and ſad event. A. R. 511. Ant. C. 241.

In the *Cenſus* made this year by C. Aurelius Cotta, and M. Fabius Buteo, which was the thirty-ninth, the number of the citizens was two hundred and ſixty thouſand. *Cenſus.*

Two new tribes added to the old ones, the Velina and Quirina compleated the number of thirty-five, at which the tribes continued fixed from thenceforth. *Two new tribes.*

This would be the proper place for making ſome obſervations upon what relates to the tribes of Rome; but I defer ſpeaking of them, till I come to the end of the twelfth book, to avoid interrupting the chain of our hiſtory.

A kind of frantic emotion, which induced the Faliſci to take up arms againſt the Romans, obliged the latter to make the two Conſuls march againſt them. The expedition continued only ſix days. It was terminated in two battles. The firſt was doubtful: in the ſecond the Fa- Liv. Epit. xix. Zonar. viii.

(*a*) Magnum & ſublime, ſed pro oculis datum—Memorabili cauſa, ſed eventu miſero. *Plin.* vii. 43.

liſci

A. R. 511. Ant. C. 241. liſci loſt two thouſand men. So conſiderable a loſs brought them to their reaſon, and they ſurrendered themſelves to the Romans, who deprived them of their arms, horſes, part of their effects, ſlaves, and half their territory. Their city, which by its natural ſituation, and the fortifications which art had added to it, had inſpired them with a ſenſeleſs confidence, was removed from the ſteep eminence on which it ſtood into the flat country. The Roman People, exaſperated by their frequent revolts, intended to inflict a much ſeverer vengeance upon them; but being informed that they had expreſsly declared in ſurrendering, that it was not to the power but to the faith of the Roman People they ſubmitted, that ſingle word inſtantly calmed their rage; that they might not ſeem to be wanting to the faith of their engagements and juſtice.

Val. Max. v. 1.

A. R. 512. Ant. C. 240.

C. CLAUDIUS CENTHO.
M. SEMPRONIUS TUDITANUS.

Liv. And. Freinſh. xx. Floralia.

This year was remarkable for new ſhews of the theatre, wherein the poet Livius Andronicus introduced tragedies and comedies in imitation of the Greeks; and by the inſtitution or revival of the games, called *Floralia*, for obtaining the fruits of the earth in abundance from the gods. Theſe games were celebrated in proceſs of time with exceſſive licentiouſneſs.

A Latin colony was now ſettled at Spoletum, a city of Umbria.

C. MA-

A. R. 513.
Ant. C. 239.

C. MAMILIUS TURINUS.

Q. VALERIUS FALTO.

This year is famous for the birth of the poet Ennius. I have related elſewhere what is known of his life and writings. *Ant. Hiſt. Vol. XII.*

A. R. 514.
Ant. C. 238.

TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

P. VALERIUS FALTO.

Rome had two wars to ſuſtain under theſe Conſuls; the one againſt the Gauls, who were inceſſantly committing hoſtilities, and the other againſt the * Ligurians, new enemies to her. Valerius loſt a firſt battle againſt the Gauls, and gained a ſecond, wherein he killed forty thouſand of the enemy, and took two thouſand priſoners. Graechus gained a conſiderable victory over the Ligurians, and ravaged a great part of their country. From Liguria he went to Sardinia and Corſica, from whence he brought off a great number of priſoners. *Wars againſt the Ligurians and the Gauls.*

From the treaty of peace between Rome and Carthage, which put an end to the firſt Punic war, the Carthaginians had a terrible war upon their hands in Africa againſt the mercenaries, whoſe revolt brought Carthage to the very brink of deſtruction. I have related the events of that war in the hiſtory of the Carthaginians. *Revolt of the mercenaries againſt the Carthaginians.* Polyb. i. 65—79.

In the extreme danger the latter were in, they were obliged to have recourſe to their allies. Hiero, who was very attentive to the events of that war, had granted the Carthaginians all they aſked of him; and redoubled his pains, when Polyb. i. 84.

* *Their country extended as far as the river Arnus, on the ſouth of the Appennines.*

A. R. 514. Ant. C. 238. he ſaw the rapid progreſs made by the ſtrangers; rightly perceiving it was not for his intereſt, that the Carthaginians ſhould be utterly cruſhed, leſt the power of the Romans, having no balance, ſhould become too formidable to himſelf: In which, ſays Polybius, his wiſdom and prudence may be diſcerned. For it is a maxim not to be neglected, that a power is not to be ſuffered to augment to ſuch a degree, as to make its neighbours incapable of diſputing even their juſt rights with it.

The Romans, on their ſide, during this war of the Carthaginians againſt the ſtrangers, had always acted with great juſtice and moderation in regard to the former. A ſlight quarrel in reſpect to ſome Roman merchants, who had been ſeized at Carthage for carrying proviſions to the enemy, had embroiled them. But the Carthaginians, having diſcharged thoſe citizens on the firſt demand, the Romans, who piqued themſelves upon their juſtice and generoſity in all things, had reſtored them their amity, ſerved them in all things that depended on them, and prohibited their merchants to carry proviſions to the enemies of the Carthaginians.

The mercenaries in Sardinia, after the example of thoſe in Africa, threw off the yoke of obedience. They began by murdering Boſtar, who commanded them, and all the Carthaginians he had with him. Another General was ſent in his room. All the troops he brought with him went over to the revolters, crucified him, and deſtroyed all the Carthaginians in the iſland, by inflicting the moſt cruel torments upon them. Having attacked all the places one after another, they ſoon made themſelves maſters of the whole country.

The

The inhabitants of the iſland, and the mercenaries, ſoon quarrelled, and came to blows. The latter having ineffectually implored the aid of the Romans, who would not at that time engage in a war manifeſtly unjuſt, were entirely driven out of the iſland, and took refuge in Italy. In this manner the Carthaginians loſt Sardinia. Hitherto the Romans had acted in an irreproachable manner in reſpect to them. They had abſolutely refuſed to give ear to the propoſals made by the Sardinian revolters, who called them in to take poſſeſſion of the iſland. They even carried their delicacy ſo far, as to refuſe the people of Utica for ſubjects, though they came of themſelves to ſubmit to their power. A people, capable of ſuch great generoſity, would be highly laudable, had they perſevered in it. A. R. 514. Ant. C. 238.

The Romans, afterwards, were not ſo delicate; and it would be hard to apply here the favourable teſtimony, which Cæſar gives of their faith to their engagements in Salluſt (*a*). "Tho' "in all the wars of Africa, ſays he, the Car-"thaginians committed abundance of breaches "of faith, even in times of peace and truce, the "Romans never acted in the ſame manner with "reſpect to them; more intent upon what was "worthy of them, than upon what juſtice "would admit them to do againſt their ene-"mies."

(*a*) Bellis Punicis omnibus, cùm ſæpe Carthaginenſes, & in pace & per induciàs, multa nefanda facinora feciſſent, nunquam ipſi per occaſionem talia feceret magis, quod ſe dignum foret, quàm quod in illos jure fierî poſſet, quærebant. *Salluſt. in bello Catilin.*

A. R. 514. Ant. C. 238. *Sardinia taken from the Carthaginians by the Romans.* Polyb. i. 88, 89.

The mercenaries who had retired, as we have ſaid, into Italy, at length determined the Romans to make themſelves maſters of Sardinia. The Carthaginians received advice of this with extreme ſorrow, pretending, and not without reaſon, that they had a much juſter right to Sardinia than the Romans. They therefore raiſed troops to avenge themſelves on thoſe who had made the iſland take up arms againſt them. But the Romans, under pretext that thoſe preparations were made againſt them, and not againſt the people of Sardinia, declared war againſt Carthage. The Carthaginians, exhauſted in all reſpects, and ſcarce beginning to reſpire, were not in a condition to ſuſtain it. It was therefore neceſſary to comply with the times, and ſubmit to the ſtrongeſt. They made a new treaty, by which they abandoned Sardinia to the Romans, and engaged to pay a new ſum of twelve hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty-five thouſand pounds) to redeem themſelves from the intended war.

It is difficult, not to ſay impoſſible, to juſtify or excuſe the conduct of the Romans upon this occaſion. They had at firſt, as we have ſaid, refuſed the offer of the mercenaries of Sardinia, becauſe it would have been too great a blot in their reputation to have received the iſland from the hands of thoſe uſurpers, as well as the moſt groſs and infamous infraction of treaty. They ſtaid, till time ſhould afford them an occaſion of war, which they could ſupport with ſome colour of reaſon, and they believed they had found it in the preparations made by the Carthaginians againſt Sardinia; pretending, that they were arming againſt them. But what probability was there, that a people entirely exhauſted,

hauſted, as thoſe of Carthage then were, ſhould think of breaking the treaty of peace, and wantonly attacking the Romans, more powerful than ever they had been? Where is that faith, that integrity, that juſtice, that magnanimity, which ſometimes do the Romans ſo much honour? Polybius, their great admirer, makes no reflection upon this conqueſt of Sardinia, and concludes his account of it with only ſaying, *That this affair had no conſequence.* It had none immediately, becauſe the Romans were the ſtrongeſt: but was one of the principal cauſes of the ſecond Punic war, as we ſhall ſoon ſee. A. R. 514. Ant. C. 238. Liv. xxi. 1.

L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS CAUDINUS.
Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS. A. R. 515. Ant. C. 237.

Under theſe Conſuls there were ſome wars not conſiderable againſt the Gauls ſettled on this ſide of the Po, and the Ligurians.

About the ſame time Ambaſſadors were ſent to Ptolomy King of Egypt (this was Ptolomy Evergetes, the ſon of Ptolomy Philadelphus) to offer him aid againſt Antiochus King of Syria, ſurnamed Θεὸς, *God*, with whom they believed him ſtill at war: but he had made an accommodation, which diſpenſed with his accepting the aid that was offered him. *Ambaſſadors ſent to the King of Egypt.* Eutrop. l. iii.

Rome was exceedingly rejoiced to ſee Hiero King of Syracuſe arrive there, a Prince attached to the Commonwealth by the ties of a ſincere amity, and an inviolable fidelity. Eutropius ſays, that he came to Rome to ſee the Secular games, which, according to ſome authors, were really to be celebrated the year following for the third time, and for which they *Arrival of Hiero at Rome.* Eutrop. ibid. *Secular games.*

A. R. 515. Ant. C. 237. were then making preparations. In order to make plenty reign at Rome, where there was to be a great concourſe of people of many countries, that generous Prince made the Roman People a preſent of two hundred thouſand buſhels of corn. I ſhall explain the ceremonies obſerved in theſe games at the end of this ſection.

P. CORNELIUS LENTULUS CAUDINUS.
A. R. 516. Ant. C. 236. C. LICINIUS VARUS.

M. Æmilius, and M. Livius Salinator were nominated to preſide in, and have the care of, the ſecular games.

Expedition againſt the Boii. The war with the Boii, with which Lentulus was charged, was terminated without coſting the Romans any blood, by a bloody diviſion which aroſe ſuddenly between the Boii, and the auxiliary troops, they had called in from the other ſide of the Alpes.

Againſt the Corſicans. Licinius had ſent M. Claudius Glicias before him into Corſica with part of his troops. The latter, forgetting who he was, had the ſenſeleſs and criminal vanity to deſire, that the glory of terminating this war might be aſcribed to him, and concluded a treaty with the Corſicans upon his perſonal authority. When Licinius arrived with the reſt of his army, he paid no regard to a treaty made without authority. He attacked the Corſicans with vigour, and ſubjected them. Claudius, the author and guarantee of the peace, was delivered up to them; and as they refuſed to receive him, he was put to death in priſon.

Death of a Cenſor. The *Cenſus* was not compleated this year, becauſe one of the Cenſors died in his office.

Corſica

Corſica and Sardinia, at the ſecret inſtigations of the Carthaginians, who gave them hopes of a powerful aid, prepared to take up arms again. As thoſe two iſlands were very weak of themſelves, their revolt did not much alarm Rome: but ſhe was not without apprehenſion of ſeeing a new war break out with the Carthaginians. To fruſtate the effect of it by being beforehand with them, it was reſolved to levy troops without loſs of time. On the firſt rumour of this the Carthaginians, amongſt whom the news had occaſioned an univerſal alarm, having ſent deputies after deputies to Rome, at laſt diſpatched ten of the principal perſons of the city, with orders to employ the moſt earneſt and moſt humble entreaties, to obtain, that they might be ſuffered to enjoy the peace, which the Roman People had granted them. As they were not heard more favourably than the firſt deputies, Hanno, the youngeſt of the Ambaſſadors, intrepid and full of a noble pride, took upon him to ſpeak, and ſaid in a lively and bold accent: *Romans, if you are determined to refuſe us the peace we have bought of you, not for one or two years, but for ever, reſtore Sicily and Sardinia to us, which were the price we paid for it. Amongſt private perſons, when any thing is bought, it is not acting with honour and honeſty to keep the goods and not reſtore the money.* The compariſon was juſt and unanſwerable: and the Romans accordingly, leſt ſo flagrant an injuſtice ſhould intirely diſgrace them with the neighbouring nations, gave the Ambaſſadors a favourable anſwer, and ſent them back ſatisfied.

A. R. 516. Ant. C. 236. *Rome confirms the peace made with the Carthaginians, not without difficulty.* Zonar. viii. Oroſ. iv. 12. Dio. in Excerpt. xi.

A. R. 517. Ant. C. 235.

C. ATILIUS BULBUS II.
T. MANLIUS TORQUATUS.

Sardinia ſubjected.

Manlius, to whom Sardinia had fallen by lot, having defeated the enemy on ſeveral occaſions, ſubjected the whole iſland to the Romans; which acquired him the honour of a triumph.

Temple of Janus ſhut for the ſecond time.

Rome at that time had neither enemies nor war, which had not happened for almoſt four hundred and forty years, and the temple of Janus was ſhut for the ſecond time; a ceremony which implied a general peace. It had been ſhut for the firſt time in the reign of Numa: and will not be ſo for the third till that of Auguſtus.

Reflections upon the continual wars of the Romans.

It is not eaſy to conceive how Rome, that at firſt was neither very rich nor very powerful, could ſuſtain continual wars during ſo many years, without having ever had time to take breath; how ſhe could ſupport the expences, which were a neceſſary conſequence of them; and how the Roman citizens came not to be tired of wars, which drew them away from their families, and made them incapable of cultivating their lands, in the product of which their whole riches conſiſted.

We muſt remember, that the Romans, properly ſpeaking, were a nation of ſoldiers, born, to uſe the expreſſion, in the midſt of arms, enemies to repoſe and inaction, and breathing nothing but wars and battles. In the early times of the Commonwealth till the ſiege of Veii, the wars were very ſhort, and often of not above ten or twenty days duration. They inſtantly took the field, gave battle, and the conquered enemy,

enemy, to preſerve their territory from farther ravages, made their accommodation, and the Romans returned home. From the eſtabliſhment of pay for the ſoldiers, and the augmentation of the Roman dominions, the campaigns were longer, but they uſually did not exceed ſix months, becauſe it was the intereſt of the Conſuls, who commanded the armies, to terminate the war ſpeedily, in order to have the honour of triumphs. A. R. 517. Ant. C. 235.

As to what regards the expences neceſſary for paying and ſubſiſting the troops, it is obſervable, that the wars which ruin and exhauſt other States, inriched the Romans, as well in reſpect to the publick as individuals. Thoſe who quitted Rome very poor, often returned very rich in the ſpoils they had taken during the campaign, either in the towns carried by aſſault, or in the camps of the enemies, which they had forced; of which the Conſuls, in order to conciliate the favour of the troops, often gained them the plunder; and the hopes of this recompence was a very ſtrong bait, a powerful attraction, which made them ſuſtain the rudeſt fatigues, not only with patience but with joy.

The war was not leſs uſeful, nor leſs lucrative to the State, than to particulars. When the conquered enemies demanded peace, it was an uſual preliminary to require of them, that they ſhould begin by reimburſing all the expences of the war; and the Roman People, by the conditions of the treaty, uſuallȳ obliged them to pay ſums more or leſs conſiderable, in order to weaken and keep them within the bounds of ſubjection by this kind of pecuniary puniſhment, that often compleated their ruin, and made them incapable of ſoon taking up arms again. The Generals

A. R. 517. Ant. C. 235. rals on their ſide, who had no thoughts of inriching themſelves but the State, by the ſpoils which they took from the enemy, piqued themſelves, on entering Rome in triumph, upon expoſing the gold and ſilver, which they brought back from their expeditions, to the eyes of the people, and cauſed to be carried into the public treaſury. Theſe reaſons, and many others, which for the ſake of brevity I omit, ſhew, that it is no wonder the Romans were almoſt always under arms, without being diſguſted by ſo rude and laborious a condition. Beſides which, all theſe wars, in the deſign of Providence, which deſtined the Roman People to be the future ſovereigns of the whole world, were a kind of apprenticeſhip to them, during which they were preparing themſelves, without knowing it, and by a kind of inſtinct, for the great conqueſts, which were to ſubject all the kingdoms and empires of the world to them.

The general peace, which, as we ſaid before, the Romans enjoyed, was not of long duration. It was interrupted ſome few months after, out of Italy by Corſica and Sardinia, and in Italy by the Ligurians.

A. R. 518. Ant. C. 234. L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS.
SP. CARVILIUS MAXIMUS.

Theſe three wars were terminated in a ſhort time, and without abundance of difficulty, by the two Conſuls and the Prætor Poſtumius.

Veſtal condemned. The veſtal Tuccia, convicted of having abandoned herſelf to a ſlave, killed herſelf to avoid the uſual puniſhment, to which ſhe had been condemned.

The

The Cenſors this year made all the citizens of age to marry, ſwear, that they would take wives in order to ſupply the Commonwealth with ſubjects. This ſingular and unuſual conduct gives room to conjecture, that the number of the Roman citizens had been found by the Cenſus to be conſiderably diminiſhed. A. R. 518. Ant. C. 234. *Cenſus.*

The poet Cn. Nævius of Campania, who had ſerved in the firſt Punic war, gave his firſt dramatic pieces to the public this year. *The poet Nævius.*

Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS VERRUCOSUS. A. R. 519.
M. POMPONIUS MATHO. Ant. C. 233.

The Fabius elected Conſul for the firſt time this year, is the famous Fabius Maximus, of whom we ſhall ſoon ſpeak in the war with Hannibal, and who will do the Commonwealth ſuch great ſervices. He was called *Verrucoſus* from a little wart upon his lip. He was called alſo *Ovicular* in his infancy, that is to ſay, *little ſheep*, upon account of his tenderneſs and ſweetneſs of temper, and ſeeming ſtupidity. For his compoſed and calm turn of mind, his ſilence, the little paſſion which he had for the pleaſures of his years, the ſlowneſs and difficulty with which he learnt what was taught him, his ſweetneſs of diſpoſition and complacency for his companions, paſſed in the ſenſe of thoſe, who did not examine nearly into him, for ſo many marks of dullneſs and heavineſs of genius. Only a very ſmall number of the more diſcerning ſaw, thro' that ſerious and grave air, a profundity of good ſenſe and judgment, and through that character of ſlowneſs and inactivity, incomparable magnanimity and the courage of a lion. Actuated afterwards, and, to uſe the expreſſion, *Character of Fabius in his infancy.* Plut. in Fab. p. 174.

rouzed

A. R. 519. Ant. C. 233. rouzed by the ſtate of things, he fully convinced all the world, that what they had taken for ſlowneſs and inertion in him, was gravity; what they called timidity, was wiſe reſerve and prudence; and what paſſed for want of activity and boldneſs, was only conſtancy and reſolution.

Differences between the Romans and Carthaginians.

Sardinia and Liguria revolted again. Liguria fell by lot to Fabius, and Sardinia to Pomponius. As the Carthaginians were ſuſpected to excite theſe defections underhand, Rome ſent Ambaſſadors to them, under pretext of demanding the ſums, which they had engaged to pay at different times. They alſo forbad them, in very rough terms, to intermeddle in the affairs of the iſlands belonging to the Roman People; with menaces to declare war againſt them if they diſobeyed. The Carthaginians were recovered from their alarms, and had began to reſume courage, ſince Amilcar their General had not only quelled the ſeveral people of Africa, who had revolted, but had alſo augmented conſiderably the dominions of Carthage by the victories which he had gained in Spain. They anſwered the Ambaſſadors therefore with haughtineſs; and as the latter, according to their inſtructions, preſented them with a dart and a *caduceus*, the ſymbols of war and peace, adding, that they had to chuſe either the one or the other; they replied, that they would not make that choice; but would accept whichſoever of the two the Romans ſhould think fit to leave them. * Zonaras relates this fact thus, who is a writer of no great authority. The thing in itſelf is little probable. The Romans were too haughty

* *Zonaras lived in the XIIth century, about the year* 1120.

to

to go back after ſuch advances. And the reſemblance between what Zonaras tells us here, and the declaration of war, which followed the taking of Saguntum, cannot but render his account ſuſpected. They parted then without determining any thing, and with a mutual hatred on both ſides in their hearts, that waited only for an occaſion to ſhew itſelf. The inhabitants of Sardinia, and the Ligurians, were eaſily defeated by the Conſuls, who acquired the honour of triumphs by their ſeveral expeditions. They were overcome, but not finally ſubdued, and took up arms again the next year, but with no great ſucceſs. A. R. 519. Ant. C. 233.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS. A. R. 520.
M. PUBLICIUS MALLEOLUS. Ant. C. 232.

Troubles on occaſion of a law propoſed by Flaminius. Polyb. ii. 109 Val. Max. v. 4.

The domeſtic feuds between the Senate and People, which had been ſuſpended by the war againſt the Carthaginians, were revived this year, on the occaſion of a law propoſed by C. Flaminius, Tribune of the People, for the diſtribution of certain lands in the territories of the Picentini and Gauls, which had belonged to the Senones. The Senate ſtrongly oppoſed this law, as they foreſaw, that its conſequences might be very pernicious to the Commonwealth, in exaſperating the Gauls, and ſupplying them with a pretext for taking up arms againſt the Romans; which the remembrance of what they had ſuffered from them, made the Fathers extremely apprehend. They tried entreaties and threats on this account, but always to no purpoſe. They went ſo far as to order the magiſtrates to keep troops in readineſs to oppoſe the violence of the Tribune. But the tenacious haughtineſs

A. R. 520. Ant. C. 232. haughtineſs of Flaminius would neither be prevailed upon by prayers, nor ſhaken by menaces. He paid no greater regard to the wiſe remonſtrances of his father, who expoſtulated with him at firſt, how wrong it was to ſet himſelf up as he did, for the head of a cabal, and then he talked to him in ſtronger terms, as a father has a right to ſpeak to his ſon. The Tribune perſiſted firmly in his reſolution; and having aſſembled the People, had already began to read his law, when his father, tranſported with juſt indignation, advanced towards the tribunal of harangues; and ſeizing him hold by the hand, made him come down, and go away with him. I do not know whether there be a fact in hiſtory, that better ſhews how great, and how much reſpected, paternal authority was at Rome. This Tribune, who had deſpiſed the indignation and menaces of the whole Senate, in the very heat of contention, and before the eyes of the People, ſo zealous for the law he propoſed, ſuffers himſelf to be taken away from the tribunal like a child by the hand of an old man: and, which is no leſs admirable, the aſſembly, which ſaw its hopes entirely fruſtrated by the removal of the Tribune, continued quiet, without ſhewing by the leaſt murmur or complaint, that they condemned an action ſo bold, and in appearance ſo contrary to its intereſts. But the promulgation of this law was only deferred, and another Tribune having joined Flaminius, it was paſſed ſoon after. According to Polybius, it became very pernicious to the Roman people, and occaſioned the war made againſt them by the Gauls about eight years after.

M. ROM-

A. R. 521.
Ant. C. 231.

M. POMPONIUS MATHO.
C. PAPIRIUS MASO.

Theſe two Conſuls ſet out, the one againſt Sardinia, and the other againſt Corſica: expeditions, which gave the Roman troops more trouble than they did them honour at firſt. But at length they were reduced into provinces of the Roman People.

Expeditions againſt Sardinia and Corſica.

A divorce was ſeen this year at Rome for the firſt time. Sp. Carvilius Ruga repudiated his wife, whom he however loved exceedingly, ſolely upon account of her barrenneſs; to which he was determined by the regard he had for the oath he had taken, as well as the reſt of the citizens, to marry in order to have children, and to propagate ſubjects for the Commonwealth. Though he acted thus through a kind of neceſſity, and with the advice of his friends, his conduct was univerſally condemned, and rendered him extremely odious.

Firſt divorce at Rome. Dion. Hal. ii. 96. Val. Max. ii. 1.

Another novelty appeared this year. The Conſul Papirius pretended to have deſerved, and in conſequence, demanded a triumph for having reduced Corſica: the Senate however refuſed him that honour. He aſſumed it himſelf, and triumphed on the Alban mountain: an example which was afterwards followed, and became ſufficiently common.

Firſt triumph upon the Alban mountain. Val. Max. iii. 6.

M. ÆMI-

A. R. 522. Ant. C. 230

M. ÆMILIUS PARBULA.
M. JUNIUS PERA.

The forty-firſt *Cenſus* was taken this year.

The Conſuls were charged with the war againſt the Ligurians, which had no conſequence at that time.

War with the Illyrians. Polyb. ii. 98. Zonar. viii.

Another war in a country, into which the Romans had not penetrated hitherto, employed their attention. This was Illyricum, the ſame as is now called the coaſts of Dalmatia. This region was divided amongſt ſeveral States. The *Ardyæi*, one of theſe nations, had ſome time before a King, whoſe name was Agron, who had made himſelf more powerful than any of his predeceſſors. This king, who was lately dead, left an infant ſon, called Pineus, under the tuition of his ſecond wife Teuta, that was not the young Prince's mother, and nevertheleſs adminiſtred the government in quality of guardian and regent during his minority.

Complaints laid before the Senate againſt the Illyrians.

Under this adminiſtration the Illyrians exerciſed with entire liberty, and even by public authority, the occupation of Corſairs throughout the Adriatic ſea, and on the coaſts of Greece; and amongſt other piracies took ſeveral merchants of Italy, who ſet out from the port of Brunduſium, and even killed ſome of them. The Senate at firſt laid no great ſtreſs upon the complaints brought againſt theſe pirates. But as their inſolence increaſed every day, and with it the complaints of the injured, it was thought proper to ſend Ambaſſadors to demand ſatisfaction for ſeveral grievances that were ſpecified, and in particular to declare, that

that the Romans had taken the little iſland of Iſſa * into their protection. The Illyrians inſulted it in every manner; becauſe it had renounced their alliance, and actually beſieged it in form. A. R. 522. Ant. C. 230.

At this juncture the Roman Ambaſſadors, Caius and Lucius Coruncanius, arrived. At their audience, they complained of the injuries their merchants had ſuſtained from the Illyrian Corſairs. The Queen ſuffered them to ſpeak without interruption, aſſuming airs of pride and haughtineſs. When they had done, ſhe made anſwer, that for her part ſhe would not give the Romans any cauſe of complaint, nor ſend any pirates againſt them; but that it was not the cuſtom of the Kings of Illyricum to prohibit their ſubjects from cruizing at ſea for their private advantage. On thoſe words, the youngeſt of the Ambaſſadors was ſeized with indignation, and with a liberty Roman indeed, but not proper at that time, *Amongſt us, Madam,* ſaid he, *one of our nobleſt cuſtoms, is to avenge in common the injuries done to particulars; and, with the favour of the gods, we ſhall act in ſuch a manner as ſhall ſoon induce you to reform the cuſtom of the Illyrian Kings.* The Queen, like an haughty violent woman, was ſo ſenſibly ſtung with that anſwer, that without regard to the law of nations, ſhe ordered the Ambaſſadors to be followed and killed with part of their train: the reſt were impriſoned; and ſhe carried her cruelty ſo far, as to burn the pilots of the ſhips that had brought them from Italy. It is eaſy to conceive, how much the Romans were inceniſed, when they received advice of ſo bar- *The Queen cauſes the Roman Ambaſſadors to be killed.*

* *This iſland is ſituated in the Adriatic gulf.*

A. R. 522. Ant. C. 230. Plin. xxxiv. 6.

barous a fact. The firſt thing they did, was to do honour to the memory of the Ambaſſadors, by erecting them ſtatues in the Forum. At the ſame time they made preparations for war, levied troops, fitted out a fleet, and declared war againſt the Illyrians in all the forms.

Expedition of the Romans into Illyricum.

The Queen began then to be in great alarm. She was a woman of amazing levity and inconſtancy of mind, and had nothing fixed and certain in her nature, and from the proudeſt and raſheſt audacity, fell immediately into the meaneſt diſcouragement, and moſt abject fear. Accordingly, when ſhe ſaw herſelf upon the point of having ſo formidable a power upon her hands, ſhe ſent deputies to the Romans, with offers to reſtore all thoſe who had been made priſoners, and were ſtill living; and farther to declare, that the pirates had killed ſome Romans without her orders. It is probable that ſhe raiſed the ſiege of Iſſa. Tho' the ſatisfaction was but ſlight, and did not anſwer the enormity of the crime committed by the Illyrians, as it gave room to hope that the affair might be terminated without taking arms, or ſhedding blood, Rome accepted it for the preſent, ſuſpended the departure of the troops, and only demanded, that the authors of the murder ſhould be delivered up. This delay made the Queen reſume her former character. She flatly refuſed to deliver up any perſon whatſoever to the Romans; and to act conformably to that refuſal, ſhe made her troops ſet out to beſiege Iſſa again.

L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS II. A. R. 523.
CN. FULVIUS CENTIMALUS. Ant. C. 229.

In the beginning of the ſpring, Teuta having cauſed a great number of ſhips to be built, had ſent them to ruin the country of Greece. Part of them ſailed to * Corſyra, (now Curſoli) and the reſt anchored at † Epidamnum. The latter, who intended to ſurprize that city, having failed in that deſign, rejoined the former, and repaired to Corcyra, which called in the Achæans and Etolians to its aid. After a rude battle at ſea, in which the people of Illyricum, ſupported by the Acarnanians, had the advantage; Corcyra being no longer in a condition to ſuſtain the attack of the enemy, capitulated, and received a garriſon, commanded by Demetrius of ‖ Pharos. The Illyrians then returned to Epidamnum, which they beſieged again.

The Romans, as may eaſily be judged, did not continue quiet. The Conſul took the field. Fulvius had the command of the fleet, which conſiſted of two hundred ſhips, and Poſtumius his collegue that of the land-army. Fulvius ſailed firſt to Corſyra, believing he ſhould arrive in time to its aid. But though the city was ſurrendered, he did not abandon his firſt deſign, as well for the ſake of knowing exactly what had paſſed there, as becauſe he held intelligence with Demetrius. For the latter having been diſ-

* *This iſland lies oppoſite to Dalmatia. It was called* Corcyra nigra, *to diſtinguiſh it from another, ſituated over againſt Epirus, now called* Corfu.

† *It is otherwiſe called* Dyrrachium, *now* Durazzo. *It borders upon new Epirus.*

‖ *An Iſland in the Adriatic ſea.*

A. R. 523. Ant. C. 229. ſerved with Teuta, and fearing her reſentment, had given the Romans to underſtand, that he would deliver up Corcyra, and all under his command, to them. The Romans landed in the iſland, and the Corcyreans delivered up the Illyrian garriſon; and the whole iſland ſubmitted; conceiving that the only method to ſecure themſelves for ever from the inſults of the Illyrians.

The Romans having fitted out a powerful fleet, and at the ſame time ſent a land-army into Teuta's dominions, on the one ſide cleared all the poſts occupied by the Illyrians in the Adriatic ſea; and on the other, reduced Teuta to ſeek her ſafety in the midſt of her country, by removing from the coaſt. They gave ſeveral places in Illyricum to Demetrius, to reward the ſervices he had done them. When the campaign was over, Poſtumius, one of the two Conſuls, took up his winter quarters near Epidamnum, in order to awe the Ardyæi, and the countries newly ſubjected.

Treaty of peace between the Romans and Illyrians.

Early in the ſpring, Teuta, ſeeing herſelf without reſource, ſent Ambaſſadors to Rome to demand peace. She laid the blame of all that had paſſed upon her husband Agron, whoſe plan and enterprizes ſhe had been obliged to follow, and continue. The peace was concluded, not in her name, but that of Pineus, Agron's ſon, to whom the kingdom belonged. It was agreed, "that Corcyra, Pharos, Iſſa, "Epidamnum, and the country of the Atin-"tanes, ſhould continue in the poſſeſſion of the "Romans, that Pineus ſhould retain the reſt "of his father's dominions; that he ſhould pay "a tribute to the Romans; and what was the "moſt important article of all to the Greeks,

"that

"that he ſhould not navigate beyond the city "of Liſſus with more than two ſhips, and "thoſe not armed for war." Teuta, either voluntarily, or by order of the Romans, quitted the adminiſtration of the government, which was transfetred to Demetrius, with the title of guardian of the young king. A. R. 523. Ant. C. 229. Dio. Zonar.

Thus ended the war of Illyricum. Poſtumius ſent Ambaſſadors the following year to the Ætolians and Achæans, in order to explain to them the reaſons which had induced the Romans to undertake this war, and to enter Illyricum. They related what had paſſed there: they read the treaty of peace concluded with the Illyrians, and afterwards returned to Corcyra,, very well ſatisfied with the good reception which they had met with from both thoſe people. And indeed this treaty was very advantagious to the Greeks, and delivered them from great matter of fear. For the Illyrians did not declare only againſt ſome part, but all Greece; and infeſted the whole neighbouring country with their piracies.

This was the firſt time the Roman arms attacked Illyricum, and the firſt alliance made by embaſſy between the Greeks and Romans. The latter ſent Ambaſſadors at the ſame time to Corinth and Athens, who were very well received, and treated with great honours by both cities. The Corinthians declared by a public decree, that the Romans ſhould be admitted to be preſent at the celebration of the Iſthmian games, as well as the Greeks. The Athenians alſo ordained, that the Romans ſhould be granted the freedom of Athens, and might be initiated into the great myſteries.

Of the SECULAR GAMES.

THE Secular games were ſo called, becauſe they were celebrated from age to age: but authors do not agree concerning the time included in an age. Till the time of Auguſtus, the exact ſpace of an hundred years were underſtood by that word. The prieſts called *Sibyllini*, to make their court to that Prince, who paſſionately deſired, that the ſecular games ſhould be celebrated in his time, declared, that the oracle of the Sybil, which ordained the celebration of them, intended by the time of *an age* the ſpace of an hundred and ten years; and in virtue of this interpretation, the ſecular games were celebrated then for the fifth time, that is to ſay, the 737th year of Rome: and this opinion Horace has followed in his *Carmen ſeculare*, of which we ſhall ſoon ſpeak.

The Emperor Claudius returned to the opinion of an hundred years, and celebrated the ſecular games ſixty-four years after thoſe of Auguſtus. Domitian afterwards reſumed the ſyſtem of an hundred and ten years. Hiſtorians have obſerved, that people laughed at the herald's proclamation, when he invited the people to games, which none had ſeen, nor ever ſhould ſee again.

Tacit. Annal. xi. 11. Suet. in Claud. c. 21.

The term *age* is not the only difficulty upon this head. The origin, occaſion, and epocha of the inſtitution of theſe games, are not leſs uncertain, and form a matter of diſpute amongſt the learned, into which the plan I have propoſed to myſelf, does not admit me to enter. Very able critics believe, that theſe games were inſtituted

tuted by Valerius Publicola, after the expulsion of the Kings, and celebrated for the first time the 245th year of Rome, which is the first of the re-establishment of liberty. It appears, that they were not solemnized exactly at the end of each century; there being many reasons which might oblige the deferring, and even interrupt the celebration of them.

The principal ceremonies in them were as follow. Some time before these games were celebrated, the magistrates sent heralds to all the States of Italy in the Roman dependance, to invite them to be present at a festival, that they never had, nor ever should see again.

Some few days before the festival, the priests who had the keeping of the books of the Sibyl, who were augmented by Sylla to the number of fifteen, from which they retained the name of *Quindecimviri*, those priests sitting on seats in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, distributed certain things to the whole people, called *Lustralia*, that is to say, things proper for purifying them, as torches, pitch, and sulphur. Every one brought wheat, barley and beans thither, to be sacrificed to the Parcæ or destinies. In this temple, and that of Diana upon mount Aventine, they passed whole nights in offering sacrifices to Pluto, Proserpine, and other divinities.

When the time of the festival arrived, it began by a solemn procession of the priests of all the colleges, the magistrates, all orders of the Commonwealth, and the People dress in white robes, crowned with flowers, and carrying branches of palm in their hands. They went in this manner from the Capitol to the field of Mars. The statues of the gods were placed upon cushions, and a great banquet was served up

to them, according to the cuſtom uſually obſerved in the public ceremonies of religion.

They ſacrificed in the night to Pluto, Proſerpine, the deſtinies, * Ilithya, and the earth; and in the day to Jupiter, Juno, Apollo, Latona, Diana, and the Genii. Only black victims were ſacrificed to the firſt.

The firſt night of the feſtival, the Conſuls, followed by the Sibylline prieſts, repaired to a place called *Terentus*, upon the banks of the Tiber, where the ſecular games had their birth. They cauſed three altars to be erected there, which they ſprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and upon which they cauſed offerings and victims to be burnt. During the night, all parts of Rome ſhone with innumerable fires and illuminations.

The ſecond day of the feſtival, the women of all ranks went to the Capitol, and to the other temples, to offer their vows and prayers to different divinities.

The third day, when the feſtival ended, twenty-ſeven boys, and as many girls, of illuſtrious birth, whoſe fathers and mothers were ſtill alive, were divided into different choirs, and in the temple of Apollo Palatinus ſung hymns and canticles in Greek and Latin, expreſsly compoſed for this ceremony, wherein they implored for Rome the aid and protection of the gods whom they had lately adored with ſacrifices.

During the three days which this feſtival continued, ſhews of all kinds were exhibited to the people.

* *The goddeſs who preſided at the birth of children, called otherwiſe Lucina.*

It is ſaid, that there was an ancient oracle in the Sibyl's books, which informed the Romans, that as long as they ſhould celebrate games at the beginning of every age in honour of certain gods therein named, Rome ſhould continue to flouriſh, and that all nations ſhould be ſubjected to her.

We have a model of the hymns that were ſung as part of the ceremonies we have related in the ſecular poem of Horace, compoſed by the order of Auguſtus the 736th year of Rome; a poem juſtly conſidered as one of that poet's fineſt pieces. I ſhall repeat only two ſtrophes or ſtanzaes of it; from which the merit of the reſt may be judged.

Alme Sol, curru nitido diem qui
Promis & celas, aliuſque & idem,
Naſceris: poſſis nihil urbe Roma
Viſere majus.
May Sol, whoſe late and early rays
Are ever bright and ever new,
In all the climates he ſurveys,
No greater ſtate nor empire view.
Creech. Hor.

How elegant, and at the ſame time how ſublime is the ſtile of theſe verſes?

Dii probos mores docili Juventæ
Dii Senectuti placidæ quietem:
Romulæ genti date remque, prolemque,
Et decus omne.
Ye gods with virtue bleſs the young,
Secure the old from toil and care;
Exalt our ſtate, our race prolong,
And make us rich, and great in war. Ib.

Can

Can more, or more important vows be included in four verſes? I am charmed in a particular manner with thoſe which regard youth: docility and probity of manners.

SECT. II.

The power of Carthage, which augmented every day, alarms the Romans. Building of new Carthage. Treaty of the Romans with Aſdrubal. Creation of two new Prætors. Alarm on rumors of a war with the Gauls. Cauſe and occaſion of this war. Irruption of the Gauls into Italy. Preparations of the Romans. Firſt battle near Cluſium, in which the Romans are defeated. Battle and famous victory of the Romans near Telamon. Reflection upon this victory. Cenſus. The Boii ſurrender at diſcretion. Battle of Adda between the Gauls and Romans. Diſcontent of the Romans in reſpect to Flaminius. Character of Marcellus. New war with the Gauls. The ſpoils, called Spolia opima, *gained by Marcellus. Triumph of Marcellus. The Romans ſubject Iſtria. Hannibal charged with the command in Spain. Demetrius of Pharos draws the arms of the Romans upon himſelf. Cenſus. Various undertakings of the Cenſors. War of Illyricum. Æmilius gains a victory over Demetrius. Illyricum is ſubjected by the Romans. Archagathus the phyſician. New colonies.*

A. R. 525. Ant. C. 229.

L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS II.
CN. FULVIUS CENTIMALUS.

Polyb. ii. 101. App. Her. 258.

THE Romans had terminated the war with Illyricum happily: but they had beſides

ſides great matter of alarm and diſquiet. On the one ſide they had been informed by true reports, that the Gauls were preparing to take arms againſt them: on the other, the Carthaginian power which augmented every day in Spain, gave them juſt apprehenſions. They therefore thought ſeriouſly of keeping things quiet on that ſide, before they attacked the Gauls. A. R. 523. Ant. C. 229.

Power of the Carthaginians, which encreaſed every day, alarms the Romans.

Amilcar, ſurnamed Barcas, Hannibal's father, of whom much has been ſaid in the war of Sicily, after having commanded the armies nine years in Spain, and ſubjected ſeveral powerful and warlike nations to Carthage, had been unfortunately killed in a battle. Aſdrubal, his ſon-in-law and ſucceſſor, who had inherited part of his hatred for the Romans, treading in his ſteps, had added new conqueſts to thoſe of his predeceſſors; employing however rather addreſs and perſwaſion than arms. Amongſt the ſervices which he rendered the State, one of the moſt important, and which contributed moſt to extend and ſtrengthen the power of his Commonwealth in Spain, was the building of a city, which was called new Carthage, and ſince Carthagena. Its ſituation was the moſt happy the Carthaginians could deſire for keeping Spain in awe.

Building of new Carthage.

The great conqueſts which Aſdrubal had already made, and the high degree of power to which he had attained, made the Romans reſolve to apply themſelves attentively to what paſſed in Spain. They were angry with themſelves for having been ſo long aſleep in reſpect to the augmentation of the dominions of Carthage, and thought in earneſt of retrieving that fault; eſpecially ſince the people of Saguntum, who ſaw themſelves upon the point of being ſubjected

A. R. 523. Ant. C. 229. jected to the yoke of the Carthaginians, had ſent deputies to the Romans to implore their aid, and to conclude an alliance with them.

A. R. 524. Ant. C. 228.

SP. CARVILIUS MAXIMUS II.
Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS VERRUCOSUS II.

Treaty of the Romans with Aſdrubal.

Such was the diſpoſition of the Romans in reſpect to the Carthaginians. They had no laws at that time to preſcribe to the Carthaginians, and dared not take arms againſt them. They had enough to do to keep themſelves upon their guard againſt the Gauls, who menaced them, and whom they expected almoſt every day. It ſeemed moſt expedient to take advantage of Aſdrubal's pacific diſpoſition in order to make a new treaty, till they ſhould have diſengaged themſelves from the Gauls, an enemy, who only watched an occaſion for hurting them, and whom it was abſolutely neceſſary to diſtruſt, not only for making themſelves maſters of Italy, but for keeping quiet poſſeſſion of their own immediate country. They therefore ſent Ambaſſadors to Aſdrubal, and in the treaty they made with him, without mentioning the reſt of Spain, they only required, that he ſhould not carry the war beyond the Iberus, which ſhould ſerve as the barrier to the two nations. It was alſo agreed that Saguntum, though ſituated on the other ſide of the Iberus, ſhould retain its laws and liberties.

P. VA-

A. R. 525.
Ant. C. 227.

P. VALERIUS FLACCUS.
M. ATILIUS REGULUS.

To the two Prætors who had been inſtituted at Rome, two more were added this year, the one for Sicily, and the other for Sardinia and Corſica. *Two new Prætors created.* Liv. Epit. xx.

M. VALERIUS MESSALA.
L. APUSTIUS FULLO.

A. R. 526.
Ant. C. 226.

The rumour of the preparations of war making by the Gauls, occaſioned great alarm at Rome. Theſe were the enemies whom the Romans always dreaded moſt, remembring, that in former days they had made themſelves maſters of Rome, and that from that time a law had been made, which diveſting the prieſthood of the privilege of being exempt from ſerving in war, obliged them to take arms like the reſt of the citizens, when the queſtion was to march againſt the Gauls. The war with them was called *Tumultus Gallicus*, (*a*) which expreſſed much more than the word *bellum* alone. For many citizens were exempt from ſerving in other wars; but in that againſt the Gauls all privileges and exemptions ceaſed. *Alarm on the rumour of a war with the Gauls.* Plut. in Marcel. p. 299.

What augmented the conſternation, at the time of which we are ſpeaking, was an oracle pretended to be found in the books of the Sibyl, which ſaid, *That the Greeks and Gauls ſhould take poſſeſſion of Rome: Romam occupaturos.* To *Cruel and impious ſacrifice.* Plut. in Marcel. p. 299. Zonar. viii. 19. Oroſ. iv. 12.

(*a*) Gravius autem tumultum eſſe, quàm bellum, hinc intelligi licet, quòd bello vacationes valent, tumultu non valent. *Cic. Philip.* viii. 3.

avert

A. R. 526. Ant. C. 226. avert the effect of ſo fatal a prediction, the Pontiffs ſuggeſted a ſtrange method, which was to bury two Greeks and two Gauls, men and women, alive; pretending that the oracle would thereby be fulfilled. What abſurdity, and at the ſame time barbarity, was this in a people, who valued themſelves in every thing elſe, upon their humanity and good nature! The ſame equally impious and cruel ceremony was again employed at the beginning of the ſecond Punic war.

Liv. xxii. 40.

Cauſe of this war. Polyb. ii. 111, 119.

The principal cauſe of the preſent war, was the diſtribution made ſeven or eight years before by the Romans of the lands of Picenum, from whence they had driven out the Senones. This was done at the inſtigation of C. Flaminius, Tribune of the People. We have ſeen, that the Senate ſtrongly oppoſed this enterprize, of which it foreſaw the conſequences. Several nations of the Gauls entered into the quarrel of the Senones, and eſpecially the Boii, who bordered upon the Romans, and the Inſubrians. They were perſuaded that the Romans did not attack them only for the ſake of commanding and giving the law, but to ruin and deſtroy them entirely in driving them out of the country. With theſe thoughts the Inſubrians and Boii, the two moſt powerful people of the nations, entered into a league, as we have juſt ſaid, and even ſent to the other ſide of the Alpes, to ſollicit the Gauls that inhabited upon the banks of the Rhone, called * Gæſates, from ſerving in the field for a certain pay; for, ſays Polybius, that is the proper ſignification of their name. They

* *According to ſome authors the name of* Gæſates *is taken from a kind of arms which they uſed, and called* Gæſum.

fold

ſold their ſervice to all who deſired to employ them in war. In order to induce their Kings to arm againſt the Romans, they made them a conſiderable preſent. A. R. 526. Ant. C. 226.

" They ſet before their eyes " the greatneſs and power of that people: they " ſoothed them with the view of the immenſe " riches, which they could not fail of acquiring " by victory over them: they repeated the ex- " ploits of their anceſtors, who having taken " arms againſt the Romans, defeated them in " the open field, and took their city."

Irruption of the Gauls into Italy.

This diſcourſe enflamed the Gauls to ſuch a degree, that an army more numerous, and compoſed of braver and more warlike ſoldiers, was never known to march out of thoſe provinces. When they had paſſed the Alps, the Inſubrians and the Boii joined them. The * Veneti and † Cœnomani were brought over to the Romans by the Ambaſſadors who had been ſent to them: which induced the Gallic Kings to leave part of their forces in the country, to guard it againſt thoſe people. The Inſubrians were the moſt powerful of the Gauls who had ſettled in Italy; and next to them the Boii. The firſt inhabited the country beyond the Po, whoſe capital was Milan; the others that on this ſide of that river.

Preparations of the Romans.

The Romans, who had been long apprized of the preparations making by the Gauls, had not failed to prepare alſo on their ſide. They had made new levies, and given their allies notice to hold themſelves in readineſs. And in order to know exactly all the troops, which they

* *People that inhabited the country at the bottom of the Adriatic gulph.*

† *People between the Po and the foot of the Alps. Their principal cities were Breſcia, Cremona, Mantua.*

could

A. R. 526. Ant. C. 226. could ſet on foot in caſe of neceſſity, they had ordered the regiſters of all the provinces, ſubject to them, to be brought in, wherein the number of all the youth fit to bear arms was exactly ſet down.

This number would appear incredible, if not atteſted by an author certainly well worthy of belief: this is Polybius, who very probably had ſeen and conſulted the regiſters, that proved its reality. I ſhall repeat this account as it ſtands in that hiſtorian. It will ſhew us in what condition the Roman People were, when Hannibal entered Italy, which happened ſome few years after; and how formidable the Roman forces were, when that great Carthaginian ventured to attack them.

Number of the troops, which the Romans could ſet on foot at the time of the war with the Gauls, ſpoken of in this place.

THIS account conſiſts of two parts. In the firſt Polybius gives the number of the troops that actually ſerved: in the ſecond, the number of thoſe, which could have been raiſed in caſe of neceſſity. It includes the forces of the Romans, and thoſe of their allies.

I. *Troops which actually ſerved.*

Four Roman legions took the field with the Conſuls, each conſiſting of five thouſand two hundred foot, and three hundred horſe. They had with them a body of the troops of the allies, to the number of thirty thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe.

Above

Above fifty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, as well Sabines as Tyrrheni, upon the general alarm flew to the aid of the Romans, and were ſent to the frontiers of Tyrrhenia under the command of a Prætor.

The Umbrians and Sarſinates, to the number of twenty thouſand, came in alſo from the Apennines, and with them as many of the Veneti and Cenomani, who were poſted upon the frontiers of Gaul; in order to oblige the Boii, by entering their country, to recal part of their forces for its defence.

At Rome, to prevent a ſurprize, an army was kept in readineſs, which on occaſion ſerved as auxiliary troops, and conſiſted of twenty thouſand Roman foot, and fifteen hundred horſe, and of the allies thirty thouſand foot, and two thouſand cavalry.

All theſe troops together amounted to two hundred and one thouſand five hundred men: 43500 Romans, and 158000 allies.

II. *Troops which might have been raiſed upon occaſion.*

The regiſters ſent to the Senate, in order to know the number of troops, on which they might rely in caſe of neceſſity, contained as follows.

Of the Latines, fourſcore thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe.

Of the Samnites, ſeventy thouſand foot, and ſeven thouſand horſe.

Of the Japyges and the Meſſapians, fifty thouſand foot, and ſixteen thouſand horſe.

Of the Lucanians, thirty thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe.

Of the Marſi, Marrucini, Ferentini, and Veſtini, twenty thouſand foot, and four thouſand horſe.

The Romans had actually in Sicily, and at Tarentum, two legions, each compoſed of four thouſand two hundred foot, and two hundred horſe, which on occaſion might be employed againſt the Gauls.

Beſides theſe, the Romans and Campanians could raiſe two hundred and fifty thouſand infantry, and twenty-three thouſand cavalry.

All theſe men capable of bearing arms, as well amongſt the Romans as the allies, amounted to the number of five hundred and ſixty-ſix thouſand, eight hundred men. Some error muſt have crept into this account; for ſeventeen hundred men are omitted in it. With the addition of them, the two ſums, that is, of the troops actually employed againſt the Gauls, and of thoſe which might have been raiſed occaſionally, agree with the total ſet down by Polybius.

This total was ſeven hundred and ſeventy thouſand men. A cotemporary author, who ſerved in this war, makes it eight hundred thouſand: this was Fabius. The power of the Romans may be judged from hence. And yet it is this mighty people that Hannibal comes to attack, with ſcarce twenty thouſand men.

Apud. Oroſ. iv. 12.

The number of troops actually employed againſt the Gauls, was very conſiderable, and amounted, as we have ſeen, to more than two hundred thouſand men: and this is not wonderful, as aids of all kinds, and from all ſides, came to join the Romans. For the irruption of the Gauls had ſpread ſuch terror in Italy, that the provinces did not think they were carrying arms any longer for the Romans, nor that the power

power of Rome was only aimed at. Their fears were for themſelves, their country, their cities, and it was for that reaſon they were ſo well-inclined, and ſo ready to execute all the orders that were given them.

L. ÆMILIUS PAPUS. A. R. 527.
C. ATILIUS REGULUS. Ant. C. 225.

Aſſoon as the Romans received advice, that the Gauls had paſſed the Alps, they made L. Æmilius march to Ariminum, to ſtop the progreſs of the enemy on that ſide. One of the Prætors was ſent into Hetruria. Atilius had ſet out before for Sardinia, which had revolted, but he ſoon reduced it to return to its obedience. *Firſt battle near Cluſium, wherein the Romans are defeated.*

The Gauls took their route through Hetruria, probably to avoid meeting Æmilius's army, with fifty thouſand foot, twenty thouſand horſe, and as many chariots. They deſtroyed the country without fear or oppoſition: after which they advanced to Rome. They were already in the neighbourhood of Cluſium, a city three day's march from that capital, when they were informed that the Roman army, commanded by the Prætor, followed them cloſe, and was upon the point of coming up with them. They immediately faced about in order to give it battle. The two armies did not come in view till towards ſunſet, and incamped at a very ſmall diſtance from each other. When night came on, the Gauls kindled fires, and having ordered their cavalry to follow them, as ſoon as the enemy ſaw them in the morning, they retired without noiſe towards * Feſulæ, where they took up

* Fezoli, *a city of Tuſcany.*

A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225. their quarters, with deſign to ſtay there for their cavalry; and when it had joined the main body, to fall unexpectedly upon the Romans, who purſued it. The latter, at the break of day, ſeeing that horſe, and no foot, believed that the Gauls were fled, and ſet forward to purſue them. When they approached, the Gauls ſhewed themſelves, and charged them. The action began with great vigour on both ſides: but the Gauls, who were ſuperior in number, and emboldened by the ſucceſs of their ſtratagem, had the advantage. The Romans loſt at leaſt ſix thouſand men there: the reſt fled to an advantagious poſt, where they intrenched themſelves. The Gauls at firſt intended to force them in it; which was the beſt thing they could have done: but they changed their opinion. Fatigued and harraſſed with their march the night before, they choſe rather to take ſome reſt, and leaving only a guard of cavalry round the eminence, to which the Romans had retired, they deferred attacking them till the next day, in caſe they did not ſurrender of themſelves. Occaſion is to be ſeized; and often, when neglected, never recurs.

Battle and famous victory of the Romans near Telamon.

During this time, L. Æmilius, who had incamped near the Adriatic ſea, having received advice, that the Gauls had thrown themſelves into Hetruria, and approached Rome, came with the utmoſt expedition to the aid of his country, and arrived very opportunely. Having incamped near the enemy, the Romans, who had retired, perceived his fires, and rightly ſuſpecting it was him, reſumed courage. They diſpatched, aſſoon as poſſible, ſome of their people unarmed during the night, and through a foreſt, to acquaint the Conſul of what had paſſed. Æmilius, without loſing time to deliberate,

rate, commanded the Tribunes, as ſoon as day ſhould begin to appear, to ſet out with the infantry. As to him, he put himſelf at the head of the cavalry, and advanced directly towards the eminence. A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225.

The chiefs of the Gauls had alſo ſeen the fires during the night, and conjecturing that the enemy were near, they held a council of war. Aneroeſtus their King ſaid, "That after having "taken plunder of ſuch great value," (for they had ravaged a great part of Italy, and the ſpoils they had taken in priſoners, cattle and baggage, were immenſe) "it was not proper "to expoſe themſelves to a ſecond battle, nor "to run the riſque of loſing all. That it was "better to return into their own country. That "after they had diſencumbered themſelves of "their plunder, they would be in a better con-"dition to reſume their arms againſt the "Romans, if it were judged proper." All coming into this opinion, they decamped before day, and took their route along the ſea-ſide through Hetruria.

Though Æmilius had reinforced his army with thoſe who had taken refuge upon the eminence, he did not however believe it prudent to hazard a pitched battle. He therefore choſe to follow the enemy, and to lie upon the watch for times and places, in which he might diſtreſs them, and retake the plunder.

By ſingular good fortune, the Conſul C. Atilius was returned from Sardinia, and at this inſtant landing his legions at Piſa; and, in order to march them to Rome, took the ſame route by which the Gauls were moving towards him. At Telamon, a city and port of Hetruria, ſome of the foragers of the Gauls having fallen in

A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225. with the Conſuls advanced guard, the Romans took them. Upon being interrogated by Atilius, they related all that had paſſed; adding, that there were two armies in the neighbourhood, that of the Gauls very near, and that of Æmilius at their heels. The Conſul was much concerned at the loſs the Roman army had ſuſtained at firſt: but was exceedingly glad that he had ſurprized the Gauls on their march, and to find them between two Roman armies. He immediately commanded the Tribunes to draw up the legions in battle, to give their front as much extent as the ground would admit, and to advance gently towards the enemy. Upon the way there was an eminence, at the foot of which the Gauls were obliged to paſs. Atilius haſtened thither with his cavalry, and poſted himſelf on the top of it, with deſign to begin the battle firſt, and convinced, that he ſhould thereby acquire the greateſt ſhare in the glory of the event. The Gauls, who believed Atilius at a great diſtance, ſeeing the eminence occupied by the Romans, ſuſpected nothing, but that Æmilius had taken a compaſs with his cavalry during the night, in order to ſeize the advantagious poſts firſt, and to cut off their paſſage, Upon that they alſo detached their horſe, with ſome light-armed troops, to drive the Romans from the hill. But having learnt from a priſoner that it was Atilius who had ſeized it, they drew up their infantry in battle with the utmoſt expedition, and diſpoſed it back to back, ſo that it formed a front before and behind. They took this order of battle upon the report of the priſoner, and the real occaſion, to defend themſelves both from thoſe whom they knew they

they had in their rear, and thoſe whom they were to have in their front. A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225.

Æmilius had indeed heard of the landing of the legions at Piſa, but did not imagine they were ſo near. He was apprized of that aid, only by the engagement of the troops upon the eminence. He alſo detached ſome cavalry thither, and at the ſame time made his infantry march againſt the enemy in the uſual order.

In the army of the Gauls, the Geſatæ, and after them the Inſubrians, formed the front Æmilius was to attack. At their backs were the * Taurini and Boii, who faced on the ſide Atilius was advancing. The chariots were placed on the wings, to prevent the enemy from taking them in flank; and the plunder was beſtowed on a neighbouring mountain, with a detachment to guard it. This diſpoſition was as well conceived as could be, in the neceſſity the Gauls were of making head againſt two armies, that were to attack them at the ſame time, the one in front and the other in the rear. This obliged them to fight couragiouſly, as it made them unable either to give ground or to fly. The Inſubrians were ſeen with their † drawers, (*braccati*) and without any thing on them except their ‖ light-coſſacs. The Geſatæ, in the front ranks, whether out of vain-glory or courage, had even thrown off their cloaths, and kept only their arms, leſt the buſhes which grew there in ſome places ſhould ſtop, and pre-

* Taurini, *or* Tauriſci, *were Gauls, that inhabited the country beyond the Po, where* Turin *is.*

† Braccha, *a kind of breeches, which covered the body from the waiſt to the knees.*

‖ Sagum, *a military caſſoc, peculiar to the Gauls.*

A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225.

vent them from acting. Beſides which this was an uſual cuſtom amongſt the Gauls; and the Gallo-Grecians in their battles with the Romans in Aſia, engaged in the ſame manner half naked, according to Livy. It often coſt them dear; and on the preſent occaſion the Geſatæ paid for their raſhneſs.

The firſt attack was made at the eminence, and as the cavalry that fought were numerous on both ſides, the three armies ſaw all their motions. Atilius loſt his life in the action, wherein he diſtinguiſhed himſelf by a valour and intrepidity, that bordered upon raſhneſs, and his head was carried to the Kings of the Gauls, who cauſed it to be ſhewn on the end of a pike to their whole army. Notwithſtanding that loſs, the Roman cavalry did their duty ſo well, that they continued maſters of the poſt, after gaining a compleat victory over that of the enemy.

The battle of the infantry began afterwards. This, ſays Polybius, was a ſingular ſpectacle, of which not only the ſight, but the mere relation, has ſomething wonderful. For a battle fought between three armies all together, is certainly one of a very particular kind and diſpoſition. The Gauls had great obſtacles and dangers to ſurmount in the neceſſity they were under of fighting on both ſides, which ſeemed to diminiſh their forces to half their ſtrength: but at the ſame time drawn up back to back, they covered themſelves reciprocally from all attacks in the rear. And what was ſtill moſt capable of contributing to their ſucceſs, no means of flight was left; and if they once ſuffered themſelves to be defeated, they had no reſource, nor any hopes

hopes of eſcaping, which is a very powerful motive to induce troops to fight with courage. A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225.

As to the Romans, ſeeing the Gauls incloſed between two armies, and ſurrounded on all ſides, they could not but entertain great hopes of the battle. The extraordinary diſpoſition indeed of thoſe troops, drawn up back to back, the cries and kind of howling of the ſoldiers before the battle, the dreadful ſound of the horns and trumpets without number, the noiſe of which the neighbouring ecchos made the mountains rebellow on all ſides, all this might ſtrike them with ſome dread. But at the ſame time the ſight of the rich collars and bracelets, with which moſt of the Gauls adorned their necks and arms, according to the cuſtom of their nation, animated the Romans with the hopes of conſiderable ſpoils.

The archers advanced in the front of the firſt line, according to the cuſtom of the Romans, and began the action by a dreadful ſhower of darts. The Gauls of the hindmoſt ranks did not ſuffer extremely from them; their drawers and caſſocks defending them. But thoſe in the front, who did not expect this terrible prelude, and who had nothing to cover their bodies, were exceedingly incommoded by it. They knew not how to keep off the ſhafts. Their ſhields were not ſufficiently large to cover them: they were naked from their waiſts upwards, and the larger their bodies were, the more they were expoſed to the darts. To revenge the wounds they received upon the archers was impoſſible; they were at too great a diſtance; beſides which, how could they advance through ſo great a flight of darts? In this perplexity, ſome tranſported with rage and deſpair, threw themſelves inconſiderately

A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225. ſiderately into the midſt of the enemy, and voluntarily abandoned themſelves to death; others pale, diſpirited, and trembling, gave way, and broke the ranks behind them. The pride and haughtineſs of the Geſatæ was humbled in this manner from the firſt attack.

When the archers retired, the main body of the Roman legions having advanced in order to puſh the enemy, the Inſubrians, Boii, and Taurini received them with vigour. They fought with ſuch obſtinacy, that notwithſtanding the wounds with which they were covered, they could not be driven from their poſts. If their arms had been the ſame as thoſe of the Romans, they perhaps had not been defeated. They had indeed bucklers as well as them to ward off blows; but their ſwords did not do them the ſame ſervice. Thoſe of the Romans cut both with the edges and points, whereas theirs were blunt at the end. Beſides which, as the blades were thin and weak, they bent immediately, and the ſoldiers loſt time in ſtraitening them to make them fit for ſervice.

Theſe troops ſuſtained this attack no longer than till the Roman cavalry came down from the eminence, and charged them full ſpeed in flank. The infantry were then cut to pieces without quitting their poſts, and the cavalry entirely put to the rout. Forty thouſand Gauls remained upon the ſpot, and at leaſt ten thouſand were taken priſoners, amongſt whom was Concolitanus, one of their Kings. Aneroeſtus eſcaped with ſome of his people to a retired place, where he killed himſelf with his own hands; and his friends did the ſame.

Æmilius having gathered the ſpoils, ſent them to Rome. As to the plunder taken by the Gauls, he cauſed every thing to be reſtored to the right owners. Then marching through Liguria at the head of the legions, he entered the country of the Boii, which he abandoned to the diſcretion of the ſoldiers, to reward them for the pains they had taken, and for the courage they had ſhewn in the battle. Soon after he returned to Rome with his whole army, and was received there with the greater joy, as this war had occaſioned incredible conſternation. All the ſtandards, collars, and bracelets he had taken, he employed in the decoration of the Capitol. The reſt of the ſpoils ſerved to adorn his triumph. The Gauls who were priſoners, ſays Florus, were expreſsly made to appear in it with their (*a*) belts on, to accompliſh the vow which they had made, not to quit them till they had aſcended the Capitoline hill. Accordingly they did not take them off till they came thither, when they were made to do ſo with ſhame, and the deriſion of the whole people. Thus ended this formidable irruption of the Gauls, which not only threatened the ruin of all Italy, but of Rome itſelf. A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225.

Reflection upon the victory gained by the Romans.

The victory gained over the Gauls in the battle of Telamon, is one of the moſt famous and compleat mentioned in the Roman Hiſtory. To examine all the circumſtances of it cloſely and with attention, it is evident, that it was not the effect of human induſtry but divine Providence, which deſtined the Romans to great

(*a*) Non prius ſolnturos ſe baltea, quàm Capitolium aſcendiſſent, juraverant. Factum eſt: victos enim Æmilius in Capitolio diſcinxit. *Flor.* ii. 4.

things,

A. R. 527. Ant. C. 225. things, and watched over them in a peculiar manner.

Three Roman armies are in Hetruria preciſely at the time the battle is going to be given, without either of them having received news of the other; without the Generals, who commanded them, having received certain advice of the arrival of their collegues; without their having concerted any thing between them, or even knowing where the enemy was. If the Gauls, after having killed the Prætor ſix thouſand men, had purſued the reſt to the eminence, to which they retreated, as good ſenſe required, the whole had been cut to pieces: but they ſuſpended the attack till the next morning. Preciſely in this night the Conſul Æmilius arrives, without knowing any thing of what had paſſed, and delivers the Prætor's troops. The Gauls reſolve to return home. On their way they meet Atilius the other Conſul, who was juſt arrived from Sardinia. They are now encloſed between two armies, and obliged to give battle. Had the Conſuls arrived a little later, at ſome diſtance from each other, the Gauls, by attacking them ſeparately, might have cut both their armies to pieces. Ought ſo miraculous a concurrence of circumſtances, all deciſive in reſpect to the victory, to be conſidered as the effect of chance, eſpecially when we are told by the Scriptures, that God was preparing a great empire for the Romans? And is not the conjuncture of time, in which the war with the Gauls happened, that is to ſay, exactly between the two Punic wars, very remarkable? What had become of Rome, if enemies ſo terrible as the Gauls had joined the Carthaginians in attacking her? An inviſible power watched over her, and ſhe was ſo unhappy,

happy, as to aſcribe to her falſe divinities a protection, that proceeded from the only true God, whom ſhe did not know. A. R. 527. Ant.C. 225.

Before the election of the new Conſuls, the Cenſus was cloſed for the forty-ſecond time. *Cenſus.* Faſti. Capitol.

T. MANLIUS TORQUATUS II. A. R. 528. Ant.C. 224.
Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS II.

After the ſucceſs of the preceding year, the Romans not doubting but they were in a condition to drive the Gauls out of all the countries in the neighbourhood of the Po, as well on this, as on the other, ſide, made great preparations of war, and levied troops, that took the field under the two new conſuls. This irruption terrified the Boii, and they choſe to ſubmit. For the reſt, the rains were ſo great, and the plague made ſuch ravages in the Roman army, that this campaign elapſed without any other memorable event. *The Boii ſurrender at diſcretion.* Polyb. ii. 119.

C. FLAMINIUS.
P. FURIUS PHILUS. A. R. 529. Ant.C. 223.

The Conſuls entered the country of the Inſubrians, at the part of it where the * Addua falls into the Po. According to the beſt authors, this is the firſt time the Romans paſſed that river. Having been very roughly handled in their paſſage and incampments, and rendered incapable of acting, they made a treaty with the Inſubrians, and quitted their country. After a march of ſeveral days they paſſed the Cluſius, now called *La Chieſa*, entered the country of *Battle of the Adda between the Gauls and Romans.* Polyb. ii. 119-121.

* *Now called the Adda.*

the

A. R. 529. Ant. C. 223. the Cenomani their allies, in conjunction with whom by the bottom of the Alps they fell again upon the plains of the Inſubrians, where they plundered and burnt all the villages. The chiefs of that people, ſeeing that the Romans were fully determined to extirpate them, made the utmoſt efforts to defend themſelves, and to the number of fifty thouſand men came boldly, and with a terrible mien, and incamped in view of the enemy.

Plut. in Marcel. p. 299. At this inſtant a courier arrived from the army, diſpatced by the Senate with letters for the Conſuls. Whether Flaminius had been apprized of their contents by his friends, or ſuſpected them, he did not think proper to open them, before he gave battle, and inſpired his collegue with the ſame reſolution.

The Conſuls, ſeeing themſelves exceedingly inferior in number to the enemy, deſigned at firſt to make uſe in this battle of the Gallick troops in their army. But reflecting, that the Gauls were not reputed to make any ſcruple of infringing treaties, and that treachery was the more to be apprehended, as the queſtion was to make Gauls fight againſt Gauls, they were afraid to uſe thoſe they had with them in an affair ſo delicate and important; and to guard againſt all treaſon, they made them paſs the river, and afterwards broke the bridges. As for themſelves, they remained on this ſide, and drew up in battle on the bank, in order that having a river not fordable behind them, they might have no hopes of ſafety but in victory.

Polybius does not approve the conduct of Flaminius in this laſt point, nor ſuch a diſpoſition of his troops, as left them no room to fall back. For, if the enemy during the battle had made

made an effort, and gained ever ſo little ground of his army, it had been beat down and tumbled into the river. The valour of the Romans happily preſerved them from this danger. A. R. 529. Ant. C. 223.

All the honour of this battle was due to the Tribunes, who inſtructed the army in general, and each ſoldier in particular, how it was neceſſary to behave in it. In former battles they had obſerved, that the ardor and impetuoſity of the Gauls, till they had received ſome check, made them indeed very formidable in the firſt charge: but that their ſwords had no points, that they hurt only with the edges, and that but once at a time: that thoſe edges became blunt, and the blades bent from one end to the other: that if the ſoldiers, after the firſt blow, had not time to ſet them againſt the ground, and to ſtraiten them with their feet, they were of no ſervice. To prevent the Gauls from making uſe of them, the Tribunes conceived a means which perfectly ſucceéded. They made the firſt line take the arms of the * Triarii, that is to ſay, the javelin or half-pike, with orders after they had uſed it, to reſume their ſwords, and to come to cloſe fight; which was happily executed. The Romans therefore began the action by puſhing their pikes vigorouſly at the faces of the Gauls, who to turn aſide their blows, made uſe of their ſabres, by which their edges were ſoon blunted. The Romans then threw down their pikes, and with their ſwords charged the enemy with great fury, and ſo near, that they made them almoſt entirely incapable of uſing their ſabres, which cut only downright; whereas the Roman ſwords, that had ſharp points, wounded by thruſt,

* *The* Triarii *formed the third line.*

and

A. R. 529. Ant. C. 223.

and not by downright blows. Levelling their points therefore at the breaſts and faces of the Gauls, they made an horrible ſlaughter of them at this time. Eight thouſand were left upon the ſpot, and twice as many made priſoners. The ſpoils were immenſe.

Diſcontent of the Romans againſt Flaminius.

We have ſaid, that a courier arrived at the army immediately before the battle, with a letter for the Conſuls. Flaminius did not open it till after the defeat of the enemy. The Senate alarmed by ſeveral prodigies, had conſulted the augurs, and on their anſwer, which was, that there was ſome defect in the creation of the Conſuls, had ſent the letter, of which we are ſpeaking, to order the Conſuls to return immediately to Rome, to abdicate their offices, and expreſsly to prohibit their undertaking any thing againſt the enemy. Upon reading this letter, Furius believed it neceſſary to return directly to Rome; and it is very probable, that he would not have any ſhare in the battle, which has been juſt fought, for there is not any mention of him in it. Flaminius repreſented to his collegue, "That theſe orders were only the effect "of a cabal jealous of their glory. That the "victory they had juſt gained, was a certain "proof, that the gods were not angry with "them, and that there had been no irregularity "in their nomination to the Conſulſhip. That "as for himſelf, he was determined not to re"turn to Rome, till he had put an end to the "war, which he had ſo happily begun; and "not to quit his office before the time. He "added, that he would teach the Romans by "his example, not to ſuffer themſelves to be "groſsly impoſed upon by frivolous ſuperſti-

"tions,

"tions, and the idle imaginations of the au- "gurs." A. R. 529. Ant. C. 223.

As Furius perſiſted in his opinion, the army of Flaminius, which was afraid of not being ſafe in the country, if that of his colleague retired, prevailed with him to continue there for ſome time: but he would form no enterprize, out of reſpect for the orders of the Senate. Flaminius made himſelf maſter of ſome ſtrong places, and of one of the moſt conſiderable cities in the country. The ſpoils were very great; and he gave them all to the ſoldiers, in order to conciliate their favour in the diſpute, which he rightly foreſaw he ſhould have with the Senate.

Accordingly, when he returned to Rome, they did not go out to meet him, as was the cuſtom, and a triumph was at firſt refuſed him. He found them extremely incenſed againſt him, not only becauſe he had not ſet out immediately, when recalled by the Senate, which was a criminal diſobedience; but ſtill more, becauſe knowing the anſwer of the augurs, he had paid no regard to it, and had even ſpoke of it in an impious and irreligious manner. For, ſays Plutarch, the Romans had a great reſpect for religion, making all their affairs depend on the will of the gods alone, and ſeverely condemning, even in thoſe whoſe ſucceſſes had been greateſt, all neglect, all contempt for the divinations authorized by the laws of their country: ſo much were they perſuaded, that what contributed moſt to the ſafety of their Commonwealth, was not, that their Magiſtrates and Generals ſhould conquer their enemies, but that they ſhould always be ſubmiſſive to the gods. What a leſſon is this for us, and how great a reproach, if we were leſs religious than Pagans! Plut. in Marcel. p. 299.

A. R. 529. Ant. C. 223. It was the Senate principally, who had declared againſt Flaminius: but the favour of the People, which he had gained when Tribune, prevailed over all the oppoſition of the Senators. Flaminius obtained the honour of a triumph; and by a neceſſary conſequence it could not be refuſed to his collegue. But immediately after the ceremony they were both obliged to abdicate their office. In all the conduct of this Flaminius, it is eaſy to perceive the temerity, which, ſome few years after, made him loſe the battle of Thraſymenus againſt Hannibal.

Plut. in Marcel. p. 300. Plutarch, on the occaſion of the contempt which Flaminius had expreſſed for the auſpices, relates a very ſingular fact. Two prieſts of the moſt conſiderable houſes in Rome, Cornelius Cethegus and Q. Sulpicius were diveſted of the prieſthood; the firſt for having offered the entrails of the victim contrary to the preſcribed order and ceremonies; and the latter, becauſe during the time he was offering a ſacrifice, the rod, which was on the top of the cap worn by the prieſts, called *Flamines*, fell down. This was carrying ſcruple a great way. But, as exceſſive and ſuperſtitious as it was, it at leaſt ſhews, how far the reverential awe of thoſe charged with the ſacerdotal office ought to go amongſt us.

A. R. 530. Ant. C. 222.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.
CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO CALVUS.

Character of Marcellus. Plut. in Marcel. p. 298. The firſt of the Conſuls is the famous Marcellus, of whom much will be ſaid in the war with Hannibal, and who will be five times Conſul.

Conſul. According to * Plutarch, he was the first of his houſe ſurnamed *Marcellus*, that is to ſay, *Martial*. He ſeemed born for war; robuſt of body, perſonally brave, a man of wit and execution, ardent and daring in battle, but gentle, modeſt, and cool in all other reſpects. He had a great taſte for the Greek literature, (in which the Latines were hitherto but ſmatterers) but that taſte went no farther than to eſteem and admire thoſe who diſtinguiſhed themſelves in it. As to himſelf, engroſſed by war, he had not leiſure to apply to eloquence ſo much as he could have deſired. Whilſt he was very young, he had deſerved the crowns and other rewards, conferred by the Generals upon valour; and his reputation increaſing every day, the People choſe him Curule Ædile, and the Prieſts created him an Augur. He always diſcharged the functions of the offices given him with honour. A. R. 530. Ant. C. 222.

At the time that he was elected Conſul, the Gauls ſent Ambaſſadors to make propoſals of accommodation. The Senate was ſufficiently inclined to peace, but Marcellus animated the People againſt the Gauls, and determined them for the war. The latter, reduced to take arms, made preparations for a laſt effort. They raiſed about thirty thouſand men amongſt the Gæſatæ, whom they kept in readineſs, againſt the enemy's coming. In the ſpring the Conſuls entered the country of the Inſubrians, and having incamped near Acetræ, a city between the Po and the Alps, they beſieged that place. As *New war with the Gauls.* Plut. in Marcel. p. 300.

* *Plutarch is contradicted by Livy in this circumſtance, who* l. viii. n. 18. *mentions one M. Claudius Marcellus, as Conſul.*

A. R. 530. Ant. C. 222.

they had ſeized the advantagious poſts firſt, the Inſubrians could not give it aid. However, to make the enemy raiſe the ſiege, they made part of their army paſs the Po, and beſieged Claſtidium, a ſmall town which the Romans had lately ſubjected. Upon this news Marcellus at the head of the cavalry and part of the infantry, haſtened to the aid of the beſieged. The Gauls, leaving Claſtidium, marched to meet the Romans, and drew up in battle. They already conſidered him as defeated, ſeeing the ſmall number of foot that followed him, and making flight of his horſe. For being very dexterous in battles on horſeback, as the Gauls were in general, and believing they had a great advantage on that ſide, on this occaſion they alſo ſaw themſelves much ſuperior to Marcellus in number.

They therefore marched directly to him with an impetuoſity full of fury, and great menaces, as aſſured of victory. Their King Viridomarus, ſuperbly mounted, was in the front of his battalions and ſquadrons. Marcellus, to prevent them from ſurrounding him in effect of the ſmall number of his troops, extended the wings of his cavalry as far as he could, and made them occupy a great extent of ground, by weakening them in depth, till they preſented a front almoſt equal to that of the enemy.

Spoils called opima *gained by Marcellus.*

When they were upon the point of engaging the Gauls, he made a vow to conſecrate the beſt arms taken from the enemy to Jupiter Feretrius. At that inſtant the King of the Gauls perceiving him, and judging from ſeveral marks, that he was the General of the Romans, he ſpurred his horſe againſt him full ſpeed, calling upon him with a loud voice to defy him to a combat, and

brandiſhing

brandiſhing a long and weighty ſpear. He was a very well made man, ſuperior in ſtature even to the other Gauls, who were generally very large; beſides which he glittered in ſuch a manner, his armour being enriched with gold and ſilver, and adorned with purple and the moſt lively colours, that he ſeemed like lightning breaking from the clouds. A. R. 530. Ant. C. 222.

Marcellus, ſtruck with this ſplendid appearance, caſt his eyes over the enemy's battle, and ſeeing no armour ſo fine as this King's, he did not doubt but thoſe were the arms he had vowed to Jupiter. Spurring againſt him therefore with the utmoſt vigour, he pierced his enemy's cuiraſs with his ſpear. The ſtroke augmented by the ſwiftneſs and impetuoſity of his horſe, was ſo forcible, that it threw the King on his back to the ground. Marcellus turned upon him, and gave him a ſecond and third wound which killed him entirely; and leaping inſtantly from his horſe, he ſtript off his arms, and taking them up lifted them towards heaven as an offering to Jupiter Feretrius, praying that god to grant the like protection to all his troops. The defeat of the king drew on that of his army. The Roman cavalry charged the Gauls with impetuoſity, who at firſt made ſome reſiſtance. But that horſe having afterwards ſurrounded and attacked them in flank and rear, they gave way on all ſides. Part of them were puſhed headlong into the river: but much the greater number were put to the ſword. The Gauls, who were in Acetræ, abandoned the place to the Romans, and retired to Milan, which was the capital of the Inſubrians.

A. R. 530. Ant. C. 223. The Conſul Cornelius followed them cloſe, and beſieged them there. As the garriſon was very numerous,, and made frequent ſallies, the beſiegers had much to ſuffer, and were very rudely handled. Every thing changed aſpect, when Marcellus appeared before the place. The Gæſatæ, who were informed of the defeat of their troops, and their King's death, having determined at all events to return into their own country, Milan was taken, and the Inſubrians ſurrendered all their other cities to the Romans, who granted them peace upon reaſonable conditions; contenting themſelves with depriving them of part of their territory, and exacting certain ſums from them, and to reimburſe the expences of the war.

At length, after ſome few years more than five hundred, we ſee all Italy, from the weſt to the eaſt, that is to ſay, from the Alps to the Ionian ſea, ſubjected to the Romans.

Triumph of Marcellus. The Senate decreed the honour of a triumph only to Marcellus; and his triumph was one of the moſt remarkable Rome had ever ſeen, as well from the great riches and quantity of fine ſpoils, as the multitude, and prodigious ſtature of the captives, and the magnificence of the whole proceſſion. But the moſt new and moſt agreeable object was Marcellus himſelf, carrying the armour of the Barbarian King to Jupiter. For having cauſed the trunk of an oak to be cut, he formed a trophy, by diſpoſing thoſe arms in proper order upon it.

When the whole pomp was ſet out, he got into his chariot drawn by four horſes abreaſt, and taking the trunk of an oak ſo dreſt up, he paſſed through the whole city with this trophy on his

his ſhoulders: it had the form of an armed man, and conſtituted the moſt ſuperb ornament of his triumph. The whole army followed him in magnificent arms, ſinging the ſongs compoſed for this ceremony, and ſongs of victory to the praiſe of Jupiter and their General. A. R. 530. Ant. C. 222.

As ſoon as he came in this order to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, he fixed up and conſecrated this trophy. He was the third and laſt General, who had the glory of obtaining the ſpoils called *ſpolia opima*. We have ſpoke elſewhere of what the Romans underſtood by that term. We ſhall only obſerve here that Romulus was the firſt who obtained the *ſpolia opima*, after having killed Acron King of the Cæninenſes: Cornelius Coſſus the ſecond, who defeated and killed Tolumnius King of the Veientes: and the third Marcellus, after having killed Viridomarus King of the Gauls.

The *Faſti* ſay, that Marcellus triumphed over the Gauls and Germans. This is the firſt time the Germans are mentioned in the Roman Hiſtory. Thoſe whom the Romans call Germans in this place, are undoubtedly the Gæſatæ.

The Romans were ſo much rejoiced on account of this victory, and the concluſion of this war, that they cauſed a gold cup to be made of part of the plunder, which they ſent to Delphi to Apollo Pythicus, as a monument of their gratitude; liberally divided the ſpoils with the cities that had embraced their party; and ſent a great part of them to Hiero king of Syracuſe, their faithful friend and ally. They alſo paid him the value of the corn which he had given the Romans during the war with the Gauls. Diod. Eclog. XXV. 4.

A. R. 531. Ant. C. 221.

P. CORNELIUS.

M. MINUCIUS RUFUS.

The Romans ſubject Iſtria.

The two Conſuls were ſent againſt new enemies, the people of * Iſtria, pirates by profeſſion, who had either taken or plundered ſome Roman merchant-ſhips. They were ſoon obliged to ſubmit.

Hannibal appointed to command in Spain.

Hannibal ſucceeded Aſdrubal this year, and was placed at the head of the armies in Spain.

A. R. 532. Ant. C. 220.

L. VETURIUS.

C. LUTATIUS.

Demetrius of Pharos draws the Roman arms upon himſelf.

Demetrius of Pharos, forgetting the obligations he was under to the Romans, and even going ſo far as to treat them with contempt, becauſe he had ſeen the terror into which the Gauls had thrown them, and beſides foreſaw that they would ſoon have the Carthaginians upon their hands, thought he might ravage the cities of Illyricum, that belonged to the Romans, with impunity. For this purpoſe, he ſailed with fifty ſhips beyond † Liſſus contrary to the faith of treaties, by which he was obliged not to paſs beyond that city with more than two ſhips, and thoſe not armed for war; and he plundered the iſlands Cyclades, and laid them under contribution. He had engaged the newly ſubjected people of Iſtria, and the Atintani, in his party, and flattered himſelf, that he ſhould receive a conſiderable aid from the King of

* *Province of the State of Venice.*

† *This city, now called Aleſo, was the laſt in Illyricum, upon the frontier next Macedonia and Epirus.*

Macedo-

Macedonia, with whom he was united by their common intereſts. War was declared againſt him, and without loſs of time preparations were made for it. The Romans took all poſſible care to preſerve the peace of the provinces ſituated to the Eaſt of Italy; in order not to have ſeveral enemies upon their hands at the ſame time, and to put themſelves into a condition to ſupport the war againſt the Carthaginians with vigour. A. R. 532. Ant. C. 220.

In the mean time the *Cenſus* was compleated for the forty-third time. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and ſeventy thouſand, two hundred and thirteen. L. Æmilius and C. Flaminius were then Cenſors. *Cenſus.*

The multitude of the freedmen diſperſed confuſedly into all the Tribes, had hitherto excited abundance of troubles. The Cenſors, after the example of Fabius Maximus, included them in the four Tribes of the city. *Different actions of the Cenſors.*

Flaminius, in the ſame Cenſorſhip, made a great way or road which led to Ariminum, and built the Circus; both which took their names from him.

M. LIVIUS SALINATOR.
L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219.

The care of the war of Illyricum againſt Demetrius was confided to theſe Conſuls; of which the latter is the father of him who conquered Perſeus King of Macedonia. Upon the news that the Romans were preparing to attack him, he had put himſelf into a condition to give them a warm reception. He threw a ſtrong garriſon into Dimallum, with all the neceſſary munitions. He cauſed the principal citizens, whom *War of Illyricum.* Polyb. iii. 173, 174.

A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219. whom he ſuſpected, to be put to death; gave the government to thoſe whom he believed in his own intereſt; and choſe throughout the whole kingdom, of which he had the adminiſtration, ſix thouſand of the braveſt men to guard Pharos.

Æmilius defeats Demetrius. The Conſul Æmilius arrived in the mean time in Illyricum; and becauſe the enemy relied much upon the ſtrength of Dimallum, which they believed impregnable, and the proviſion they had made for its defence, he reſolved, in order to daunt them, to open the campaign with the ſiege of that place. He animated each of the principal officers in particular, and carried on the works on ſeveral ſides with ſo much diligence, that the place was taken by ſtorm the ſeventh day. This ſufficed to make the arms of the enemy fall out of their hands. They immediately came from all the cities to ſurrender themſelves to the Romans, and to put themſelves under their protection. The Conſul received them all upon ſuch conditions as he thought moſt convenient, and immediately ſet ſail to attack Demetrius himſelf in Pharos.

Having been informed, that the city was ſtrong, the garriſon numerous and compoſed of choſen troops, and that it had proviſions and all other munitions in abundance, he was afraid, that the ſiege ſhould be difficult, and of long duration. To avoid that inconvenience, he had recourſe to a ſtratagem. He landed during the night in the iſland with his whole army; poſted the greateſt part of it in woods and other covered places, and at day-break put to ſea again, and in open view entered the port neareſt the city with twenty veſſels. Demetrius perceived him, and thinking to make nothing of ſo ſmall a force,

a force, marched to the port to oppoſe the de- A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219.
ſcent of the enemy. They were ſcarce come to blows, than the action growing hot, freſh troops came perpetually from the city to the aid of thoſe engaged. At length the whole garriſon was drawn out. The Roman troops, who had landed in the night, having ſet out by ways covered from view, arrived at that moment. Between the city and the port there was a ſteep eminence. This they ſeized and thereby cut off the communication with the city of thoſe who had quitted it to attack the Conſul. Demetrius then thought no longer of preventing the Romans from landing. He drew up his troops, exhorted them to do their duty, and led them on to the eminence, with deſign to fight in line of battle. The Romans, who ſaw that the Illyrians approached with impetuoſity and in good order, advanced againſt them and charged them with aſtoniſhing vigour. Whilſt this paſſed, the Romans who had juſt landed, attacked them in the rear. The Illyrians, ſurrounded on all ſides, were in extreme confuſion and diſorder. At length puſhed in front and rear, they were obliged to fly. Some eſcaped into the city; but the greateſt part of them diſperſed into the iſland by ſecret ways. Demetrius got on board ſhips which he had at anchor in concealed places; and puttting to ſea during the night, arrived happily at the court of Philip King of Macedonia, where he paſſed the reſt of his life. He contributed much by his flattery and perni- Polyb. apud. Valeſ. l. vii.
cious counſels, to pervert and corrupt the diſpoſition of that prince, who in the beginning of his reign had acquired general eſteem; and it was he principally, that to avenge himſelf, induced Philip to declare againſt the Romans, whereby

A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219. whereby he drew a long train of misfortunes upon himſelf. How much care ought young Princes to take in the choice of thoſe, in whom they place their confidence, and with what caution ought they to remove all from about their perſons, in whom they diſcover a diſpoſition to flattery!

Æmilius, after this victory, entered Pharos by ſtorm, and demoliſhed it, after having given the plunder of it to his ſoldiers. All Illyricum received the law from the Romans. The throne was reſerved to the young Pineus, who had no ſhare in the revolt of his guardian. Some new conditions were added to the former treaty concluded with the Queen Teuta, his mother-in-law.

At the end of the ſummer, when every thing had been regulated in Illyricum, the Conſul returned to Rome, which he entered in triumph. All the honours were paid him, and all the applauſes given him, which the addreſs and valour he had ſhewn in the war of Illyricum deſerved.

In this relation we have followed Polybius, who ſpeaks only of Æmilius, Livius his colleague, muſt however have ſhared in the ſucceſs of the war; becauſe it is certain that he triumphed: of which what is now to follow, is an evident proof.

Both of them, after the expiration of their office, were cited before the People, and equally accuſed of having converted part of the ſpoils to their own uſe, and of not having obſerved a juſt and reaſonable equality in the diſtribution they had made of the reſt to the ſoldiers. Æmilius did not get over this trial without difficulty; and all the Tribes, except the

the Mæcian, condemned Livius. This indignity gave him the moſt ſenſible affliction. He quitted Rome, retired into the country, renounced the public affairs and all commerce of the world, till the emergencies of the Commonwealth obliged him to reſume his uſual courſe of life. We ſhall ſee him act in the Cenſorſhip in a very extraordinary manner. A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219. Liv. xxvii. 34. Liv. xxix. 37.

It was in this Conſulſhip, that Archagathus came from Peloponneſus to Rome, where he was the firſt that exerciſed the profeſſion of a Phyſician. He had the freedom of the city conferred upon him, and was honourably entertained snd lodged at the expence of the public. I have ſpoke of him elſewhere. *Ant. Hiſt. Vol. XIII.*

Under the ſame Conſuls colonies were ſent to Placentia and Cremona, which very much exaſperated the Boii and Inſubrians againſt Rome. *New colonies.*

We have ſeen elſewhere how attentive the Romans were not to admit new forms of worſhip, and foreign religions. They were expreſsly prohibited by a law of the twelve tables, unleſs the public authority intervened. Notwithſtanding the vigilance of the magiſtrates, new ceremonies were introduced from time to time in Rome. The Conſul, of whom we have been ſpeaking, found the worſhip of Iſis and Serapis, Egyptian divinities, almoſt univerſally eſtabliſhed amongſt the populace. The Senate decreed, that the chapels, which had been erected to them, ſhould be demoliſhed. No maſon could be found, that would aſſiſt in the execution of this decree, ſuch deep root had ſuperſtition taken in the minds of the people. If we may believe Valerius Maximus, the Conſul Paulus Æmilius was obliged to perform this office himſelf; who laid aſide his Conſular robe, Val. Max.

and

A. R. 533. Ant. C. 219. and demoliſhed thoſe monuments of the Egyptian worſhip with an ax.

Val. Max. v. 6. The ſame author relates another fact, which happened at the ſame time, and appears ſtill more fabulous. Whilſt the Prætor Ælius Pætus Tubero, was diſpenſing juſtice on his tribunal in the Forum, a woodpecker came and perched upon his head, where it continued quietly. The fact ſeemed ſingular. The augurs, who were conſulted immediately, replied, that if the Prætor let the bird live, it would be much for the good of his family, but very bad for the Commonwealth; and that the contrary would happen, if he killed it. He did not heſitate a moment; he tore the woodpecker to pieces, and the event is ſaid to have verified the anſwer. Seventeen of his family periſhed in the battle of Cannæ.

I promiſed to ſpeak of the Tribes of Rome at the end of this book, to which I proceed.

Digreſſion upon the Tribes of Rome.

Vol. I. & IV. IN the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Inſcriptions and Belles Lettres, there are ſeveral learned diſſertations of Mr. Boindin's upon the Roman Tribes, from which I have extracted the greateſt part of what I ſhall ſay in this place, that ſeemed neceſſary for giving the generality of readers a ſufficient idea of this ſubject, which often recurs in the Roman Hiſtory.

A certain number of the people, whom Romulus had diſtributed into three diſtricts or quarters of the city, were at firſt called a *Tribe*, perhaps from that diviſion; though Livy ſays, *l.* vi. *c.* 5. *a Tributo.* Theſe three Tribes were divided

divided according to the difference of the three nations, of which the Roman People were then compoſed: the firſt founders of the colony were called *Ramnenſes* or *Ramnes*; the Sabines, *Titienſes*; and the Tuſcans, *Luceres*.

Servius Tullius having ſuppreſſed the antient Tribes, of which the names were no longer retained, except in the centuries of the cavalry, inſtituted new ones. The Romans were at that time pent up within very narrow bounds, and their frontiers did not extend beyond five or ſix miles, their whole territory conſiſting of the country round Rome, which was afterwards called *Ager Romanus*, bounded on the eaſt by the cities of Tibur, Preneſte, and Alba; on the ſouth by the port of Oſtia, and the ſea; on the weſt by that part of Hetruria, which the Latines called *Septempagium*; and on the north by the cities of Fidenæ, Cruſtumerium, and the river Anio, now called the Teverone.

In this ſmall extent of country, were contained all the Tribes inſtituted by Servius Tullius: that is to ſay, four in the city, and * ſeventeen in the country.

The four of the city were denominated from its four principal quarters, and were called *Suburana*, *Eſquilina*, *Collina*, and *Palatina*. They took place of all the reſt at firſt, not only becauſe they were inſtituted firſt, but becauſe they were then the moſt honourable, though they afterwards fell into contempt. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus relates, that Servius Tullius aſſigned theſe Tribes to the Freedmen. IV. 226.

* *What Livy ſays, ii. 27. that the Tribe inſtituted the 259th year of Rome, was the one and twentieth, leaves room to conclude, that Servius Tullius inſtituted only ſixteen ruſtic Tribes.*

It

It is probable, that Servius Tullius at firſt divided the territory of Rome into ſeventeen parts, of which he formed as many Tribes, that were called Ruſtic Tribes, to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe of the city. All theſe Tribes were called at firſt by the names of the places, where they were ſituated. But moſt of them having afterwards taken the names of Roman families, only five of them retained their antient names, of which in conſequence the exact ſituation may be determined.

The Romans augmented the number of their Tribes from time to time, in proportion as that of their citizens encreaſed, and as they conquered new tracts of country from the different nations of Italy, to which they ſent colonies compoſed of antient citizens, in order to lay the foundations of their empire in them. (*a*) And this was in reality the beſt method for extending their power. For all theſe colonies were ſo many advanced poſts, which ſerved not only to cover their frontiers, and to awe the provinces in which they were ſituated, but to ſpread the ſpirit and taſte of the Roman government in them, by the privileges and immunities they enjoyed. It was not till after the famous ſiege of Veii, and till the Romans had made themſelves maſters of part of Hetruria, that they inſtituted (*b*) the four firſt of the four-

(*a*) Hoc in genere, ſicut in ceteris Reip. partibus, eſt operæ pretium diligentiam majorum recordari, qui colonias ſic idoneis in locis contra ſuſpicionem periculi collocarunt, ut eſſe non oppida Italiæ, ſed propugnacula imperii viderentur. *In Rull.* ii. 73.

(*b*) Tribus quatuor ex novis civibus additæ, Stellatina, Fromentina, Sabatina, & Anienſis. *Liv.* vi. 5.

teen

teen Tribes, which are aſcribed to the Conſular times in the 368th year of Rome. They afterwards added others to them from time to time for the ſame reaſons, till the Tribes Velina and Quirina were inſtituted in the country of the Sabines, which were the laſt of the fourteen inſtituted by the Conſuls. With the four city Tribes, and the ſeventeen Ruſtic of Servius Tullius, they made up the number of thirty-five, of which the Roman People were ever after compoſed.

When all the States of Italy were made free citizens of Rome, eight new ones were created for the multitude of new-comers. But they did not ſubſiſt long, and the Tribes were reduced again to the number of thirty-five.

It only remains for us to ſpeak of the political form of the Tribes, and to ſhew the different uſes made of them under the Kings, and under the Conſuls.

Though the Sabines and Tuſcans, whom Romulus had incorporated with the Romans, formed only one and the ſame people with them, thoſe nations however compoſed three different Tribes, that lived ſeparately, and without mingling with each other, till the time of Servius Tullius. They were equally ſubject to the Prince's authority, but had each a Chief of their own nation, who were a kind of Lieutenants to him, on whom he relied for their behaviour. Theſe chiefs had other officers under them, to whom they confided the care of the *Curiæ*: for each Tribe was divided into ten *Curiæ* or different quarters, each of which had its magiſtrate called *Curio*, who was alſo the miniſter of the ſacrifices, and religious feſtivals

of the Curia. Beſides this, each Tribe had its augur, who had the care of the auſpices.

All the Curiæ had an equal ſhare in the honours civil and military. It was in their general aſſembly, called *Comitia Curiata*, that the moſt important affairs of the public were decided. For though the State was monarchical at that time, neither the power of the Prince was ſo arbitrary, nor the authority of the Senate ſo abſolute, as to exclude the people from a great ſhare in the government. They not only had a right to determine in reſpect to war or peace, but could either receive or reject laws, and had even the liberty to elect all ſuch as were to have any authority under them. For as there were no other *Comitia* at that time but thoſe of the Curiæ, in which all the citizens equally had voices, and the number of the Plebeians in each *Curia* far exceeded that of the Patricians and Knights, the elections almoſt always depended on their ſuffrages.

This induced Servius Tullius to inſtitute the *Comitia Centuriata*, (aſſemblies by centuries) in which the rich and great had all power, as we have ſhewn elſewhere; to ſuppreſs the antient Tribes, which till then had ſhared in the government; and to eſtabliſh new ones, to whom he left no authority; who ſerved only to divide the Roman territory into diſtricts, and to expreſs the place of the city and country, where each citizen inhabited.

As the Ruſtic Tribes were compoſed at that time only of citizens, who lived in the country, and cultivated their own lands; and all who reſided at Rome, were included in thoſe of the city, the latter were at firſt the moſt honourable.

nourable. But, in proceſs of time, the Cenſors having degraded them by including the whole populace and freedmen in them, the Patricians affected to be removed into the ruſtic Tribes, and eſpecially into the laſt and moſt remote, becauſe the firſt inſtituted by Servius Tullius, and which were neareſt Rome, were coveted by new citizens.

From the eſtabliſhment of the new plan laid down by Servius Tullius, the Tribes had no ſhare in the public affairs. The aſſemblies by Curiæ and Centuries divided all authority: and even the aſſemblies by Curiæ were held almoſt ſolely for form's ſake, and on account of the auſpices, which were peculiar to them. The Great were entirely maſters in the aſſemblies by centuries, wherein the Conſuls, and in proceſs of time, all the other principal magiſtrates were elected, and the moſt important affairs of the State tranſacted.

The Roman People, who probably at firſt were amuſed by the grateful thoughts of being eaſed in reſpect to contributions, and ſerving public offices, and had not conſidered the conſequences of the change introduced by Servius Tullius in the State, felt all the effect and weight of it in the ſequel. They perceived with a very ſenſible mortification, that for a trivial advantage, they had ſuffered themſelves to be deprived of all authority in the government, of which the Great had entirely poſſeſſed themſelves, and abuſed ſtrangely, in order to keep them in a kind of ſlaviſh ſubjection. They did not extricate themſelves out of this ſtate till ſixty years after, by the vigour and reſolution of their Tribunes, who made the firſt attempt

Dion.Hal. vii. 463. towards it in the affair of Coriolanus, whom they brought to a trial before the People aſſembled by Tribes: this is the firſt time the *Comitia* by Tribes are mentioned.

The Tribunes did not ſtop there. They had no ſooner aſſumed the right of aſſembling the People with the Senate's permiſſion, than they made uſe of it to render the aſſemblies by Tribes frequent, and ſoon after found means to transfer the election of the Plebeian magiſtrates, which till then had been choſen by the *Curiæ*, to the Tribes: An enterprize, ſays (*a*) Livy, which as it wore no very offenſive outſide at firſt, occaſioned no great apprehenſions; but in the ſequel gave a fatal blow to the authority of the Patricians.

In theſe aſſemblies the magiſtrates of the ſecond claſs, *minores Magiſtratus*, and all thoſe of the People were elected; as the Tribunes of the People, the Plebeian Ædiles, the Queſtors, the Legionary Tribunes, many other officers who
Liv. ix46. had different functions, *Triumviri rerum capitalium*, *Triumviri Monetales*, and others. In the ſame *Comitia* by Tribes, the laws, called *Plebiſcita*, were paſſed, by which at firſt only the People were bound, but which afterwards had the force of laws alſo in reſpect to the Senate, and the latter were even obliged previouſly to give their conſent and approbation to them.
Liv. xxx. 43. It was in the ſame aſſemblies, that the peace with the Carthaginians, and that with Philip King of Macedonia, were included.

(*a*) Haud parva res, ſub titulo prima ſpecie minimè atroci, ferebatur; ſed quæ patriciis omnem poteſtatem per clientium ſuffragia creandi quos vellent Tribunos auferret. *Liv.* ii. 56.

By

By degrees and ſucceſſion of time, the People, whoſe authority had been ſo much weakened in the beginning, got poſſeſſion of all the honours civil, military, and even ſacred. By that means every thing became equal, and the Patricians enjoyed no advantage, that the Plebeians did not ſhare with them.

In ſome aſſemblies only ſeventeen of the Tribes were ſummoned. Theſe were the Comitia, in which the great Pontiff was created. Cic. in Rull. ii. 17, 18.

BOOK THE THIRTEENTH.

THE ROMAN HISTORY Continued.

THIS book contains the beginning of the ſecond Punic war: the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal; his paſſage into Italy over the Alps; the battles of Ticinus, Trebia, and the Lake of Thraſymenus. It includes alſo the firſt advantages of Cn. Scipio in Spain.

SECT. I.

General idea of the ſecond Punic war. Amilcar's hatred of the Romans. Oath which he makes his ſon Hannibal take, whilſt an infant. The like diſpoſition in Aſdrubal, his ſucceſſor. He cauſes Hannibal to come to the army. Character of the latter. Hannibal is charged with the command of the troops. He prepares for the war with the Romans by the conqueſts he makes in Spain. He beſieges Saguntum. Embaſſy of the Romans to Hannibal, and afterwards to Carthage. Alorcus endeavours in vain to perſuade the people of Saguntum to an accommodation.

Taking

Taking and destruction of Saguntum. Trouble and grief, which the ruin of Saguntum occasions at Rome. War resolved there against the Carthaginians. Partition of the provinces between the Consuls. The Roman Ambassadors declare war against the Carthaginians. Frivolous reasons of the Carthaginians to justify the siege of Saguntum. True cause of the second Punic war. Roman Ambassadors go to Spain, and afterwards to Gaul. Hannibal prepares for his march to Italy. Review of the Carthaginian forces. Hannibal's journey to Gades. He provides for the safety of Africa, and for that of Spain, where he leaves his brother Asdrubal.

General idea of the second Punic war. Liv. xxi. 1.

IN beginning to relate the war which the Romans sustained against the Carthaginians under Hannibal, I may justly declare, that it is one of the most memorable wars come down to us in history, as well as one the most worthy of a curious reader's attention, whether we consider it in respect to the boldness of enterprizes, and the wisdom of the measures put in execution; the obstinacy of the two rival peoples efforts; the promptitude of resources in their greatest misfortunes; the variety of unexpected events; the uncertainty of the final issue; and lastly, the uniting of the finest models of every kind of merit with the most instructive lessons history can supply, as well in respect to war as polity, and the art of governing. Never did states or nations more powerful, or at least more warlike, take arms against each other; and never had those in question appeared in a higher degree of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were undoubtedly at that time the two principal States of the world. Having already

tried their ſtrength and military abilities in the firſt Punic war, they perfectly knew each other: and in this ſecond war, the fortune of arms was balanced in ſuch a manner, and the ſucceſſes ſo compounded with viciſſitudes and variety, that the ſide which triumphed, was that which found itſelf neareſt to the danger of being deſtroyed. How great ſoever the forces of the two people were, their mutual hatred may almoſt be ſaid to be ſtill greater; the Romans, on one ſide, being enraged to ſee a vanquiſhed enemy the firſt to reſume the arms, which had ſucceeded ſo ill before, againſt their conquerors; and the Carthaginians, on the other, pretending to have been treated by the Romans after their defeat with inſupportable inhumanity and avarice.

Amilcar's hatred of the Romans.

Hannibal brought to this war an hatred for the Romans of an older date, and which he had inherited from his father. He was the ſon of Amilcar * Barcas, who having been overcome by thoſe formidable enemies, had himſelf ſigned the ſhameful but neceſſary treaty, which had put an end to the firſt Punic war. But in ceaſing to make war with them, he had not ceaſed to hate them. (*a*) His lofty ſpirit could not brook the loſs of Sicily and Sardinia. He was particularly enraged at the manner, in which thoſe equally unjuſt and rapacious conquerors had poſſeſſed themſelves of the laſt of

* *From which name the party, that favoured the intereſts of Amilcar and his family at Carthage, was called the* Barcinian faction.

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the two iſlands, by taking an advantage, during peace, of the bad ſtate of the affairs of the Carthaginians in Africa, to force them to abandon it; and not only that, but to have the cruelty to impoſe a new tribute upon them at the ſame time.

He was always, from the peace of the iſlands Ægates till his death, at the head of the Carthaginian armies. But whilſt he made war either in Africa againſt the rebellious mercenaries, or in Spain againſt the different ſtates which he ſubjected, it was apparent from his conduct, that he meditated greater and bolder deſigns than thoſe he was actually executing.

Oath which he makes his ſon Hannibal take whilſt an infant. Polyb. iii.

It is ſaid, that whilſt Amilcar was ſacrificing one day, to render the gods propitious in the war he was going to make in Spain, after having happily terminated that of Africa, his ſon Hannibal took him round the neck, and conjured him to take him along with him to the army, employing for that purpoſe all the careſſes uſual at his age, a language of great power over the mind of a father, who tenderly loved his ſon. The ſame authors add, that the General, charmed with ſo noble a diſpoſition in a child of nine years old, took him up in his arms, and placing him near the altar, made him ſwear with his hand upon the head of the victim, that he would declare himſelf the enemy of the Romans, as ſoon as he ſhould be of age to bear arms. The ſequel will ſhew, that he kept this oath moſt punctually.

If Amilcar had lived much longer, it is certain, that he would have carried the war into Italy himſelf, as Hannibal did afterwards. It was only deferred by the too early death of that General, and the too great youth of his ſon.

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During

The like hatred in Aſdrubal who ſucceeds him. Polyb. ii. 123.

During this interval, Aſdrubal, to whom Amilcar had married his daughter, ſupported by the immenſe credit which the Barcinian faction had both amongſt the people and in the army, made himſelf maſter of the government, notwithſtanding the endeavours uſed by the Great to prevent it. He was better qualified to negotiate than make war, and was no leſs uſeful to his country from the alliances which he had the dexterity to concert with ſtrangers, by the means of gaining their chiefs, than if he had obtained many victories in the field. Aſdrubal made a treaty with the Romans: for we are obliged to repeat in this place ſome facts, for the greater convenience of the reader. By this treaty it was agreed, without any explanations concerning the reſt of Spain, that the Carthaginians ſhould not carry the war beyond the river Iberus. There was alſo an article in it, by which the people of Saguntum were excepted, as allies of the Romans, from the number of thoſe States, the Carthaginians were allowed to attack.

He cauſes Hannibal to come to the army. Liv. xxi. 3.

The proſperity which Aſdrubal enjoyed, had not made him forget the obligations he was under to his father-in-law. He wrote to Carthage, whither Hannibal had returned after Amilcar's death, to demand, that he ſhould be ſent to the army. Hannibal was then about * three and twenty. The affair met with ſome difficulty. The Senate was divided into two powerful

* *Livy is miſtaken here in making Hannibal but fourteen years old:* vixdum puberem. *He was nine, when he was carried to Spain, where Amilcar his father paſſed nine years. To theſe eighteen muſt be added the firſt five of Aſdrubal's command, which make twenty-three years.*

factions,

factions, that followed quite oppoſite views in the conduct of the public affairs. The one had Hanno at its head, to whom his birth, merit, and zeal for the good of the State, gave great authority in the public councils; and this party was upon all occaſions for preferring a ſafe peace, that might preſerve all the conqueſts in Spain, to the uncertain events of an hazardous war, which, they foreſaw, would one day terminate in the ruin of their country. The other faction, which was called the *Barcinian* faction, from ſupporting the intereſt of Amilcar, ſurnamed *Barcas*, and thoſe of his family, openly declared for the war. When the Senate therefore was to deliberate upon Aſdrubal's demand in reſpect to young Hannibal, the Barcinian faction, who deſired to ſee him fill the place of Amilcar his father, ſupported the deſign of Aſdrubal with their whole credit. On the other ſide Hanno, chief of the oppoſite faction, uſed his utmoſt endeavours to keep him at Carthage. *Aſdrubal's demand*, ſaid he on this occaſion, *ſeems juſt; however I am not of opinion that we ſhould grant it.* So odd a beginning having rouzed the attention of the whole aſſembly; *Aſdrubal*, continued he, *believing himſelf indebted for his whole fortune to Amilcar, ſeems to have reaſon to be ſolicitous for the riſe of his ſon, in order to teſtify his gratitude: but it would be inconſiſtent for us, to prefer private views to the intereſts of the public. Are we afraid, that a ſon of Amilcar ſhould not imitate his father's tyrannical ambition ſoon enough? Are we afraid, that we ſhall be the ſlaves of the ſon too late, who have ſeen the ſon-in-law, after the father's death, uſurp the command of our armies as an hereditary office, that belonged to him in right of ſucceſſion? My advice is to keep this young*

young man in the city, in order that he may have time to learn the ſubmiſſion and obedience, which he owes to the laws and the magiſtrates; leſt this ſmall ſpark ſhould one day light up ſome great conflagration. The wiſeſt and beſt of the Senate were of Hanno's opinion; but the greater number, as is uſual, carried the point againſt the more ſalutary reſolution.

Character of Hannibal. Liv. xxi. 4.

Hannibal in conſequence was ſent to Spain: and on this occaſion (*a*) Livy draws his picture in the following colours. As ſoon as he appeared in the army, he drew upon him the eyes and

(*a*) Miſſus Annibal in Hiſpaniam, primo ſtatim adventu omnem exercitum in ſe convertit. Amilcarem ventem redditum ſibi veteres milites credere: eundem vigorem in vultu, vimque in oculis, habitum oris, lineamentaque intueri. Deinde brevi effecit, ut pater in ſe minimum momentum ad favorem conciliandum eſſet. Nunquam ingenium idem ad res diverſiſſimas, parendum atque imperandum, habilius fuit. Itaque haud facilè diſcerneres, utrum imperatori an exercitui carior eſſet. Neque Aſdrubal alium quemquam præficere malle, ubi quid ſtrenuè ac fortiter agendum eſſet: neque milites alio duce plus confidere, aut audere. Plurimum audaciæ ad pericula capeſſenda, plurimum conſilii inter ipſa pericula erat. Nullo labore aut corpus fatigari, aut animus vinci, poterat. Caloris ac frigoris patientia par: cibi potionisque, deſiderio naturali, non voluptate, modus finitus: vigiliarum ſomnique, nec die nec nocte diſcriminata tempora; id quod gerendis rebus ſupereſſet, quieti datum. Ea neque molli ſtrato, neque ſilentio arceſſita: multi ſæpe militari ſagulo opertum humi jacentem inter cuſtodias ſtationeſque militum conſpexerunt, Veſtitus nihil inter æquales excellens: arma atque equi conſpiciebantur. Equitum peditumque idem longè primus erat. Princeps in prælium ibat: ultimus conferto prælio excedebat. Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia æquabant: inhumana crudelitas, perfidia pluſquàm Punica; nihil veri, nihil ſancti, nullus deûm metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla religio. Cum hac indole virtutum atque vitiorum, triennio ſub Aſdrubale imperatore meruit: nullâ re, quæ agenda videndaque magno futuro duci eſſet, prætermiſsâ. *Liv.* xxi. 4.

favour

favour of the troops. The old ſoldiers in particular believed they ſaw their old General Amilcar revive in him. They obſerved the ſame lineaments, the ſame martial vigour, the ſame vivacity in his looks. But this reſemblance of his father ſoon became the leaſt attraction that gained him their hearts. And indeed never was there a genius more happily formed than his for two things, as contrary as they ſeem; *to obey, and to command.* In conſequence it had been difficult to determine, which loved him moſt, the General or the ſoldiers. If any enterprize was to be executed, that required vigour and valour, Aſdrubal made choice of him for it in preference to all others; and the troops were never more confident of ſucceſs, than when he was at their head. None had more bravery than him, when it was neceſſary to expoſe himſelf to danger; nor any one more preſence of mind in the midſt of it. No fatigue could either weary his body, or depreſs his courage. He bore cold and heat with equal indifference. Pleaſure had no ſhare in his meals; pure neceſſity and the wants of nature, were his rules in eating and drinking. He knew no diſtinction of night and day for his hours of labour or reſt: what remained of time after his affairs were finiſhed, he gave to repoſe. And he ſought neither a ſoft bed, nor ſilence, to invite ſleep. He was often ſeen in a ſoldier's caſſock lying upon the ground amongſt the ſentinels, and at the places where guards were poſted. He did not diſtinguiſh himſelf from others by the magnificence of his dreſs, but by the goodneſs of his horſes and arms. He was at the ſame time the beſt foot-ſoldier and horſeman in the army. He always advanced firſt to battle, and returned laſt

laſt from it. Theſe great qualities were however united with as great vices: inhuman cruelty, more than Carthaginian perfidy; no reſpect for truth; none for what is moſt ſacred amongſt men; no fear of the gods, no regard for the ſanctity of oaths, no ſenſe of religion. With this mixture of great virtues and great vices, he ſerved three years under Aſdrubal: during which he applied himſelf with infinite attention both to ſee and do every thing, that could form a great Captain. We ſhall examine in the ſequel, whether all the vicious ſtrokes, with which Livy has compounded his picture of Hannibal, really ſuited him.

Hannibal is charged with the command of the army. Polyb. iii. 168. Liv. xxi. 3. App. de Bell. An. P. 514.

After the death of Aſdrubal, the ſoldiers immediately carried Hannibal into the General's tent, and elected him unanimouſly, young as he was, to command them: he might then be about ſix and twenty; and the People, at Carthage, made no difficulty of approving their choice. Hannibal perceived aright, that the faction oppoſite to him, which was in great credit at Carthage, would ſooner or later bring it about to ſupplant him, if he did not make them incapable of hurting him. He therefore judged, that the moſt certain means to ſupport himſelf, was to engage the Republic in an important war, wherein ſhe would have occaſion for his ſervice, and he become neceſſary to the State. This is the uſual policy of the Ambitious; who, little affected with the publick intereſts, regard only their own advancement; and Princes, as well as States, are often blind enough not to diſcover the ſecret ſprings, which actuate their Miniſters and Generals, and to take that for zeal, which is only the effect either of vile ſelf-intereſt, or frantic ambition.

From

From the moment he had been nominated General, as if he had already received orders to carry the war into Italy, he ſecretly turned all his views that way, and did not loſe time, that he might not be prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. He took many towns of ſtrength in Spain, and ſubjected ſeveral States; and on an important occaſion, though the army of the enemy, conſiſting of more than an hundred thouſand men, was much ſuperior to his own in number, he knew ſo well how to chuſe his time and poſts, that he entirely defeated it. After this victory, nothing oppoſed him. However, he did not meddle yet with Saguntum; carefully avoiding to give the Romans any occaſion for declaring war againſt him, before he had taken all the meaſures he judged neceſſary for the ſucceſs of ſo great a deſign; and therein he followed the advice given him by his father. He applied himſelf particularly to conciliate the affection of his citizens and allies, and to acquire their confidence, by giving them a liberal ſhare of the plunder which he took from the enemy, and paying them exactly all the arrears that were due to them: a wiſe precaution, which never fails of producing its effect in time.

He prepares for the war with the Romans by the conqueſts which he makes in Spain. Polyb. iii. 168, 169.

Hannibal fearing to take upon him an enterprize ſo hazardous in itſelf, as that of beſieging Saguntum, prepared people for it at a diſtance. He cauſed many complaints to be made at Carthage againſt the inhabitants by his creatures and emiſſaries. He wrote ſeveral times himſelf to the Senate; that the Romans were labouring underhand to debauch their allies from them, and to make Spain take arms againſt them. He carried

Appian. 315.

ried on his intrigue with ſo much addreſs, that full powers were given him to act in reſpect to Saguntum whatever he ſhould judge moſt advantagious for the State. In this manner wars have their riſe! For the reſt, we ſee in this inſtance, that Hannibal was no leſs an able politician than an artful Captain.

The people of Saguntum, on their ſide, rightly perceiving the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progreſs made by Hannibal in his conqueſts. This paſſed in the beginning of the Conſulſhip of Livius and Æmilius, of whom we have ſpoke in the preceding book, or at the end of the preceding year. The Romans appointed Deputies to go and inform themſelves on the ſpot in the preſent ſtate of affairs, with orders to lay their complaints before Hannibal, in caſe they ſhould think it expedient; and if he ſhould not give them ſatisfaction, to go to Carthage for the ſame purpoſe.

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. *Siege of Saguntum by Hannibal.* Polyb. iii. 170—173. Liv. xxi. 6—15.

Saguntum was ſituated on the ſide of the Iberus next Carthagena, about a thouſand paces from the ſea, in the country where the Carthaginians were permitted to carry their arms. But the inhabitants having put themſelves under the protection of the Romans ſome years before, were excepted not only by the treaty with Aſdrubal, in which there was an expreſs article to that effect, but even by that of Lutatius, whereby the two people engaged not to attack the allies of each other. For the reſt, an happy ſituation, which procured them all the advantages of ſea and land, a conſiderable multitude of inhabitants, exact diſcipline in the government of their

their little ſtate, joined with principles of honour and probity, of which they gave ſhining proofs in their attachment and fidelity to the Romans; all this in a ſhort time had acquired them immenſe riches, and enabled them to make head againſt all the neighbouring people. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal perceived of what importance it was to make himſelf maſter of this place. He conceived, that he ſhould thereby deprive the Romans of all hopes of making war in Spain: that this new conqueſt would ſecure all thoſe he had made already: that by leaving no enemy behind him, his march would be the more quiet and ſafe: that he ſhould acquire money for the execution of his deſigns: that the plunder which his ſoldiers ſhould take in it, would render them more ardent to follow him: and laſtly, that the ſpoils which he ſhould ſend to Carthage, would conciliate the people, and diſpoſe them to favour him in the great enterprize which he meditated.

He had long been contriving a pretext, by propagating quarrels and ſowing matters of diviſion between the Saguntini and the Turdetani their neighbours. At length he openly eſpouſed the latter; and under pretence of doing them juſtice, entered the territory of Saguntum, and ravaged the whole country, whilſt the Romans were loſing time in deliberating and appointing embaſſies. Having divided his army into three bodies, he attacked the city in as many places at once. One angle of the wall ran into a valley of greater extent, and more level than the reſt of the ground round the place. It was here he made his galleries approach, in order to be in a condition to bring his battering rams to work under cover. They advanced at firſt with ſuf-

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

ficient facility: but in proportion as they approached the wall, they found the difficulties increaſe upon them. Beſides, being a direct mark for the darts, which they poured upon them from a very high tower, this ſide of the wall being more expoſed than the reſt, was better fortified; and a great number of choſen troops defended the part of the city, where the enemy made moſt efforts to take it, with the utmoſt vigour and valour. The Saguntines at firſt kept a continual diſcharge of darts and arrows upon Hannibal's workmen, who never ſhewed themſelves uncovered with impunity: and ſoon after, not contenting themſelves with fighting from the tops of their walls and tower, they were ſo bold as to make ſallies upon them, in order to deſtroy their works; and in all theſe actions, the loſs of the Carthaginians was as great as that of the Saguntines. But when Hannibal himſelf, in approaching the wall with little precaution, had been dangerouſly wounded with a javelin in the thigh, his troops were ſo much terrified with the danger he had ran, that they were very near abandoning their works entirely.

The attacks were ſuſpended for ſome days, till Hannibal was cured of his wound: but all that time was employed in working upon new batteries. For which reaſon he was no ſooner in a condition to act, than the city was attacked again with more vigour than before, and on different ſides at the ſame time. The mantles were puſhed farther on, and the ram prepared to batter. Hannibal, whoſe army was believed to amount to an hundred and fifty thouſand men, had ſufficient numbers for every occaſion. But the beſieged found it very difficult to reſiſt ſo many

many troops, and repulſe ſuch repeated aſſaults, which left them no time to breathe. The ram had already made ſeveral openings in the wall, through which the city was uncovered. Three towers fell down afterwards with all their walls. So conſiderable a breach made the Carthaginians imagine they were upon the point of taking Saguntum. The wall was no ſooner fallen, than both ſides ran with equal ardor, the one to force, and the other to defend, the city. This action had not the aſpect of thoſe tumultuous battles, that are fought during ſieges, on the occaſion of an aſſault or a ſally. It was a battle in form, ſuſtained by two armies, drawn up as in the open field, between the ruins of the walls and the narrow ſpace between them and the houſes of the city. On one ſide hope, on the other deſpair, animated the combatants: the Carthaginians aſſuring themſelves, that with ſome few efforts they ſhould carry the place; and the Saguntines oppoſing their bodies to the beſiegers in the room of their ruined fortifications. None gave ground, for fear of ſeeing the poſt they abandoned occupied by the enemy. In conſequence as they fought with abundance of ardor and animoſity, and were confined within a very narrow compaſs, all blows took place. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

The Saguntines made uſe of a kind of javelin, which they diſcharged with the hand, and called *Falarica*. The wooden part towards the handle was round every where, except towards the end tipt with iron, which was ſquare. Round this part they wrapt hemp dipt in pitch, and ſet it on fire. The iron was three feet long, and capable of penetrating both the arms and bodies of thoſe at whom it was thrown. But, if it continued fixed in the ſhield only, without pier-

A.R. 534. Ant.C. 218.

cing the body, it however occaſioned great terror and perplexity. For, as it was diſcharged flaming, and the motion made it burn the fiercer, the ſoldier whom it hit, let fall his arms, and remained expoſed without defence to the following diſcharges.

The victory was a long time in ſuſpence between the two parties. But a reſiſtance beyond hope having augmented the courage and force of the Saguntines, and the Carthaginians conſidering themſelves as defeated, for the ſole reaſon that they were not victorious, the former on a ſudden raiſed great cries, and repulſed the beſiegers into the breaches: then ſeeing them wavering and uncertain, they drove them even from thence, and at length obliged them to fly outright into their camp.

Roman Ambaſſadors to Hannibal, and afterwards to Carthage.

At this inſtant Hannibal was informed, that the Roman Ambaſſadors were juſt upon the point of arriving in his army. As he was reſolved not to comply with their demands, he choſe not to hear them. He ſent perſons to meet them at the ſea-ſide, and to tell them, that it was not ſafe for them to come to him in the midſt of an army compoſed of ſo many barbarous nations with arms in their hands; and that as for himſelf, the important enterprize he was employed in, did not leave him time to give audience to Ambaſſadors. He rightly judged, that upon his refuſal to hear them, they would not fail to go directly to Carthage. For which reaſon he wrote inſtantly to the heads of the Barcinian faction to keep upon their guard, and to uſe their utmoſt endeavours to fruſtrate thoſe made by the oppoſite party in favour of the Romans.

Theſe

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Theſe Ambaſſadors ſucceeded no better at Carthage than they had at Saguntum. All the difference was, that the Senate was very willing to give them audience. None but Hanno took upon them the defence of the treaty. He was heard without interruption; but the ſilence afforded to his diſcourſe, was rather an effect of the authority, which his rank gave him in the aſſembly, than a ſign of its conſent and approbation. *This is not the firſt time*, ſaid he, *that I have apprized you of what you had to fear from the family of Amilcar; and that I have conjured you by the gods, who are arbiters and witneſſes of treaties, not to confide the command of your troops to any of that odious race. The manes of Amilcar cannot remain in quiet; and whilſt a ſingle perſon of the blood and name of Barcas continues at Carthage, you muſt not depend upon the obſervance of treaties and alliances. Notwithſtanding my advice, you have ſent to your army an ambitious boy, who, burning with deſire to reign, ſees no other means for attaining his ends, than to live ſurrounded with troops, and to excite new wars continually. Herein you have lighted the fire, that conſumes you, inſtead of putting it out. Your troops are now beſieging Saguntum, contrary to the faith of a recent treaty: but the Roman armies will ſoon beſiege Carthage under the guidance of the ſame gods, who avenged the infraction of antient treaties in the firſt war. What can be the motive for your confidence? Do you not know the enemy? Do you not know yourſelves; or are you ignorant of the fortune of the two nations? The Romans, before they declare themſelves, ſend you Ambaſſadors, like allies, and for allies; and your important General does not vouchſafe to admit them into his camp, and contrary to the law of nations, refuſes them an audi-*

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ence, that ought to be granted even to enemies at war. Treated in this manner, they come hither to make their complaints to you, and to demand ſatisfaction. They are willing to ſuppoſe, that the public council of Carthage has no ſhare in the inſult; and in that caſe they demand, that Hannibal be delivered up to them, as the only perſon culpable. But the more patience and moderation they ſhow at firſt, the more inexorable I am afraid they will be, when they have once taken arms to avenge themſelves. Remember mount Eryx; remember the Ægates. Set before your eyes the calamities you have ſuffered, and the loſſes you have ſuſtained by ſea and land during twenty-four years. And you had not at your head a raſh young man, like Hannibal, but his father, Amilcar himſelf, that other Mars, as his partizans call him. How then came you to be overcome? It was becauſe the gods thought fit to avenge the injury the Romans had received from us in Italy, when contrary to the faith of treaties we aided Tarentum; as they will avenge that which we have now committed in Spain by beſieging Saguntum. (a) Yes, it was the gods that puniſhed you, and, though words might have made it doubtful in the beginning, which ſide had broke the treaty, it was their will, that the event, like an equitable judge, ſhould decide the queſtion, in giving the victory to thoſe, who had juſtice on their ſide. It is againſt the walls of Carthage, that Hannibal is now advancing his mantles and towers: It is the walls of Carthage that he is now battering with his rams. I wiſh my prediction may prove falſe: but I foreſee, that the ruins of Saguntum

(a) Vicerunt ergo dii hominesque: & id de quo verbis ambigebatur, uter populus fœdus rupiſſet, eventus belli, velut æquus judex, unde jus ſtabat, & victoriam dedit.

will

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will fall heavy upon our heads, and that we ſhall be reduced to ſuſtain againſt the Romans the war, which we have undertaken againſt the people of that city. You are then, ſays ſomebody, for having Hannibal delivered up to the Romans. I well know, that the enmity which always ſubſiſted between his father and me, may render me ſuſpected of partiality, and deprive my opinion of part of the weight it ought to have with the Senate. But I will not pretend, that I was not glad of Amilcar's death; becauſe had he lived, we ſhould already have been at blows with the Romans. As to his ſon, I hate and deteſt him, as the fury, the firebrand of this war: and I am not only of opinion for delivering him up to the Romans, as they demand, to expiate the infraction of the treaty; but though they ſhould not have required it, I ſhould adviſe you to baniſh him to the utmoſt extremities of the earth and ſea; to ſuch a diſtance, that his name might never more be heard amongſt us, nor his preſence diſturb the tranquillity of our Republic. My advice therefore is, that you decree three embaſſies. The firſt to go immediately to Rome to make ſatisfaction. The ſecond, to declare in your name to Hannibal, that he muſt withdraw his troops from before Saguntum, and to deliver himſelf into the hands of the Romans. You will direct the third to reimburſe the Saguntines for the loſſes they have ſuſtained during the ſiege of their city.

Almoſt all the Senators were ſo much in Hannibal's intereſt, that there was no occaſion for any long ſpeeches in anſwer to Hanno. Far from approving his advice, they reproached him with having ſpoken againſt Amilcar's ſon with more violence and animoſity than Valerius himſelf, the principal of the Roman Ambaſſadors.

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. Accordingly, all the anſwer they gave him was, that it was not Hannibal, but the people of Saguntum, who had given occaſion for the war; and that the Romans would be much in the wrong to prefer the Saguntines to the Carthaginians, their antient allies.

Whilſt the Romans loſt time in ſending Ambaſſadors, Hannibal puſhed the ſiege of Saguntum with vigour. As he ſaw, that his ſoldiers were fatigued by working and fighting without any relaxation, he gave them ſome days reſt, having however taken the precaution to poſt ſome troops for the preſervation of his mantles and other works. During this time he animated them by repreſenting the inſupportable pride of the enemy, and promiſing them great rewards. But when he had publickly declared, that he would give them all the plunder in the city after they had taken it, the hopes of it inflamed their courage to ſuch a degree, that if the ſignal had been immediately given, nothing ſeemed capable of reſiſting them. The Saguntines, on the contrary, did not employ the time that the Carthaginians ſuſpended their attacks in idleneſs. But, without making any ſallies, they paſſed day and night in building a new wall where the old one had been thrown down, and the city was expoſed.

The enemies ſoon returned to the charge, and attacked the city with more vigour than ever; ſo that the beſieged, confounded by the cries, which reſounded on all ſides, knew not which way to turn to defend it. Hannibal in perſon encouraged his troops both with words and actions, at the place where he cauſed a moving tower higher than the fortifications of the place to be brought forwards. And by the means of the

the baliſtas and catapultas, which he had diſ- A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.
poſed in the ſtories of that tower, having either killed or driven away all that defended the wall with diſcharges of ſtones and darts, he believed the time was come for carrying the place. For this reaſon he ſent five hundred Africans with tools for ſapping the wall at the bottom. They found no great difficulty to ſucceed; for the ſtones were not faſtened together with lime and cement, but only plaiſtered over with a mortar of earth, according to the antient cuſtom. Every ſtroke of the pickax made a much larger breach than the place where it was ſtruck into, and whole companies entered the city through theſe openings.

It was on this occaſion they ſeized an eminence, whither they cauſed their machines to be carried; this place they ſurrounded with a wall, in order to have a kind of fort in the city, that might command it even within itſelf. The Saguntines, on their ſide, built a new wall in the part within the city, not yet taken by the enemy. Both ſides applied to fortifying themſelves with a kind of emulation, and were often obliged to come to blows whilſt ſo employed. But the beſieged, by loſing ground, and intrenching ſtill behind what they loſt, ſaw their city diminiſh every day. They even began to want proviſions, the length of the ſiege having exhauſted their ſtores; and they could rely upon no relief from without; the Romans, their ſole hope, being too remote, and the whole country round about in the poſſeſſion of the enemy.

Reduced to this extremity, Hannibal gave them a little time to breathe, being obliged to march againſt the Carpetani and Oretani, who had lately taken up arms again. Thoſe two people

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. people, exaſperated by the rigour with which levies were made in their country, had roſe, and even ſeized Hannibal's officers. But ſurprized at that General's diligence, they immediately returned to their duty.

The vigour of the beſiegers did not relax during this expedition. Maharbal the ſon of Imilco, whom Hannibal had left to command in his abſence, worked with ſo much ardor, that hardly either ſide perceived his abſence. That officer had the advantage in all the actions that paſſed againſt the Saguntines, and battered their walls with three rams at once with ſo much fury, that Hannibal at his return had the pleaſure to ſee them entirely demoliſhed. He therefore made his army advance againſt the citadel itſelf. The beſieged defended it with great valour; but could not prevent the enemy from taking great part of it.

Alorcus endeavours ineffectually to induce the Saguntines to an accommodation.

Saguntum was in this condition, when Alcon, of that city, and a Spaniard named Alorcus, took upon them to attempt ſome means for an accommodation. The firſt, without conſulting his countrymen, went in the night into the camp of the beſiegers, not deſpairing of being able to move Hannibal with his prayers and tears. But when he found the incenſed victor deaf to every thing, and that he propoſed none but extremely hard conditions, he became a deſerter from a negociator, which he had pretended himſelf, and remained in the camp of the Carthaginians; proteſting, that it would coſt any perſon whatſoever their life, who ſhould dare to propoſe ſuch an accommodation to the Saguntines. Now Hannibal inſiſted, that they ſhould make the Turdetani ſatisfaction in reſpect to all their grievances; that they ſhould deliver up all their gold and

and ſilver to him; and that they ſhould quit the place without arms, and go and ſettle in whatever country he ſhould aſſign them. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Theſe were the conditions, to which Alcon affirmed the Saguntines would never ſubmit. However Alorcus, who ſerved at that time in Hannibal's army, but was the gueſt and friend of the Saguntines, was not of his opinion. Convinced on the contrary, that when people have loſt all, they alſo loſe courage, he took the negotiation upon himſelf. Going over therefore to the beſieged, he delivered his arms to the ſentinels, and demanded to be carried to the Prætor of Saguntum. He was followed to him by a crowd of all kinds of people, who were made to remove in order to his having audience in the Senate; where he ſpoke in the following terms.

If Alcon your fellow-citizen, after having taken upon himſelf to demand conditions of peace of Hannibal, had not wanted courage to bring back ſuch as he dictated, my undertaking this application to you had been uſeleſs, which I now make neither as a deſerter, nor as a deputy from Hannibal. But as he has remained amongſt the enemy, either thro' his fault, if he has falſely pretended to fear you; or yours, if you cannot be told the truth without danger: I thought it fit as your antient friend and gueſt to come hither, in order that you might not be ignorant of the means, which ſtill remain for obtaining peace, and preſerving yourſelves. And what ought to make you conclude, that I act in this manner only out of conſideration for you, is my not having made any propoſal to you, as long as you were in a condition to defend yourſelves, or had any hopes of aid from the Romans. Now you no longer expect any aſſiſtance from them, and neither your

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

your walls nor your arms can defend, or afford, you ſecurity, I come to offer you a peace, more your neceſſity than in your favour, and which cannot take place, if you do not hear the conditions as a conquered people, which Hannibal propoſes as victor; and if you do not conſider all left you as gain, rather than all taken from you as loſs; becauſe, ſtrictly ſpeaking, all belongs to the conqueror. He inſiſts, that you abandon a city, which is half in ruins, and of which he is almoſt entirely maſter: but he reſtores you your lands, and leaves you at liberty to build another wherever you ſhall think fit. He orders you to bring to him all your gold and ſilver, either belonging to the publick or particulars: but he gives life and liberty to yourſelves, your wives and children, provided you quit Saguntum without arms. Theſe are the laws a victorious enemy dictates, and which the condition you are in reduce you to accept, as hard as they are. If you abandon yourſelves without reſerve to his clemency, I do not deſpair of his mitigating the rigour of theſe conditions, and remitting a part of them. But, ſhould he inſiſt upon them all without exception, would it not be better for you to ſubmit to them, than to ſuffer your own throats to be cut, and to expoſe your wives and children to all the indignities unavoidable in a place taken by ſtorm?

Taking and deſtruction of Saguntum.

When Alorcus had done ſpeaking, the principal Senators retired from the people, who had ran in crouds to hear him; and without giving him any anſwer, they cauſed all the money in the public treaſury and their own houſes to be thrown into a fire, which they had ordered to be kindled in the Forum, and moſt of them flung themſelves alſo into the midſt of the flames.

So

So deſperate a reſolution had already ſpread conſternation throughout the whole city, when a great noiſe was heard on the ſide of the citadel, which cauſed no leſs terror. It was occaſioned by the fall of a tower, that the enemy had battered a great while. A Carthaginian cohort having immediately entered through the opening made by the fall of that tower, ſent to acquaint Hannibal, that the city had no defence left on that ſide. The General, without loſing a moment's time, attacked it with all his forces, and ordered his ſoldiers to kill all that were of age to bear arms. This order was cruel: but the event ſhewed it was neceſſary. For what had it ſignified to ſpare a frantic and furious people, who ſhut themſelves up in their houſes, and either burnt themſelves there with their wives and children, or deſperately defended themſelves ſword in hand, to the laſt moment of their lives. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

In this manner, after eight months care and fatigue, Hannibal took the city by ſtorm. Tho' the inhabitants had purpoſely ſpoiled and deſtroyed all that they had of fine and magnificent, and the incenſed victor had put the conquered to the ſword, without regard to ſex or age, a prodigious quantity of money and moveables, and a great number of priſoners, were taken. Hannibal ſet the money apart, to be employed in his deſigns; diſtributed the priſoners amongſt the ſoldiers, according to their ſeveral merits; and ſent all that was valuable in ſtuffs and moveables to Carthage. The ſucceſs anſwered all he had projected. The ſoldiery became more bold in expoſing themſelves: the Carthaginians came in with pleaſure to all he demanded of them: and with the money he had abundantly ſupplied himſelf,

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

himſelf, he ſaw himſelf in a condition to execute the great deſigns he had formed. Hannibal, after the taking of Saguntum, retired to Carthagena, to paſs the winter there.

Trouble and grief occaſioned at Rome by the taking of Saguntum. Liv. xxi. 16.

The Ambaſſadors, who had been ſent to Carthage, were ſcarce returned to Rome, than advice came of the taking and deſtroying of Saguntum. It is hard to expreſs the grief and conſternation, which that ſad news occaſioned at Rome. Compaſſion for that unfortunate city, ſhame of having failed to aid ſuch faithful allies, juſt indignation for the Carthaginians, the authors of ſo many evils; all excited ſuch trouble and confuſion, that it was not poſſible in the firſt moments to form any reſolution, nor to do any thing except to vent grief and ſhed tears for the ruin of a city, which had been the unhappy victim of its inviolable attachment to the Romans, and of the imprudent delays with which the latter had acted in regard to it.

To theſe firſt ſentiments ſoon ſucceeded the moſt lively apprehenſions for their own condition and danger, believing they ſaw Hannibal already at their gates. They conſidered, "that "they never had to do with ſo warlike and "formidable an enemy, and that the Romans "had never been ſo little enured to arms as "they then were. That what had paſſed be"tween them and the people of Sardinia, Cor"ſica, Iſtria, and Illyricum, might be conſi"dered rather as an exerciſe for their troops, "than as a war in form. That Hannibal was "at the head of an army of veteran ſoldiers, "accuſtomed for twenty-three years to battles "and victory, amongſt the moſt warlike na"tions of Spain, under the braveſt and moſt "enterprizing of Generals. That after having

"ren-

" rendered them more ardent and bold by A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.
" taking the moſt opulent city of all Spain, he
" was upon the point of paſſing the Iberus, with
" the moſt warlike nations of the country at his
" heels, who had come in voluntarily to follow
" his ſtandards. That the Gauls, always fond
" of war, would augment his army in his march
" through their country. That they ſhould ſee
" themſelves reduced to fight againſt all the
" nations of the univerſe under the walls of
" Rome, and for the preſervation of Rome
" itſelf."

When they had recovered themſelves a little, an aſſembly of the People was called, in which the war with the Carthaginians was determined. The Conſuls drew lots for their provinces. Spain fell to Scipio, and Africa with Sicily, to Sempronius. The Senate fixed the number of troops that were to ſerve this year at ſix legions. Each Roman legion conſiſted at that time of four thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe: the number of the allies to be added to them was left to the diſcretion of the Conſul. But they were ordered to ſpare nothing that was neceſſary for having a powerful and well-manned fleet.

War reſolved at Rome againſt the Carthaginians.

Partition of the provinces between the Conſuls.

Dio. xxi. 17.

Two Roman legions were given to Sempronius; ſixteen thouſand foot and eighteen hundred horſe of the allies, and an hundred and ſixty galleys of five benches of oars with twelve galliots. Sempronius was ſent into Sicily with theſe land and ſea forces; and with orders to go to Africa, in caſe his collegue was in a condition with the troops that remained to prevent Hannibal from entering Italy.

As the latter advanced by land, Scipio had only ſixty galleys left him, with two Roman legions;

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. legions; and fourteen thouſand foot and ſixteen hundred horſe of the troops of the allies.

The Prætor, L. Manlius with two Roman legions, ten thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe was ſent into Gallia Ciſalpina, even before the Carthaginians were expected on that ſide.

Public enterprizes, whether great or ſmall, always began at Rome by acts of religion, without which they did not believe they could hope good ſucceſs. Proceſſions through the city were therefore decreed, and publick prayers in the temples, for obtaining the protection of the gods during the war, for which the Roman People were preparing.

The Roman Ambaſſadors declare war againſt the Carthaginians. Liv. xxi. 18. Polyb. iii. 187.

After all theſe meaſures had been taken at Rome, the Senate, that they might have nothing to impute to themſelves, thought it proper, before hoſtilities were commenced, to ſend Ambaſſadors into Africa, who were choſen out of the principal perſons of that auguſt body. They were to demand of the Senate of Carthage, whether it was by their order, that Hannibal had beſieged Saguntum; and if they anſwered in the affirmative, as it was probable they would, to declare war againſt the people of Carthage in the name of the Roman People. As ſoon as they arrived at Carthage, and had obtained audience, Fabius, who was at the head of the embaſſy, without any preliminary diſcourſe, declared the commiſſion he was charged with. Upon which one of the principal Senators of Carthage ſpoke as follows: *Your firſt Ambaſſadors in demanding, that Hannibal ſhould be delivered up to you, under pretence that he had beſieged Saguntum on his own authority, perfectly ſhewed us, to what an height you carry your pride.*

This

This ſecond embaſſy is more moderate in appear- A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.
ance; but more unjuſt and violent at bottom than the firſt. At firſt you confined yourſelves to the perſon of Hannibal only: now you attack all the Carthaginians, from whom you are for extorting a confeſſion of their pretended fault, in order to aſſume a right from that confeſſion, to demand repa-
ration for it from them. As for me, the queſtion between you and us ſeems not to be, whether Hannibal, in beſieging Saguntum, has acted of his own head, or by our command; but whether the enterprize were juſt or unjuſt in itſelf. The firſt queſtion concerns only us. It belongs only to us to judge our citizen, and to examine, whether he has undertaken the war of his own head, or by our orders. All that you can diſcuſs on this point with us, is confined to knowing, whether the ſiege of Saguntum be an actual contravention of the treaty. Now, as yourſelves ſupply us with a diſtinction between enterprizes undertaken by a General upon his own authority, and thoſe which he executes by that of the public; I confeſs, that the Conſul Lutatius made a treaty with us, wherein there is a clauſe, by which the allies of both States are exempted from all inſults. But there is not one word in it of the Saguntines, who at that time were not your allies. You will anſwer, no doubt, that in the treaty which you made ſome time after with Aſdrubal, the Saguntines are expreſsly mentioned. I allow it: but to this objection I ſhall anſwer only what you have taught us yourſelves. You have pretended, that you were not held to execute the firſt treaty made by Lutatius, becauſe it had not been confirmed by the Senate and People of Rome; and for this reaſon a ſecond was made, which was ratified by both orders. We admit this principle. If then the treaties made by your Generals do not oblige you, unleſs

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

you have previouſly approved them; that, which Aſdrubal made with you without conſulting us, can neither oblige us. Ceaſe therefore to talk of Saguntum and the Iberus, and at length declare the deſign which you have ſo long concealed at heart.

Fabius then holding up a piece of his robe that was doubled together: *I have here*, ſaid he in a lofty tone, *peace and war; and you are to chuſe one or the other.* Upon being anſwered, that he might make that choice himſelf: *I give you war then*, ſaid he, letting fall his robe. *We accept it willingly, and ſhall make it ſo*, replied the Carthaginians with the ſame loftineſs.

Frivolous reaſons of the Carthaginians to juſtify the ſiege of Saguntum. Polyb. iii. 175, 176. Liv. xxi. 19.

This ſimple and open manner of interrogating the Carthaginians, and afterwards upon their anſwer, of declaring war againſt them, ſeemed to the Romans more conſiſtent with the dignity of their character, than if they had amuſed themſelves in ſubtilizing upon the conſtruction of the treaties, eſpecially after the taking and demolition of Saguntum had left no hope of peace. For, if the queſtion had been to enter into diſputes, it had been eaſy to have replied to the Carthaginian Senator, that he was in the wrong to compare the firſt treaty of Lutatius, which was changed, with that made with Aſdrubal; becauſe it was expreſsly ſtipulated in that of Lutatius, *that it ſhould be only ſo far in force as it ſhould be approved by the Roman People:* whereas there was no ſuch exception in that of Aſdrubal; and the latter had been confirmed by a ſilence of ſo many years, during the life of Aſdrubal himſelf, and after his death. After all, had they adhered to the treaty of Lutatius in queſtion, the Saguntines are ſufficiently comprehended in the general terms of *the allies*

of

of the two States; that clauſe neither declaring thoſe that were ſo at that time, nor excepting ſuch as might become ſo in the ſequel. Now both States having reſerved to themſelves entire liberty in that reſpect for the time to come, was it juſt either that they ſhould admit no nation into their alliance, whatever ſervices they might receive from it, or that they ſhould not protect ſuch as they did admit into it? All that the Romans and Carthaginians could mutually require, was, that they ſhould not endeavour to debauch each other's allies; and, if there were any people, who ſhould be for going over from the one to the other, that they ſhould not be received. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Polybius, from whom Livy has extracted this whole reaſoning, adds a reflection, which the latter ought not to have omitted. It would, ſaid he, be a groſs miſtake, to conſider the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal, as the principal and real cauſe of the ſecond Punic war. It was the beginning, but not the cauſe of it. The regret of the Carthaginians for having given up Sicily too eaſily by the treaty with Lutatius, which terminated the firſt Punic war; the injuſtice and violence of the Romans, who took the advantage of the troubles in Africa, to make the Sardinians alſo take arms againſt the Carthaginians, and to impoſe a new tribute upon them; and laſtly, the great ſucceſs and conqueſts of the latter in Spain, which alarmed the one, and inſpired the other with courage and preſumption: theſe were the real cauſes of the rupture. If only the taking of Saguntum were to be conſidered, the Carthaginians would be wholly in the wrong, who could not, with any reaſonable pretext, beſiege a city, undoubtedly *Real cauſe of the ſecond Punic war.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. included, as the ally of Rome, in the treaty of Lutatius. The Saguntines indeed were not in alliance at the time that treaty was concluded: but it is evident, that the two States did not diveſt themſelves by that treaty of the liberty of making new alliances. To take things only in this view, the Carthaginians would have been abſolutely inexcuſable. But if we go farther back to the times when Sardinia was taken by force from the Carthaginians, and without any reaſon a new tribute impoſed upon them, it muſt be confeſſed, (ſays Polybius, who ſtill ſpeaks) that the conduct of the Romans, in reſpect to theſe two points, can by no means be excuſed, being ſolely founded upon injuſtice and violence. This is certainly a blot in their glory, which their greateſt actions cannot remove. I only ak, whether the notorious injuſtice of the Romans previouſly committed, did not juſtify the Carthaginians in no longer obſerving a treaty concluded in all the forms, and whether it was not a legitimate reaſon for entering into a war with them? In this kind of diſcuſſions of treaties, people very ſeldom act with a due regard to faith, or think it incumbent upon them to make juſtice their ſole guide and interpreter.

The Roman Ambaſſadors go to Spain and into Gaul. Liv. xxi. 19, 20.

The Roman Ambaſſadors, according to the order they had received at ſetting out, went from Carthage into Spain, to endeavour to engage the States of that nation in the amity of the Romans, or at leaſt to diſſuade them from entering into that of the Carthaginians. The Barguſians *, whom they viſited firſt, not being ſatisfied with the Carthaginians, whoſe yoke was become inſupportable to them, received

* *People between Catalonia and Arragon.*

them

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

them with abundance of favour; and their example made moſt of the nations beyond the Iberus deſire to change ſides. The Roman Ambaſſadors applied next to the Volſcians; but the anſwer they received from them ſpreading throughout Spain, made other States loſe all the inclination they might have had to ally themſelves with Rome. *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaid the oldeſt perſon in the aſſembly, where they had audience, *to ask us to prefer your alliance to that of the Carthaginians, after what it has lately coſt the Saguntines, whom you, their allies, treated with greater cruelty in abandoning them, than Hannibal their enemy in deſtroying their city. I adviſe you to go in queſt of allies into other countries, where the fate of Saguntum is not known. The Ruins of that unfortunate city are a ſad indeed, but ſalutary, leſſon for all the States of Spain, that ought to teach them to place no confidence in the Romans.* After this diſcourſe, they were ordered to quit the territory of the Volſcians directly. They were no better treated by the reſt of the Spaniſh nations, to whom they applied; ſo that, after having ran over all Spain ineffectually, they entered Gaul, and went at firſt to * Ruſcino.

It was then the cuſtom of the Gauls to come to the aſſemblies compleatly armed: which, at their firſt appearance, preſented an object terrible enough to the eyes of the Romans. It was ſtill worſe, when after having extolled the glory and valour of the Romans, and the greatneſs of their dominions, they demanded of the Gauls of this canton, to refuſe the Carthaginians, who were going to invade Italy, paſ-

* *A city in the neighbourhood of Perpignan.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. ſage over their lands, and through their cities. For there aroſe ſo great a murmur, attended with fits of laughter, in the aſſembly, that the magiſtrates and old perſons could not quiet the impetuoſity of the youth without great difficulty; ſo void of reaſon and even ſhame did it ſeem to aſk the Gauls, that in order to ſpare Italy, they ſhould take a dangerous war upon themſelves, and expoſe their own lands to being plundered and deſtroyed for the ſake of preſerving thoſe of others. The tumult being at length appeaſed, the oldeſt perſon made the Ambaſſadors this reply: "That the Gauls had "never received either any ſervice from the "Romans, or any injury from the Carthaginians, that ought to induce them to take arms "for the one againſt the other. That on the "contrary they were informed, their countrymen ſettled in Italy had been very ill treated "by the Romans; who had driven them out "of the lands they had conquered, laden them "with tributes, and greatly injured them in "every reſpect."

They were not treated more favourably in any other part of Gaul. The Maſſilienſes were the only people, that received them like friends. Theſe equally faithful and vigilant allies apprized the Romans of every thing it was for their intereſt to know, after having taken great care to be informed of it themſelves. They gave them to underſtand, that Hannibal had been beforehand with them, in order to ſecure the amity of the Gauls: but that this nation, ſavage and greedy of money, would continue no longer in his intereſt, than he took care to engage their Chiefs by preſents.

Having

Having ran over the different regions of Spain and Gaul in this manner, they arrived at Rome, immediately after the Conſuls had ſet out for their provinces, and found all the citizens full of the war, which they were going to have upon their hands; nobody doubting but that Hannibal had already paſſed the Iberus. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

That General, after taking Saguntum, went into winter quarters at Carthagena. Here he received advice of all that had paſſed in reſpect to him both at Carthage and Rome. In conſequence, conſidering himſelf not only as the Chief, but as the author and cauſe of the war, he either diſtributed, or ſold, what remained of the ſpoils; and perſuaded that he had no time to loſe, he aſſembled the Spaniſh ſoldiers, and ſaid to them: *I believe, friends, that you rightly perceive, now we have eſtabliſhed peace throughout Spain, that the only choice we have to make, if we deſire not to quit our arms, and diſband our armies, is to carry the war elſewhere. For we can only procure theſe nations the advantages of peace and victory, by marching againſt a people, whoſe defeat may acquire us glory and riches. But, as we are going to undertake a remote war, and it may happen, that we ſhall not return ſo ſoon as we could wiſh; if any of you are deſirous to ſee your countries and families, I give you my permiſſion. You will return to your colours very early in the ſpring, in order that with the protection of the gods, we may go and begin a war, that will crown us with glory, and load us with riches.* *Hannibal prepares for his march to Italy, and reviews the armies of the Carthaginians.* Polyb. iii. 187, 188. Liv. xxi. 21, 22.

This permiſſion, which he granted them of himſelf, gave them abundance of pleaſure, becauſe almoſt all of them deſired extremely to ſee their countries again, from which they foreſaw they ſhould be abſent a great while. The

A. R. 534 Ant. C. 218. reſt they enjoyed during the whole winter, between the labours they had already paſſed, and thoſe they were ſtill to experience, reſtored all the vigour of body, and ardor of courage they had occaſion for in the new enterprizes they were to execute. They came to the rendezvous at the beginning of the ſpring.

Hannibal's journey to Gades. Liv. xxi. 21. Hannibal having reviewed the different nations, of which his army was compoſed, returned to Gades, a Phœnician colony, as well as Carthage, in order to perform the vows he had made to Hercules; and he made new ones to that god for the good ſucceſs of his deſigns.

He provides for the ſecurity of Africa. Polyb. iii. 187. But as he was no leſs intent upon the defence of his country, than upon attacking that of the enemy, he reſolved to leave forces conſiderable enough in Africa, to cover it againſt the attempts of the Romans, in caſe they ſhould think fit to make deſcents in it, whilſt he was on his march through Spain and Gaul to enter Italy by land. For this purpoſe he cauſed levies to be made in Africa and Spain, eſpecially of ſlingers, and thoſe that diſcharged darts and arrows: but he made the Africans ſerve in Spain, and the Spaniards in Africa; being perſuaded, that they would behave better in a ſtrange country than in their own, eſpecially as they had contracted by that exchange, a reciprocal obligation to defend themſelves well. He ſent thirteen thouſand eight hundred and fifty foot armed with light bucklers, and eight hundred and ſeventy ſlingers of the iſlands Baleares, with twelve hundred horſe of different countries, into Africa. He garriſoned Carthage with part of theſe troops, and diſtributed the reſt in the country about it. At the ſame time he ordered four thouſand choſen youth to be raiſed in the different cities of the

the province, whom he ſent to Carthage, as well to ſerve for hoſtages there, as for the defence of the city. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

He did not think it proper to neglect Spain, eſpecially as he had been informed that the Roman Ambaſſadors had uſed their utmoſt endeavours to engage the ſeveral States in their intereſts. He charged his brother, a bold and active man, with the defence of it; and for that ſervice gave him the following forces, moſt of them raiſed in Africa: eleven thouſand eight hundred and fifty African foot, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearian ſlingers. To this body of infantry, he added four hundred and fifty Liby-phœnician horſe, eighteen hundred Numidians and Mauritanians, and two hundred Ilergetes, a Spaniſh nation. And in order, that nothing wherein the force of a land-army conſiſted might be wanting, he added one and twenty elephants. And laſtly, as he did not doubt but the Romans would act by ſea, where they had gained a famous victory, which had terminated the firſt war between them and the Carthaginians; for the defence of the coaſts, he left him fifty galleys of five benches of oars, two of four, and five of three. He gave his brother wiſe advice concerning the manner in which he was to act, both in reſpect to the Spaniards, and the Romans, in caſe they ſhould attack him.

And for that of Spain, where he leaves his brother Aſdrubal. Liv. xxi. 22. Polyb. iii. 189.

We ſee here from the beginning of this war, in the perſon of Hannibal, the model of an excellent General, whoſe wiſe foreſight nothing eſcapes; who gives his orders on all ſides where neceſſary: who takes all the meaſures early, that can conduce to the ſucceſs of his deſigns; that always purſues thoſe he has taken; and who never

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. never forms any, that are not great; who ſhews ſo perfect a knowledge of war, that, if he had not been ſo young, it might have paſſed for the effect of conſummate experience.

SECT. II.

Hannibal ſecures the good-will of the Gauls. He ſignifies the day for beginning the march of the troops. Dream or viſion of Hannibal. He marches towards the Pyreneans. Way Hannibal had to march from Carthagena to Italy. The Gauls favour the paſſage of Hannibal through their lands. Revolt of the Boii againſt the Romans. Defeat of the Prætor Manlius. The Conſuls ſet out for their reſpective provinces. P. Scipio arrives at Marſeilles by ſea. He is informed, that Hannibal is upon the point of paſſing the Rhone. Paſſage of the Rhone by Hannibal. Skirmiſh between the detachments ſent out by both parties. Deputation of the Boii to Hannibal. He harangues the troops before he enters the Alps. P. Scipio finds Hannibal ſet out. The latter continues his route to the Alps. He is choſen arbiter between two brothers, and places the oldeſt upon the throne. Famous paſſage of the Alps by Hannibal. Greatneſs and wiſdom of that General's enterprize.

Hannibal makes ſure of the good-will of the Gauls. Polyb. iii. 188.

HANNIBAL having provided for the ſafety of Africa and Spain, waited only for the arrival of the couriers, which the Gauls were to ſend, and the informations which he expected from them, concerning the fertility of the country at the foot of the Alps and along the Po; the number of the inhabitants; whether

ther they were a warlike people; whether they retained any animoſity againſt the Romans in effect of the war with them ſome time before. He had great expectations from that nation. It was for this reaſon, that he had taken care to ſend deputies to all the petty kings of Gaul, as well on this ſide of the Alps, as thoſe who inhabited thoſe mountains, reſolving to fight the Romans only in Italy, and rightly judging, that he ſhould ſtand in need of the help of the Gauls, for overcoming the obſtacles which he ſhould meet with on his way. He therefore took care to gain their chiefs by preſents, of which he knew they were very greedy, and thereby to aſſure himſelf of the affection and fidelity of a part of that nation. At length the couriers arrived, and informed him of the diſpoſition of the Gauls, who expected him with impatience; of the extraordinary height of the Alps, and the difficulties he muſt expect to find in paſſing them, though it was not abſolutely impracticable. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

He ſignifies the day for marching to his troops.

Early in the ſpring, Hannibal made his troops quit their winter-quarters. The news he received from Carthage of what had been done there in his favour, had extremely encouraged him. Aſſured of the good-will of his citizens, he began then to ſpeak freely of the war with the Romans to his ſoldiers. He repreſented to them "in what manner the Romans had demanded, that himſelf, and all the officers of the army, ſhould be delivered up to them. He ſpoke with advantage of the fertility of the country they were going to enter, of the diſpoſition of the Gauls in his favour, and the alliance they were to make together." The troops having told him, that they were ready Polyb. iii. 189.

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. ready to follow him wherever he thought fit, he praiſed their courage, declared the day when he would ſet out, and diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

Dream or viſion of Hannibal. Liv. xxi. 22.

Upon the day fixed, Hannibal began his march at the head of ninety thouſand foot, and about twelve thouſand horſe. He paſſed near * Etoviſſa, and advanced towards the Iberus, without quitting the ſea-coaſt. He is ſaid to have had a dream here, in which he ſaw a young man of a form and ſtature more than human, who ſaid, he was ſent by Jupiter to conduct Hannibal into Italy. It is added, that he bade him follow him, and keep him in view, without looking off upon any other object. That accordingly he did ſo at firſt with reſpect mingled with dread, without turning his eyes any other way. But that at length not being able to reſiſt a curioſity ſo natural to mankind, eſpecially in things forbidden, he turned his head to ſee the object he was forbad to look upon. That he then perceived a ſerpent of enormous magnitude, that rolled itſelf along amongſt the ſhrubs which it beat down on the right and left with a great noiſe. That at the ſame time it began to thunder with a dreadful ſtorm. And laſtly, that having aſked, what this prodigy ſignified? he was anſwered, that it preſaged the deſolation of Italy: but that he continued his march, without inquiring farther concerning an event, which the fates were for keeping a ſecret.

He marches to the Pyrenees Polyb. iii. 189, 190. Liv. xxi. 23.

Be this dream as it will, for Polybius ſays nothing of it, Hannibal paſſed the Iberus, attacked

* *The exact ſituation of this city is not known.*

tacked the ſeveral * nations that inhabited the country upon his route from the Iberus to the Pyrenean mountains, fought ſeveral bloody battles, in which himſelf loſt a conſiderable number of men. He however ſubjected that country, of which he gave Hanno the government, in order to be maſter of the defiles, which ſeparate Spain from Gaul. To guard theſe paſſes, and awe the inhabitants of the country, he left him ten thouſand foot, and a thouſand horſe, and the keeping of the baggage of thoſe who were to follow him into Italy. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal here was informed, that three thouſand of the Carpetani, terrified by the length of the way, and the height of the Alps, which they repreſented to themſelves as unſurmountable, had taken their route back to their own country. He ſaw plainly that he ſhould get nothing by endeavouring to retain them by kind treatment, and at the ſame time was afraid of irritating the ſavage diſpoſition of others, if he employed force. He therefore uſed addreſs and policy; and, beſides that number, diſmiſſed ſeven thouſand ſoldiers more, who, he perceived, were no longer pleaſed with this war, pretending, that it was alſo by his order, that the Carpetani had retired. By this wiſe conduct he prevented the bad effects, which the deſertion of the Carpetani might have occaſioned in the army, had it been known; and he gave the troops hopes of being diſcharged, whenever they pleaſed; a powerful motive to induce them to follow him chearfully, and not to be tired of the ſervice.

* *The Ilergetes, Barguſians, Ereneſians, and Andoſians.*

The

A. R. 534
Ant. C. 218.

The army not being incumbered then with their bagage, and compoſed of fifty thouſand foot, nine thouſand horſe, and thirty ſeven elephants, Hannibal made it march through the Pyreneans, in order to go on and paſs the Rhone. This army was formidable, more by the valour than number of the troops, who had ſerved many years in Spain under the moſt able Generals Carthage had ever produced.

Way Hannibal had to march from Carthagena to Italy. Polyb. iii. 192, 193.

Polybius gives us a very clear idea of the length of way which Hannibal had to march, in order to arrive in Italy. From Carthagena, from whence he ſet out, to the Iberus, is two thouſand two hundred *ſtadia*: (110 * leagues.) From the Iberus to Emporium, a little maritime town, that ſeparates Spain from Gaul according to Strabo, ſixteen hundred *ſtadia*: (80 leagues.) From Emporium to the paſſage of the Rhone, the ſame ſpace of ſixteen hundred *ſtadia*: (80 leagues.) From the paſſage of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred *ſtadia*: (70 leagues.) From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred *ſtadia*: (60 leagues.) Thus from Carthagena to Italy, the way is eight thouſand *ſtadia*, that is to ſay, four hundred leagues. Theſe meaſures muſt be right; for Polybius tells us, that the Romans had carefully divided this route by ſpaces of eight *ſtadia*, that is to ſay by Roman miles.

The Gauls favour the paſſage of Hannibal through their lands. Polyb. iii. 195. Liv. xxi. 24.

Hannibal having paſſed the Pyreneans, incamped near the city of † Illiberis. The Gauls well knew, that his deſign was againſt Italy, and had at firſt expreſſed ſufficient good-will for the deputies he had ſent to them. But having

* *The eſtimate here is, twenty ſtadia to a league.*

† *Now called Colioure in Rouſſillon,*

been

been apprized, that he had ſubjected by force ſeveral ſtates of Spain beyond the Pyreneans, and that he had left ſtrong garriſons in their countries, to keep them in awe, the fear of being enſlaved like them made them take arms, and aſſemble in ſufficiently great numbers near * Ruſcino. Hannibal being apprized of this, apprehended the delay they might occaſion of his march, much more than the force of their arms. This obliged him to ſend deputies to the petty Kings of the country, to demand an interview of them. "He gave them their "choice either to come to him at Illiberis, "where he was incamped, or to ſuffer that he "ſhould approach Ruſcino; in order that the "proximity of place might facilitate their con-"verſations. That as for him, he would re-"ceive them with joy in his camp, or would "immediately attend them in theirs, if they "choſe that. That the Gauls ought to treat "him as a friend, and not as an enemy; and "that unleſs they forced him to it, he would "not draw his ſword till he arrived in "Italy." This he gave them to underſtand by his deputies. But their Princes coming themſelves immediately to him at Illiberis, they were ſo charmed with the good reception he gave them, and the preſents he made them, that they left his army at entire liberty to paſs through the country, taking their route by Ruſcino. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

In the mean time the Romans were informed by deputies from † Maſſilia, that Hannibal had paſſed the Iberus. This was a new motive to

* *Near Perpignan. Hod. Ruſcinon.*
† *Marſeilles.*

make

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. make them haſten the execution of their project of ſending an army into Spain under the command of P. Cornelius, and another into Africa under that of Tiberius Sempronius. But whatever diligence they uſed, they could not prevent that of their enemy.

Revolt of the Boii. Polyb. iii. 193—194 Liv. xxi. 25, 26.

Whilſt the two Conſuls were levying troops, and making other preparations, all poſſible expedition was uſed to conclude every thing relating to the colonies, before intended to be ſent into Ciſalpine Gaul. The cities were incloſed with walls, and thoſe who were to inhabit them, were ordered to repair thither in thirty days. Each of theſe colonies conſiſted of ſix thouſand men. One was ſettled on this ſide of the Po, and called Placentia; and the other on the other ſide of that river, to which the name of Cremona was given.

Theſe colonies were no ſooner ſettled, than the Boii, being apprized of the approach of the Carthaginians, and promiſing themſelves much from their aid, revolted from the Romans, without regard to the hoſtages they had given them at the end of the laſt war. They drew over the Inſubrians, whom an antient grudge againſt the Romans before inclined to take arms, and both together ravaged the country, which the Romans had diſtributed. Thoſe who fled were purſued as far as Mutina, another colony of the Romans: (*Modena.*) Mutina itſelf was beſieged. They ſhut up three Romans of great diſtinction in that place, who had been ſent thither to diſtribute the lands: theſe were C. Lutatius, a perſon of Conſular dignity, and two old Prætors. They demanded an interview, which was granted them by the Boii: but contrary to their engagement, they ſeized their perſons,

perſons, with the view of recovering their hoſtages by their means. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

The Prætor Manlius defeated.

Upon this news, L. Manlius the Prætor, who, as we have ſaid, commanded an army in the country, made his troops march towards that city, without having taken any precaution, or ſo much as acquainted himſelf with the country. The Boii had laid ambuſcades in a foreſt. As ſoon as the Romans entered it, they fell upon them from all ſides: Manlius loſt a great part of his army, and with much difficulty eſcaped with the reſt, whom not without great pains and danger, he made enter Tanetum, a ſmall town on the banks of the Po, where they intrenched themſelves, and where they were afterwards beſieged by the enemy.

When it was known at Rome, that they were to have the revolt of the Gauls upon their hands, at the ſame time with the impending war of the Carthaginians, the Senate ſent the Prætor C. Atilius to the aid of Manlius with a Roman legion, and five thouſand of the allies, whom the Conſul P. Scipio had lately raiſed. The enemy retired on the rumour of this march. Publius however raiſed a new legion to ſupply the place of that which had been ſent with the Prætor.

The Conſuls ſet out for their ſeveral provinces.

In the beginning of the ſame ſpring that Hannibal paſſed the Iberus and the Pyrenees, the Conſuls, having made all the neceſſary diſpoſitions for the execution of their deſigns, ſet ſail, Publius with ſixty ſhips for Spain, and Tiberius Sempronius with an hundred and ſixty of five benches of oars for Africa. Polyb. iii. 194.

The latter acted at firſt with ſo much impetuoſity, made ſuch formidable preparations at Lilybæum, and aſſembled ſuch great bodies of

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

troops from all ſides, that it might have been thought, his deſign was, when he landed in Africa, to beſiege Carthage.

Publius arrives by ſea at Marſeilles.

Publius keeping along the coaſts of Hetruria, Liguria, and the mountains of the Salians, arrived the fifth day in the neighbourhood of Marſeilles, landed his troops, and incamped near the firſt of the mouths, by which the Rhone empties itſelf into the ſea, with deſign to give Hannibal battle in Gaul, before he arrived at the Alps. He was far from believing, that he had paſſed the Pyrenees already. But being informed, that he was even upon the point of paſſing the Rhone, he was ſome time uncertain whether he ſhould march in order to meet him. Seeing that his troops had not perfectly recovered the fatigues of their voyage, he gave them ſome days reſt, contenting himſelf with ſending out three hundred of his braveſt horſe, as ſcouts, with ſome Gauls then in the pay of the people of Maſſilia, with orders to approach the enemy as near as they could without expoſing themſelves, and to obſerve well their march, number, and aſpect. This delay was highly ſalutary for Hannibal. For had the Conſul haſtened his march, and joined the Gauls, in order to diſpute the paſſage of the river with him, he might have put a ſtop to his progreſs, and fruſtrated all his deſigns.

He is adviſed that Hannibal is upon the point of paſſing the Rhone.

Polyb. iii. 195. Liv. xxi. 26.

Hannibal paſſes the Rhone.

Hannibal having either awed or brought over all the other nations of Gaul, whoſe country he had paſſed through, was arrived at about the diſtance of four days march from the mouth of the Rhone in the country of the Volcæ, a powerful people. They inhabited on the banks of the Rhone on both ſides of that river: But deſpairing of being able to defend the

Polyb. iii. 195—200 Liv. xxi. 26, 28.

the ſide, on which the Carthaginians were entering their country, they removed with all their effects to the other, and prepared to diſpute the paſſage of thoſe ſtrangers with force of arms. All the other States that inhabited along the Rhone, and eſpecially thoſe on whoſe lands Hannibal incamped, ardently deſired to ſee him on the other ſide of that river, in order to be delivered from ſo great a multitude of ſoldiers, that ſtarved them. In conſequence he eaſily engaged them by preſents to aſſemble all the barks they had, and even to build new ones. He alſo cauſed an extraordinary number of boats, ſkiffs, and floats to be made; in which work he paſſed two days. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

The Gauls were poſted on the other ſide, in a good diſpoſition for diſputing the paſſage with him. It was not poſſible to attack them in front. He therefore commanded a conſiderable detachment of his troops under the command of * Hanno ſon of Bomilcar, to paſs the river higher up, and in order to conceal their march and his deſign from the knowledge of the enemy, he made them ſet out the beginning of the third night. He ordered him to go up the river towards its ſource, and to paſs it with the troops as ſecretly as poſſible at the firſt place where it was fordable, and afterwards to take a large compaſs in approaching the enemy, in order to fall on them in the rear at the proper time. This ſucceeded as he intended. The Gauls, whom Hannibal had given them for guides, made them march about five and twenty miles; at the end of which, they ſhewed Hanno a little iſland, formed by the river in di-

* *Not the Hanno left to command in Spain.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

viding itſelf, which occaſions its not being ſo deep, and more eaſy to paſs, in this place. They * paſſed the river the next day without any reſiſtance, or being perceived by the enemy. They halted the reſt of the day, and during the night (which was the fifth) they advanced with little noiſe towards the enemy.

Hannibal in the mean time prepared to attempt the paſſage. The heavy-armed troops were to go on board the greater barks, and the light-armed infantry in the ſmall. The greater were placed above in a long file and upon the ſame line, and the leſs below, in order that the former ſuſtaining the violence of the ſtream, the latter might have leſs to ſuffer from it. It was conceived proper to make the horſes follow ſwimming; and in order to that, a man in the ſtern of each boat held three or four on each ſide by the reins. Part of the horſes were made to enter the water entirely equipped, in order that their riders might immediately charge the enemy on landing. By this means a ſufficiently great number of troops were thrown upon the other ſide at the firſt paſſage.

Hannibal had not began to paſs the river with his army, till after he had ſeen a ſmoke riſe on the other ſide; which was the ſignal the troops, that had paſſed the river with Hanno, was to make. Every thing was immediately diſpoſed, and ſpoke the prelude of a great battle. In the barks ſome mutually encouraged each other with great cries; whilſt others, to uſe the expreſſion, ſtrove with the violence of the ſtream; and the Carthaginians, who re-

* *This is believed to have been between Roquemaure and Pont S. Eſprit.*

mained

mained upon the ſhore, animated their companions with their voices and geſture. The Barbarians, on the other ſide, according to cuſtom, raiſed dreadful cries and howlings, claſhing their ſhields together, and already aſſuring themſelves of victory. At that inſtant, they heard a great noiſe behind them, ſaw all their tents on fire, and themſelves vigorouſly attacked in the rear. Hannibal, animated by this ſucceſs, drew up his troops in battle as they landed, exhorted them to behave with bravery, and led them on againſt the enemy. The latter, terrified, and already in diſorder by ſo unforeſeen an event, were inſtantly broke, and put to flight. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal, maſter of the paſſage, and at the ſame time victor over the Gauls, immediately took care to make the reſt of his troops paſs the river, and incamped that night upon its banks. The next morning, on the report that the Roman fleet was arrived at the mouth of the Rhone, he detached five hundred Numidian horſe to diſcover where the enemy lay, their number, and what they were doing.

It remained now to make the elephants paſs the Rhone, which occaſioned abundance of perplexity; but that was removed in the following manner. A raft of two hundred feet in length and fifty in breadth, was brought to the ſide of the river, and made faſt by large cables to beams planted along the ſhore. This float was covered all over with earth; ſo that thoſe animals on going upon it, imagined that they went as uſual upon the land. From this firſt float, which was fixed, they paſſed on to a ſecond, of the ſame form, but only an hundred feet in length, and made faſt to the other by cords eaſily untied. The females were made to go foremoſt. The

A. R. 524. Ant. C. 218. other elephants followed them; and when they had paſſed on to the ſecond float, it was let looſe from the firſt, and towed to the other ſide by ſmall boats. After which it returned to fetch the reſt. Some of them fell into the water, but got to ſhore to the reſt, ſo that not one of them was drowned.

Meeting of the parties detached to ſcout on both ſides. Polyb. iii. 198. Liv. xxi. 29.

In the mean time the two parties ſent out to view the armies of each other, happening to meet, an action, much more furious and bloody than could be expected from ſo ſmall a number, enſued. Almoſt all the men were wounded. The number of the ſlain was pretty equal on both ſides; and it was not till after a very obſtinate reſiſtance, that the Numidians fled, and abandoned the victory to the Romans, who began to be extremely fatigued on their ſide. The victors loſt an hundred and ſixty men, Romans and Gauls; and of the Numidians more than two hundred remained upon the ſpot. This action, which was at once, ſays Livy, the beginning of this war, and the preſage of its ſucceſs, made people judge, that if the Romans had the advantage in the end, they would at leaſt buy their victory dear. After it was over, the Romans in purſuing the enemy approached the intrenchments of the Carthaginians, examined every thing with their own eyes, and immediately flew to give the Conſul an account of what they had ſeen.

Deputation of the Boii to Hannibal. Polyb. iii. 197. Liv. xxi. 29.

Hannibal was in doubt, whether he ſhould go to Italy without fighting, or come to blows with the firſt enemy he ſhould meet on his way. Magalus, Prince of the Boii, and chief of the embaſſy ſent to him by that people, removed that uncertainty. He told him, "that "the Boii and the other Gauls called him in to "their

" their aid, and promiſed to join him in the A. R. 534. Ant
" war againſt the Romans. He took it upon
" himſelf to conduct his army into Italy by
" ways, where it would want nothing, and by
" which his march would be ſhort and ſafe. He
" deſcribed the fertility of the country it was to
" enter in magnificent terms, and dwelt parti-
" cularly upon the diſpoſition of the ſeveral
" ſtates to take arms in his favour againſt their
" common enemy. He concluded with ad-
" viſing him to reſerve all his forces for Italy,
" and not to give battle, till it arrived there."

Hannibal, before he ſets out for the Alps, harangues his troops. Polyb. iii. 198. Liv. xxi. 30.

Hannibal being determined to purſue his route to Italy, aſſembled his ſoldiers, and as he had perceived ſome coldneſs, eſpecially in reſpect to the length of the way and paſſing the Alps, of which they had a terrible idea from report, he made uſe both of reproaches and praiſes, to reanimate their courage. He repreſented to them, " that having to that
" day confronted the greateſt dangers with
" them, he could ſcarce comprehend, from
" whence the terror that ſeized them could
" ariſe. That during the many years they had
" ſerved under his father, under Aſdrubal, and
" himſelf, they had always been victorious.
" That they had paſſed the Iberus with deſign
" to deliver the Univerſe from the tyranny of
" the Romans, and to extirpate the very name
" of that haughty people. That then none of
" them thought the way too long, tho' it were
" to be from the extremity of the Weſt to that
" of the Eaſt. That now, when they had
" marched the greateſt part of it; had paſſed
" the Pyrenees in the midſt of the moſt ſa-
" vage nations; had paſſed the Rhone, and
" ſtemmed the impetuous waves of ſo rapid a

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

" river in the view of ſo many thouſand Gauls,
" who had diſputed the paſſage with them in
" vain: now when they found themſelves cloſe
" to the Alps, of which the oppoſite ſide to
" that before them was part of Italy, they
" wanted ſpirit and reſolution. What image
" then did they form of the Alps! Did they
" believe them any thing but high mountains?
" That though they were higher than the Py-
" renees, there certainly was no land that
" touched the ſky, or was not to be paſſed by
" mankind. That it was certain the Alps were
" inhabited; that they were cultivated; that
" they ſubſiſted men and other animals, to
" whom they had given birth. That the Am-
" baſſadors themſelves from the Gauls, whom
" they ſaw before their eyes, had no wings,
" when they paſſed them to come thither.
" That the anceſtors of the ſame Gauls, before
" they ſettled in Italy, where they were ſtran-
" gers, had often paſſed them with an innume-
" rable multitude of women and children, who
" went with them in queſt of new habitations.
" He concluded with repeating all the aids,
" with which the Ambaſſadors of the Gauls had
" engaged to ſupply them."

The ſoldiers would ſcarce give Hannibal time to conclude, but raiſed their hands up all together, and declared they were ready to follow wherever he would lead them. He fixed their departure for the next day; and after having made vows and ſupplications to the gods for the ſafety of the whole army, he diſmiſſed them, recommending it to them, to refreſh and reſt themſelves. Accordingly he ſet out the next day.

Whatever

Whatever diligence P. Scipio made, with deſign to give Hannibal battle, he did not arrive at the place where the Carthaginians had paſſed the Rhone till three days after they were marched. Having no hopes of coming up with them, he returned to his fleet, and embarked again, with the reſolution to go and wait for them at the bottom of the Alps. But in order not to leave Spain without defence, he ſent his brother Cneus thither, with the greateſt part of his troops, to make head againſt Aſdrubal, and ſet out for Geneva, intending to act with the army in Ciſalpine Gaul, near the Po, againſt Hannibal. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. *Scipio finds Hannibal ſet out.* Polyb. iii. 202. Liv. xxi. 31.

Hannibal ſet out the next day, as he had declared, and continued his march through Gaul along the river towards the north: not becauſe that way was the moſt direct and ſhorteſt, but that by removing from the ſea, he removed from Scipio, and favoured his deſign of entering Italy with all his forces, and without weakening them by any battle. *Hannibal croſſes Gaul.* Polyb. iii. 202. Liv. xxi. 31.

After a march of four days he arrived at a kind of iſland, as it was called, formed by the confluence of the * Iſara and the Rhone, which unite in this place. Here he was choſen arbiter *He is choſen arbiter between two brothers, and ſets the eldeſt upon the throne.* Polyb. iii. 203. Liv. xxi. 31.

* *The text of Polybius, as we have it, and that of Livy, place this iſland between the Saone and the Rhone, that is to ſay, where Lions has been ſince built. This is pretended to be an error. In the Greek it was wrote* Σκωρας, *to which the word* Αραρ *has been ſubſtituted. Jac. Gronovius ſays, he ſaw it wrote* Biſarat *in a manuſcript of Livy: which ſhews, that* Iſara Rhodanuſque amnes *muſt be read inſtead of* Arar Rhodanuſque; *and that the iſland in queſtion is formed by the confluence of the Iſara and Rhone. The ſituation of the Allobroges, mentioned here, is an evident proof of this. I do not enter into this kind of diſputes. I thought it neceſſary to follow the correction.*

between

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between two brothers, who diſputed the crown with each other. He adjudged it to the eldeſt, conformably to the intention of the Senate and principal perſons. The Prince in gratitude for that ſervice, ſupplied him abundantly with proviſions and cloathing, of which his army was in extreme want, for covering themſelves againſt the inſupportable cold they were to feel on the Alps.

The greateſt ſervice which Hannibal received from the Prince he had juſt placed upon the throne, was his poſting his troops in the rear of the Carthaginians, who were in ſome diſtruſt and fear of the Allobroges, and his eſcorting them to the place where they were to enter the Alps.

After marching about eight hundred *ſtadia*, (forty leagues) in ten days, they arrived at the foot of the Alps. The ſight of thoſe mountains, which ſeemed to touch the sky, and were covered all over with ſnow, where nothing was to be ſeen but a few wretched cottages, diſperſed here and there, and ſituated upon the tops of inacceſſible rocks, but lean cattle ſtarved with cold, men with long uncouth hair and beards, and of a fierce and ſavage aſpect; theſe objects revived the thoughts they had conceived of them before, and ſtruck the ſoldiers with dread.

Famous paſſage of the Alps by Hannibal. Polyb. iii. 203—209 Liv. xxi. 32—37.

As long as Hannibal had continued in the flat country, the Allobroges had not diſturbed him in his march, whether becauſe they feared the Carthaginian cavalry, or that the troops of the King of the Gauls kept them in awe. But when that eſcort retired, and Hannibal began to enter into the defiles of the mountains, the Allobroges ran in great numbers to ſeize the eminences,

eminences, that commanded the places through which his army muſt neceſſarily paſs, The troops were extremely alarmed, when they perceived thoſe mountaineers perched upon the ridges of their rocks. Had they known how to improve their advantage, and keep their poſts, which was very eaſy to have done, all had been over with the whole army, which might have been entirely deſtroyed in thoſe mountains. Hannibal ſtopped, made his troops halt, and as there was no other paſſage that way, he encamped as well as he could in the midſt of a thouſand precipices, and ſent ſome of his Gauliſh guides to view the diſpoſition of the enemy. By their means he learnt, that the defile where he was ſtopped, was guarded only in the day-time by the inhabitants, who at night retired to their ſeveral cottages. This information ſaved the army. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal, early in the morning, advanced towards thoſe ſummits, making a feint as if he intended to go over them in the day, and in the view of the Barbarians. But the ſoldiers, overwhelmed with an hail of flints and great ſtones, ſtopped ſhort, as they had received orders. Hannibal, after having paſſed the whole day in fruitleſs attempts, but which he deſignedly repeated to deceive the enemy, incamped in the ſame place and intrenched himſelf. As ſoon as he was certain that the mountaineers had abandoned that eminence, he cauſed a great number of fires to be kindled, as if he intended to ſtay where he was with his whole army. But leaving his baggage, with the cavalry and the greateſt part of his infantry there, he ſet out at the head of his braveſt troops, paſſed the defile with them, and ſeized the ſame ſummits, which

the

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the Barbarians had juſt quitted. At the break of day the groſs of the Carthaginian army de-camped, and prepared to advance. The enemy, at the uſual ſignal, had already quitted their forts in order to reſume their poſts upon the rocks, when they perceived part of the Carthaginians over their heads, whilſt the reſt were upon their march: but they did not loſe courage. Accuſtomed to run over thoſe rocks, they came down upon the Carthaginians on their march, and haraſſed them on all ſides. The Carthaginians had the enemy to fight, and the difficulty of the places, where they could ſcarce keep on their legs, to contend with at the ſame time. But the greateſt diſorder was occaſioned by the horſes and beaſts that carried the baggage, that terrified by the cries and howlings of the Gauls, which the mountains re-echoed in an horrible manner, fell back on the ſoldiers, and beat them down along with them into the precipices on the ſide of the way.

Hannibal had hitherto been only a ſpectator of what paſſed, for fear of augmenting the confuſion, by endeavouring to remedy it. But now ſeeing himſelf in danger of loſing his baggage, which would be attended with the ruin of the whole army, he came down from the eminence, and put the enemy to flight: after which, quiet and order being reinſtated amongſt the Carthaginians, he continued his march without trouble and danger, and arrived at a fort, which was the moſt important place of the country. He made himſelf maſter of it, as well as of all the neighbouring towns, in which he found great quantities of corn and abundance of cattle, that ſerved to ſubſiſt his army during three days.

After

After a march quiet enough, he had a new danger to experience. The Gauls pretending to have been taught by the example of their neighbours, who had ſuffered for having undertaken to oppoſe the march of the army, came to compliment Hannibal, brought him proviſions, offered to be his guides, and left hoſtages with him for their fidelity. Hannibal, without relying much upon their promiſes, would not diſguſt them however, leſt they ſhould declare themſelves openly againſt him. He gave them an obliging anſwer, and having accepted of their hoſtages, and the proviſions, which themſelves had cauſed to be brought into the way, he followed their guides, not confiding however entirely in them, but always upon his guard, and with abundance of circumſpection and ſecret diffidence. When they came into a much narrower way, commanded on one ſide by an high mountain, the Barbarians quitted an ambuſcade on a ſudden, attacked the Carthaginians in front and rear; pouring a ſhower of darts upon them both near and from ſome diſtance, and rolling down ſtones of enormous magnitude upon them from the eminences. The rear was charged with greater vigour than the reſt, and by a greater number of the enemy. This valley had undoubted been the tomb of the whole army, if the Carthaginian General had not taken care from the beginning, by way of precaution againſt treachery, to poſt the Baggage with the cavalry in the front, and the heavy-armed foot in the rear. That infantry ſuſtained the enemy's charge, without which the loſs had been much greater; as Hannibal, notwithſtanding all his precautions, was upon the point of being entirely defeated. For whilſt he was in ſuſ-

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

pence,

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. pence, whether he ſhould make his army advance in theſe narrow ways, becauſe he had left his infantry no reinforcement to cover their rear, as himſelf did that of the cavalry; the Barbarians took the advantage of that moment of uncertainty, to charge the Carthaginians in flank; and having ſeparated the rear from the front of the army, they ſeized the ſpace between both, ſo that Hannibal paſſed the night ſeparately from his horſe and baggage.

The next day the mountaineers renewed the charge, but with much leſs vigour than the day before; ſo that the Carthaginians joined again, and paſſed this defile, where they loſt more of their carriage-beaſts than ſoldiers. From thenceforth the Barbarians appeared only in ſmall bodies, more like robbers than real enemies, ſometime on the rear, ſometimes in the front, according as the place favoured them, or the Carthaginians themſelves gave them opportunities of ſurprizing them, by advancing too far in the front, or keeping too much behind the rear, of the army. The elephants which were placed in the advanced guard, croſſed theſe rugged and ſteep mountains very ſlowly. But on the other ſide, wherever they appeared, they coverd the army from the inſults of the Barbarians, that did not dare to approach thoſe animals, whoſe figure and magnitude were new to them.

After a march of nine days, Hannibal arrived at laſt upon the top of the mountains. He continued there two days, as well to reſt thoſe who had got thither happily, as to give othets time to join the main body. During this halt, the troops were agreeably ſurprized to ſee moſt of the horſes and carriage-beaſts appear which had

had tired upon the route, and had followed the track of the army. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

It was then about the end of October, and abundance of ſnow had newly fallen, which covered all the ways, and very much troubled and diſcouraged the troops. Hannibal perceived it; and ſtopping upon an eminence, from whence all Italy might be ſeen, he ſhewed them the fertile * countries watered by the Po, where they were almoſt arrived, adding, "that they "had now only a ſlight effort to make. He "repreſented to them, that a battle or two was "now upon the point of putting a glorious "period to their labours, and of inriching them "for ever, by making them maſters of the ca-"pital of the Roman dominions." This diſcourſe, full of ſuch grateful hopes, and ſuſtained by the ſight of Italy, reſtored joy and vigour to the dejected army. They continued their march in this diſpoſition. But the way was not the more eaſy in effect of it: on the contrary, as it was downhill, the difficulty and danger increaſed; and the more, becauſe on the ſide next Italy the declivity of the Alps is much greater, and more ſteepy. Accordingly, they ſcarce found any but broken, direct, ſlippery ways; ſo that the ſoldiers could not keep their feet in walking, nor ſtop themſelves when they made a wrong ſtep, but fell againſt and threw down one another.

They arrived at a place more difficult than any they had yet paſſed. The ſoldiers, though without arms or baggage, had a great deal of trouble to get down by feeling for, and laying hold of, the buſhes and brambles that grew there, with their feet and hands. The place

* *Of Piedmont.*

was

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. was extremely ſteep of itſelf, but was become more ſo by a late falling in of the earth, in effect of which there was an abyſs oppoſite to them of above a thouſand feet in depth. The cavalry ſtopt ſhort here. Hannibal ſurprized at that ſtand, ran thither, and ſaw that it was actually impoſſible to go on. He had thoughts of taking a long compaſs; but that was found to be equally impracticable. As ſome days before new ſnow of no great depth had fallen upon the old, the feet entering it ſupported themſelves with eaſe. But when this new ſnow was melted by the paſſing of the firſt troops and carriage-beaſts, the reſt marched only upon ice, where every thing was ſlippery; where there was no hold for the feet; and where in caſe of the leaſt falſe ſtep, in which the hands and knees might be neceſſary for recovering the legs, there was no longer either branches or roots to lay hold of. Beſides this inconvenience, the horſes ſtriking the ice hard in order to keep footing upon it, plunged their feet into it in ſuch a manner, that they could not draw them out, and continued there as if catched in a gin. It was therefore proper to have recourſe to ſome other expedient.

Hannibal choſe to make his army incamp, and reſt itſelf for ſome time upon the ſummit of this hill, which was broad enough, after the ground was cleared, and all the ſnow, both new and old, that covered it, removed, which coſt infinite pains. A way was afterwards cut by his order through the ſolid rock, and that work carried on with amazing ardour and conſtancy. To open and enlarge this way, all the trees round about were cut down, and as faſt as that was done, the wood was diſ-

poſed

poſed round the rock; after which it was ſet on fire. Happily the wind was very high, which ſoon kindled a vaſt flame; ſo that the rock itſelf became as red as the fire around it. Hannibal then, if we may believe Livy, (for Polybius does not ſay a word of this circumſtance) cauſed * vinegar to be poured upon it, which inſinuating itſelf into the clefts of the rock, ſplit by the force of the fire, calcined and ſoftened it. In this manner taking a compaſs ſo as to abridge the declivity, a way was cut along the rock that afforded an eaſy paſſage for the troops, baggage, and even elephants. Four days were employed in this work. The carriage-beaſts died of hunger; for there was nothing to ſubſiſt them on mountains entirely covered with ſnow. They at length arrived at cultivated, fertile places, which ſupplied the horſes abundantly with forage, and the men with all kinds of nouriſhment. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

In this manner Hannibal arrived in Italy, after having employed fifteen days in paſſing the Alps, and five months in this whole march from Carthagena, till the army quitted theſe mountains. It was then much inferior in number to what it was when he ſet out from Spain, where we have ſeen that it amounted to near ſixty thouſand men. It had already ſuſtained great

* *Many reject this fact as ſuppoſed and impoſſible.* **Pliny** *however obſerves upon the force of vinegar in breaking ſtones and rocks.* Saxa rumpit infuſum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens, *l.* xxiii. *c.* 1. *For which reaſon he calls vinegar*; Succus rerum domitor, *l.* xxxiii. *c.* 2. *Dio ſpeaking of the ſiege of Elcuthera, ſays, that its walls were made to fall down by the force of vinegar*, l. xxxvi. p. 8. *The difficulty of finding a ſufficient quantity of vinegar on theſe mountains for ſuch an operation, is probably what makes it doubtful.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

loſſes upon the march, either in the battles it had been obliged to fight, or in paſſing rivers. On its quitting the banks of the Rhone it was ſtill thirty thouſand foot, and eight thouſand horſe. The paſſing of the Alps diminiſhed it almoſt one half. Hannibal had only twenty thouſand foot left, (of which twelve thouſand were Africans, and eight thouſand Spaniards) and ſix thouſand horſe. Himſelf had cauſed this to be engraven upon a column near the Lacinian promontory.

Grandeur and wiſdom of Hannibal's enterprize.

Thoſe who are ever ſo little accuſtomed to read hiſtory with reflection, cannot but admire ſo great, ſo noble, and ſo bold a deſign, as this of Hannibal, who undertakes to croſs four hundred leagues of country, to paſs the Pyreneans, the Rhone, and the Alps, in order to attack the Romans in the very centre of their empire, without being ſtopt by the innumerable difficulties, with which ſuch a deſign muſt inevitably be attended. But when we conſider all the dangers to which he expoſed himſelf and his army, eſpecially in paſſing the Alps, where he loſt more than half of it, one might be tempted to tax his conduct with imprudence and even temerity; eſpecially if we ſuppoſe, that he engaged in ſo hazardous an enterprize as this, without having foreſeen all its conſequences, and without being informed of the diſpoſition of the nations, and the nature of the places, through which he was to paſs. He would no doubt be inexcuſable, had he acted in this manner: but in this reſpect he has a good apologiſt, in the perſon of Polybius. Hannibal, ſays that Hiſtorian, conducted this great affair with abundance of prudence. He had informed himſelf exactly in the nature and ſituation of the places, to which he propoſed

Polyb. iii. 201.

poſed to go. He knew, that the nations, thro' which he was to paſs, waited only an occaſion to revolt againſt the Romans. And laſtly, by way of precaution againſt the difficulty of the ways, he took the people of the country for his guides, who offered themſelves the more willingly for that ſervice, and might be confided in with the greater ſecurity, as they had the ſame hopes and intereſts. Beſides which, the ways over the Alps were not ſo impracticable, as they might be imagined. Before Hannibal approached them, the Gauls bordering upon the Rhone had paſſed thoſe mountains more than once; as they had very recently to join the Gauls in the neighbourhood of the Po againſt the Romans. And farther, the Alps themſelves are inhabited by a very numerous people, where an army, in conſequence, may find proviſions and forage. I can ſpeak with certainty of all theſe things, ſays Polybius at the end of this reflection, becauſe I have informed myſelf concerning them by the teſtimony of cotemporaries; and as to what regards places, I know them of myſelf, having viſited the Alps, and conſidered them attentively, in order to have an exact knowledge of them. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

SECT. III.

Hannibal takes Taurinum (Turin.) *Battle of the cavalry near the Ticinus, in which P. Scipio is defeated. The Gauls come in crowds to join Hannibal. Scipio retires, paſſes the Trebia, and intrenches himſelf near that river. Actions that paſs in Sicily. Naval battle, in which the Carthaginians are defeated. Sempronius is recalled from Sicily into Italy, to aid his collegue. Notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of P. Scipio, he fights a battle near Trebia, and is defeated. Succeſsful expeditions of Cn. Scipio in Spain. Hannibal attempts to paſs the Appenines. Second battle between Sempronius and Hannibal. The Conſul Servilius ſets out for Rimini. The feaſt of the Saturnalia revived. Hannibal diſmiſſes the priſoners taken from the allies of Rome without ranſom. His ſtratagem to prevent attempts upon his life. He paſſes the marſh of Cluſium, where he loſes an eye. He advances towards the enemy, and ravages the whole country to draw the Conſul to a battle. Flaminius, contrary to the advice of the council of war, and bad omens, engages. Famous battle of the lake of Thraſymenus. Contraſt between Flaminius and Hannibal. Bad choice of the People the occaſion of the defeat. General affliction which it cauſes at Rome.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. *Taking of Taurinum.* Polyb. ii. 212. Liv. xxi. 39.

HANNIBAL's firſt care, on quitting the Alps, was to give his troops ſome reſt, of which they were in extreme need. When he ſaw them in a good condition, the people of the territory of Turin (*Taurini*) having refuſed to make an alliance with him, he incamped

incamped before their principal city, which he took in three days, and put all who had oppoſed him to the ſword. This expedition occaſioned ſo great a conſternation amongſt the Barbarians, that they all came of themſelves to ſubmit to the victor. The reſt of the Gauls would have done the ſame, as they were highly diſpoſed by inclination, and as they had cauſed Hannibal to be aſſured, if the fear of the Roman army, which approached, had not reſtrained them. Hannibal judged then, that he had no time to loſe, that it was neceſſary to advance into the country, and to venture ſome exploit, that might eſtabliſh a confidence in him amongſt the people, who were deſirous to declare for him. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

The Romans, in the beginning of the campaign, had expected nothing leſs than to be obliged to ſuſtain the war in Italy. The extraordinary rapidity of their enemy, the ſucceſs of ſo hazardous an enterprize as that of marching through ſo many countries, and of paſſing the Alps with an army, the diligence and vivacity of his motions immediately after his arrival; all this aſtoniſhed Rome, and occaſioned great alarm there. Sempronius, one of the Conſuls, received orders to quit Sicily, and come to the aid of his country. P. Scipio, the other Conſul, had no ſooner landed at Piſa, and received from the Prætors Manlius and Atilius the troops under their command, than he advanced by long marches towards the enemy, paſſed the Po, and incamped near the * Ticinus. *Battle of the cavalry near the Ticinus gained by Hannibal.* Polyb. iii. 214—218 Liv. xxi. 39—47. App. 316.

* *A little river in Lombardy.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Here the two armies were in view of each other. The two Generals knew little of, but had already conceived an eſteem, and even admiration, for each other. On the one ſide the name of Hannibal had been very famous from before the taking of Saguntum; and on the other, the Carthaginian judged the merit of Scipio, from the choice which had been made of his perſon to command the Romans againſt him. What ſtill mutually increaſed this high opinion, was, that Scipio had renounced the command of the army in Spain, and quitted Gaul to oppoſe Hannibal in Italy; and that Hannibal had been ſo bold as to form the deſign of paſſing the Alps, and ſo fortunate as to put it in execution.

The Generals on both ſides thought it proper to harangue their ſoldiers, before they came to blows.

"Scipio, after having repreſented to his "troops the glory of their country, and the "great actions of their forefathers, told them, "that victory was in their own hands, as they "had to deal with Carthaginians, ſo often de-"feated, reduced to be their tributaries and al-"moſt their ſlaves long ago. That Hannibal, "in paſſing the Alps, had loſt the beſt part of "his army: that the reſt were exhauſted by "hunger, cold, fatigues and miſery: that it "would ſuffice only to ſhew themſelves, in or-"der to put troops to flight, that reſembled "ghoſts more than men." *All that I fear*, continued he, *is that Hannibal will ſeem to have been conquered by the Alps, before you come to blows with him. But it is but juſt that the gods, who have been firſt inſulted, ſhould alſo begin the war firſt with a people and a leader guilty of perjury and*

and the violation of treaties. They have only left to us, us who have been injured but in the ſecond place, the glory of giving them the laſt blow. Let us try, added he, *whether, after twenty years, the earth on a ſudden has brought forth a new race of Carthaginians, or whether they are the ſame we defeated at the iſlands Ægates, and in ſo many other places. We might have made our victorious fleet ſail for Africa, and, without much pains, have deſtroyed Carthage their capital. We granted them peace, and took them under our protection, when they were highly diſtreſſed by the revolt of all Africa. For theſe great ſervices they are come to attack our country under the leading of a young madman, who has ſworn our deſtruction. For now it is not Sicily and Sardinia, but Italy, that is in queſtion. It is here that we are to make our utmoſt efforts, as if we fought under the walls of Rome themſelves. Let each of you imagine, that he is not only defending his own perſon, but his wife and children. And let not your families only engroſs your thoughts; remember that the Roman Senate and People have their eyes fixed upon your arms; and that the fortune of Rome and her whole empire, depends ſolely upon your vigorous behaviour and valour.* A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal, in order to be the better underſtood by ſoldiers of a groſs apprehenſion, ſpoke to their eyes, before he addreſſed himſelf to their ears, and did not think of perſuading them by reaſons, till after he had prepared them by objects. He gave arms to many of the mountaineers he had taken, made them fight two and two in the ſight of his army; promiſing liberty and a compleat ſuit of armour, with a war-horſe to ſuch of them as came off victorious. "The joy, with which thoſe Barbarians

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

" ran to fight on ſuch motives, gave Hannibal
" occaſion, from what had juſt paſſed before
" their eyes, to give his troops a more lively
" image of their preſent ſituation, which leaving
" them no means of going back, laid them
" under the abſolute neceſſity of conquering or
" dying, in order to avoid the infinite miſeries
" prepared for thoſe, who ſhould be abject
" enough to give way before the Romans. He
" ſet before their eyes the greatneſs of rewards,
" the conqueſt of all Italy, the plunder of
" Rome, that rich and opulent city, illuſtrious
" victory, immortal glory. He depreciated
" the Roman power, of which the vain glare
" ought not to dazzle warriors like them, come
" from the pillars of Hercules into the very
" heart of Italy, through the moſt fierce and
" ſavage nations. As to what regarded him
" perſonally, he would not deſcend to com-
" pare himſelf with a General of ſix months
" ſtanding; (ſo he defined Scipio) him, who
" was almoſt born, at leaſt nurtured and brought
" up in the tent of his father Amilcar; him,
" who was the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul,
" of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what
" is ſtill much more, of the Alps themſelves.
" He excited their indignation againſt the in-
" ſolence of the Romans, who had preſumed
" to demand, that himſelf and the ſoldiers
" who had taken Saguntum, ſhould be deli-
" vered up to them; and he animated their
" jealouſy againſt the inſupportable pride of
" thoſe imperious maſters, who believed that
" every thing was to obey them, and that they
" had a right to impoſe laws upon the whole
" earth."

After

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

After theſe diſcourſes both ſides prepared for a battle. Scipio having laid a bridge over the Ticinus, paſſed that river with his troops. Two bad omens had ſpread trouble and alarm throughout his army. To avert their effects, he made the uſual ſacrifices. The Carthaginians were full of ardor. Hannibal made them new promiſes, and cruſhing the head of a lamb he was ſacrificing to pieces, he prayed Jupiter to cruſh his own in the ſame manner, if he did not give his ſoldiers the rewards he had juſt promiſed them.

There is reaſon to ſay, that in war every thing depends upon the beginnings, and that it is a good omen for a General to open the campaign with a victory. Hannibal had great occaſion to begin well, in order to obviate the opinion people might conceive of his having undertaken things above his ability. He relied much upon the valour of his cavalry, and the vigour of his horſes, which were all Spaniſh.

The two Generals ſet out with all their horſe, and with the ſame deſign of taking a view of each other, and met in a great plain on this ſide the Ticinus. Scipio drew up his troops in one line, with the Roman cavalry on the wings, and the Gallick allies in the centre, which were ſtrengthened by light-armed troops. Hannibal regulated himſelf by this diſpoſition. The Numidian horſe were excellent. His cavalry bridled and equipped, were equal in front to that of the Romans. As to the * Numidian horſe, he threw them into the wings, and marched in that order againſt the enemy.

* *The Numidian horſe uſed neither bridle nor ſaddle.*

A. R. 534. Ante C. 218.

The Generals and the cavalry deſiring only to engage, the charge began. At firſt, Scipio's light-armed ſoldiers had no ſooner diſcharged their firſt darts, than terrified by the Carthaginian cavalry, which came on upon them, and fearing to be trod under foot by the horſes, they gave way, and fled through the intervals between the ſquadrons. The battle was ſuſtained a great while with equal vigour. Many ſoldiers diſmounted on both ſides, ſo that the action became of foot as well as of horſe. During this time the Numidians, that extended beyond the Roman cavalry in front, wheeled about upon the wings, and whilſt part of them charged in flank, the reſt cut to pieces what remained of the light-armed troops, that had retired behind the wings, and afterwards attacked the horſe in the rear. The Romans being ſurrounded on both ſides, the diſorder became general. Scipio was wounded in this battle, and rendered incapable of action. He was brought off from the enemy by the valour of his ſon, who was then but ſeventeen years of age, and was making his firſt campaign. That young Hero diſtinguiſhed himſelf gloriouſly here by an action of valour, and at the ſame time of filial piety, in ſaving his father's life. This was the great Scipio, who afterwards acquired the name of *Africanus*, by terminating this war ſucceſsfully.

The Conſul dangerouſly wounded, retired in good order, and was carried into his camp by a large body of the horſe, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the reſt of the troops followed him thither. He quitted it ſoon after, having ordered his ſoldiers to pack up their baggage ſecretly, decamped from the Ticinus,

cinus, moved on expeditiouſly to the banks of the Po, and made his troops paſs that river with abundance of tranquility. They arrived at Placentia, before Hannibal knew that they were decamped from near the Ticinus. He immediately ſet out to purſue them, but found the bridge broke down. He took only ſix hundred men priſoners, who were ſtill on this ſide of the river, and had not made haſte enough to paſs over to the other. Theſe had been left to guard the fort built at the head of the bridge. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Such was the firſt battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, which properly ſpeaking was only a rencounter of the cavalry, and not a battle in form. The ſuperiority of the Carthaginian cavalry was manifeſt in it; and from thenceforth the principal force of their army was judged to conſiſt in it; for which reaſon the Romans ought to have avoided large and open plains, ſuch as are thoſe between the Alps and the Po.

The Gauls come in throngs to join Hannibal.

Immediately after the battle of Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls, in emulation of each other, came in and ſurrendered themſelves to Hannibal, as they had concerted at firſt, ſupplied him with munitions, and entered themſelves to ſerve in his troops. And this, as Polybius has already obſerved, was the principal reaſon that induced that wiſe and able General, notwithſtanding the ſmall number and fatigue of his troops, to hazard an action, which was become his abſolute neceſſity, as it was not in his power to return back, had it been ever ſo much in his will: becauſe only a victory could make the Gauls declare in his favour, whoſe aid was the ſole reſource he had in the preſent conjuncture. Polyb. iii. 220. Liv. xxi. 48.

Han-

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Hannibal having paſſed the Po upon a bridge of boats, incamped near the enemy. The following night, about two thouſand foot and two hundred horſe of the Gauls, who ſerved amongſt the Romans as auxiliary troops, after having killed the guards of the gates of the camp, went over to that of Hannibal. That General received them with many profeſſions of amity, and having promiſed them great rewards, he ſent them to their reſpective homes, recommending it to them to engage their countrymen in his intereſts.

Scipio, retires, paſſes the Trebia, and intrenches himſelf near that river.

Scipio conſidered this deſertion of the Gauls as the ſignal of a general revolt, and did not doubt, that they would fly to arms like madmen, after having proceeded to ſuch an exceſs of perfidy. For this reaſon, notwithſtanding the pain which his wound gave him, he ſet out ſecretly towards the end of the following night, and having advanced toward the Trebia, a little river near Placentia, he incamped upon the eminences, where it was not eaſy for the horſe to approach. His retreat was not ſo ſecret as from the Ticinus. Hannibal having ſent after him firſt the Numidians, and afterwards all his cavalry, would have infallibly cut off his rear-guard, if the Numidians, through their avidity of plunder, had not thrown themſelves into the camp, which the Romans had juſt abandoned. Whilſt they were ſearching every where without finding any thing to make them amends for the time they loſt, the enemy eſcaped out of their hands. And accordingly they immediately perceived the Romans employed in intrenching themſelves on the other ſide of the river, which they had time enough to paſs; and all their advantage was confined to killing a ſmall

a ſmall number of ſtragglers, whom they found ſtill on the ſame ſide with them. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Scipio not being able to ſupport the pain, which the agitation of the march gave him, and believing it neceſſary to wait for his colleague, whom he knew had been recalled from Sicily, choſe the ground by the ſide of the river where he thought he might continue with moſt ſafety, and intrenched himſelf. Hannibal was incamped not far from thence. But, if his victory over the Roman cavalry gave him joy, the ſcarcity of proviſions, which augmented every day in an army obliged to march through an enemy's country, without any preparation for it on its route, gave him no leſs diſquiet. This reduced him to ſend a party to * Claſtidium, where the Romans had laid up a great quantity of corn. The perſon whom he had charged with this expedition, tried at firſt to make himſelf maſter of that place by force. But Daſius of Brunduſium, who commanded in it, having offered to deliver it up for money, he accepted that traitor's propoſal; in conſequence of which it coſt Hannibal only four hundred pieces of gold for what ſubſiſted his troops during the whole time, that he continued in the neighbourhood of Trebia. He treated the garriſon, which had been put into his hands with the place, favourably, in order to acquire the reputation of a General of great clemency in the beginning.

Actions in Sicily. Naval battle, in which the Carthaginians are defeated. Liv. xxi. 49, 52.

Whilſt Hannibal was carrying on the war in Italy by land, the Carthaginians acted by ſea in the neighbourhood of Sicily, and the other iſlands near Italy. Of twenty galleys of five benches

* *A ſmall city between the Po and the Alps.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

benches of oars, which the Carthaginians had put to ſea to ravage the coaſts of Italy, nine got to the iſland of Lipara, and eight to the *Vulcaniæ*. The three others were carried into the ſtrait by a contrary wind. King Hiero, who was by accident then at Meſſana, where he expected the Conſul, having perceived them, ſent out twelve galleys, which took them without difficulty, and brought them into the port of that city. The priſoners taken in thoſe ſhips informed him, that beſides the fleet of twenty galleys of which they were part, there were thirty-five ſhips more of the ſame kind, which were coming to Sicily, in order to ſollicite the antient allies of the Carthaginians. That they believed this ſecond fleet was principally deſigned to take the city of Lilybæum: but that it had been driven to the iſlands Ægates by the ſame ſtorm as had diſperſed them.

The King wrote immediately to M. Æmilius, Prætor of Sicily, to give him this advice, and to apprize him of the arrival of the enemy. The Prætor immediately ſent Lieutenants and Tribunes to Lilybæum, and the neighbouring cities, with orders to keep the ſoldiers in readineſs, and eſpecially to take care of Lilybæum, in which the proviſions and machines neceſſary for war were laid up. At the ſame time he publiſhed a decree, by which the mariners and ſoldiers, who were to ſerve by ſea, were required to prepare proviſions for ten days, to carry them on board their ſhips, and to embark the moment the ſignal ſhould be given for that purpoſe. He alſo recommended it to thoſe, who guarded the coaſts, to redouble their vigilance, and to give notice of the arrival of the enemy's fleet as ſoon as they perceived it at ſea. In conſequence,

ſequence, though the Carthaginians had regulated their courſe ſo as to arrive at Lilybæum in the night, they were however deſcried at a conſiderable diſtance, becauſe the moon ſhone bright, and they came with their ſails flying. The ſentinels gave their ſignal that inſtant; the city took arms, and the ſhips were manned immediately. The ſoldiers were divided, ſo that ſome fought on board the galleys, whilſt the reſt defended the walls and gates of the city. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

The Carthaginians, on their ſide, ſeeing that the enemy were upon their guard, would not enter the port before day. They paſſed the reſt of the night in furling their ſails, and preparing their ſhips for battle. As ſoon as day appeared they ſtood out to ſea, in order to have room enough to act themſelves, and to give the enemy liberty to come out of the port. The Romans did not refuſe battle, encouraged by the advantage they remembered they had gained over the Carthaginians almoſt in the ſame place, and relying upon the number and valour of their ſoldiers.

When the two fleets were out at ſea, the Romans, full of ardor and confidence, prepared to meaſure their force with that of the Carthaginians. The latter, on the contrary, endeavoured to avoid fighting man to man, ſubſtituting ſtratagem to force, becauſe their hope was founded ſolely on the lightneſs and agility of their veſſels, and not on their own courage. And indeed they had abundance more people to work them than to fight; and on boarding them there appeared far more mariners than ſoldiers. This difference of troops having leſſened their boldneſs, and augmented that of the Romans, they immedittely fled, leaving ſeven

of

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. of their ſhips at the mercy of the enemy, with ſeventeen hundred men, as well mariners as ſoldiers, amongſt whom were three Carthaginians of the principal nobility. The Roman fleet retired without having ſuffered any thing, except one galley, which had received damage; but however regained the port with the reſt.

The news of this battle had not yet been carried to Meſſana, when the Conſul Sempronius arrived there. In entering the port he found King Hiero, who was come to meet him with a fleet well equipped. That Prince having quitted his own ſhip to go on board that of the Conſul, expreſſed his joy for his happy arrival with his fleet and army, wiſhed him all poſſible ſucceſs in Sicily, and afterwards acquainted him with the condition of the iſland, and the enterprize of the Carthaginians. He concluded with aſſuring him, that he would ſerve the Romans in his advanced age with the ſame zeal and courage, as he had given them proofs of in his youth. He told him, that he would ſupply him *gratis* with proviſions and cloaths for the legions, and the ſoldiers and mariners that ſerved on board the fleet: That the enemy intended to attack Lilybæum, and the other maritime cities; and that there was reaſon to fear that the love of novelty would induce a great number of Sicilians to ſecond them. The Conſul, upon this advice, believing he had no time to loſe, ſet out for Lilybæum, accompanied by Hiero and his fleet. They had not been long at ſea, when they were informed of the battle, which had been fought near that city, and the defeat of the Carthaginians.

When

When they arrived at Lilybæum, Hiero took leave of the Conſul, and retired with his fleet. Sempronius having recommended the care of the coaſt to the Prætor, whom he left at Lilybæum, ſet ſail for Malta, where the Carthaginians had a garriſon. As ſoon as he appeared, Amilcar the ſon of Giſgo, who commanded in the iſland with about two thouſand men under him, were delivered up to him. Some days after he returned to Lilybæum, and himſelf and the Prætor ſold all the priſoners they had taken, except the perſons of diſtinction. The Conſul, ſeeing that Sicily had nothing farther to fear on that ſide, went to the * iſlands Vulcaniæ, where it was reported, that the Carthaginian fleet lay in the road. But he did not find any of the enemy: they were ſet out from thence in order to plunder the coaſts of Italy. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Sempronius is recalled from Sicily into Italy to aid his collegue. Polyb. iii. 220. Liv. xxi. 52.

The Conſul, at his return to Sicily, received advice of the deſcent and ravages of the enemy's fleet, and at the ſame time letters from the Senate, which informed him of Hannibal's arrival, and ordered him to return directly to the aid of his collegue. Divided by ſo many different cares, his firſt was to embark his army, which he ordered to repair to Ariminum by the Upper, or Adriatic ſea. He ſent Sextus Pomponius his Lieutenant with twenty-ſeven galleys to cover Calabria, and all the maritime coaſt of Italy. He left the Prætor M. Æmilius a compleat fleet of fifty galleys. As for himſelf, after having put Sicily into a condition of defence, he coaſted Italy with ten ſhips, and landed at Ariminum, where he found his army, and marched with it to join his collegue near Trebia.

* *North of Sicily.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

In conſequence the Conſuls were joined with all the troops of the Commonwealth; and it was expected, that the two armies would ſoon come to a battle. Hannibal had approached the camp of the Romans, from which he was ſeparated only by the little river. The proximity of the armies occaſioned frequent ſkirmiſhes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of cavalry, gained an inconſiderable advantage over a party of the Carthaginians; but one that much augmented the good opinion that General had already conceived of his own merit.

Sempronius notwithſtanding his colleague's remonſtrances gives battle near Trebia, and is defeated. Polyb. iii. 221—227 Liv. xxi. 52—57. App. 317.

This ſlight ſucceſs ſeemed a compleat victory to him. He boaſted with much ſelf-complacency of having beat the enemy in the firſt encounter, in a kind of fight wherein his collegue had been defeated, and of having thereby revived the languid courage of the Romans. Determined to come to a deciſive action as ſoon as poſſible, he thought it neceſſary, for the ſake of decency, to conſult Scipio, whom he found of an entirely different opinion. "That Conſul "repreſented, that if time was given the new "levies to exerciſe themſelves during the winter, they would be much more capable of "ſervice the next campaign; that the natural "levity and inconſtancy of the Gauls would by "degrees divide them from Hannibal; that "himſelf was not entirely well of his wound, "and that when he ſhould be in a condition to "act, his preſence might be of ſome uſe in a "general affair: and he concluded with earneſtly deſiring him to go no farther."

How ſolid ſoever theſe reaſons were, Sempronius could not reliſh them, or at leaſt he had no regard to them. He ſaw ſixteen thouſand Romans,

Romans, and twenty thouſand allies under his command, without including the cavalry: a compleat army conſiſted then of that number of troops, when the two Conſuls were in the field together. The enemy's army, though augmented by the Gauls, was not ſo numerous. The conjuncture ſeemed to him entirely favourable. He ſaid openly, "that both officers "and ſoldiers deſired a battle, except his col-"legue, whoſe courage being more weakened "by his wound than his body, could not bear "to hear of coming to blows. But was it "juſt, that every body ſhould grow languid "with him? What more did he expect? Had "he any hopes, that a third Conſul and a "new army were to come to his aid? What a "grief, ſaid he, would it be to our anceſtors, "if they ſaw two Conſuls at the head of two "great armies, tremble before the ſame Car-"thaginians, whom they in times paſt attacked "within the very walls of Carthage"? A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

He talked in the ſame manner both amongſt the ſoldiers, and even in the tent of Scipio. A perſonal view made him think and ſpeak in this manner. The time for the election of new Conſuls which approached, made him fear, that a ſucceſſor would be ſent him, before he could come to blows with Hannibal; and he thought it neceſſary to take the advantage of his colleague's illneſs, to ſecure all the glory of the victory to himſelf. As he did not conſult the proper time for the ſervice, ſays Polybius, but for himſelf, he could not fail of taking bad meaſures. Accordingly he ordered the troops to hold themſelves in readineſs for a battle.

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. This was all Hannibal deſired; who held it for a maxim, that a General who has advanced into an enemy's or a foreign country, and has formed an extraordinary enterprize, has no other reſource, than continually to keep up the hopes of his allies by ſome new exploit. Knowing that he had to do only with new raiſed troops of no experience, he was deſirous to take the advantage of the ardor of the Gauls, who demanded to fight, and of Scipio's abſence whom his wound would not permit to be preſent in the battle. And laſtly, he ſaw that the poſt he occupied was the moſt advantagious that could be choſen for his numerous cavalry and elephants, in which the principal force of his army conſiſted, to act in. Animated by all theſe motives, his only thought was to lay an ambuſcade, from which the raſhneſs of Sempronius promiſed him good ſucceſs.

Between the two armies there was a ſpot, which Hannibal judged proper for this deſign. It was an open plain wherein there was a rivulet. Its banks of ſufficient height, were beſides covered with buſhes and brambles, and near it were hollows of depth enough to hide even cavalry. He knew that an ambuſcade was often more ſure in a flat and level country, but buſhy as this was, than in woods, becauſe leſs ſuſpected. He ordered Mago his brother to poſt himſelf here with with two thouſand horſe and foot. He made his Numidian cavalry paſs the Trebia, with orders to advance at day-break to the very gates of the enemy's camp, in order to draw them on to a battle; and to repaſs the river in retiring, to induce the Romans alſo to paſs it; and to enter the plain. What he foreſaw did not fail to happen. The hot-headed Sempronius

Sempronius firſt ſent all his cavalry againſt the Numidians, then ſix thouſand light-armed troops, who were ſoon followed by all the reſt of the army. The Numidians gave way with deſign. The Romans purſued them with ardor. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

That day there was a very cold fog, and abundance of ſnow fell. As the Conſul had made the men and horſes quit the camp with precipitation, and without either having taken any nouriſhment. or given them any other preſervative againſt the inconvenience of the place and ſeaſon, they were benummed with cold, which became ſtill more intenſe in proportion as they approached the river. But when in purſuing the Numidians, who had fled expreſsly to draw them on, the foot had entered the water up to their breaſts, which the rain had ſwelled extremely the night before, their limbs were chilled and penetrated with cold to ſuch a degree, that they could ſcarce ſupport their arms; beſides what they ſuffered by hunger, not having ate the whole day, which was now much advanced.

This was not the caſe with Hannibal's ſoldiers. By his order they had kindled fires before their tents, and rubbed all their limbs with oil, which was diſtributed by companies, in order to render them the more ſupple: they had alſo refreſhed themſelves entirely at their eaſe. We ſee here the advantage of having a General of attention and foreſight, whoſe vigilance nothing eſcapes.

As ſoon as the Romans had quitted the river, Hannibal, who waited that moment, made his troops advance. The Conſul, ſeeing that the enemy, in facing about, treated his horſe roughly, had cauſed a retreat to be ſounded and

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. called them. Both ſides then prepared for battle. The two Generals drew up their armies in the following manner.

Hannibal poſted the ſlingers and light-armed troops in the front line, who amounted to about eight thouſand men. Behind them he drew up his infantry in one line, to the number of twenty thouſand men, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans. He divided his cavalry on the two wings, which, including the Gauls, amounted to above ten thouſand men; and ſtrengthened thoſe two wings with his elephants, part of which he placed before the right, and part before the left.

Sempronius drew up his foot, conſiſting of ſix and thirty thouſand men, in three lines, according to the cuſtom of the Romans. His cavalry, which conſiſted of four thouſand men, was divided on the two wings. The light-armed troops were poſted along the whole front. According to this diſpoſition, the Roman army muſt have been much exceeded in front by that of the Carthaginians.

When they advanced, the light-armed troops on both ſides began the action, which at firſt was no leſs favourable to the Carthaginians than diſadvantagious to the Romans. On the ſide of the latter were ſoldiers who had ſuffered hunger and cold from early in the morning, moſt of whoſe darts had been diſcharged in attacking the Numidians; and thoſe that remained were ſo heavy with having been ſoaked in the water, that they could be of no uſe. The horſe and the whole army were in no better condition to act. There was nothing of this kind on the ſide of the Carthaginians. Freſh, vigorous, and

and full of ardor, nothing prevented them from doing their duty. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Accordingly, as ſoon as the light-armed troops were retired into the intervals of the lines, and the heavy-armed infantry were engaged, the Carthaginian horſe, which far exceeded the Roman cavalry in number and vigour, fell upon the latter with ſuch force and impetuoſity, that they broke and put it to flight in a moment. The flank of the Roman foot being then uncovered, the light-armed troops of the Carthaginians, and the Numidian horſe, returned to the charge, fell upon the flanks of the Romans, put them into diſorder, and made them incapable of defending themſelves againſt thoſe who attacked them in front. The battle was hotteſt on both ſides in the center of the heavy-armed infantry. The Romans defended themſelves there with a courage, or rather a fury, that nothing could overcome. At this inſtant the Numidians quitted their ambuſcade, charged the legions, who fought in the centre, and put them into extreme confuſion. The two wings, that is to ſay, the troops on the right and left of the centre, attacked in front by the elephants, and in flank by the light-armed troops, were driven headlong into the river. As to the centre, thoſe who were in the rear, could not keep their ground againſt the Numidians, who had charged them behind, and were entirely put to flight: the reſt, who were in the front and on the firſt line, forced by an happy neceſſity to fight in deſpair, after having defeated the Gauls, and part of the Africans, opened themſelves a way through the Carthaginians. Then ſeeing that they could neither aid their wings, which had been entirely put to the rout, nor return to

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. their camp, which the Numidian cavalry, the river, and the rain oppoſed, they drew up in cloſe order, and took the rout of Placentia, to which they retreated without danger, to the number of at leaſt ten thouſand men.

Moſt of the reſt who ſtaid behind periſhed upon the banks of the river, either cruſhed to pieces by the elephants, or put to the ſword by the horſe. Thoſe who could eſcape, as well foot as horſe, joined the groſs of the infantry of whom we have juſt ſpoke, and followed it to Placentia. The Carthaginians purſued the enemy to the river, where the rigor of the weather ſtopped them, and made them return to their intrenchments. The victory was compleat, and the loſs inconſiderable. Only a very ſmall number of Spaniards and Africans remained upon the place. The Gauls ſuffered moſt, and the whole army exceedingly by the rain and ſnow. Abundance of men and horſes periſhed with cold, and only a ſmall number of the elephants could be ſaved.

The night following, the Romans who had ſtaid behind to guard the camp, paſſed the Trebia without being perceived by the enemy, in effect of a violent rain, which fell with a great noiſe. And perhaps exhauſted with the fatigue of the day, and having abundance of wounded, they only feigned not to perceive them, and gave them time to retire to Placentia.

The loſs of the battle was only to be imputed to the raſhneſs and blind preſumption of the Conſul, who, notwithſtanding the wiſe remonſtrances of his collegue, hurried on to a battle in a conjuncture, when every thing was againſt him. The bad ſucceſs was a juſt puniſhment of his vanity, but not the remedy of it. To conceal his ſhame and defeat, he ſent couriers

riers to Rome, who ſaid no more than that a battle had been fought, in which the Roman army would have been victorious, if it had not been for the bad weather. At firſt nobody ſuſpected the truth of this news. But the whole particulars of the action arrived ſoon after: that the Carthaginians had defeated the Conſul's army, and taken his camp; that part of the legions had retired and taken refuge in the neighbouring colonies; that all the Gauls had made an alliance with Hannibal; and that the army had no munitions, but what came from the ſea by the Po. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

This news occaſioned ſo much terror in the city, that the people every moment expected to ſee the victorious army arrive before their walls, without having any means for defending themſelves. They ſaid, that after the defeat of Scipio at the Ticinus, they had recalled Sempronius from Sicily, and ordered him to go to the aid of his collegue. But after the defeat of two Conſuls, and two Conſulary armies, what other leaders, what other legions, could they oppoſe to the victorious enemy! *Conſternation occaſioned by this news at Rome.* Polyb. iii. 227. Liv. xxi. 57.

Theſe ſad reflections did not long engroſs the Romans. They conſidered how to prevent the conſequences of ſo unfortunate an event. Great preparations were made for the following campaign: garriſons were put into the towns, and troops were ſent into Sardinia and Sicily, as alſo to Tarentum, and all the important poſts. Sixty galleys were fitted out of five benches of oars, and deputies diſpatched to Hiero to demand aid. That King ſent them five hundred Cretans, and a thouſand heavy-armed foot. To conclude, no meaſures were omitted, that the conjuncture made neceſſary. For, adds Polybius, *Preparations for the next campaign.*

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

bius, ſuch are the Romans in general and particular; the more reaſon they have to fear, the more formidable they become. The firſt thing they did, was to make the Conſul Sempronius return from the army to preſide in the aſſembly, for the election of Conſuls. Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius were choſen. We ſhall ſoon ſee of what character the latter was, after we have ſeen what paſſed the ſame year in Spain.

Succeſs of Cn. Scipio in Spain. Polyb. iii. 228. Liv. xxi. 60, 61.

Cn. Cornelius Scipio, to whom Publius his brother had left the command of the naval army, having ſet out from the mouths of the Rhone with all his fleet, arrived at * Emporiæ. He beſieged all the cities upon that coaſt as far as the Iberus that refuſed to ſurrender, and treated thoſe who ſubmitted voluntarily with abundance of lenity. He took great care, that the latter ſhould ſuffer no hurt, and put good garriſons into the new conqueſts he had made. Then penetrating into the country at the head of his army, that had already been augmented by a great number of the Spaniſh people, who became his allies in proportion as he advanced into the country, he ſometimes received cities into his alliance, and ſometimes took them by force, as they lay on his route.

Hannibal had given the government of that province on this ſide of the Iberus to Hanno, and ordered him to keep it in the intereſts of the Carthaginians. To put a ſtop to the progreſs of the Romans, before the whole country ſhould have declared for them, he incamped in their view, and offered them battle. Scipio accepted it with joy, becauſe not being able to avoid having both Aſdrubal and Hanno to deal

* *Now called* Empurius *in Catalonia.*

with,

with, he choſe rather to fight them ſeparately, A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. than to have them both upon his hands at the ſame time. The victory coſt them little. He killed ſix thouſand of the enemy, took the General himſelf with ſome of his principal officers, and two thouſand priſoners, with thoſe who had been left to guard the camp, of which he made himſelf maſter, as well as of * Sciſſis a neighbouring city, which he took by ſtorm. The plunder of it was very conſiderable, becauſe thoſe who had gone with Hannibal to Italy, had left their equipages in it.

Before the news of this defeat had ſpread, Aſdrubal had paſſed the Iberus with eight thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe, in order to meet Scipio, imagining that he was only juſt arrived in Spain. But when he was apprized of Hanno's loſs of the battle and his camp near Sciſſis, he turned towards the ſea. Not far from † Taraco he found the mariners and ſoldiers of Scipio's fleet, negligently diſperſed about the country, in effect of the ſecurity, with which the good ſucceſs of their land-army had inſpired them; and having detached his horſe againſt them, a great number of them were put to the ſword, and the reſt driven to their ſhips. He afterwards retired, and repaſſing the Iberus with his army, took up his winter-quarters in New Carthage, where he applied himſelf wholly in making new preparations, and in guarding the country on that ſide of the river.

Cn. Scipio, on returning to his fleet, puniſhed thoſe who had neglected their duty; and having united both armies, that of the ſea

* *There is no trace of this city in the antient geographers.*
† *City of Catalonia.* Hod. *Tarragona.*

with

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. with the land-forces, he took up his winter-quarters at Taraco. There dividing the ſpoils amongſt the ſoldiers with a ſtrict regard to juſtice, he gained their affection, and made them ardently deſire the continuance of a war, from which they derived ſuch great advantages. And this was the ſtate of affairs in Spain.

Hannibal marches into Hetruria. Liv. xxi. 58. Hannibal, after the battle of Trebia, went upon ſome other expeditions, but of no great importance. The rigour of the ſeaſon obliged him to give his troops ſome reſt after ſo many labours. As ſoon as the leaſt ſign of ſpring appeared, he drew them out of their winter-quarters to make them march into Hetruria, with deſign either to bring over the inhabitants of that country by gentle methods, or to ſubject them by force, as he had the Gauls and Ligurians.

He paſſes the Apennines. For this purpoſe it was neceſſary for him to paſs the Apennine mountains, where he was ſurprized by ſo dreadful a ſtorm, that what he had ſuffered in paſſing the Alps, ſeemed leſs terrible in the compariſon. A prodigious high wind, mingled with rain, drove directly into their faces with ſuch violence, that they were reduced either to abandon their arms, or to be beat down if they attempted to oppoſe the impetuoſity of the hurricane. But, when the wind took away their breath, they turned their backs, and ſtood ſtill for ſome time in that condition. The thunder and lightning with which its dreadful claps were attended, deprived them at once of the uſe of their eyes and ears, ſo that they were ſtruck with terror, and remained in a manner immoveable. The rain at length ceaſed: but, as is the uſual conſequence, the wind riſing ſtill higher, they were obliged to incamp in the ſame place where the ſtorm ſurprized them. This

was

was a new and as arduous a fatigue to them as the firſt. For they could neither ſpread nor pitch the tents, the wind either tearing them out of their hands, or driving them out of their places. And at the ſame time the water, which the wind had raiſed, having condenſed and froze on the tops of the mountains, ſo great a quantity of ſnow and hail fell, that abandoning an ineffectual labour, they all threw themſelves on the ground, overwhelmed under the weight of their tents and habits, rather than covered by them. The cold which enſued was ſo ſharp and penetrating, that the horſes as well as the men endeavoured in vain to riſe, during a great while, their nerves being become ſo ſtiff, that it was impoſſible for them to bend or make uſe of their members. When they had recovered a little ſtrength and courage, in effect of the pains and agitation they gave themſelves, they began to kindle fires from ſpace to ſpace, which was a great relief to them, and ſeemed to reſtore them to life. Hannibal remained two days in this place as if beſieged, and did not quit it till after having loſt a great number of men and horſes, with ſeven of the elephants, which had ſurvived the battle of Trebia. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Battle between Sempronius and Hannibal. L. iv. xxi. 59.

On his deſcent from the Appenines, he incamped ten miles from Placentia. The next day he marched in queſt of the enemy with twelve thouſand foot, and five thouſand horſe. Sempronius, who was already returned from Rome, did not decline the battle. The two armies were then but a league diſtant from each other. The next day they marched with equal ardor to battle which was long diſputed, and in which both ſides had alternately the advantage. In the firſt charge, the Romans were ſo much

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

much ſuperior to the Carthaginians, that after having put them to flight, they purſued them as far as their camp, and even endeavoured to force it. But Hannibal having poſted a ſmall body of troops at the gates, ſufficient however to defend the entrance, ordered the reſt to keep in cloſe order in the middle of the camp, till he gave them the ſignal to ſally, and attack the enemy. It was now about three in the afternoon, when Sempronius, having fatigued his troops ineffectually, ordered a retreat to be ſounded. As ſoon as Hannibal perceived the Romans retiring, he made his cavalry march out on the right and left. The action had been moſt bloody, if the day had permitted it to be of any continuance. Night ſeparated the combatants, dreadfully furious againſt each other. The number of the dead in conſequence did not anſwer the animoſity with which they fought. The loſs on both ſides did not amount to ſix hundred foot, and three hundred horſe: but that of the Romans was conſiderable more by the rank than number of their dead; becauſe many Knights, five legionary Tribunes, and three * Generals of the allies, were left upon the place.

* Præfectos.

After this battle, Hannibal retired into Liguria, where the inhabitants, as a proof of their fidelity, upon his arrival delivered up to him C. Fulvivs and C. Lucretius two Quæſtors, two legionary Tribunes, and five Knights, almoſt all of them Senators. Sempronius retired towards Lucca.

Prodigies. Liv. xxi. 62.

During (*a*) this winter, ſeveral prodigies hap-

(*a*) Romæ aut circa urbem multa, eâ hieme, prodigia facta: aut (quod evenire ſolet motis ſemel in religionem animis) multa nunciata, & temerè credita ſunt. *Liv.*

pened

pened at Rome, and in the neighbourhood: or *to ſpeak more juſtly, a great number were reported, to which people gave credit lightly enough, as it happens, when once ſuperſtition has taken poſſeſſion of their minds.* These words of Livy are remarkable, and ſhew, that he was neither ſo credulous nor ſo ſuperſtitious as many have imagined him. All the ceremonies preſcribed in the like caſes were very ſcrupulouſly performed, and the minds of the people much quieted, after ſacrifices were offered, and vows made to the gods, according to the direction of the Sibyl's books. A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218.

Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius were Conſuls elect. The latter had made himſelf known long before for his turbulent and ſeditious diſpoſition, incapable either of taking his meaſures with wiſdom, or of giving them up after having once reſolved upon them. We have ſeen him engaged in violent conteſts with the Senate during his Tribuneſhip; and again in his firſt Conſulſhip, firſt concerning the Conſulſhip itſelf, which they were for having him abdicate, and then on account of his triumph, of which they undertook to deprive him. He had alſo rendered himſelf odious to them, upon the occaſion of a new law, which Q. Claudius had carried againſt their order, Flaminius having been the only perſon of the Senators that had ſupported him in that enterprize. By this law it was prohibited for any Senator to have a bark of more than three hundred *amphoræ* in burden, which was about 15625 pounds, or about eight tons, ſea-computation. Q. Claudius conceived a veſſel of theſe dimenſions ſufficient for bringing the growth of the Senators lands to Rome, and that *Raſhneſs and arrogance of Flaminius.* Liv. xxi. 63.

A. R. 534. Ant. C. 218. that it was unworthy of their rank to make uſe of ſhips of burthen to carry the grain and fruits of others for hire. The hatred of the Senate ſerved only to acquire him the favour of the People, who, out of a blind affection for him, raiſed him a ſecond time to the Conſulſhip.

He was convinced, that the Senate, to be revenged of him, would keep him at Rome, either by alledging bad omens, obliging him to celebrate the *Feriæ Latinæ*, or having recourſe to ſome of the uſual pretexts for retarding the departure of the Conſuls. Reſolved to cut ſhort all thoſe difficulties, he pretended buſineſs in the country; and having left Rome, he ſet out ſecretly for his province, whilſt he was ſtill in a private capacity. This evaſion, when made public, exaſperated the Senators the more, who were already much incenſed againſt him. They talked publickly, "That Flaminius had declared war, not only againſt the Senate, but "the Gods themſelves. That having been "made Conſul the firſt time contrary to the "auſpices, which oppoſed his election, he had "derided both the Gods and men, who united "in forbidding him to give battle. That now, "actuated by the reproaches which his conſcience made him of his impiety, he had avoided appearing in the Capitol, and performing there the auguſt ceremony of entering "into the Conſulſhip, that he might not be obliged to invoke great Jupiter on ſo ſolemn "an occaſion; that he might neither ſee nor "conſult the Senate, whom he was the only "one that was hated of all the Romans, and by "whom he knew he deſerved to be hated; that

"he

" he might withdraw himſelf from the moſt A. R. 534.
" auguſt and moſt indiſpenſible ceremonies; Ant. C. 218.
" that he might avoid making the uſual vows
" in the Capitol for the proſperity of the Com-
" monwealth and himſelf; and afterwards ſet
" out for his province with the honourable
" marks of his dignity. That he had quitted
" Rome by ſtealth, like the meaneſt ſervant in
" his army, without being preceded by the
" Lictors, without having the *Faſces* carried
" before him, almoſt as if he left his country in
" order to go into baniſhment. Did he believe
" it more honourable and decent for himſelf
" and the Roman Commonwealth to perform
" ſo ſacred and ſo ſplendid a ceremony at Ari-
" minum than at Rome, and in the houſe of
" a ſtranger, than in the preſence of his hou-
" ſhold gods."

The complaints of the whole Senate, and the Deputies ſent to him to oblige him to return, had no effect upon him. He entered upon office at Ariminum; and having received two legions from Sempronius, one of the laſt year's Conſuls, and two from the Prætor C. Atilius, he paſſed the Apennines, in order to enter Hetruria.

CN. SERVILIUS,
C. FLAMINIUS II. A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

Servilius entered upon office at Rome on the Ides, that is to ſay, the 15th of March, the day fixed then for that ceremony; and aſſembled the Senate, in order to conſult them concerning the operations of the campaign which he was going to open. This deliberation gave room for renewing their reproaches againſt Fla- *The Conſul Servilius ſets out for Ariminum.* Liv. xxii. 1.

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. minius. They complained, that they had created two Conſuls, and had but one. That Flaminius could not be deemed as ſuch, having ſet out from Rome without either authority or auſpices. That it was at the Capitol that the Conſuls received thoſe two qualifications, in the preſence of the gods and of the Roman citizens, after having celebrated the Latine games, and offered the cuſtomary ſacrifices upon the Alban mountain, and to the moſt high Jupiter; and not in his province, and a ſtrange country, whither he went only in quality of a private perſon. Servilius, after having received their inſtructions, repaired with his troops to Ariminum, in order to ſhut up the paſſes on that ſide againſt the enemy.

He left Rome in great perplexity. The fears of the public were increaſed by the prodigies related from all parts. Sacrifices, proceſſions, and prayers were ordered to be made in all the temples. Amongſt many other acts of religion, a public feaſt was given, and the * feaſt of Saturn, which continued a day and a night, was proclaimed. This ceremony was made an annual feſtival, which the People were ordered to celebrate for ever. I ſhall relate the circumſtances of it at the end of this ſection.

Saturnalia renewed.

Hannibal diſmiſſes the priſoners taken from the allies of the Romans. Polyb. iii. 229.

Hannibal wintered in Gallia Ciſalpina, where he treated the priſoners of war in a different manner, according to their being Romans or allies. He kept the Romans in priſons, and ſcarce allowed them the neceſſaries of life: whereas he acted with all poſſible lenity in reſpect to their allies. He aſſembled them one

* *This feſtival was inſtituted almoſt three hundred years before.* Liv. ii. 21. *It was only revived now.*

day,

day, and told them, "that he had not come A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.
"thither with intent to make war upon them,
"but to take their defence upon him againſt
"the Romans: that therefore if they under-
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"pouſe his party, as he had paſſed the Alps
"with no other view than to reinſtate the Ita-
"lians in their liberty, and to aſſiſt them in re-
"covering the cities and countries out of
"which they had been driven by the Romans."
After this diſcourſe, he ſent them home to their own countries without ranſom. This was a ſtratagem, to ſeparate the people of Italy from the Romans, to induce them to join him, and to make all thoſe, whoſe cities or ports had been ſubjected by the Romans, take arms in his favour.

Stratagem which he uſes to prevent attempts upon his life. Polyb. iii. 229. Liv. xxii. 1. App. 316.

It was in the ſame winter-quarters that he conceived a truly Carthaginian ſtratagem. He was ſurrounded by a fickle and inconſtant people, and the tie contracted with them was ſtill entirely recent. He had reaſon to apprehend, that on a change of diſpoſition in reſpect to him, they might form deſigns againſt him, and attempt upon his life. For his ſecurity therefore he cauſed perukes and habits to be made for all different ages; and ſometimes wore one kind and ſometimes another, and diſguiſed himſelf ſo often, that not only thoſe, who only ſaw him go backwards and forwards, but even his friends, could hardly know him.

Hannibal ſets out for Hetruria. Polyb. iii. 230. Liv xxii. 2.

The Gauls in the mean time ſuffered the war to be made in their country with great impatience. The hopes of booty had been their ſole inducement to follow Hannibal. They ſaw, that inſtead of enriching themſelves at the expence of others, their country, become the

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A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. theatre of the war, was equally haraſſed by the winter-quarters of both armies. Hannibal had every thing to fear from this diſcontent, which already broke out in murmurs, and complaints ſufficiently public. To prevent their effects, as ſoon as winter was over he made haſte to decamp. He knew, that Flaminius was arrived at Arretium in Hetruria, and directed his march that way. He began by conſulting thoſe who knew the country beſt, in order to judge what route he ſhould take for approaching the enemy. Many were pointed out to him, which did not pleaſe him, becauſe too long, and becauſe they expoſed him to being traverſed by the enemy. There was one which lay through certain marſhes. This was moſt to his liking, becauſe it agreed beſt with the ardent deſire he had of coming to blows with the Conſul, before his collegue could have joined him; and he gave it the preference. On its being rumoured in the army, every body was terrified. There was not a man that did not tremble at the thoughts of the fatigues and dangers they ſhould undergo, in paſſing thoſe marſhes, which the Anio beſides had overflowed for ſome days.

He paſſes the marſhes of Cluſium, where he loſes an eye. Polyb. iii. 230, 231. Liv. xxii. 2.

Hannibal, having been well informed, that the bottom was good, decamped, and compoſed his advanced guard of Africans, Spaniards, and all his beſt troops. With theſe he mixed the baggage, in order, if they were obliged to ſtop, that they ſhould be in want of nothing. The main body was compoſed of Gauls; and the cavalry formed the rear-guard. He had given the command of it to Mago, with orders to make the Gauls advance either by fair means or force, in caſe they ſhould take diſguſt

diſguſt through terror, and be- for going back. A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

The Spaniards and Africans got over with no great difficulty, becauſe as nobody had paſſed the marſh before them, it was tolerably firm under foot. Beſides which they were ſoldiers enured to fatigues, and accuſtomed to this kind of toils. It was not the ſame when the Gauls paſſed. The marſh had been poached by thoſe who had gone over it before. They could not advance without extreme difficulty; and, as they were little uſed to ſuch laborious marches, they did not ſupport this without the utmoſt impatience. However, it was impoſſible for them to go back: the horſe preſſing them forwards continually. It muſt be owned, that the whole army had abundance to ſuffer. During four days and three nights they never had their feet out of water. But the Gauls ſuffered more than all the reſt, moſt of the carriage-beaſts periſhed in the mud, and even then did not ceaſe to be of ſome uſe. Upon their packs out of the water the ſoldiers ſlept at leaſt ſome part of the night. A great number of horſes loſt their hoofs. Hannibal himſelf, upon the only elephant that remained, had all the difficulty in the world to get out of it. A defluction, that fell upon his eyes, occaſioned as well by the alternate heats and colds uſual enough in the beginning of the ſpring, as by being continually awake, and the groſs vapours of the marſh, tormented him exceſſively. And as the conjuncture would not ſuffer him to ſtop, in order to his being cured, this accident coſt him an eye.

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. *Hannibal advances towards the enemy, and ravages the whole country to draw the Conſul on to a battle.* Polyb. iii. 234. Liv. xxii. 5.

When he had with great difficulty got over theſe wet and marſhy lands, he incamped in the firſt dry place he found, in order to give his troops ſome refreſhment. Having been informed by his ſcouts, that the army of the enemy was ſtill in the neighbourhood of Arretium, he applied himſelf with infinite attention to know, on the one ſide, the deſigns and character of the Conſul, and on the other, the ſituation of the country, the means he was to uſe for having proviſions, the ways by which they could be brought to his camp; and all the things in general that could be of advantage to him in the preſent conjuncture: cares highly worthy of a great Captain, and of one that does not act by chance. He knew in conſequence, that the country between * Feſulæ and Arretium was the moſt fertile of Italy; that it had cattle, corn, and all the fruits, which the earth produces for the nouriſhment of man, in abundance. As to Flaminius, that he was a man of an happy turn for inſinuating himſelf into the favour of the populace; but who, without any talents either for government or war, had an high opinion of his own capacity for both, and for that reaſon neither conſulted any body, nor hearkened to any advice: for the reſt, that he was hot, fiery, and bold even to raſhneſs. Hannibal concluded from hence, that if he ruined the country before his eyes, he ſhould infallibly draw him on to a battle.

He neglected nothing that could provoke the fiery temper of his adverſary, and aſſuredly hurry him into the vices natural to him. Ac-

* *Cities of Tuſcany.* Hod. *Fieſole & Arizzo.*

cordingly

cordingly leaving the Roman army on the left, he moved on the right towards Feſulæ; and putting all to fire and ſword in the fineſt country of Hetruria, diſplayed to the eyes of the Conſul as much ravage and deſolation as was poſſible. Flaminius was not of a diſpoſition to remain quiet in his camp, even though Hannibal had lain ſtill in his. But when he ſaw the lands of the allies ravaged before his face, and that the pillage of them was carried off with impunity, and the ſmoke on all ſides denouncing the entire ruin of the country, he believed it a diſgrace to him, that Hannibal ſhould march triumphantly through the middle of Italy, ready to advance to the very gates of Rome, without any reſiſtance. It was to no purpoſe, that thoſe who formed the council of war endeavoured to perſuade him "to prefer the ſafeſt choice to "that which ſeemed the moſt glorious; to "wait for his collegue, in order to act in con-"cert with all the forces of the Commonwealth; "and to content himſelf in the mean time with "detaching the cavalry and light-armed foot, "to prevent the enemy from ravaging the "country with ſo much licence and impunity." Flaminius could not hear this wiſe diſcourſe without indignation. He quitted the council abruptly, and at the ſame time gave the ſignal for the march and battle. *Yes, no doubt*, ſaid he, *let us ſtay here with our arms acroſs before the walls of Arretium. For this is our country; our houſhold gods are here. Let us ſuffer Hannibal, eſcaped out of our hands, to ruin Italy with impunity, and putting all to fire and ſword before him, to arrive at the gates of Rome. And as for us, let us take great care not to ſtir from hence, till a decree of the Senate comes to fetch Flaminius from*

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

Flaminius, contrary to the advice of his council of war and bad omens, gives battle.

Polyb. iii. 233. Liv. xxii. 3. App. 319.

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. *Arretium, as of old Camillus from Veii, to the aid of his country.*

On ſaying theſe words, he leaped upon his horſe. But the beaſt fell down, and threw him head foremoſt to the ground. All who were preſent were frightened by this accident, as a bad omen. As for him, he took no notice of it. The officer, who preſided at the auſpices having informed him, that the chickens would not eat, and that it was neceſſary to put off the battle to another day: *and ſuppoſe they ſhould take a fancy not to eat then*, ſays Flaminius, *what muſt one do, pray? Keep ſtill*, replied the officer. O *wonderful auſpices*, cried Flaminius! *If the chickens are hungry, one may give battle; but if they wont eat, becauſe they have had their fill, one muſt by all means take care not to fight.* He then gave orders to pull up the colours, and follow him. At that inſtant one came to tell him, that a ſtandard-bearer with all his force could not pull his enſign out of the ground, where it had been fixed in the uſual manner. Flaminius, without expreſſing the leaſt ſurprize, turning towards the perſon who brought him this news: *Don't you alſo bring me letters from the Senate*, ſaid he, *to prevent me from giving battle. Begone; and tell the ſtandard-bearer, if fear has froze his hands, to dig round the ſtaff of his enſign, and he'll get it out, I warrant him.*

Cic. de Divin. l. 77.

The army then began to march. Whilſt the General's preſumption inſpired the ſoldiers with a kind of joy, who were ſtruck with his air of confidence, without being capable of weighing his motives for it; the principal officers, who had been of a contrary opinion in the council, were the moſt terrified by the two prodigies, of which they had juſt been witneſſes.

Hanni-

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

Famous battle near the lake of Thraſymenus.

Polyb. iii. 234—236 Liv. xxii. 4—7. Plut. in Fab. 175.

Hannibal, in the mean time, advanced continually towards Rome, with Cortona on his left, and the lake of Thraſymenus on his right. When he ſaw that the Conſul approached, he ſtudied his ground, in order to give battle to his advantage. On his march he came to a very level and ſpacious valley, ſkirted on each ſide with two ridges of mountains, and cloſed at the end with a ſteep hill, of difficult acceſs. At the entrance lay the lake, between which and the foot of the mountains there was a narrow defile, which led into the valley. Through this paſs he filed off, gained the hill at the bottom, and poſted himſelf there with the Spaniards and Africans. On the right behind the eminences, he poſted his Balearians and other troops, armed with miſſive weapons. As to the cavalry and the Gauls, he placed them behind the eminences on the left, and extended them in ſuch a manner, that at the extremity they reached almoſt to the defile at the entrance of the valley. He paſſed an whole night in laying his ambuſcades; after which he waited quietly till he ſhould be attacked.

The Conſul marched behind with an extreme deſire of coming up with the enemy. The firſt day, as he arrived late, he encamped near the lake. It required no great experience in war to perceive, that engaging himſelf in ſuch a defile, was to court his own deſtruction. However, the next morning before day-break, without taking the precaution to have the places viewed, and without ſtaying till it was light enough to diſcern objects, he made his troops enter it. He even carried his ſenſeleſs confidence to ſuch an height, as to make a troop of the ſervants of the army follow him with chains,

Polybius.

with

A. R. 535. Am. C. 217. with which he intended to load the Africans, already conquered in his imagination. A very thick fog had aroſe that morning. When the Conſul had made his troops enter the plain, he believed he had only the Carthaginians he ſaw in his front to deal with, at the head of whom was Hannibal. He never imagined that there might be other bodies of troops in ambuſcade on each ſide behind the mountains. Hannibal having ſuffered him to advance above half the length of the valley, gave the ſignal of battle, and ſent orders to thoſe who were in ambuſcade to attack the enemy at the ſame time on all ſides. One may judge the confuſion of the Romans.

They were not yet drawn up in battle, and had not prepared their arms, when they ſaw themſelves charged on all ſides, in the front, flanks, and rear. Flaminius, though void of all the other qualities neceſſary to a General, had courage. He was the only intrepid perſon in ſo univerſal a conſternation, animated his ſoldiers with his hand and voice, and exhorted them to open themſelves a way with their ſwords through the enemy. But the tumult, that prevailed on all ſides, the dreadful cries of the combatants, and the fog, which had roſe, prevented him from being either heard or ſeen. However, when they perceived, that they were incloſed on all ſides, either by the enemy, the lake, or the mountains, the impoſſibility of eſcaping by flight, reanimated them, and they began to fight on all ſides with aſtoniſhing fury. The animoſity of the two armies was ſo great, that nobody perceived an earthquake, which at that inſtant threw down almoſt whole cities in many

many countries of Italy, and produced amazing effects. A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

The action continued three hours. Flaminius having been killed by an Inſubrian Gaul, the Romans began to give way, and afterwards fled outright. A great number in order to eſcape, threw themſelves into the lake. Others having taken the way of the mountains, came into the midſt of the enemy they were endeavouring to ſhun. Only ſix thouſand opened themſelves a paſſage through the victors, and retired to a place of ſafety: but they were ſtopped, and made priſoners the next day by Maherbal, who beſieged and reduced them to ſo great an extremity, that they laid down their arms, and ſurrendered themſelves upon a promiſe, which was made them, that they ſhould have liberty to retire.

Such was the famous battle of Thraſymenus, which the Romans reckoned in the number of their greateſt misfortunes; and ſuch the fruit of the raſhneſs of Flaminius. It coſt him his own life, and Rome the loſs of ſo many brave ſoldiers, who had been invincible under another General. The Romans loſt fifteen thouſand men in the battle itſelf. About ten thouſand got to Rome by different ways; and only fifteen hundred were killed on the ſide of the Carthaginians; but a great number of their men died of their wounds. Hannibal treated the Roman priſoners very cruelly, and even thoſe who had ſurrendered to Maherbal; pretending that officer had no right to treat with them without having firſt conſulted him. As to the Latine allies of the Romans, he diſmiſſed them without ranſom. He cauſed the body of Flaminius to be ſought for in vain, in order to give

it

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. it honourable interment. He paid the laſt duties to the officers and ſoldiers of his army, that had fallen in the battle; after which he put his troops into quarters of refreſhment.

Contraſt of Flaminius and Hannibal. It is not neceſſary, that I ſhould collect here all the faults of Flaminius into one point of view. They are evident, groſs, and cannot eſcape the leaſt diſcerning eye. We ſee in him the effects of a blind eſteem for one's ſelf, and a ſenſeleſs preſumption, which is diffident of nothing, which would believe it a diſgrace either to aſk or follow counſel, which always flatters itſelf with good ſucceſs, without having taken any meaſures to make it ſure, and which ſees no danger, till it is impoſſible to avoid it.

What a contraſt is there in Hannibal, who ſhews in the action we are ſpeaking of, all the qualities of a great Captain: vigilance, activity, foreſight, profound knowledge of all the rules of the art-military, and of all the ſtratagems of war, indefatigable attention to inform himſelf in every thing; and laſtly, a wonderful addreſs in improving occaſions of times, places, and perſons; and in making them all ſubſervient to his views.

Bad choice of the People occaſion of the defeat. I cannot pardon the Roman people for having, through prejudice for a factious perſon that knew how to flatter them, oppoſed ſo formidable an enemy with ſo contemptible a General as Flaminius. Such choices, and they are not uncommon, often bring a State to the very brink of deſtruction.

General affliction which it occaſions at Rome. Polyb. iii. 236. Liv. xxii. 7. As ſoon as the news of the defeat of the army near the lake of Thraſymenus was brought to Rome, the whole people went to the Forum with abundance of terror and conſternation. The ladies running to and fro about the ſtreets, aſked

aſked all they met, what was the bad news, which had juſt happened, and in what condition the army of the Commonwealth was. The multitude aſſembled round the tribunal of harangues; and the Senate and magiſtrates were deſired to repair thither, in order to inform them of what had paſſed. At length, towards the evening, the Prætor M. Pomponius appeared in public. He ſought no evaſions to ſoften ſuch mournful news: the misfortune was too great to admit of palliatives. *We have loſt a great battle*, ſaid he. Though he did not enter into any particulars, ſome perſons from confuſed rumours, related however different circumſtances: "That the Conſul had been killed; that the greateſt part of the troops had "fallen in the battle; that only a ſmall number of ſoldiers, diſperſed by flight into Hetruria, or made priſoners by the victor, had "eſcaped with life." A. R. 536. Ant. C. 217.

Thoſe, whoſe relations had ſerved under the Conſul Flaminius, were divided in thought by as many various anxieties, as there are different misfortunes, to which conquered troops are expoſed; and nobody yet knew what they were either to hope or fear. The next and the following days, a multitude of citizens were ſeen at the gates, but far more women than men, who waited there the return of their relations, or of ſuch as might give ſome account of them. And, if any one of their acquaintance arrived, they immediately ſurrounded him, and did not quit him, till they had learnt all the particulars they deſired to know from him. They afterwards returned to their homes with grief or joy in their looks, according to the news they had heard,

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

heard, accompanied by others who either congratulated, or condoled with, them.

The women diſtinguiſhed their grief or joy ſtill more than the men. One is ſaid to have died at the gates of the city on the unexpected appearance of her ſon, that returned from the army: and another, who had been falſely informed of the death of her's, to have expired the very moment ſhe ſaw him enter her houſe, where ſhe had given herſelf up to grief. For ſeveral days, the Prætors kept the Senate aſſembled from morning till evening, to deliberate upon the meaſures it was neceſſary to take, and to determine with what General, and what troops, they ſhould be able to oppoſe the victorious Carthaginians.

New defeat of four thouſand horſe. Liv. xxii. 8.

Before they had fixed upon any meaſures, the news of a new misfortune was brought them. Hannibal had defeated four thouſand horſe, whom the Conſul Cn. Servilius had ſent to the aid of his collegue, but who had ſtopt ſhort in Umbria, as ſoon as they had been apprized of what had paſſed near the lake of Thraſymenus. This loſs made different impreſſions upon the people. Some conſidered it as ſlight in compariſon with that ſuſtained before, which wholly engroſſed them. (*a*) Others did not judge of this event from the loſs in itſelf: but as the ſlighteſt accident ſuffices to depreſs a body already weakened by a dangerous illneſs, whilſt

(*a*) Pars, non id quod acciderat, per ſe æſtimare: ſed ut in affecto corpore quamvis levis cauſa magis, quàm valido gravior, ſentiretur; ita tum ægræ & affectæ civitati quodcumque adverſi inciderit, non rerum magnitudine, ſed viribus extenuatis, quæ nihil quod aggravaret pati poſſent, æſtimandum eſſe. *Liv.*

one

one in perfect health can reſiſt a much ruder ſhock; ſo they believed, that the defeat of this cavalry was not to be conſidered in itſelf, but according to the relation it had to the exhauſted ſtrength of the Commonwealth; which made it incapable of ſuſtaining the moſt inconſiderable blow. In ſo ſad a conjuncture they had recourſe to a remedy, which had not been employed a great while, and reſolved to create a Dictator. In the next volume we ſhall ſee upon whom the choice fell. A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217.

DIGRESSION

Upon the SATURNALIA.

THE SATURNALIA were a feaſt inſtituted in honour of Saturn. Fable, which has made a god of him, conceals the truth of his hiſtory under different fictions. Saturn is believed to have been a very powerful King. After various events, being conquered by his ſon Jupiter, who poſſeſſed himſelf of his throne, he retired to the court of Janus, King of the Aborigines in Italy, who gave him a good reception. (*a*) In conjunction with him, he governed that people, who were almoſt ſavage, civilized their manners, gave them laws, taught them to cultivate the earth, and invented the

(*a*) Italiæ cultores primi Aborigines fuere: quorum rex Saturnus tantæ juſtitiæ fuiſſe traditur, ut neque ſervierit ſub illo quiſquam, neque quicquam privatæ rei habuerit; ſed omnia communia, & indiviſa omnibus fuerint, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium eſſet. Ob cujus exempli memoriam cautum eſt, ut Saturnalibus exæquato omnium jure paſſim in conviviis ſervi cum dominis recumbant. *Juſtin.* xliii. 1.

ſickle,

ſickle, which was afterwards his ſymbol. The peace and plenty which they enjoyed during his reign, occaſioned thoſe happy times to be called *the Golden Age*; and it was to perpetuate the remembrance of it, that the feaſt of the Saturnalia was inſtituted.

The particular intent of this feaſt was to preſent the equality which prevailed in the time of Saturn amongſt men, who lived according to the laws of nature, without diverſity of conditions; ſlavery being introduced into the world only by violence and tyranny.

This feaſt began, as is believed, in the time of Janus, who ſurvived Saturn, and placed him in the number of the gods. It was originally only a popular ſolemnity. Tullus Hoſtilius gave this cuſtom in Rome the ſanction of the public authority, and raiſed it to the rank of a feſtival eſtabliſhed by law: at leaſt he made ſuch a vow. It appears, that this vow was not performed till the Conſulſhip of A. Sempronius and M. Minucius, in whoſe time a temple was dedicated to Saturn, which became the public treaſury of the Roman People, (*ærarium*) where the public money and acts were kept. At the ſame time the feaſt of the Saturnalia was inſtituted in all the forms. The celebration of them was probably diſcontinued afterwards, and reeſtabliſhed *in perpetuum*, in the ſecond Punic war, and the Conſulſhip of Servilius and Flaminius, as we have ſaid before.

Dion. Hal. iii. 175.

Liv. ii. 21.

Liv. xxii. 1.

They (*a*) were days of rejoicing, which were paſſed in feaſting. The Romans then laid aſide the Toga, and appeared in public in the Tunica, or dreſs uſed at table. They ſent each

(*a*) Hilara ſanè Saturnalia. *Cic. Epiſt. ad Attic.* v. 20.

other

other preſents, in the manner of new-year's gifts, which were called *Apophoreta*, and gave their name to the laſt book of Martial's epigrams. Games of chance, prohibited at other times, were then allowed. The Senate adjourned: the affairs of the bar were ſuſpended; and the ſchools were ſhut. It was thought a bad omen to begin a war, and to puniſh criminals, during a time ſacred to pleaſure.

The children proclaimed the feaſt, by running through the ſtreets the day before, and crying out *Io Saturnalia*. There are medals ſtill in being with thoſe words upon them. The ſevere raillery, which the famous Narciſſus, Claudius's freedman, ſuffered, is founded on thoſe Words. When that Emperor ſent him into the Gauls to appeaſe a ſedition, which had aroſe amongſt the troops, upon his aſcending the tribunal in order to harangue the army, the ſoldiers cried out *Io Saturnalia*, by way of implying, that it was the feaſt of the Saturnalia, when the ſlaves acted as maſters. Dio. lx. 677.

This feſtival continued only one day at firſt: but in proceſs of time it laſted three, then five, and at length ſeven, including the two days of a contiguous feſtival in it. It was celebrated in the month of December xiv. * Kal. Jan.

The moſt ſingular and remarkable of the cuſtoms obſerved during the Saturnalia, is that which relates to the ſlaves; and it is for that reaſon I have reſerved it for the end of this head. I have already obſerved, that this feaſt had

* *The xiv. Kal. Jan. in the year of Numa, when the month of December had only* 29 *days, was the* 17*th of December. After the Reformation of the calendar by Cæſar, which gave* 31 *days to that month, it was the nineteenth.*

been principally inſtituted to preſerve the remembrance of the primitive and natural equality, which ſubſiſted between all mankind. It (*a*) was for this reaſon, that the power of the maſters over the ſlaves was ſuſpended at that time. They made it a diverſion to change condition and dreſs with them. They gave them authority over the whole houſe, which obeyed them like a little Republic. They ordered them to be treated with the ſame reſpect and duty as themſelves. They not only admitted them to their tables, but, according to Athenæus, ſerved them there. To conclude, they gave them the liberty to ſay and do all they thought fit. This is the privilege, which Horace permitted his ſlave Davus to uſe, who deſired to tell him abundance of things, but was afraid of offending him. *Uſe*, ſays his maſter to him, *the liberty which the month of December gives thee.*

Athen. xiv. 639.

Sat. vii. l. 2.

Age: libertate Decembri
(Quando ita majores voluerunt) utere: narra.

The ſupreme power, which maſters had over their ſlaves, might eaſily degenerate into cruelty and tyranny. The cuſtom, of which we are ſpeaking, had been wiſely eſtabliſhed to make them remember, that (*b*) ſlaves were men as well as themſelves, and conſequently ought to be treated with humanity, and conſidered by their maſters as a kind of companions and friends

(*a*) Inſtituerunt diem feſtum, quo non ſolùm cum ſervis domini veſcerentur, ſed quo utique honores illis in domo gerere, jus dicere permiſerunt, & domum puſillam rempublicam eſſe judicaverunt. *Senec. Epiſt.* 47.

(*b*) Servi ſunt? imò homines. Servi ſunt? imò contubernales. Servi ſunt? imò humiles amici. *Senec. Ep.* 47.

of

of an inferior claſs. (*a*) It was for the ſame reaſon, that at Rome, in the ſolemnity moſt capable of inſpiring ſentiments of vanity and haughtineſs, I mean the triumph, wherein the victor, ſeated in his pompous chariot, exhibited himſelf as a ſpectacle to the whole people, care was taken to place a ſlave behind him, who put him in mind from time to time, to remember that he was a man.

Every body knows how cruelly the Lacedæmonians treated the Helots, who were their ſlaves. This was not the practice at Rome; and Plutarch gives a very natural and ſenſible reaſon for it. "At that time," ſpeaking of the infancy of the Commonwealth, "ſlaves were "uſed with abundance of humanity, their "maſters conſidering them rather as their com- "panions than their bondmen; becauſe they "worked, and lived with them in the coun- "try. For that reaſon they behaved with a "great deal of goodneſs to them, and af- "forded them a kind of freedom and familia- "rity, that very much ſoftened their condi- "tion." Plut. in Coriolan. p. 225.

Not to mention views of religion, maſters only gain by a mild and humane treatment of their ſervants. (*b*) Love ſerves with a quite different zeal and fidelity from fear. Seneca con-

(*a*) Hominem ſe eſſe etiam triumphans in ſublimiſſimo illo curru admonetur. Suggeritur enim à tergo: RESPICE POST TE. HOMINEM MEMENTO TE ETIAM. *Tertull. Apolog.* cap. 33.

Et ſibi Conſul
Ne placeat, ſurvus curru portatur eodem. *Juv.* Sat. X.

(*b*) Fidelius & gratius ſemper obſequium eſt, quod ab amore, quàm quod à metu proficiſcitur. *Hieron. ad Celantiam.*

gratulates one of his friends upon his kind and gentle uſage of his ſlaves; and exhorts him ſtrongly not to regard the (*a*) frivolous and unjuſt reproaches of thoſe, who diſlike his familiarizing himſelf with his ſervants, and his not making them ſenſible of his ſuperiority by the pride and inſolence of his behaviour.

Beſides this there were ſlaves at Rome of extraordinary merit, both for natural parts and the ſciences, for virtue and fidelity. (*b*) Slavery extends no farther than the body; the ſoul is not within its power. The body may be bought and ſold: but the ſoul is free and independant. This is ſo true, ſays Seneca, that we have neither a right to exact obedience from them, nor are they obliged to obey us, in all things. They are not to execute orders againſt the State, nor to perpetrate any crime at our bidding.

Mem. de l'Acad. des Belles Let. Tom III.

Part of what I have ſaid upon the Saturnalia is extracted from a brief memoir on the ſame ſubject, which is treated at large in Macrobius, and in the Dialoge of Lipſius upon that feſtival.

(*a*) Non eſt quòd faſtidioſi te deterreant, quo minùs ſervis tuis hilarem te præſtes, & non ſuperbè ſuperiorem. *Senec. Epiſt.* 47.

(*b*) Errat, ſi quis exiſtimat ſervitutem in totum hominem deſcendere: pars melior ejus excepta eſt. Corpora obnoxia ſunt, & aſcripta dominis: mens quidem ſui juris—Corpus itaque eſt, quod domino fortuna tradidit: hoc emit, hoc vendit. Interior illa pars mancipio dari non poteſt. Ab hac quicquid venit, liberum eſt. Non enim aut nos omnia jubere poſſumus, aut in omnia ſervi parere coguntur. Contra rempublicam imperata non facient; nulli ſceleri manus commodabunt. *Senec. de Benef.* iii. 20.

REFLEXION *upon the Vows made by the* ROMANS.

IT was not without reaſon, that the Roman People were extremely enraged, and alarmed, by the impious refuſal of the Conſul Flaminius to obſerve the religious ceremonies, enjoined the Conſuls, before they ſet out from Rome for the war. One of the moſt common of them was to make vows, and offer ſacrifices in the Capitol, in order to draw down the divine protection upon their arms. The Conſuls never took the field, till they had, previouſly to all things, diſcharged that duty; and no war was undertaken till that was firſt done. In the very war of which we have been ſpeaking, the (*a*) Prætor made vows, in the name and by the order of the Roman People, *in caſe the Commonwealth ſhould continue during ten years in the ſtate wherein it then actually was.* When the Roman People made war againſt Antiochus, they promiſed to cauſe the great Roman games in honour of Jupiter to be celebrated during ten days ſucceſſively, if that war was ſucceſsful. (*b*) The Generals often, in the very heat of battle, made vows when the army was in danger. For the time to (*c*) addreſs vows to the Divinity is when there is no reſource to be had from man. The Roman hiſtory abounds with facts of this kind. Liv. xxxvi 2.

(*a*) Prætor vota ſuſcipere juſſus, ſi in decem annos Reſpublica eodem ſtetiſſet ſtatu. *Liv.* xxi. 62.

(*b*) Bellona, ſi hodie nobis victoriam duis, aſt ego tibi templum voveo. *Liv.*

(*c*) Tum præcipue votorum locus erat, cùm ſpei nullus eſſet. *Plin.* viii. 16.

But the cuſtom of making vows was not peculiar to the Roman People. It is of all times and all nations, and conſequently is derived from revelation. For an univerſal cuſtom is a manifeſt proof of a general tradition come down from the firſt family, from which all mankind are deſcended. And not only States and Republics, but private perſons, have in all times made it a practice to make vows to God, in order to obtain from him even their temporal wants.

To conſult only the light of human reaſon, one might perhaps believe, that it is not treating the Divinity with ſufficient reſpect, to make him deſcend to ſuch inconſiderable particularities, as the care of ſupplying us with the things neceſſary to life; or of ſtipulating with him, that, if he will vouchſafe to take that care upon him, we on our ſide will diſcharge certain duties, to which we oblige ourſelves only on that condition. But thoſe who judge in this manner of vows, are in an error.

God, by this means, has thought fit to preſerve in the minds of all the people of the earth, a clear idea of his Providence; of the care which he takes of all men in particular; of the ſupreme authority which he reſerves to himſelf over all the events of their lives; of his entire liberty to ſubſtitute nature and all things to his will; and of his attention to thoſe who call upon him, and have recourſe to him in their need.

The Pagans have acknowledged this truth. Seneca, in refuting Epicurus, who pretended, that the Divinity did not interfere in any kind of human affairs, employs the common opinion and univerſal cuſtom of mankind in this point, as an

Senec. de Benef. iv. 4.

an invincible argument againſt him. (*a*) To think as Epicurus does, ſays he, one muſt be ignorant that in all places, in all times, amongſt all nations, men have lifted up their ſuppliant hands, and made vows to heaven, for the attainment of its graces. Would they act in this manner, would they all be ſo ſtupid and extravagant to addreſs their prayers and vows to a Divinity, whom they believed deaf and impotent? And is not this general concurrence a certain proof of their internal conviction, that God both hears and grants their requeſts?

DIGRESSION.

Upon the PUBLICANS.

AS the Publicans will be ſpoken of in the next volume, I think myſelf obliged to give the reader ſome ſlight idea of them. I ſhall reduce what I have to ſay upon this head to two articles. In the firſt, I ſhall treat of the revenues of the Roman People; in the ſecond, of the Publicans, who were the farmers or receivers of thoſe revenues.

(*a*) Hoc qui dicit, non exaudit precantium voces, & undique ſublatis in cœlum manibus vota facientium privata ac publica. Quod profectò non fieret, nec in hunc furorem omnes mortales conſenſiſſent, alloquendi ſurda numina & inefficaces deos: niſi noſſent illorum beneficia nunc ultro oblata, nunc orantibus data.

ARTICLE I.

Of the Revenues of the Roman People.

THE revenues of the Roman People conſiſted principally in two kinds of impoſts, which were raiſed either upon the citizens, or the allies of the empire: *Tributum* and *Vectigal*. I ſhall call them *Taxes* and *Tributes*, though perhaps thoſe words do not exactly render the Latin terms. We ſhall ſee their difference in the ſequel.

SECT. I.

Of the Taxes.

THE tax, *Tributum*, was a perſonal contribution, which Princes or Commonwealths raiſed upon their ſubjects to ſupport the expences of the State.

The tax at firſt was paid Rome equally and by the head, without diſtinction either of eſtate or condition. Servius Tullius, the ſixth King of the Romans, aboliſhed this cuſtom, and regulated the contributions by the eſtates of every particular; as we have ſhewn in ſpeaking of the inſtitution of the *Cenſus*. They were not conſiderable at firſt. But when Rome began to give the ſoldiers pay, who till then had ſerved at their own expence, the contributions perpetually augmented with the occaſions of the State. They were of two kinds: the one ordinary and fixed; the other extraordinary, which were raiſed only in the emergencies of the Commonwealth; as happened the 538th year of Rome in

Liv. xxiv. 11.

in the Conſulſhip of Q. Fabius Maximus and M. Claudius Marcellus, when particulars were taxed a certain ſum according to their eſtates, for equipping a fleet, and ſupplying it with mariners.

Theſe taxes continued to be raiſed upon private perſons, till the 586th year of Rome. Paulus Æmilius at that time cauſed ſuch conſiderable ſums of gold and ſilver to be carried into the public treaſury, of the ſpoils taken from Perſeus, the laſt King of Macedonia, that the Commonwealth was in a condition entirely to take off all taxes from the citizens; and they enjoyed that exemption, till the year after the death of Julius Cæſar. Cic. de Offic. ii. 76.

I cannot forbear inſerting in this place a circumſtance, which Cicero adds to what I have juſt been ſaying of Paulus Æmilius, and which is highly for his honour. After having related, that he cauſed immenſe ſums to be carried into the public treaſury: "As to himſelf, ſays he, he carried nothing into his own houſe, except immortal glory. *At hic nihil domum ſuam præter memoriam nominis immortalem detulit.* How noble and entraordinary was ſuch diſintereſtedneſs!

SECT.

SECT. II.

Of the Tributes or Impoſts.

SO I call what the Romans term *vectigalia.* Theſe revenues in the early times of the Commonwealth were of three ſorts, and were raiſed either upon lands; paſturages belonging to the Commonwealth; or cuſtoms for the importation or exportation of merchandize: theſe were called *Decumæ, Scriptura, Portorium.*

DECUMÆ, or *Decimæ.* When the Romans had conquered a people, either in or out of Italy, they deprived them of part of their territory, part of which they diſtributed amongſt citizens who ſettled there as a colony, and reſerved the property of the reſt to the State, which they farmed to particulars, upon condition of paying a tenth of the profits of ſuch lands to the Roman People.

The tenths were not raiſed in the ſame manner in all the provinces. From ſome a certain quantity of grain, or fixed ſum of money, was exacted, as in Spain, and Africa; and this impoſt was called *Vectigal certum*; becauſe it was always the ſame, whether the year were good or bad, or the lands produced much or little. Other provinces, as Aſia, were treated more favourably, and paid only the tenth preciſely; ſo that the Roman People ſhared in the miſfortune of barren years. Sicily was treated in the ſame manner, and with ſtill greater favour.

In Ver. iii. 12.

Corn was brought from Sicily (as alſo from the other provinces) under three denominations; which corn, according to thoſe three differences,

differences, was called either *decumanum*, *emptum*, or *æſtimatum*.

Frumentum Decumanum, was the tenth of the corn produced by each huſbandman's lands, with which he was obliged to ſupply the Roman People *gratis*.

Emptum was the corn which the Roman People bought for the occaſions of the State, on which they ſet the price themſelves.

Æſtimatum was the corn conſumed in the Prætor's houſe, with which the province was obliged to ſupply him. He ſometimes received it in money, and fixed the value on it himſelf.

The tenths of wine, oil, and the lower ſpecies of grain were alſo paid. Cic. 5. in Ver.

SCRIPTURA. This was the revenue which the Roman People raiſed upon the paſture-lands, of which the property was in the Commonwealth, and which was farmed to particulars. It was ſo called, becauſe the number of cattle, which particulars were to put into thoſe paſturages, were regiſtered, and it was by that number the yearly ſums they engaged to pay were regulated.

PORTORIUM. The duties laid upon merchandize brought through the gates of cities, and into ſea-ports, or carried out of them, were ſo called.

There was alſo another impoſt diſtinct from the foregoing, which was called *viceſima manumiſſorum*: this was the twentieth of the value at which each ſlave made free was eſtimated, and which was carried into the public treaſury. It was eſtabliſhed by the Conſul Cn. Manlius in the camp; a thing unprecedented. The Senate, however, paſſed that law, becauſe that impoſt brought in a great revenue to the Commonwealth, Liv. vii. 16.

monwealth. (*a*) Cicero obſerves, that it ſtill ſubſiſted in his time, even after all Italy was exempt from taxes and duties. The Emperor Caligula doubled that duty one half.

Dio. in Exc. lxxii.

The Romans had alſo a revenue from the making and ſale of ſalt. This tax is what the French now called *la Gabelle*. The King Ancus Marcius was the firſt who eſtabliſhed ſalt-works. Thoſe who farmed them, ſelling the ſalt too dear, the duty was taken out of their hands; and to eaſe the people, they were afterwards uſed in the name of the public by commiſſioners, who rendered an account of their adminiſtration. This was in the year of Rome 246.

Liv. i. 33.

Liv. ii. 9.

This change was made for the advantage of the people, and ſalt, during more than three hundred years, continued exempt from all duties. In the 548th year of Rome, a tax was laid upon it for the firſt time in the Cenſorſhip of M. Livius and C. Claudius. The price of ſalt had been till then at Rome and throughout Italy, the ſixth part of the *As*, which is not quite ſo much as the ſixth of our penny: *Sextante ſal & Romæ, & per totam Italiam erat.* Livy does not explain what quantity of ſalt was ſignified by the word *ſal*: it is to be underſtood of his own times. Livius is believed to have been the author of this impoſt, and to have inſtituted it by way of revenge upon the people for the unjuſt judgment they had formerly paſſed againſt him; and for that reaſon he was ſurnamed *Salinator*. We do not find in any author to what this duty amounted.

Liv. xxix. 37.

(*a*) Portoriis Italiæ ſublatis——quod vectigal ſupereſt domeſticum, præter viceſimam. *Ep. ad Att.* ii. 16.

The

The mines of iron, ſilver and gold, were in proceſs of time a very great revenue to the Romans. Polybius, as cited by Strabo, tells us, that in his time there were forty thouſand men employed in the mines in the neighbourhood of Carthagena; and that they every day produced the Roman People five and twenty thouſand drachmas, that is about ſix hundred pounds. Strab. iii. 247.

The public treaſury of Rome was conſiderably enriched by the ſpoils brought into it by the Generals at their return from their victories, eſpecially when they were as diſintereſted as Paulus Æmilius, of whom we have ſpoken before.

It is a misfortune, that antient authors have left us no particular detail either of the amount of the ſeveral taxes and tributes paid to the Romans, or of the groſs of the revenues of the State. They were undoubtedly very moderate in the beginning: but towards the end of the Commonwealth, they had augmented in proportion to its conqueſts and dominions. Appian, in an expreſs work, treated all that related to the forces, revenues, and expences of the Empire: but that book is loſt, with the greateſt part of his hiſtory.

Plutarch tells us, that Pompey, in his triumph over Mithridates, cauſed inſcriptions in great characters to be carried, wherein was read, that till then the public revenues had amounted annually to only five thouſand myriads, or fifty millions of Attic drachmas, that is to ſay, to about one million two hundred thouſand pounds; and that from his conqueſts the Romans had augmented their revenue eight thouſand five hundred myriads, or fourſcore and five millions of drachmas, that is to ſay, about two millions one hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. Theſe Plut. in Pomp.

two

two ſums added together, made about three millions three hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. Aſia only is here in queſtion. The conqueſt of the Gauls, and that of Egypt, farther augmented the revenues of the Roman People. The tribute impoſed by Cæſar upon the Gauls, according to Suetonius and Eutropius, amounted to ten millions of drachmas, or about two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling. And, according to Velleius Paterculus, Egypt paid almoſt as much as Gaul.

Suet. in Cæſ. xxv. Eutrop. l. vi.

Vell. Pat. ii. 39.

After having ſpoken of the revenues of the Roman People, it is neceſſary to add ſomething in reſpect to thoſe who were appointed to collect them.

ARTICLE II.

Of the PUBLICANS.

THOSE, who collected the public revenues, were ſo called, and were much the ſame as the *Fermiers Generaux*, Receivers-general, in France. The Roman Knights uſually exerciſed this function. The order of Knights were in great conſideration at Rome, and a kind of middle rank between the Senators and the People. Their inſtitution was as early as Romulus. They did not attain the great offices, nor enter the Senate, as long as they continued in the order of Knights: which made them the more capable of employing themſelves in collecting the revenues of the Roman People.

They conſiſted of ſeveral different ſocieties, into which three ſorts of perſons were admitted: *Mancipes*, or *Redemptores*, who took the farms in their names; *Prædes*, thoſe who were ſecurity

curity for them; *Socii*, Aſſociates, who entered into a kind of partnerſhip with the reſt, and divided the loſſes and gains with them.

The farms of the public revenues, whether of Italy or the provinces, could be conſigned only at Rome, and in the preſence of the People: and this was done by the Cenſors.

When any difficulty aroſe, either in reſpect to the diminution or cancelling a leaſe, or any thing of the like nature, the affair was referred to the Senate, who decided ſupremely in ſuch caſe. For theſe farmers ran great riſks. Cicero, in his fine diſcourſe to the People, to induce them to give Pompey the command of the war againſt Mithridates, repreſents in a very lively manner the extreme danger, to which that war expoſed thoſe, who collected the public revenues in Aſia. (*a*) That province excelled all the reſt of the empire, as well for the fertility of the countries, and variety of their productions, as the extent of its paſtures, and multiplicity of merchandizes exported from thence to other places. Now the rumour only of war, and the neighbourhood of an enemy's troops, ruins an whole country, even before they have made any irruption into it; becauſe at that time the care of breeding cattle, and the cultivation of lands, are abandoned; and commerce by ſea entirely interrupted. Thus all the ſources, from

(*a*) Aſia tam optima eſt & fertilis, ut & ubertate agrorum, & varietate fructuum, & magnitudine paſſionum, & multitudine earum rerum quæ exportantur, facile omnibus terris antecellat —— Pecora relinquuntur, agricultura deſeritur, mercatorum navigatio conquieſcit. Ita neque ex portu, neque ex decumis, neque ex ſcriptura vectigal conſervari poteſt. Quare ſæpe totius anni fructus uno rumore periculi, atque uno belli terrore, amittitur. *Pro. Leg. Manil.* 14, 15.

which

which the product of the farms is derived, being ſtopt and dried up, the farmers are incapable of performing their engagements, and of paying the ſums agreed on for their leaſes.

Cicero inſiſts much upon this inconvenience, and ſpeaks of the farmers-general in a manner, that ſhews the exceeding conſideration he had for them. "If (*a*) we have always believed, "ſays he, that the revenues ariſing from taxes "and impoſts, are the nerves of the Common-"wealth, we ought to conſider the Order, that "takes upon itſelf the care of raiſing them, as "the ſupport of all the other bodies of the "State." Cicero uſes the ſame language every where in his diſcourſes. And indeed they did the Commonwealth great ſervice, and were often its reſource in calamitous times, and on preſſing occaſions. Livy relates, (as we ſhall after him) that after the battle of Cannæ, the Prætor Fulvius, having repreſented the incapacity of Rome either to ſend the proviſions and cloathing, that were abſolutely neceſſary, to Spain, (*b*) exhorted the people of buſineſs, who had augmented their fortunes by the farms, to aſſiſt the Commonwealth which had enriched them, by making advances for its ſervice, that ſhould be punctually reimburſed. And this they did with a readineſs and joy, that argued their zeal for the public good.

It was not deemed criminal in them to have acquired riches by collecting the public reve-

(*a*) Si vectigalia nervos eſſe Reip. Semper duximus, eum certé ordinem qui exercet illa, firmamentum ceterorum ordinum rectè eſſe dicemus. *Ibid.*

(*b*) Cohortandus, qui redempturis auxiſſent patrimonia, ut reipublicæ, ex qua creviſſent, tempus commodarent. *Liv.* xxxiii. 48.

nues.

nues. Nothing is more juſt and legal than ſuch gains when moderate; and they ſeem to have been thought ſo in reſpect to the perſons, of whom we are now ſpeaking; as they are only ſaid to have augmented their patrimony, *qui redempturis auxiſſent patrimonia.* The profeſſion therefore of buſineſs, far from being reproachable in itſelf, ought to be conſidered as abſolutely neceſſary to a State. Princes, to ſupport the charges of it; to defend it againſt enemies abroad, and to maintain tranquility at home, are obliged to lay taxes and impoſts upon their ſubjects. A Roman Emperor ſeemed to deſign to aboliſh them entirely, and to make ſo glorious a preſent to mankind: *Idque pulcherrimum donum generi mortalium faceret.* The Senate, in praiſing ſo generous a thought, repreſented to him, that putting it in execution, would be to ruin the empire. It is againſt their will, that princes find themſelves reduced to this ſad neceſſity, with which not being able to diſpenſe, their intention is, that, both in the impoſing and levying of taxes, their ſubjects ſhould be treated with all poſſible humanity; and they readily agree in their ſentiments with a King of Perſia, who anſwered a Governor of a province, that thought to make his court to him by augmenting the impoſts, *that he was for ſhearing, and not for flaying, his ſheep.*

Tacit. Ann. xiii. 50.

The misfortune is, that the intention of Princes is not always followed; and that thoſe to whom they confide their authority, ſometimes abuſe it in a ſtrange manner. And this often rendered the name of Publican odious. Cicero, who declares ſo much in their favour, confeſſes "that "Italy and the provinces reſounded with com-

Ep. 1. ad Quinct. Frat.

" plaints againſt them; (*a*) and that it was leſs " upon the account of the impoſts, than their " cruel and unjuſt manner of exacting them." It is in his fine letter to his brother Quintius, who had then the government of Aſia, that he explains himſelf thus; a letter, which is a maſterpiece, and which all governors and miniſters ought always to have before their eyes. " He " tells his brother, that he will find the publi- " cans a great obſtacle to the protection he de- " ſigns to afford, and the good he deſires to " do, the people of his province. He exhorts " him to act with all poſſible reſerve in reſpect " to an order of perſons, to whom his brother " and himſelf have very great obligations; but " ſo however, that the publick good may not " ſuffer by it." *For, adds he,* (*b*) *if you have a blind complacency for them in all things, that will be the means to ruin inevitably thoſe whom the Roman People have confided to your care, that you might not only be vigilant for their ſafety and the preſervation of their lives, but for the intereſts of them all, and that you might procure them all the advantages that depend on you. To judge rightly of things, this is the only difficulty you will find in the government of your province.*

The wiſe advice which Cicero gives his brother in a letter, wherein he opens his heart freely to him, ſhews, what his real thoughts were of the publicans, and detracts very much from the

(*a*) Non tam de portorio, quàm de nonnullis portitorum injuriis querebantur.

(*b*) Sin autem omnibus in rebus obſequemur, funditus, eos perire patiemur, quorum non modò ſaluti, ſed etiam commodis conſulere debemus. Hæc eſt una (ſi verè cogitare volumus) in toto imperio tuo difficultas.

praiſes

praiſes he gives them in the public diſcourſes, wherein he talks as an orator.

Accordingly we ſhall be obliged, in the ſequel of this hiſtory, to relate ſeveral facts not much for their honour: and ſome of the greateſt men of the Commonwealth have recommended themſelves by nothing more, than their reſolution and vigilance in redreſſing the grievances, which the publicans made the ſubjects of the Empire ſuffer. Amongſt others, Q. Mutius Scævola had been charged with the government of Aſia in the quality of Prætor. When he arrived in his province, nothing was heard but the cry of the whole people againſt the unjuſt exactions and inhuman cruelty of the publicans. He found, upon a ſerious examination into them, that theſe complaints were only too well founded, and that his predeceſſors, either to curry favour with the order of Knights, which was very powerful then at Rome, or to inrich themſelves, had entirely given the reins to the inſatiable avidity of the men of buſineſs. He believed ſuch notorious rapine could only be put a ſtop to, by an example of ſeverity capable of ſpreading terror amongſt them, and hanged one of the principal commiſſioners, that preſided in collecting the public revenues. Is a robber upon the highway more criminal than a man, who abuſes the authority confided to him, to plunder and ruin nations?

Diod. in Excerpt. Valeſ. p. 394.

Often indeed it was not the publicans themſelves, who committed theſe rapines, and had the advantages of theſe thefts, but their ſubſtitutes: but this excuſe, admitting it to be true, did not juſtify them. They might be told

with Cicero, (*a*) *Your confederates were your hands; your deputies, officers, clerks, kindred, friends, dependants, all were your hands. You are reſponſible for their conduct to the citizens, allies, and the Commonwealth. Their crimes are yours. If we would be deemed innocent, we muſt not only abſtain from crimes ourſelves, but reſtrain all in office under us from committing them.*

This is the rule? But where is it obſerved?

(*a*) Comites illi tui dilecti, manus erant tuæ: præfecti, ſcribæ, accenſi, præcones, manus erant tuæ: ut quiſque te maximè cognatione, affinitate, neceſſitudine aliqua attingebat, ita maximè manus tua putabatur——Si enim innocentes exiſtimari volumus, non ſolum nos abſtinentes, ſed etiam noſtros comites præſtare debemus. *Ver.* iii. n. 27, 28.

Circumſpiciendum eſt diligenter, ut in hac cuſtodia provinciæ non te unum, ſed omnes miniſtros imperii tui ſociis, & civibus, & reipublicæ præſtare videare. *Cic. Epiſt.* 1. *ad Quint. Frat.*

DIGRESSION

Upon the habits of the ROMANS.

BEFORE I ſpeak of the habits of the Romans, I ought to obſerve, that there is hardly any ſubject either more confuſed, or upon which authors leſs agree, than this. I ſhall not take upon me either to refute, or reconcile them. The end I propoſe is to relate, as briefly as poſſible, what ſhall appear moſt probable to myſelf, and moſt uſeful to my readers.

Habits of the Men.

The TOGA was, properly ſpeaking, the habit of the Romans.

Romanos rerum Dominos, gentemque togatam.
Virg.

It was ſo peculiarly an habit of peace, that peace was expreſſed by the word *Toga*.

Cedant arma togæ.

The *Toga* was a kind of very ample cloak, and according to the moſt received opinion, quite open before. It was uſually made faſt upon the left ſhoulder, ſo that the right ſhoulder and arm of the ſame ſide were entirely at liberty. As it was of an extraordinary breadth, to prevent it from trailing upon the ground, it was wrapt round the body, folded ſeveral ways, and the ends gathered in broad plaits, and carried upon the arm. Quintilian (Book XI.

Chap. 3.) explains with great extent in what manner the orator ſhould hold his robe in pleading. (*a*) Hortenſius, that famous orator, who was curious to exceſs in reſpect to the elegance and gracefulneſs of his dreſs, looked in a glaſs, to examine whether the whole was well diſpoſed, and took no leſs care in adjuſting the folds of his Toga, than in turning the periods of his diſcourſe. How often is there ſomething of little, even in the greateſt men! *Quantum eſt in rebus inane.*

In antient marbles and monuments this habit ſeems to have much grandeur and dignity, but it could not have been very commodious. The *Toga* was of a very light ſtuff, white, and uſually of wool. They quitted it when in mourning, and in times of public calamity, to wear black.

The meaſure of the *Toga* was not fixed, but according to the fortune or pride of the wearer. Horace repreſents a rich man recommending ſeriouſly to one of a very ſmall income, not to pretend to vye with him in the magnitude of his *Toga.*

——————*Meæ, contendere noli*
Stultitiam patiuntur opes: tibi parvula res eſt.
Arcta decet, ſanum comitem toga.

In another place he deſcribes the public indignation for a rich man of no birth, who proud

(*a*) Hortenſius——in præcinctu ponens omnem decorem, fuit veſtitu ad mundiciem curioſo, & ut bene amictus iret, faciem in ſpeculo ponebat, ubi ſe intuens, togam corpori ſic applicabat, ut, &c. *Macrob.* ii. 9.

of

of his great eſtate and credit, ſwept the ſtreets of Rome with a *Toga* ſix ells wide.

Vides ne Sacrum metiente te viam
Cum bis ter ulnarum toga,
Ut ora vertat huc & huc euntium
Liberrima indignatio. *Epod.* 4.

Seeſt thou, when with ſix ells of gown
You ſweep the Mall, how many frown,
How each that views thee, ſcrews his face
And juſtly ſcorns thee for an aſs. CREECH.

The TUNICA was common to the Greeks and Romans: but amongſt the Greeks, it had pretty cloſe ſleeves; and amongſt the Romans wide ones extremely ſhort, which did not reach to the elbow. It came down to the knees or ſomething lower. The *Tunica* had no opening before. As it was wide enough, it was kept cloſe with a girdle or ſaſh. It was a diſgrace amongſt the Romans to appear in public looſe and without a girdle, *diſcinctus ut nepos*; or with a (*a*) tunic, that reached down to the heels, *cum tunica talari*; and in one that had ſleeves which reached to the hands, *Et tunicæ manicas & habent redimicula mitræ.* Cæſar wore a *Latus-clavus*, that had ſleeves to the wriſts with fringes to them, and with a ſaſh only over his *Latus-clavus*, leaving it looſe and ill faſtened on. (*b*) This gave occaſion for Sylla's ſaying, which Horat. Cic. Virg. Suet. in. Cæſ. c. 45.

(*a*) Talares ac manicatas tunicas habere, ollm apud Romanus flagitium. *S. Aug. de Doctr. Chriſt.*

(*b*) Unde emanavit Sullæ dictum, optimates ſæpius admonentis, ut malè precinctum puerum caverent. *Sylla then very old, treated Cæſar as a child.*

he often repeated to the favourers of ariſtocracy: *Beware of the boy with the looſe girdle.* Silla's thought was, that under that outſide of ſoftneſs and effeminacy lay hid unbounded ambition, and a genius formed for cabal and faction.

The Tunica was worn immediately under the *Toga*. Only the common people appeared abroad in Rome in the tunic; from whence Horace calls them *tunicatus*. In the country and the municipal cities, perſons of the greateſt condition wore only this habit.

Beſides this external tunic many wore another next the ſkin. This was called *intercula*, *ſubucula*, or *induſium*: for thoſe three words ſignify almoſt the ſame thing. This internal tunic was made of wool: flax was not yet applied to that uſe; and that made bathing abſolutely neceſſary to the cleanlineſs and health of the body.

We ſee here then three things commonly and almoſt generally worn by the Romans: *the ſhirt*, ſo I call *induſium*; the *tunic*, and the *toga*. They had other Habits, according to the difference of age, rank and condition.

PRÆTEXTA. This was a kind of Toga given to the young Romans of quality, when they were turned of fourteen. It was ſo called, from being edged, and in a manner ſtriped with purple. They quitted it for the *Toga virilis*, or robe of manhood, at ſixteen or ſeventeen years; for opinions differ.

Macrob. i. 6. Every body knows the hiſtory of young Papirius Prætextatus. He had been preſent, as the ſon of a Senator, according to the cuſtom of thoſe times, at a deliberation of the Senate, which had continued a great while. His mo-

ther

ther earneſtly preſſed him to tell her the ſubject of it. But the ſon's refuſal ſerved only to increaſe the mother's curioſity. At length, as if overcome by her inſtances, he told her that the Senate had deliberated, whether it would be moſt advantagious to give two wives to one husband, or two husbands to one wife; and that the affair would not be determined, till the next day. He concluded with deſiring her in the ſtrongeſt terms to keep it a ſecret. The whole city had it immediately. The next day the ladies in a great alarm came in a body to the Senate; who only laughed at the ingenious fiction of the young man, and for the future prohibited the admittance of young perſons to their deliberations, except Papirius, to whom that diſtinction was granted, to reward his fidelity in keeping a ſecret at an age, whilſt he ſtill wore the Prætexta; and that gave him the ſurname of *Prætextatus*.

The BULLA may be placed here, though it was not an habit. The *Bullæ* were ornaments antiently given to children of quality; but the uſe of them became more common in proceſs of time. They were uſually of gold, moſt frequently in the form of au heart, or round; they hung at the breaſt, and were hollow, in order, ſays Macrobius, that preſervatives againſt envy might be put in them.

The *Prætexta* was alſo the robe of the magiſtrates, as well at Rome as in the colonies and municipal cities.

The ROBE OF MANHOOD, TOGA VIRILIS. This is that deſcribed firſt. It was alſo called *Toga pura*, becauſe it had no purple in it. *Ego meo Ciceroni Arpini——puram togam dedi.*

To

To put on this robe gave the youth great joy, becauſe they then began to be men for themſelves, to enter into affairs, to ſhew themſelves at the bar if they thought fit; for as long as they wore the *Prætexta*, they were not permitted to appear there.

The LATUS-CLAVUS. This was the ornament of an habit, which gave its name to the habit itſelf. It is agreed it conſiſted of pieces of purple inſerted into the tunic: but ſome affirm, that they were of a round form, like the head of a nail; and others, that they were long pieces in the form of a nail itſelf. However that were, the tunic, in which theſe pieces were largeſt, were peculiar to the Senators: in that of the Knights they were leſs, for which reaſon it was called *Auguſtus-clavus*.

TRABEA. It was alſo a robe of honour, uſed at firſt by the Kings, and afterwards by the Conſuls. The augurs alſo wore it. It was a kind of *Toga*, or at leaſt ſerved inſtead of it. This habit was of purple. Aldus Manutius ſays, that it was a military habit, worn by the Conſuls during war. The Knights alſo uſed it at their general review on the 15th of July.

The CHLAMYS, and PALUDAMENTUM, are often enough confounded by authors. It was a military habit, open, worn over the tunic, faſtened with a claſp, and uſually upon the left ſhoulder to leave the right arm at liberty. The Conſul and Generals, before they ſet out for the field, went to the Capitol dreſt in this robe, in order to pray and make vows to the gods, and quitted it at his return, when he entered the city back in the *Toga*.

The

The SAGUM was a caſſock worn in the army by officers as well as private men: but the Sagum of the former was of a finer kind of ſtuff than that of the latter. It was originally an habit from the Gauls, from whom the Romans had learnt the uſe of it.

We often find in Livy the *Togæ* and *Tunicæ*, mentioned amongſt the cloathing ſent to the army. The latter were uſed there in all times, and by all in the ſervice: but the Togæ were only for the officers; and they uſed them only within the camp, at a time of reſt, and not in action.

The CINCTUS GABINUS is only a certain manner of wearing the Toga, a part of which was brought under the right arm to form a kind of girt or binding round the body.

The Romans uſually went bare-headed: ſtatues and marbles almoſt always repreſent them ſo. When either the ceremony of a ſacrifice, the ſun, rain, or cold weather obliged them to cover their heads, they made themſelves a kind of cap of the corner of their Toga; as we ſee in ſome marbles. They had however ſeveral kinds of hats, to defend them from the injuries of the weather, of which they made little uſe.

The CUCULLUS, was a kind of cowl like that of the monks. It was uſually faſtened to the *Lacerna*, a kind of ſurtout or riding coat, uſed by the ſoldiers, and inhabitants of the country.

The PILEUS, the form of which was not unlike our night-caps. It was given to ſlaves, when they were made free, by their maſters.

The PETASUS. It was uſed by travellers. The Petaſus uſually had brims, but narrower than thoſe of our hats. It muſt be owned, that ours are infinitely more commodious for keeping off the ſun and rain. The Turks however, and all the nations of the Eaſt, ſtill retain their turbants.

The dreſs of the leg is one of the moſt obſcure things relating to their habits; and upon which authors give us leaſt light, as Father Montfaucon owns, who has been of great uſe to me in this digreſſion.

This dreſs of the legs may be divided into two kinds. Thoſe which covered the foot entirely, like our ſhoes; *calceus*, &c: and thoſe which were formed of one or more ſoals under the foot, and ſtrings or ribands which bound the naked foot in ſuch a manner at top, that part of it remained uncovered; this is not much unlike what we call ſandals: *caliga*, *ſolea*, *crepida*, *ſandalium*. The difference between theſe ſeveral kinds of ſandals is little known. Some of them went no farther than the ancle: others higher, and ſometimes as far as the middle of the leg. The *caliga* was a kind of boot worn by the ſoldiery.

The *Ocreæ* were alſo a kind of little boots, which covered part of the legs.

Habits of the Women.

The women, as well as the men, had three garments one over the other.

The INDUSIUM was next the ſkin, and ſerved as a ſhift.

The STOLA, was the ſame thing as the *Tunica* of the men, except in being longer, and reaching down to the heels. It had ſleeves to the elbow, whereas thoſe of the Tunica were very ſhort.

The PALLA, *pallium*, *amiculum*, or *peplum*, was the outward habit of the women, which anſwered to the Toga of the men. It is difficult to diſtinguiſh the different ſignification of thoſe names.

It is not expected from me that I ſhould enumerate in this place the different ornaments uſed by the women in their dreſs, in which they have been very curious in all ages and nations, as St. Jerom has thought proper to obſerve, in giving the ſex the epithet of φιλόκοσμον, *lovers of ornaments*. Neither ſhall I expatiate upon their head-dreſſes, which in all times have been ſubject to abundance of variations: for in thoſe times the *Mode* changed at leaſt as often as in theſe. And indeed, how ſhould I be able to deſcribe the head-dreſſes, which are extant upon marbles, wherein the hair riſes before, like a top-knot, in five or ſix rows of curls, and the whole is reared like different ſtories, to the height of half a foot above the forehead; and wherein the hair, on the back of the head, is made into treſſes, or braided in large braids, interwove with

with each other, and diſpoſed with amazing artifice.

Tot premit ordinibus, tot jam compagibus altum
Ædificat caput. *Juvenal.*

With curls on curls they build her head before,
And mount it in a formidable tow'r.

DRYDEN.

One can hardly believe, ſays Father Montfaucon, that one woman's hair could form ſo many braids behind, and ſo many curls before: perhaps falſe hair was uſed in this kind of headdreſs.

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